


















This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 2000. 
 





The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
THE TELEVISION POLICIES OF THE 
BRITISH LABOUR PARTY: 1951-2000 
DES FREEDMAN 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
October 2000 
UNIVERSITY OF WES11AINSTER 
HARROW LEARNING RESOURCES CENTRE 
Contents 
Abstract 3 
Declaration and acknowledgements 5 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter Two: 1951-1964 38 
Chapter Three: 1964-1970 79 
Chapter Four: 1970-1979 121 
Chapter Five: 1979-1992 171 
Chapter Six: 1992-2000 220 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 268 
Chapter Eight: Sources 279 
2 
Abstract 
This thesis provides an extended analysis of the television policies of the British 
Labour Party from 1951 up to the present day. It examines the evolution of Labour's 
television policy and focuses on the social, political and economic contexts in which 
policies were developed, the party forums in which policies were discussed and the 
consequences of these policies for British television as a whole. It evaluates the 
contrasting contributions to television policy made by the parliamentary leadership, 
the Labour left, the trade unions, and intellectuals sympathetic to the party. 
Although the Conservatives have been widely acknowledged to be responsible for 
the majority of innovations in British television, the thesis refutes the view that this is 
due to any lack of interest in television policy inside the Labour Party. Drawing on 
extensive archive material and interviews with key participants, it argues that the 
Labour Party has intervened in all the main debates concerning British broadcasting 
and has produced a wide range of proposals for the reform, modemisation and 
consolidation of television structures in the UK. 
The thesis examines the party's response to the development of commercial 
television in the 1950s and to the Pilkington Report in the early 1960s. It assesses 
the impact on television policy of the Labour governments in the 1960s and 
highlights the contribution of left-wing demands for television reform in the 1970s. 
The thesis then considers the government's response to the Annan Report at the end 
of the 1970s and analyses how the party responded to the Conservative government's 
reform of television in the following decade. The thesis concludes with an 
evaluation of the role of television in the emergence of New Labour and provides a 
critique of the current Labour government's record concerning television 
developments. 
The thesis suggests that divisions between rival interests in the Labour Party have 
undermined the possibility of a unified television policy. The result of these 
divisions has been that the leadership has marginalised innovative proposals for 
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refonn in favour of policies that have safeguarded the existing structures of and 
power relations in television. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Aims of the Thesis 
The current New Labour government has been extremely active in the field of 
communications policy. It has embraced the possibilities of digital and broadband 
technologies for use by business, education, government and consumers and is 
currently preparing legislation to modernise the UK's regulatory framework to adapt 
to and facilitate the convergence of broadcasting, IT and telecommunications. This 
activity appears to stand in stark contrast to the Labour Party's former indifference or 
hostility towards innovations in the field of electronic media. With the exception of 
the Open University, the party has not been directly associated with any of the major 
developments in communications - the launch of ITV, BBC2 and Channels Four and 
Five, the development of commercial radio and the go-ahead for cable, satellite and 
digital systems - which have all occurred under Conservative administrations. 
This is partly due to the fact that the Conservatives have been in government for 35 
of the last 50 years but it has also been argued that Labour has traditionally been less 
interested in transforming the institutions of the British media. Back in 1968, a 
Guardian editorial reflected on the lack of debate on communications policy at 
Labour's annual conference: 'The subject [of communications] is one on which the 
Government has no ideas and the party only wishful thoughts' (Guardian, 1968). 
The trade unionist and future Labour MP, Denis MacShane, wrote in 1987 that, 
although the party did by now have resolutions routinely passed at conference, 'the 
Labour Party still has no agreed policy on the media' (MacShane, 1987: 218). In 
James Curran and Jean Seaton's influential history of UK media, Curran argues that 
Labour's instinct is 'to slap a preservation order on the broadcasting system as it now 
is even on the eve of digital TV. In this sense, it is more conservative with a small 
"c" than the Conservative Party' (in Curran and Seaton, 1997: 355). 
While these quotes are, of course, highly selective, they nevertheless express a 
widely-held conception that Labour has tended to defend the status quo when it 
comes to communications policy. Labour supporters have provided a number of 
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explanations for their party's apparent lack of innovative or proactive policy on the 
media. Mulgan and Worpole attribute it to the economism of its trade union 
supporters and argue that 'Labour Party puritanism has failed to understand exactly 
how liberating 
... some patterns of consumer. spending 
[on media] have been (Mulgan 
and Worpole, 1986: 12). MacShane (1987: 226) blames the influence of Labour- 
supporting media trade unionists who have consistently prioritised defence of their 
pay and conditions above programmes for broadcasting reform. Collins and Murroni 
can find just two official Labour policy statements on the media and explain this in 
terms of the party's traditional hostility to private ownership and competition which 
they argue is 'fundamentally flawed' (Collins and Murroni, 1995: 5). 
As my thesis will demonstrate, these arguments seriously underestimate the amount 
of discussion on the media that has taken place at all levels of the Labour Party. 
Instead of bemoaning the lack of attention that the party has paid to communications 
policy, this thesis seeks to highlight and to analyse the wide-ranging debates that 
have occurred and the numerous policies that have been developed in the last fifty 
years. What interests me is not the absence of debate about media policy among 
Labour supporters but the way in which the many debates on this subject have 
connected to wider questions about the political aims and objectives of the Labour 
Party. Communications has never been the most important area of interest for 
Labour (or indeed Conservative) policyrnakers but it has illuminated many of the 
tensions - between left and right, between consolidationists and revisionists, between 
traditionalists and modernisers and between Old and New Labour - that have proved 
to be so decisive in the fortunes of the Labour Party. 
The object of this study is not 'mass media' or 'mass communications' policy as a 
whole but television policy in particular. The omission of press policy from my 
study should in no way imply that it lacked importance for the Labour Party. The 
role of the press has absorbed the minds of party leaders and ordinary members for 
many years, from concerns about monopolisation and bias to proposals for a 
sympathetic or in-house daily newspaper. Labour governments have initiated two 
Royal Commissions on the Press and the need for press reform has long been 
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discussed at party conference. '. I focus, however, on broadcasting because it is 
increasingly seen as the most dominant cultural institution and on television, as 
opposed to radio, because the two media have traditionally operated under different 
policy dynamics with television assuming a. much more visible place in public policy 
debates over the last fifty years. My research starts in the early 1950s with the 
debates over the introduction of commercial television and the beginnings of a mass 
television audience in the UK. 
While there is a rich body of literature on broadcasting policy in the UK (see pp. 24- 
28 for more detailed discussion of this literature), there is very little that deals 
specifically with the impact of political parties on television policy. Academic 
literature in this area tends to deal either with the relationship between parties and the 
directly political communications process 2 or with a conception of television policy 
in which party political actors are simply one feature of the general policy 
environment. 3 While these studies seek to provide an admirably holistic view of the 
development of television in the UK, they are clearly not written with the singular 
purpose of identifying the dynamics of specific political actors in their approach to 
television policy. The one book that does seek to do this is Peter Goodwin's 
Television tinder the Tories (1998) which maps out the direction of the Conservative 
government's approach to television policy as part of a more general concern with 
the project of Thatcherism. My thesis attempts to perform a similar conceptual task: 
to evaluate the Labour Party's approach to television policyrnaking through 
reflecting on the project of 'Labourism' over the last fifty years. My study differs 
from Goodwin's in that it covers a far longer historical period and one in which the 
party was in opposition for a majority of the time. 
See, for example, Curran (ed. ) (1978), O'Malley (1997) and Baistow (1985) for critiques of and 
roposals for press reform from within the labour movement. 
Texts on party political communications in the UK include Hennessy, Walker and Cockerell (1985), 
Cockerell (1989) and Scammell (1995). 
3 See, for example, Briggs (1979 and 1995), Sendall (1982,1983), Potter (1989,1990), Curran and 
Seaton (1997) and Crissell (1998) for histories of UK broadcasting or Wilson (1961), Shulman 
(1973), Humphreys (1996), O'Malley (1992) and Barnett and Curry (1994) for analyses of specific 
periods of television history. 
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My interest in combining an analysis of the development of television policy with 
one of the Labour Party stems from my background in the broadcasting industry and 
my former role as a media trade unionist and is connected to my current role as a 
media academic and an active socialist. Thq thesis is intended to highlight (at least 
for me) both the possibilities of imaginative, socialist approaches to television policy 
that have been proposed by sections of the Labour Party and the ultimate undoing 
and neutralisation of these approaches. My aim, as a socialist outside the Labour 
Party, is not at all to pour scorn on the attempts by socialists inside the party to 
reform and democratise television along socialist lines, but to begin to explain why 
these valiant attempts have met with such resistance and, in the end, with such little 
success in implementing socialist policies for television. 
My research aims, therefore, include the following broad questions as well as ones 
that are more specific to the individual chapters and which are listed below in the 
brief reviews of each chapter. 
9 To what extent has the Labour Party pursued a coherent and consistent approach 
to television policy since 195 1? 
o What are the differences between Labour policies discussed and proposed in 
government and those discussed and proposed in opposition? 
4, In what ways have Labour's television policies differed from those of the 
Conservatives? 
e To what extent has communications policy been used as a means of 'rebranding' 
and 'repositioning' the party since 195 1? 
9 Which constituencies of interest (i. e. trade unions, parliamentary leadership, 
intellectuals) have been most influential on the development of the party's 
television policies? 
9 To what extent have Labour's television policies been conditioned by the party's 
relationship with media entrepreneurs? 
* To what extent has the Labour Party acted as a vehicle for the refonn of 
broadcasting structures? 
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Overview of the Thesis 
1951-1964 (Chapter Two) 
The period between 1951 and 1964 was one of unprecedented economic growth and 
social change characterised by full employment, a 30% increase in real wages and 
the emergence of a consumer revolution. According to one commentator, 'the nation 
was better housed, better educated and better cared for in old age' (Pinto- 
Duschinsky, 1970: 55). The nation was also spending more: expenditure on items 
such as cars, holidays, television sets, washing-machines and foreign holidays 
rocketed as the post-war boom allowed workers to shrug off the restrictions of the 
war years. 
These conditions presented an enormous challenge to the Labour Party and led to the 
deepening of programmatic splits over issues such as nationalisation and defence 
spending. Attempts were made to provide an intellectual justification for the need to 
adopt a new orientation towards its supporters. An influential group of 'revisionists' 
argued that, in particular, Labour's traditional role as the political expression of the 
British working class needed to be rethought to reflect the structural changes 
affecting the whole of British society. Another group on the left of the party insisted 
that Labour's links with the organised working-class movement and policies of 
public ownership should be defended and consolidated. The consequence of these 
high-profile disagreements was that the 'main characteristics of the 1950s for the 
Labour Party were public dissension among its leaders and a decline of its popularity 
with the electorate' (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 97). 
This chapter examines Labour's television policy during its years in opposition in 
order to illuminate these conflicts and examines the extent to which television was 
one of the developments that the party was forced to address in order to reposition 
itself in terms of the electorate. The discussions which took place in the run-up to 
the establishment of commercial television in 1955, the debates concerning a third 
television channel and the reactions to the Pilkington Report on the future of 
broadcasting all provide rich evidence of the tensions between different Labourist 
approaches in the 1950s and early 1960s. This chapter analyses not simply the 
10 
official position of the party but also evaluates the contributions made by other 
elements of Labour's constituency, for example, the trade unions, the Labour left, 
sympathetic intellectuals and influential individual supporters. 
1964-1970 (Chapter Three) 
By the time of the general election in October 1964, television was accessible to 
more than 90% of British households (Shulman, 1973: 25) and was beginning to 
exert a powerful influence on British politics. Full employment and rising wages had 
brought both increased access to consumer goods and the confidence to question 
established attitudes. In particular, the emerging economic independence of young 
workers had led to a reluctance to accept the expectations or lifestyles of an older 
generation schooled in war and austerity. Together with a re-examination of 
Britain's political and economic role in the world, previously hegemonic ideas 
concerning the family, religion, opportunity and sexuality were consistently 
challenged. Television helped to service this development: advertising provided the 
shop-window of the consumer revolution while programmes like That Mas The Meek 
That Was (TIV3) and Z-Cars expressed what the broadcasting historian Asa Briggs 
calls 'the desire to subject every kind of institution to fierce critical scrutiny' (Briggs, 
1995: 429) that was typical of the period. 
However, contemporary historians attribute a more decisive role to television than as 
a mere mirror of social change. Harold Wilson's biographer, Ben Pimlott, argues 
that because of its novelty and monopoly on audiences, 'television became the 
crucible of the pennissive revolution, and of the wider cultural and political shift that 
accompanied it' (Pimlott, 1993: 268). Christopher Booker, a writer for TW3, 
describes how television was decisive in fomenting a collective 'vitality-fantasy' 
which reached its apotheosis in the mid- 1 960s (Booker, 1992: 79). Robert Hewison, 
in his study of Art and Society in the Sixties, quotes approvingly the views of 
Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart in relation to the 'synthetic culture' of the 
commercialized mass media and suggests that television had an important part to 
play 'in masking economic reality with pleasurable fantasy' (Hewison, 1988: xiv). 
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No government, therefore, could ignore the impact of television, particularly if, as 
Hewison suggests, it might help to deflect attention away from more pressing 
economic questions. Indeed the newly elected Labour government was immediately 
engaged with the consequences of 'economýc reality' in the shape of a balance of 
payments crisis and stagnating productivity. Harold Wilson had come to power on a 
'modernizing' ticket, determined to sweep away the remnants of the Edwardian 
establishment who he believed were responsible for Britain's declining stature in the 
world and its stagnating economic performance. He championed a new kind of 
meritocracy, where skilled and committed technicians would purposefully guide 
Britain towards economic growth and social justice. As Wilson himself wrote, the 
brief for the government was 'not confined to the measures necessary to modernize 
industry or to expand and humanize our social services; in a far wider sense it was 
seen in the transformation of many of Britain's political and social institutions' 
(Wilson, 1974: 18). 
This chapter sets out to evaluate the ways in which the policies and institutions of 
British television ivere transformed by Labour rule. Can it be said that Labour 
helped to foster change and to modernize British television in the 1960s? In what 
way was television policy affected by both Wilson's desire for indicative planning 
and the declining economic conditions? The chapter therefore assesses the positions 
adopted by contrasting figures both inside and outside the Cabinet in relation to the 
key events concerning television at the time, for example the future of the licence fee 
and the structure of ITV, the creation of the Open University, the party's attitude 
towards advertising and its relationship to broadcasting personnel. 
'Revisionist' historians seeking to re-evaluate Wilson's record in a more favourable 
light have complained of a selective and prejudiced approach to the 1964-1970 
governments. Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo (1993: 5) argue that '[w]hole areas of 
study which might have contradicted the generally damning conclusions [on the 
Wilson governments] have been ignored. For example, very little has been written of 
the 'low' politics of the period. ' The chapter will therefore also seek to partially 
redress the balance and to incorporate the 'low' politics of television policy into the 
wider framework of Labour's second post-war period in office. 
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1970-1979 (Chapter Four) 
After the tun-noil of the 1960s with its continuous scuffles between government and 
BBC over the licence fee, the problems with the new ITV franchises and the 
increased politicisation of broadcasting, the promise of a new decade reassured some 
senior broadcasters. Grace Wyndham Goldie, then the BBC's head of current affairs, 
wrote of a 'new and welcome stability' (Goldie, 1977: 308) in British television in 
1970 which put to rest any fears that broadcasting could be undermined either by 
rampant commercialism or government intervention. Colourisation was now 
providing the BBC with an expanding source of revenue while ITV was proving to 
be a creative and responsible competitor. Britain, she asserted, 'had achieved a 
television system which embraced two vigorous bodies, each offering a wide 
diversity of programmes which fulfilled different needs but which complemented 
each other' (ibid. ). For Goldie, the public service tradition of television was in rude 
health. 
Tony Benn, a former broadcasting minister in Harold Wilson's government, adopted 
a rather different attitude. Writing in a Fabian pamphlet published in September 
1970, three months after the Conservatives had won the general election, Benn 
reflected about the importance of public channels of communication in expressing a 
diverse range of opinions and aspirations. He condemned the lack of opportunity for 
the vast majority of the population to contribute to the 'new talking shops of the mass 
media' and compared this exclusion to the lack of the franchise for most citizens in 
the 19'h century. 'The democratisation and accountability of the mass media', he 
predicted, 'will be a major issue for the Seventies and the debates on it are now 
beginning' (Benn, 1988: 515). 
This chapter will reflect on the growing mood for reforrn from the left of the labour 
movement and analyse the party's first systematic media policy, the left-wing The 
People and the Media, as well as the party's attitude towards the 1977 Annan 
Committee on the Future of Broadcasting. To what extent was the Annan Report a 
victory for those who wished to open up broadcasting structures? What were the 
motivations of the Labour goverm-nent in agreeing to an inquiry and how did the 
committee negotiate between the radical demands of the left and the more 
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conservative submissions of the political and broadcasting establishment? The 
chapter also poses a more general question about the utility of the public inquiry as a 
means of media reform. 
1979-1992 (Chapter Five) 
The 1980s, just as much as the 1950s, was a 'lost' decade for the Labour Party. 
Resoundingly defeated in May 1979 by a Conservative Party led by Margaret 
Thatcher, Labour was to spend the next eighteen years in opposition in a process of 
organisational and ideological transformation. The reason for this was the rise of a 
new political-economic paradigm, neo-liberalism, which superseded the corporatist 
and Keynesian strategies on which Labour had depended since the 1940s. 
Privatisation, deregulation and fiscal liberalisation were the preferred strategies of a 
Tory government which was committed to the free market as the key instrument of 
attaining economic growth and personal freedom. 
According to James Curran and Jean Seaton, '[t]he 1980s were the 'me' decade. 
Political, economic and social revival was supposed to be led by the individual's 
pursuit of self-interest. Nowhere was this principle in public life more dominant than 
in thinking about the media' (1997: 319). In particular, the Tories attempted to 
reshape the structure and culture of British television by injecting commercial 
principles throughout what was, until that point, a highly regulated and relatively 
stable broadcasting system. Between 1979 and 1992, the Tories embarked on an 
ambitious programme of television development, overseeing the creation of a new 
terrestrial channel, introducing new cable and satellite technologies, considering the 
future of how to finance the BBC and changing the way in which ITV franchises 
were awarded. The outcome of this programme included the launch of Channel Four 
in 1982, the 1984 Cable and Broadcasting Act, the Peacock Committee of 1985-6 
and the 1990 Broadcasting Act. 
Such an active policy approach to broadcasting involved not only substantial 
legislation but also a lively debate about some basic questions affecting British 
television. However, unlike the 1970s, the agenda was set not by the left, with its 
concern about democratisation and accountability, but by the rising group of neo- 
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liberals around the Conservative government wishing to 'open up' broadcasting to 
market forces and to 'liberate' television from bureaucratic regulation. However, the 
chapter focuses less on the extent to which the Tories were able to realise their aims 
than on how Labour managed to respond to these changing circumstances and 
formulate a television policy in the light of the technological and structural upheavals 
inside British broadcasting in the 1980s. The chapter examines the extent to which 
Labour was able to offer both a coherent response to the radical market arguments in 
broadcasting and effective opposition to government activities in these different 
periods. To what extent did the party simply react to Tory policy initiatives in the 
field or was it able to offer up creative ideas of its own in relation to new 
developments in broadcasting? Finally, although it is bound to be speculative, we 
will consider what kind of difference Labour might have made to British television 
had it been in power at the time. 
1992-2000 (Chapter Six 
The Conservatives won the 1992 general election but enjoyed a remarkably brief 
honeymoon. The events of 'Black Wednesday' in September of that year, when the 
government spent a third of its reserves buying sterling, increased interest rates twice 
in one day and was finally forced to withdraw from the European exchange rate 
mechanism, destroyed the Tories' fiscal credibility. For most of its period in office 
John Major's government, damaged by frequent allegations of sleaze and unable to 
tackle the funding crisis in transport, health and education, 'appeared to be under 
siege' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 1). This opened up great opportunities for a 
Labour Party which had undertaken a significant amount of organisational and 
ideological reform under the leadership of Neil Kinnock in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and had moved towards an accommodation with market forces in an attempt to 
shed its left-wing reputation. Led by John Smith from 1992 and then by Tony Blair 
two years later, a fiirther process of political re-orientation took place culminating in 
the emergence of 'New Labour' and then the landslide victory in the election of May 
1997. 
Media and communications strategies were central to New Labour's project of 
modernisation. The belief that it was the behaviour of the Tory-supporting tabloid 
15 
press which had cost Labour the 1992 election led party strategists to attempt to 
neutralise the impact of the press while the growing use of news management 
techniques and political marketing necessitated a sophisticated grasp of media 
routines and skills by the party. Yet whilst ýaost commentators concentrated on 
Labour's political communications regime - the influence of its spin doctors, 
advertising campaigns and Tony Blair's press secretary, Alastair Campbell - the 
party was also engaged in a substantial rethink of its communications policies. In the 
run-up to the 1997 election, New Labour seized on issues such as media ownership, 
new communications technology and the economic value of the film and television 
industries as a crucial means of identifying the party with modernisation and, in 
particular, economic liberalisation. In part this was in recognition of the increased 
political and economic impact of media flows at the end of the 20'h century, which 
any electoral organisation would have considered. But New Labour appeared to 
highlight media-related issues as a way of actually defining itself as a party that laid 
great store on the importance of professional presentation, cutting-edge creativity and 
a modem image. 
This focus on the media continued after the election. Franklin (1999) has criticised 
Labour's obsession with massaging the news, its centralisation of the government's 
information and communications services, its creation of a strategic communications 
unit in Downing Street and the appointment of dozens of special advisers who have 
further blurred the boundary between matters of presentation and policy. According 
to the Guardian, No 10 Downing Street now employs 149 people, including 25 
members of staff whose sole responsibility is to monitor and answer press enquiries, 
24 hours a day (Hencke, 2000). Yet the government has also been very active in the 
field of media policy, encouraging the take-up of digital services, pondering the 
future of the BBC licence fee and media ownership rules, contemplating changes to 
the regulatory structure of the media and telecommunications industries and 
stimulating exports of UK television and film. The government has produced a 
series of consultation papers on the communications industries and is now preparing 
for primary legislation in the parliamentary session of 2001/2. 
In this situation, the chapter considers whether James Curran's formulation (see p. 6), 
that the Labour Party is more conservative than the Conservatives when it comes to 
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broadcasting policy, is still appropriate when talking about New Labour. This 
chapter will examine the pace and direction of Labour's approach to television since 
1992 in the light of its ideological reliance on theories of globalisation, the 'Third 
Way' and the knowledge economy. To whýt extent has New Labour pursued a more 
innovative or proactive policy towards television than Labour's previous 
incarnations? Who have been the winners and losers in the evolution of a distinct 
New Labour television policy and to what extent has this policy broken from 'Old 
Labour' attitudes towards the regulation of television? 
Methodology 
'Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the 
past', wrote George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell, 1982: 3 1). While 
current political priorities are bound to influence the sorts of questions asked about 
the past, the ability to learn lessons from historical events and to draw continuities 
between different historical periods allows the historian to interrogate the present and 
to attempt to shape the future. Such an objective is as relevant to media history as it 
is to military and constitutional history. This means that my thesis shares the 
methodological problems common to many historical studies in terms of the 
questions posed, the status of sources used and the validity of propositions identified. 
In his classic account of historiography, E. H. Carr further notes the issue of the 
subjectivity of historical interpretation that 'when we take up a work of history, our 
first concern should not be with the facts which it contains, but with the historian 
who wrote it' (Carr, 1990: 22). 
In addition to these general issues concerning all historiography, there are some 
problems associated with the writing of nzedia history. Firstly, because the 
institutions of mass media and broadcasting are relatively recent, there is therefore a 
more condensed historical sweep than with many other areas of historical study. The 
fifth volume of the official history of ITV, for example, is described by its author as 
occupying a space somewhere between 'history' and 'journalism' because of the 
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contemporary nature of its subject matter. 4 Secondly, the qualities of immediacy and 
obsolescence that are often attached to the media makes them an uneasy object of 
historical study. While wars and elections are fought to establish power structures 
for the future, the media are produced and cqnsumed in the here-and-now. As Dahl 
(1994: 552) puts it, 'although endlessly present as ubiquitous realities, they seem to 
resist historical exploration by their sheer and monotonous insistence on dealing 
mainly with contemporary moments - today's news, the situation now... ' (emphasis 
in original). 
I want to deal first with the question of subjectivity and bias. Having established my 
credentials as a socialist outside the Labour Party, I have no wish to deny that the 
overall objectives of my research (concerning the nature of Tabourism) are 
influenced by my political stance. Here I follow Eric Hobsbawm's distinction 
between 'legitimate partisanship' (Hobsbawm, 1998: 175) and unquestioning 
advocacy. While the former relies on a sense of commitment to a set of principles, 
the latter seeks to reach a predetermined conclusion irrespective of the evidence 
gathered. According to Hobsbawm, every scholar 'must entertain the possibility of 
allowing himself to be publicly persuaded by contrary argument or evidence' (ibid.: 
174). Indeed, I started my research with the distinct impression that the Labour Party 
had never seriously tackled the subject of television policy and that further research 
would uncover the reasons for this clear absence. Instead, I have since discovered 
that the party has had no lack of television policies and that the more pressing 
research questions concerned how these policies were developed and what fate they 
met. 
Hobsbawm further argues (ibid.: 175-185) that there are three valid reasons for 
embracing a partisan approach to historical scholarship. Firstly, because some areas 
of study arc more likely to be ignored by 'mainstream' historians, for example the 
history of the British labour movement, the historian who is sympathetic to the 
particular 'cause' may be performing a valuable task in opening up the topic to 
'Written too close to the events it relates to allow of a true historical perspective, but more 
authoritative than the journalism contemporaneous with those events, this book should indeed be read 
as 'an account' of the key developments, issues and incidents that took place within Independent 
Television between 1981 and 1992 (Bonner and Aston, 1998: xii). 
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historical debate. In the case of television policy, demands for democratisation and 
reform were overwhelmingly associated with the left from the early 1960s until the 
rise of New Labour so that an historian of the left is well placed to analyse these 
debates. Secondly, Hobsbawrn comments týat, just as the most celebrated medical 
scientists had a commitment to preventing illness and disease, there is no reason to 
believe that the political commitment of many social scientists and historians 
necessarily undermines the quality of their scholarship. Finally, Hobsbawrn asserts 
that a partisan approach to scholarship may help to undermine the modem trend 
towards intellectual compartmentalisation and 'the self-insulation of the academy' 
(ibid.: 185). Here, it is vital to assert that media history is unapologetically part of 
the terrain of contemporary history but that it is also interdisciplinary and relies, as I 
do in this thesis, on the work of economists, political scientists, sociologists and 
political historians. 
This leads me on to the question of the status of my evidence and my sources and the 
way in which they are presented. E. P. Thompson's formulation that the historian's 
task consists of 'the close interrogation of texts and contexts' (Thompson, 1993: 43 1) 
helpfully emphasises the relationship between source material and the environments 
in which that material is generated. In each chapter, I frame the analysis of Labour's 
television policy with a brief consideration of the key political, economic or social 
conflicts of the particular period. It would be extremely short-sighted to consider 
Labour's approach to television in the 1950's without a discussion of revisionism 
and the 'embourgoisiement' thesis. It would also paint an incomplete picture to 
examine the 1960's without acknowledging the importance of the balance of 
payments crisis, the 1970s without tackling the general political shift to the left or the 
1980s and 1990s without focusing on the increasing hegemony of pro-market 
arguments inside the Labour leadership. 
All historians have to be selective and I have had to carefully consider which 
television-related issues to prioritise in each chapter. Some choices are simply down 
to common sense. For example, while I concentrate on Labour's attitude to the 
licence fee in the 1960s and the 1990s, I do not do so in the 1950s or 1980s for the 
reason that Labour was not in government at the time and therefore was less 
interested in and equipped to influence that debate. At other times, my decision is 
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not so straightforward. Labour's relationship to ITV is clearly a very important story 
but I focus on it more explicitly in the 1950s and 1960s as it highlights the dynamics 
of party policy more visibly in those decades than in later ones. The thesis, 
therefore, is not a clear example of narrativq history but one structured thematically 
as well as chronologically. The impact of revisionism, the conflict between left and 
right, the party's relationship to the trade unions and to commercial forces, the 
tension between innovation and preservation and the difference between pragmatism 
and idealism are all themes that underpin the thesis as a whole. My choice of 
television-related issues, therefore, depends more on their ability to connect with and 
illuminate these debates than the amount of column inches written or parliamentary 
questions asked at the time. 
Indeed if it was press coverage alone that determined my choice of issues, television 
policy would be way down the list as compared to debates around programme 
content and standards. However, just as I have decided not to include the whole area 
of political communications, from election broadcasts to public information 
campaigns, the subject of Labour's attitude to controversies around bias, swearing 
and nudity is also largely excluded. Sometimes, as in the case of Harold Wilson and 
latterly in the creation of New Labour, I have touched on these issues as they directly 
impact on television policy itself. More often than not, as for example with Labour's 
reaction to Mary Whitehouse's campaign against 'immoral' behaviour on television 
in the 1970s, I have ignored them as I believe that they are outside the scope of my 
thesis and less relevant to expressing the tensions and priorities of Tabourism'. 
My thesis may be thematic as well as chronological but it is nevertheless heavily 
dependent on the traditional sources of information for historians. Much of my data 
comes from key institutional sources such as Cabinet records in the Public Records 
Office, the minutes of Labour's National Executive Committee (NEC), transcripts of 
the annual conferences of the Labour Party and the trade unions, the BBC's written 
archives and from Hansard for the records of parliamentary debates. I have also 
relied on the official documents of the many public inquiries, broadcasting bills and 
the green and white papers that have emerged over the last fifty years. Like any 
contemporary historian, I have not had access to government records of the last thirty 
years nor have I been granted access to either the minutes of the Parliamentary 
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Labour Party or the shadow Cabinet. I did, however, gain access to the personal 
papers of Morgan Philips, Labour's general secretary in the 1950s, that included 
many previously unpublished documents about the party's attitude to ITV and a third 
channel. Collected together, these documents provide a substantial part of the 
I 
primary evidence of the existence of the many examples of Labour policy for British 
television. 
One important issue is that these sources tend to reveal the outcomes rather than the 
discussions that led to these outcomes. For example, the minutes of Labour's NEC 
and Home Policy Committee (HPC) record only basic summaries of often lengthy 
and complex debates. Notes of the meetings of the party's study groups and sub- 
committees on television are slightly more detailed but are still weighted towards 
recording the action to be taken and the documents to be tabled rather than the 
intricacies of the arguments that may have occurred during these meetings. I have 
attempted, therefore, to supplement and contextualise these sources with the views 
and analysis of the main participants gathered from my own interviews and from 
their own published accounts. 
Broadcasting is relatively well catered for in terms of the memoirs and biographies of 
senior broadcasters, from Lord Hill and Hugh Greene to Alasdair Milne and Jeremy 
Isaacs, as well as those of the leading Labour politicians of the time. Similarly, the 
diaries of Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle have helped to illuminate the 
debates in Labour Cabinet meetings in the 1960s and 1970s. Of course any 
broadcasting historian, and particularly one interested in the Labour Party, will be 
indebted to the diaries of the former postmaster general and media reformer Tony 
Berm, who started recording his activities in 1940. None of these various texts 
necessarily constitute unimpeachable sources of information. Firstly, there is a 
significant difference between the contemporary recording of events in a diary 
format and the recollection of events some years later when putting together 
memoirs. This problem is accentuated with the memoirs of politicians for whom 
broadcasting was rarely a central area of interest and who would have had a range of 
other portfolios of more immediate importance. Secondly, even with diaries, where 
the problem of memory is not so acute, both broadcasters and politicians are often 
involved in conflicts that are certain to shape the way in which they record their 
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experiences. Given that diaries and memoirs are, therefore, likely to be partisan and 
incomplete historical sources, I have attempted to use them as expressions of the 
contrasting political and ideological positions adopted in relation to the formulation 
of television policy. 
Newspapers provide a further source of information about the policy process and one 
on which I draw heavily, especially in the period of New Labour. Ministers and 
spokespeople have become increasingly happy to brief specialist journalists about 
forthcoming policies and proposals. As long as television policyrnaking remains one 
of the less visible elements of public policy, these short journalistic contributions will 
continue to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, although subject to the 
same qualifications concerning their truthfulness raised in the previous paragraph. I 
have also taken advantage of both specialist television journals, like Television 
Today and Bi-oadcast, as well as political magazines from Socialist Commentary and 
Tribune to the Neiv Statesman and the in-house journals of the media unions. Ihave 
also used those political journals that have adopted media and culture as a central 
area of concern, including Neiv Left Revieiv, Neiv Socialist and Marxism Today. 
Another source of information is the two dozen interviews I conducted with a range 
of Labour MPs, civil servants, intellectuals, activists and regulators. Here I faced 
problems that will be familiar to many historians and researchers. I have no 
interview material for the 1950s chapter because the key players, like Christopher 
Mayhew and George Darling, are no longer alive and because those who are still 
alive indicated to me that they had no memory of events that were, after all, not that 
important to them even at the time. This was the case with most of the events 
covered in this thesis, apart from those in the last few years, and is particularly 
accentuated when interviewing politicians who may have held a broadcasting brief 
for only a few years before moving on to a different portfolio. Such is the turnover 
of roles for modem politicians that the recollections of Mark Fisher and Robin 
Corbett about broadcasting issues in the 1980s are almost as limited as those of Tony 
Benn's and Ted Short's about the 1960s. 
My interviews with civil servants active in the policy field today also contributed less 
to the thesis than I had originally expected. I feel that any original comments were 
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undermined not by lack of memory on their part but by their determination not to add 
to the public statements previously made by government ministers. The interviews 
that I believe to have been the most useful and which helped to contextualise the 
party documents and official papers were those of the media activists and 
intellectuals who have been engaged with media reform for a number of years. James 
Curran, Nicholas Garnham, Tom O'Malley, Anthony Smith and Philip Whitehead, 
while not necessarily detailed about dates and places, were all able to reflect on the 
achievements and problems of Labour's television policies in a way that 
demonstrates their actual engagement with, and not simply formal attachment to, 
television reform. Finally, while my requests for interviews with media trade union 
leaders were rejected, their thoughts on television policy are easily accessible from 
the records of their union conferences and the pages of union j ournals. 
In summary, this thesis reflects many of the problems associated with both narrative 
and thematic histories. In relying on the traditional sources and structures of 
narrative history - the chronological ordering of official documents, political 
memoirs and elite inter-views - the thesis may be accused of taking these political 
actors at their word and fitting them into a packaged and orderly view of history. 
Additionally, as the thesis provides an analysis of contemporary events that will be 
further clarified through the passing of time and the releasing of documents, it may 
be argued that it is too impressionistic to uncover any underlying patterns in the 
formation of policy and the development of television. I would argue, however, that 
the thesis attempts to draw on the strengths of both narrative political history and a 
critical media history in searching for continuities and differences in the formulation 
of Labour's television policy across different historical periods. Eric Hobsbawrn 
suggests that 'the event, the individual, even the recapture of some way of thinking 
of the past, are not ends in themselves, but the means of illuminating some wider 
question, which goes far beyond the particular story and its characters' (Hobsbawm, 
1998: 248). In focusing on the history of Labour's television policies over the last 
fifty years, that is precisely my aim: to generalise about the efficacy of Labour as a 
vehicle for radical change. 
23 
The academic context 
Two relatively distinct sets of literature influenced this thesis: material on 
broadcasting history produced in the field of mass communications and media 
studies and material on the history and ideology of the Labour Party from within 
political science. The key problem I faced was that while the role of political parties 
is rarely discussed in media history literature, the field of television policy is almost 
entirely absent from Labour Party histories and studies. My thesis, therefore, 
attempts to re-insert both political agency into the history of UK broadcasting policy 
and a focus on television structures and institutions into a critique of the Labour 
Party. 
Starting with the media studies literature, I believe that it is revealing that, out of the 
dozens of accounts of the development of British broadcasting, the role of political 
parties has been so little analysed. This is partly a product of the idea that the media 
in Britain operate at ann's length from the state. The ideology of a 'free press' has 
developed alongside the regulation of broadcasting through semi-autonomous 
agencies, for example the BBC Board of Governors or the Independent Television 
Commission. While television in other European countries like France and Italy 
remained part of government departments for many years, the independent nature of 
British broadcasting has often appeared to preclude the need for close attention to the 
activities of specific political parties. A further reason is that when academics have 
examined the relationship between television and politics, this has been done almost 
exclusively in the field of political communications: how prime ministers have used 
television for political ends and how parties have devised media strategies to win 
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elections. The rise of Tony Blair and New Labour has accentuated this trend. 
The consequence of this is that, in many broadcasting histories, political parties are 
given brief walk-on roles that are usually peripheral as compared to the parts played 
by broadcasters themselves. For example, there are no references to either 
Conservative or Labour parties in the index to Andrew Crissell's 280-page, 4n 
5 As well as the books listed in footnote two on page 8, see McNair (1999) and Riddell (1998) or, for a 
more journalistic account of New Labour's relationship with spin doctors, Jones (1999). 
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Introditamy History ofBritish Broadcasting (Crissell, 1997). Tony Benn, a former 
postmaster general and influential figure on the development of British television, 
receives one mention (and that only in the bibliography). Institutional players and 
technological factors are seen as far more iipportant than politicians to the extent that 
Crissell totally excludes both Tories and Labour from his brief consideration of the 
Pilkington Report (ibid.: 108-114) and mentions Labour only in passing when 
discussing the Annan Committee (ibid.: 191-195). John Whale (1977) makes 
occasional reference to political parties when summarising the history of the British 
press and broadcasting but then neglects them in the section on the state which he 
defines as 'the whole apparatus of Government' (ibid.: 114). Whale conceives 
government here as an abstract body preoccupied with administrative 
responsibilities, not as the embodiment of particular political principles and 
ideological frameworks, and argues that the relationship between government and the 
media is marked by perennial tension as well as necessary linkages. While this is 
certainly true, what Whale omits from his analysis is that different government may 
do different things and have different sorts of relationships with journalists and 
broadcasters when faced with the same circumstances. 
This raises a general problem about the way in which political parties are represented 
in broadcasting histories - as governments or oppositions but rarely as distinct 
political forces. This is the case even in those texts where political parties make 
frequent appearances, as in the histories of commercial television (Sendall [1982 and 
1983], Potter [1989 and 1990], Bonner [1998]) and in Asa Briggs' histories of British 
broadcasting (for our purposes Briggs [1979 and 1995]). For example, Sendall 
reduces the Labour Party's role in the debates surrounding the breaking of the BBC's 
monopoly and the introduction of commercial television in the 1950s essentially to 
one of the parliamentary opposition. Most of the references to Labour concern its 
behaviour in the passage of the legislation (Sendall, 1982: 36-55): its attempt to 
wreck the bill, the moving of its own amendments and the party's reaction to 
government amendments. 
Briggs is similarly interested in the parliamentary manoeuverings of political parties 
in their roles as 'government' or 'opposition', although he shows far more sensitivity 
than Sendall to the social and political forces that condition their behaviour in 
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parliament. For example, Briggs reproduces a party leaflet attacking the immorality 
of commercial television, refers to poll results of Labour voters on the subject and 
notes the impact of speeches by Labour leaders on the break-up of the monopoly as a 
prelude to assessing the role of the oppositiqn during the passage of the 1954 bill 
(Briggs, 1979: 896-898). Nevertheless, Briggs largely measures the impact of 
political parties in the area of broadcasting policy by their behaviour in parliament 
above all. In my analysis of Labour's policy towards commercial television, 
however, I attempt to show how these parliamentary arguments were simply one 
element of a much more complex ideological discussion within the party about its 
attitude towards morality, cornmercial forces, and US culture. To make a full 
evaluation of the Labour Party's television policies, I would submit that the 
researcher needs to move well beyond parliament to the many forums in which 
policy is developed - in the trade unions, in the left of the party, among party 
intellectuals - and to examine the general economic and social climate in which the 
party operates at any one time. 
This is the approach adopted by Jean Seaton in her analysis of broadcasting in Polver 
ivithout Responsibility, particularly in the section on how the theorising of the decline 
of working-class culture by Labour supporters influenced the eventual publication of 
the Pilkington Report (in Curran and Seaton, 1997: 173-176). However, as Seaton's 
focus is on the development of broadcasting as a whole and not on the impact of one 
political party, it is clearly of only partial use to this thesis. Indeed, while many 
studies of broadcasting comment on the role of the Labour Party at particular times 
(and I draw on these very helpftil studies in my analysis of specific periods), few are 
prepared to generalise act-oss periods about Labour's impact on broadcasting policy. 
The exceptions to this are therefore especially valuable. James Curran, as I have 
already noted (see p. 6), has pointed out the enduring conservatism towards 
broadcasting policy that exists at the centre of the Labour Party. However, he also 
notes the libertarian ideas on the left of the party that are 'more closely aligned, in 
practice, to those of the libertarian new right than to paternalists on their own side' 
(ibid.: 370). Taking up this idea that traditional political divisions of left and right do 
not necessarily fit the map of broadcasting politics, I reflect on the convergence 
between socialists and neo-liberals in the debates on independent production in the 
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mid- I 980s (see p. 195). A second example is Colin Seymour-Ure's analysis of the 
fragmented nature of media policyrnaking (Seymour-Ure, 1991: 203-218). Although 
he highlights technological and institutional factors and the difficulties of having a 
single 'media policy' given rival technologlies, he nevertheless makes an important 
point about the potential impact of different parties in government. 
A Labour government of the mid- I 950s would not have introduced ITV; 
nor would Channel 4 have taken exactly the same shape under a Labour 
government in the 1980s. But Labour did not attempt to reconstruct the 
ITV system when it had the chance in the 1960s and 1970s ... nor did the Conservatives give the third TV channel to ITV in 1962. (ibid.: 207). 
Apart from these exceptions, the majority of the literature on UK broadcasting policy 
either marginalises the role of political parties or treats them as abstract 
representatives of 'government' or 'opposition', engaged in the parliamentary battles 
associated with those two positions. The texts that do highlight the activities of 
Labour and Conservative parties either deal with media policy in general or deal with 
one fairly limited historical period: the early 1950s (Wilson, 1960), the 1960s 
(Shulman, 1973) or the late 1980s and early 1990s (Barnett and Curry, 1994). The 
one text that most closely resembles this thesis in its emphasis on television policy in 
particular, the role of a single political party and the conjuncture of these two across 
a significant time period is Peter Goodwin's Television under the Tories (Goodwin, 
1998). In contrast to analyses of the most recent example of Conservative rule that 
date either from 1979 to 1992 ('Thatcherism') or from 1992 to 1997 ('Majorism'), 
Goodwin is keen to examine the contribution made by the government across both 
periods and to look for continuities between the approaches of the two prime 
ministers. 
Additionally, Goodwin seeks to analyse the extent to which there was a coherent 
cplan' to reform broadcasting along market lines in conjunction with the neo-liberal 
ideology that underpinned the administrations of both Thatcher and Major. While 
Goodwin finds little evidence of an overarching strategy to transform the institutions 
and structures of British television, he nevertheless argues that UK television policy 
was guided, not simply by technological imperatives, but by the ideological positions 
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adopted by the government. The Conservatives may have not been consistent in 
their approach to broadcasting, but they made a difference in tenns of 
commercialising the UK television environment. According to Goodwin, 
4 
one conclusion is inescapable. Government policy counted. Different 
policies would have produced substantially different outcomes. UK 
television in 1997 was by no means a result of technological or economic 
inevitability. For good or ill, its actual shape was to a very large extent 
the result of the vagaries of Tory policy over the previous eighteen years. 
(ibid.: 173). 
My thesis, somewhat presumptuously, aims to assess the 'vagaries' of Labour Party 
policy in the field of television, not over eighteen, but nearly fifty years, in order to 
evaluate the extent to which party political agency does indeed matter. 
This leads me to the second set of texts that have provided the intellectual framework 
for this thesis: the political science literature on the Labour Party. Firstly, 'it is worth 
making the point that television policy is almost entirely absent from studies of the 
party. Historical surveys like Brand (1974), Davies (1996), Jones (1996), Pelling 
and Reid (1996) and Wright and Carter (1997) all neglect to mention Labour's 
achievements in the field of television policy. This does not necessarily point to a 
dismal record in this area as much as a belief that television policy is simply not as 
important as issues concerning defence, the economy, housing, social security, 
education, health and so on. 6 The only time television does appear in the literature is 
with reference to Wilson's relationship with the BBC (see Davies [1996: 301-302]) 
or the emphasis on media strategies in the formation of New Labour (see Anderson 
and Mann [ 1997: 41-45]), in other words regarding political communications and not 
communications policy. 
Yet while television policy is clearly lower on the list of electoral priorities than the 
NHS, it can nevertheless express some of the tensions in and dynamics of the party's 
political orientation. For example, Steven Fielding partially attributes Labour's 
6 The same goes for the Conservatives as well. According to Goodwin, "'[h]ow to organise 
television" was never even a marginal feature of British election campaigns in the 70s, 80s, or 90s' 
(Goodwin, 1998: 6). The only exception to this concerns the introduction of commercial television 
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electoral decline in the 1950s to its inability to relate to the new consumer culture, of 
which television played a key role. The party's 'hostility to changes after 195 1, such 
as the rise of supennarkets, the creation of commercial television and the 
development of youth culture, betrayed a m9ralism which rejected the realities of 
working-class affluence' (Fielding, 1997: 22). This statement is taken from 
Fielding's introduction to a collection of Labour Party documents on socialism and 
society since 195 1. Given that the collection excludes all references to foreign 
affairs and concentrates on domestic matters only, one might have expected some 
discussion of the party's attitude to the rise of commercial television in the 1950s. 
Instead, there are statements about a whole range of issues, from party democracy 
and internal divisions, to nationalisation, moral corruption, party campaigning 
techniques and the role of women. Commercial television, a subject that exercised 
the minds of many Labour supporters at the time, is ignored as a subject in its own 
7 right. My thesis does not seek to argue that television policy ought to be seen as a 
priority area, but that it does provide a way into the debates, for example about 
revisionism in the 1950s and pragmatism in the 1960s, which took place within the 
party. 
So the first problem is that there is no substantial account of television policy in any 
studies of the Labour Party. A related issue is that, out of the hundreds of academic 
books on the party, there are very few examples of historically-rooted analyses of 
specific areas of party policy. What there is tends to be limited to both a short 
timescale, most frequently the assessment of one government, and to a narrow list of 
policy areas, most notably foreign affairs, the economy and social policy. For 
example, while Andrew Williams' Labour and Russia (Williams, 1989) examines 
the attitude of the party to the Soviet Union between 1924 and 1934, John Naylor's 
Labour's International Policy (Naylor, 1969) focuses on the 1930s alone. Studies of 
economic and social policy also rarely go beyond the confines of one brief period, 
witness Robert Skidelsky's Politicians and the slunip, 1929-1931 (Skidelsky, 1967), 
which was a genuine political issue in the run-up to the 1955 election (see Wilson [1960] and chapter 
two of this thesis). 
7 Actually, there are three references to commercial television submerged in the text. First, as an 
example of the moral corruption of the Tories (ibid.: 39); second, of the Gaitskellite argument that 
television had changed the lives and expectations of millions of people (ibid.: 54); and finally as part 
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Wilfred Beckerman's The Labour Government's Econondc Record, 1964-70 
(Beckerman, [ed. ], 1970), Martin Holmes' The Labour Governnient, 1974-79 
(Holmes, 1985) and Labour and Inequality (Townsend and Bosanquet [eds. ] 1972), 
an analysis of the social policy of the Wilson govermnents between 1964 and 1970. 1 
While these texts are not able to offer a comparative analysis of Labour across 
different periods, there are nevertheless two themes that re-occur. Firstly, there is an 
emphasis in these policy studies on the debilitating impact of internal party conflicts 
between left and right. Naylor, for example, blames Labour's poor grasp of foreign 
affairs in the 1930s on the rebellion of the left in response to the National 
Government and a poor relationship between the national executive and the 
parliamentary party. 'A factionalized, uncertain leadership and a distrustful 
membership together constituted a party of divided domestic counsel in the period 
immediately following the political rout of 193 V (Naylor, 1969: 45). In a very 
different context, that of a left critique of the Wilson government's education policy, 
Dennis Marsden writes that the 'major lesson of the historical review of Labour's 
performance is that we cannot talk about Labour's educational policies because the 
Party is not unified and has never had an agreed policy' (Marsden, 1972: 138). My 
thesis draws on this recurrence of a division between left and right and examines its 
impact on the development of a coherent 'television policy' or whether there have 
been, in fact, several overlapping and competing television policies. 
The second theme is the importance of external factors on Labour Party policy, most 
notably the impact of the state of the economy on Labour's ability to carry out 
reforms. Harold Wilson's own assessment of the economic record of the 1964-70 
government stressed 'the economic restraints on our ability to carry through the 
social revolution to which we were committed at the speed we would have wished 
(Wilson, 1974: 18). In a difficult situation, 'we achieved far more than most would 
have expected' (ibid. ). Martin Holmes makes a similar judgement on the 1974-79 
government that, in the context of what he calls 'economic reality' (Holmes, 1985: 
174), i. e. rising inflation and the pressure from the IMF for public expenditure cuts, 
of a discussion of how to attract the votes of women electors for whom television now signified some 
sort of status (ibid.: 62). 
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the record of that government was far from the disaster the left claimed it to be. The 
policy consequence of Labour's vulnerability to extraneous influences means that 
attention is deflected away from consideration of its ideological commitment to 
reforin towards one of finding the most appropriate and praginatic political stance. 
Pragmatism both in terms of developing policy and in terms of governing is a key 
theme that underpins the party's approach to television policy over the years. 
Neiv Labour in Poiver: Precedents andprospects (Brivati and Bale [eds], 1997) is a 
significant exception to the highly periodised nature of most academic analysis of 
Labour Party policy. Written in response to the victory of New Labour in 1997, the 
collection reflects on the development of economic, social, constitutional, trade 
union and defence policies throughout the last century. Vernon Bogdanor and John 
Young, in their analyses of constitutional reform and foreign affairs respectively, 
both point to continuities in the party's approach to these areas over the years and, in 
particular, the many points of agreement with the Conservatives. 'Labour in power', 
according to Young (in ibid.: 138), 'has been far less ready to adopt radical policies 
abroad and, indeed, a consensus on the general lines of foreign and defence policy 
has generally been the rule for the front benches of the major parties. ' 
Nick Ellison traces the evolution of Labour's social policy in the post-war era and 
emphasises the impact of divisions in the party, not so much on stunting the 
development of coherent policy as on undermining electoral success. The uniting of 
the party behind Wilson and the slogan of the 'scientific revolution' in 1964 paved 
the way for victory in the election but did little for the creation of an innovative 
social policy. On the other hand, 
severe disagreements throughout the 1950s amongst 'Tribunites', centre 
left 'planners', Keynesian socialists and ethical socialists about the 
relative importance of different aspects of democratic socialist strategy, 
and particularly the salience of public ownership as a distinctively 
socialist economic programme, not only prevented the Party from 
developing an agreed programme, but forced a persistent return to the 
one common factor shared by each of these positions - the continuing 
belief in state-sponsored welfare spending ... (Ellison in ibid.: 38). 
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In other words, one of the consequences of political splits between left and right in 
the party was the tendency to fall back on areas of common ground. Internal 
divisions, therefore, need not always result in civil war but in compromise -a feature 
that I argue was present in the Labour government's attitude towards the demand of 
radical left reformers in the 1970s, particularly concerning the Annan Committee. 
A further contribution made by the book is to qualify the whole project of 
comparative historical analysis. In his chapter on Labour's economic policy, Jim 
Tomlinson argues that comparisons between the 1970s and the late 1990s are 
irrelevant given that today there is no inflationary boom, no incomes policy and that 
it is the market right and not the Keynesian left that is dominant (Tomlinson in ibid.: 
12). Instead, Tomlinson contrasts the economic situation under Blair with that of the 
particular situation of Harold Wilson in 1964. Both governments share a concern 
with increasing productivity and competitiveness while both have inherited 
economies that are overheating and generating balance of payments problems (ibid.: 
13). Tomlinson's conclusion (that the health of the macro-economic environment is 
decisive for Labour today) and his premise (that meaningful historical comparisons 
need to reflect broadly similar situations) are both relevant to my thesis. I have 
already discussed how the analysis of Labour's television policy needs to 
acknowledge the macro-economic climate in the particular period. It is also 
important to bear in mind that television policy does not develop in a linear and 
predictable way with easy comparisons to be made between all periods, irrespective 
of changing economic, cultural and technological contexts. 
However, one weakness of Neiv Labour in Poiver is revealed by its title: it deals only 
with Labour in government and not in opposition. Not surprisingly, academic 
literature on specific areas of policy deals only with Labour in office while my thesis 
aims to analyse the party's approach to television across three periods in office and 
three in opposition. This requires an understanding of the party's organisational 
structure and of where power lies in the party as well as a grasp of the ideas which 
provide the foundation for Labour's distinctive political programme across different 
periods of government and opposition. 
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The Labour Party was founded in 1900 by trade union leaders seeking independent 
representation in parliament yet the party has always been a 'broad church' 
involving, for example, Marxists and anti-communists, trade union militants and 
their employers, atheists and Christians .8 Pqlling and Reid argue (1996: 4-5) that the I 
party's launch was 
not so much a birth as a marriage: not the emergence of something 
fundamentally new, but rather an alliance between trade unions with a 
longstanding involvement in radical politics and the more recently 
formed ethical socialists, with the possibility of more participation by 
state socialists in the future. 
According to Geoffrey Foote, the glue that holds the party together and which 
distinguishes it from either Marxist or conservative parties and ideologies is the 
notion of Tabourism'. 9 
The diverse factions which have constituted the Labour Party since its 
birth have somehow been able to find a common factor to keep them 
together for all the fury and frustration of their debates, and this unifying 
force cannot be simply reduced to one of mere tactical alliances. (Foote: 
1997: 6) 
Foote sees this as an ideology rooted in the relationship between the party and the 
unions and notes five main features of Labourism (ibid.: 8-12). Firstly, that labour 
itself is denied a proper and fair share of the wealth it creates and that, secondly and 
consequently there is the need for the re-distribution of wealth. Thirdly, Labourism 
is defined by its opposition not to private capital but to bad capitalists. Fourthly, 
Labourism recognises the demand for the political self-organisation of workers while 
fifthly it is marked by its loyalty to the nation state. Although Labour leaders have 
reduced the role of the unions in party affairs in recent years, the definition remains 
relevant in its expression of the underlying beliefs of Labour supporters. 
8 It is worth noting that the Labour Party is both an alliance itself but also the key political 
organisation at the centre of a larger network of groups and individuals, including the trade unions, co- 
operative and socialist societies, intellectuals, and socialists from outside the Labour Party, that makes 
up the 'labour movement', a term I refer to frequently in my thesis. 
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The definition also helps to clarify the contradictory instincts of the party, for 
example in its attitude to commercial forces and its relationship to parliament. By 
drawing on this understanding of Labourism, my thesis seeks to highlight a number 
of tensions that are present in the party's deýates on television policy: that of 
parliamentary activity versus extra-parliamentary activity; pragmatism versus 
idealism; managing capitalism versus transforming capitalism; the party as an 
establishment insider versus its position as an outsider; and finally the tension 
between the leadership and the grass-roots. 
This latter conflict lies at the heart of the classic work on the power relations of the 
two main political parties in Britain, Robert McKenzie's British Political Parties 
(McKenzie, 1967). McKenzie focuses on intra-party organisation and analyses, in 
particular, the relationship between the parliamentary members and those of the 
wider organisation. He identifies one basic similarity in structure, if not in political 
outlook, between Labour and Conservative parties. 'Each is an autonomous entity 
which throws up its own leaders and acknowledges its ultimate responsibility only to 
the electorate ... neither party in Parliament allows itself to be directed or controlled 
by its mass organization' (ibid.: 386). This contradicts the notion, endorsed by the 
party itself, that the sovereign decision-making body of the Labour Party is the 
annual conference with the NEC, whose members are selected from across the party, 
as the locus of power in between conferences. Instead, McKenzie argues that the 
parliamentary party (PLP) operates as a rival power base to conference and refuses, 
again and again, to be bound by conference decisions that it feels to be electorally 
unpopular. While the PLP appears to be more democratic in opposition, 'in office 
the PLP has conformed to the traditional practices of the other great parliamentary 
parties to a striking degree (ibid.: 412). 
McKenzie further argues that, to the extent that the NEC and conference are key 
decision-making bodies, the PLP is usually able to influence their decisions, either 
through dominating NEC membership or speeches at conference and relying on the 
trade union block vote where necessary. More often than not, ordinary party 
9 Tony Blair's definition of Labourism focuses on values: 'A fair deal; concern for those who are 
poor, unemployed or lacking opportunity' tolerance; and duty to others - these are great British 
values' (Blair, 1997: 7). 
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members are reluctant to attack the Labour leader who is seen as a 'prime minister- 
in-waiting' and therefore entitled to retain a degree of power. For McKenzie, this is 
both essential and welcome for a modem political party and he concludes that it is 
'abundantly clear that the real centre of day-jo-day policy-making within the Labour 
Party is to be found in the deliberations of the Parliamentary Committee and of the 
PLP' (ibid.: 526). While the NEC can act as a forum of dissent and debate, as it did 
with Bevanism in the 1950s, power is held centrally with ordinary members 
assuming importance only when canvassing during elections or raising money for the 
party. The result of this, as Fielding (1997: 9) notes, is that 'there have always been, 
in effect, two parties. One has been organised at Westminster and formed the 
opposition or government of the day; the other has been based in the country at 
large. ' 
Lewis Minkin's important work on The Labour Party Conference (Minkin, 1980), 
seeks not so much to deny the existence of two distinct parties but to re-negotiate the 
relationship between the two. McKenzie's book, first published in 1955, was written 
before the experience of the Wilson governments and the sight of regular rebellions 
against the party leadership in annual conference and against the government in 
parliament. Challenging the idea that the parliamentary leadership was almost 
autonomous in its ability to make decisions, Minkin suggests a far more diffuse 
pattern of power relations within the party. He attributes this to the particular make- 
up of the Labour Party, based as it is on the democratic influence of the unions and 
the role of the NEC and annual conference in checking the leadership. He argues 
that McKenzie's model 
not only understated the structural and procedural limitations on the 
power of the parliamentary leadership but underestimated the capacity of 
the extra-parliamentary Party to reassert itself, particularly when the 
trade unions reacted adversely to the failures of a Labour government 
(ibid.: xii). 
Far from the unions simply ceding power to the party leadership, Minkin claims that 
extra-parliamentary forces have 'always produced a contrapuntal element into the 
process of policy-making' (ibid.: 12). 
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For Minkin, the fluidity and conflict at the heart of Labour policy-making has led to 
various challenges to the leadership. He gives the example of the successful 
opposition to Hugh Gaitskell's attempt to scrap Clause IV in the late 1950s and 
points to the stand-off in policy in 1967 when, although the NEC 'proved unable to 
impose its will upon the Government then conversely Government Ministers proved 
unable to stifle or colonize the process of policy-making to their satisfaction' (ibid.: 
53). Far from romanticising the possibilities of conference democracy, Minkin's 
argument is that Labour institutions like the annual conference and the NEC are 
symbolic of party members' desire for a participatory and egalitarian form of 
politics. Policy within the Labour Party is developed, according to this model, with 
purely electoral considerations on the one hand and with a democratic instinct on the 
other. 
Both McKenzie's and Minkin's formulations of power relations within the Labour 
Party have been very useful for my assessment of Labour's media policies. Their 
theories force the researcher to examine both the impact of the unions' role in the 
party and the relationship between the leadership and the grass roots, and to 
conceptualise policy-making not as a linear process but as one fraught with 
competing electoral and ideological considerations. Clearly, the two studies also 
need to be approached in the light of more recent developments around the rise of 
New Labour in terms of the reduction of the influence of the unions on the party and 
the increasing centralisation of the party's organisational structures. However I 
contend that the questions posed by McKenzie and Minkin remain very relevant to 
the attempts to understand the development of policy in a party that contains so many 
contradictions and conflicts. As one American academic concluded, studying the 
party through the eyes of an outsider: 
The Labour party is a party of change, but it is deeply concerned with the 
preservation of what is good; it is idealistic in its approach to both 
domestic and foreign affairs, but it is eminently practical and pragmatic 
in its methods; it stresses internationalism without being anti-national; it 
is a party of the middle way in spite of an extremist wing; it is socialist, 
but it does not forget the individual (Brand, 1974: 1-2). 
36 
These are the contradictions that shape the party's activities in general and, as I will 
attempt to illustrate, that have conditioned the development of Labour's television 
policies in the last fifty years. 
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Chapter Two: 1951-1964 
Labour in Opposition: 1951-1955 
The Labour Party entered a long period of opposition that was marked by growing 
internal division. Labour leaders like Clement Attlee and Herbert Morrison were 
determined to downplay the importance of public ownership and 'attempted to throw 
off their commitments to further nationalisation as graceftilly as they were able' 
(Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970: 72). This reflected Morrison's belief that the political and 
social reforms of the 1945 Labour goverm-nent 'had finally given the working-class 
movement an equal status in society. The time to recognise that the demand for 
social justice had burst beyond the narrow divides of any class or section of the 
community had come' (Foote, 1997: 199). The call for further nationalisation would 
simply be a barrier to the urgent task of repositioning Labour as a national, and not a 
class, party and undermine its embracing of a mixed economy and social and 
political consensus. 
These views were nourished and developed by writers organised around the journal 
Socialist Coninientary in the late 1940s. Drawn from the right of the party and 
influenced by Labour figures like Evan Durban and Douglas Jay, the journal 
presented an early example of 'revisionist' ideas which came to fruition in the 
booming economic conditions of the 1950s. One of the first influential pieces of 
revisionist writing was the Labour MP Anthony Crosland's contribution to New 
Fabian Essays, a compilation of articles published in 1952 to provoke debate about 
Labour's ideological mission and political strategy. Crosland argued that increases 
in national and personal income had confounded the Marxist prediction of economic 
crisis and that we had entered a new kind of 'pluralist' society in which '[i]ndividual 
property rights no longer constitute the essential basis of economic and social 
power. ' Furthermore, as pure laissez-faire capitalism is challenged by state 
intervention and political and economic power is diffused, the rise of a technical and 
professional state has fragmented the existing class structure (Crosland, 1952: 38- 
42). 
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The consequence for Crosland was that Labour's socialism should no longer concern 
itself with questions of redistribution along class lines but with equality and common 
interest. In place of extending welfare, nationalisation and planning, Crosland called 
for psychological battles to increase participation and belonging in society, for 
example, more consultation in industry, more worker representation on boards and 
agreements requiring companies to act responsibly to their workers and communities. 
Although this redefinition of socialism resembled that of Herbert Morrison's 
deliberately vague statement in 1951 that socialism 'means the assertion of social 
responsibility for matters which are properly of social concern' (quoted in Foot, 
1973: 238), Crosland intended it as an attack on the conservatism of the Labour 
leadership. The new 'pluralist society' required an urgent reconsideration of 
Labour's approach to questions of profit, public ownership, equality and the role of 
the state. 'The revisionists', according to Geoffrey Foote, 'were in revolt against 
Corporate Socialism and wished to release the radical energies locked up in the 
Labour Party by an outmoded class outlook' (Foote, 1997: 205). In the figure of 
Hugh Gaitskell, later to become Labour leader, the revisionists were to have a crucial 
influence on the party for the rest of its years in opposition. 
From the left of the party, another group of MPs and activists were in revolt against 
the conservatism of the leaders and sought to protect the existing links of the party 
with the working-class movement and social ownership. The 'Bevanites', as those 
around Nye Bevan (the minister of health in the 1945 government) were dubbed by 
the press, provided the most serious and public opposition to the Labour leadership 
in the 1950s. Bevan attacked the boards of nationalised industries and called for an 
extension of the principle of industrial democracy. However, while the Bevanites 
sought a more favourable role for public ownership than that envisaged by either 
Morrison and the Labour leadership or the growing number of revisionists, they were 
wedded to parliamentary methods and focused, above all, on internal party reform. 
'This was a movement of the ranks to take hold of its executive bodies and 
organisations to effect a return to radical policies' (Jenkins, 1979: 265). 
The Bevanites were backed by the Tribune newspaper and commanded substantial 
influence in the constituency Labour parties as well as the trade unions. Their 
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influence peaked at Labour's 1952 conference when Bevanite candidates won six out 
of the seven constituency seats on the National Executive Committee, removing key 
right-wingers from the NEC. At the same conference, the left won a resolution for 
extending the range of industries to be nationalised, although one may assume that 
the leadership had little inclination to act on the motion. Throughout the early 1950s, 
the Bevanites were presented as an organised opposition to the leadership, blocking 
all attempts to 'modernise' the party and mobilising the power of the grassroots to 
defend social ownership. 
The reality is somewhat more complex. Resistance took place in the parliamentary 
arena and rarely spilled over into extra-parliamentary action. Furthermore, the 
clearest disagreements occurred over foreign and defence issues, particularly over 
German rearmament and relations with America. Ben Pimlott (1980: 174) argues that 
it is 'hard to see fundamental differences between the two sides: Bevan and Crosland 
shared many opinions. Most of the conflicts were not of principle but of degree... ' 
Bogdanor concurs that while Bevanism was a reaction to the consensual policies of 
the leadership, 'the revolt never became an articulate one. Policy differences on 
domestic issues were never clearly stated' (Bogdanor, 1970: 83). 
Labour failed to shrug off its ideological and organisational problems by the time it 
lost the 1955 general election. The party was simply not equipped to deal with 
unexpectedly favourable economic conditions. Throughout those early years of 
opposition, the party demonstrated a range of conflicting attitudes towards the USA, 
towards public ownership and private profit, towards state intervention and the free 
market and, in particular, towards the role of a socialist party in the post-war boom. 
There was consensus on the need for a mixed economy but the right of the party 
urged that the ties with the organised working class be loosened while the left argued 
to maintain these links. Bogdanor attributes Labour's 'years of wilderness' to the 
contradictions of the party's different constituencies: 
The Left failed to make a coherent and relevant case for nationalisatiop. 
The Revisionists failed to wean the party away from its traditional 
commitments. And those whose primary concern was to make the 
Labour Party an efficient and radical governing party failed to alter its 
doctrinal nature (ibid.: 113). 
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The result was a programme that failed to inspire any constituency. According to 
Stephen Haseler, 'the lack of adventure in Labour's proposals was stultifying the 
Party and frustrating its true radicals on the Pight as well as on the Left' (Haseler, 
1 
1969: 56). All these positions and problems were played out in Labour's approaches 
to the debates on the introduction of commercial television to which we now turn. 
Labour and the Battle for Commercial Television 
Such was the consensus between Labour and Conservatives in the 1950s that, 
according to Pinto-Duschinsky, '[t]here was no major issue, from 1951 onwards, 
which produced a fundamental cleavage between the official policy of the Labour 
Party and that of the Conservatives' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970: 71). The example of 
the introduction of commercial television is a clear exception to this. 
The one million TV sets in use in 1951 were tuned into a single BBC channel. This 
monopoly was deemed unacceptable by a minority in the ruling Conservative Party 
who set about 'liberating' British broadcasting through the introduction of 
competition into television. The broadcasting historian Asa Briggs confirms that 
'social change became associated, in consequence, between 1951 and 1955 ... with 
the Conservative Party's policy of "setting the people free... (Briggs, 1979: 428). 
Despite an initial reluctance to sanction sponsored or advertising-funded television, 
most Tory MPs were even more reluctant to sustain a broadcasting monopoly and 
backed the introduction of a commercial television service in 1955. 
The Conservatives were able to break the BBC's television monopoly and introduce 
commercial television for a number of reasons. H. H. Wilson's Pressure Group 
(196 1) argues that ITV was the product of a well-organised business lobby to unleash 
commercial forces inside broadcasting. Whale (1977) claims that commercial 
television provided a convenient battleground for a group of Tory MPs desperate to 
undermine the monopoly principle in British industry and to extend the free market. 
Seaton (in Curran and Seaton, 1997: 163) suggests that Winston Churchill was 
simply not prepared to defend the BBC, having harboured a grudge against the 
organisation since the 1926 General Strike. Briggs, however, emphasises the 
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coinprolnises made during the passage of the legislation and notes how the eventual 
structure of commercial television was closely modelled on the BBC in terms of the 
role of governors and a public service remit. He criticises Wilson for undervaluing 
the parliamentary manoeuverings with 'theiy many interesting undercurrents and the 
ultimate compromises on many points which ensured that even after the end of the 
BBC's monopoly Britain would still retain within a dual system provision for a 
single basic approach to the regulation and control of broadcasting' (Briggs, 1979: 
933). 
The Labour Party was a key part of the broad movement, including religious figures, 
leading Tories, university vice-chancellors, newspaper editors and Lord Reith, the 
founder of the BBC, which set out to oppose and compromise commercial television. 
Labour MPs suggested an all-party conference on broadcasting, argued for a free 
vote in the legislation and tabled dozens of amendments - all of which were ignored 
by the Tories. Wilson's account of Labour's involvement, however, stresses the 
futility of its opposition, as 
it is conceivable that nothing done by either the [previous 1945-195 1 
Labour Government or the proponents of public service broadcasting 
could have done more than delay the aspirations of those working within 
the Conservative coalition who consider broadcasting to be primarily a 
commercial instrument (Wilson, 1961: 208). 
Such a simple story fails to do justice to the myriad of positions held, principles 
argued and compromises negotiated by those around the Labour Party concerning the 
breaking of the monopoly. Television was not one of the key questions facing the 
party at the time but the events nevertheless reveal much about the priorities of and 
tensions between different elements of the party as it attempted to relate to the new 
economic developments and changing expectations of the early 1950s. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that Labour leaders of the time considered television policy 
in general to be less important than either press policy or political broadcasting. 
Tony Benn complained in 1953 that the NEC was 'hardly concerned with 
broadcasting in between elections' (Benn, 1953: 8). According to one biographer, 
Nye Bevan 'loathed television, believing that it turned politicians into 'pure salesmen 
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- like American politicians', and had never taken the trouble to master its 
techniques' (Campbell, 1987: 358) while Clement Attlee 'took very little interest in 
the media' (Harris, 1982: 519). 
This analysis gives a rather false impression of the then Labour leadership's 
ignorance about media matters given that Attlee and Morrison launched both the 
1949 Royal Commission on the Press and the 1951 Beveridge Report on 
Broadcasting. Yet it was press policy above all which captured the attention of the 
party. Irritated by the fierce criticisms of Conservative-supporting newspapers and 
worried about the future of a radical press, the 1945 Labour government became 
increasingly preoccupied with press reform. Tom O'Malley argues that 'Morrison, 
Attlee, other Ministers and the wider Labour movement were therefore critically 
aware of the problems posed for Labour by the press and this awareness underlay 
their willingness to initiate the inquiry in 1946' (O'Malley, 1997: 140-41). 10 At the 
height of debates over the introduction of commercial television, Labour leaders 
were still paying particular attention to the importance of newspapers. In 1954, the 
future Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell tried to persuade Cecil King, proprietor of the 
Daily Mirror, to set up a new right-wing Labour newspaper to counter the influence 
of Tribune and the Neiv Statesnian in the Labour movement (Shaw, 1988: 47). 
The leadership was also interested in taking advantage of new developments in 
broadcasting for electoral purposes and moved quickly to draw up a policy over 
political broadcasting and the production of election broadcasts. In May 1950, 
Morrison set up an unofficial and confidential 'Technical Committee on 
Broadcasting', involving ex-journalists like Tony Benn and George Darling, to 
advise on scripts and to prepare Labour leaders for broadcasting appearances. " In 
1953, Tony Benn prepared a report for the NEC recommending the creation of a 
'Joint Broadcasting Committee' to maximise the potential of television appearances 
by Labour politicians. Berm argued that the party 'should recognize the increased 
'('O'Malley points out that Labour had a long record of critical interventions concerning the 
partisanship and monopolistic tendencies of the British press which preceded its decision to set up the 
1949 Royal Commission on the Press. " According to Beim, the 'sub-committee had no official existence whatsoever, and derived its status 
entirely from the fact that its recommendations went to Herbert Morrison ... In view of the peculiar 
way in which it had been established, it operated almost in secret... ' (Benn, 1953: 2). 
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importance of broadcasting and Television and should seek to improve and extend 
existing techniques' (Benn, 1953: 14). This emphasis on political broadcasting as 
opposed to broadcasting policy was reflected in the weight attached to the former and 
the almost total exclusion of the latter in NEC meetings. The only time the NEC 
discussed its attitude towards commercial television between 1951 and 1955 was in 
September 1954 when it was forced to consider whether a resolution on the subject 
could go forward to annual conference. The NEC voted 13-9 to accept the resolution 
which criticised the Conservatives for introducing commercial television without a 
mandate from the British public and supported restoring broadcasting to public 
control with an additional channel. When it reached conference, the resolution was 
remitted and not commented upon further. The introduction of commercial 
television was thus never debated by a Labour conference. 
However the NEC had previously discussed policy when approving the party's 
evidence to the Beveridge Committee on Broadcasting which the Labour government 
had set up in 1949 to make recommendations on the future of the BBC. Labour's 
evidence was largely uncritical of the BBC and praised its 'tradition of fair comment 
and the presentation of all opinions on controversial subjects' (Labour Party, 1950: 
1). It expressed a clear opposition to 'sponsored radio' as being desired only by 
advertisers, suggested a degree of regional decentralisation for radio and opposed a 
separate corporation for television. This conflicted with the advice supplied to the 
NEC by George Darling MP who warned that, given the experience of the BBC, 'a 
single-monopoly tends to become hide-bound, to work to rigid formulae, stifling 
initiative and accepting mediocrity as an easy substitute for enterprise' (Darling, 
1950: 6). Labour's evidence did complain, however, of an 'anti-Labour bias' in 
news programmes 'as a matter of course' (Labour Party, 1950: 5) and proposed that 
the BBC deal with this by broadening the field of recruitment to allow for the 
inclusion of more working-class viewpoints. Substantial reform, it felt, was 
unnecessary. 
Tribune also came to the aid of the BBC. The BBC, it argued, was nothing like major 
private manufacturing monopolies and cartels where restrictive practices ought to be 
broken up. 'It is not an irresponsible dictatorship. Its affairs are under constant 
scrutiny in the press, and are supervised by public servants: that fabled despot, the D- 
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G, is not a free agent, but is responsible to the Governors' (Bain, 1951: 9). What is 
needed, argued THbune, 'is a really effective devolution of London control' (ibid. ) 
and increased accountability and democracy in the organisation. Both George 
Darling and Tony Benn suggested internal r9structuring to iron out the problems 
arising from monopoly. Darling proposed four separate broadcasting corporations, 
'efficiently manageable units' (HoC Debates, 19 July 195 1: col. 210) but saw no 
need for an overall change in broadcasting policy. Benn's idea to set up four 
separate boards of management to deal with the 'legitimate objections' (ibid.: col. 
1530) to monopoly held by Tory MPs was even praised, though subsequently 
ignored, by Ness Edwards, the Labour postmaster general (PMG). 
Labour's discussions on broadcasting policy in the early 1950s were therefore 
characterised both by a growing concern with the existence of an organisation which 
held a monopoly of the airwaves but also by a firm defence of that institution. The 
key problems were identified as administrative and organisational, how to fix what 
Darling called an 'overgrown machine' (ibid.: col. 210). There was little discussion 
about the political role of the BBC such as the make-up of its governors, its attitude 
towards the trade union movement, its interpretation of 'cultural unity' and, apart 
from occasional complaints to the general secretary, the extent of its impartiality. 
Beveridge himself expressed harsh criticisms of the BBC's Tondonization' and 
elitism but nevertheless recommended the renewal of the BBC's licence as the most 
favourable option. Labour was voted out of office before it could pass the legislation 
allowing the Conservatives to seize the opportunity for 'reform' and produce a White 
Paper in May 1952 that included one clause relating to commercial television. It was 
from this time that the battle started and the features of Labour's opposition to ITV 
emerged. 
The key opponent of commercial television was the National Television Council 
(NTC), established by the Labour MP Christopher Mayhew in June 1953. This was 
a cross-party campaign whose organising committee included an impressive array of 
Lords, Reverends, entertainment entrepreneurs, two Viscounts and a trade union 
leader, all united in defence of public service broadcasting. The combined forces of 
the representatives of entertainment workers and employers, religious and secular 
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bodies, government and opposition made for a high-profile campaign but one in 
which there were very fragile common interests. Leading figures from Prince Littler 
Productions and Associated British Pictures Corporation, both of which were active 
in the early years of ITV, were involved in the NTC. Trade union concerns about the 
impact of commercial television on film technicians' jobs coincided with worries 
about the moral health of the nation. 
The NTC argued that commercial television would not be in the 'national' interest. 
It avoided all criticisms of the BBC and conducted its campaign around the issues of 
protecting standards and values. A commercial network was being sought by a 
minority of 'interested parties' in Parliament and, furthermore, was not even desired 
by the general public. Theý NTC's pamphlet, Britain Unites Against Coninlercial TV, 
highlighted a recent Gallup Poll which showed that 'if the B. B. C. were permitted to 
provide alternative TV Programmes only ONE IN FIVE British people would want 
Commercial TV' (NTC, 1953). Mayhew was particularly concerned not by the 
commercialisation of televisionper se, but by the increasing 'Americanisation' of 
culture which commercial television would institutionalise. The scale of the 
American market, he argued, was such that not only would British networks be 
flooded by vulgar US imports but that British commercial programmes would be 
tailored for export to the American market. 'The danger of this is obvious, not only 
to our television standards, but to our whole national culture and way of life' 
(Mayhew, 1953). 
Labour's public and parliamentary campaign against commercial television echoed 
many of these strands. Anti-Americanism, an important source of division inside the 
Labour Party at the time, was virulent. Labour MP Charles Hobson argued that the 
legislation for ITV 'absolutely stinks of Americanism and American business 
methods ... hon. Gentlemen will realise that their attitude was entirely wrong for 
British political standards' (HoC Debates, 25 March 1954: col. 1484). Mayhew 
claimed that the legislation was a trojan horse for American business practices and 
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warned that 'we all still underestimate the menace of the impact of Americanism 
12 
which will come through this Bill' (HoC Debates, 22 June 1954: col. 336). 
Labour's central office issued a series of le; ýflets in 1953 in opposition to commercial 
television which followed a twin-track approach of defending national cultural 
standards and attacking the commercialisation of broadcasting. 'Not Fit For 
Children' screamed the headline of the first and claimed that '[t]his latest proposal is 
a menace to all our home standards and to the impressionable young minds of our 
children'. It criticised the 'Conservative TV (too vulgar) policy' and appealed to 
'KEEP OUR TV AND RADIO STANDARDS' (Labour Party 1953a). The next 
pamphlet called the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Coventry as witnesses to 
the effects of commercial television and promised that '[w]e will resolutely oppose 
the introduction of commercial TV. This service which is bound to exercise a 
growing influence on our national life must serve values and purposes which the 
nation approves - not those which advertising agencies force upon us' (Labour Party, 
1953b). 
Labour's exhortation to defend the British way of life was matched by a warning that 
commercial television would unleash market forces and lower programme quality. 
The Tory proposal 'means that Big Business will be able to move right into your 
house to sell their products. The standard of programmes will slump when the 
commercialisers get busy on the TV screen' (ibid. ). For one Labour MP, Malcolm 
MacPherson, this was a secondary concern. 'When people talk about the lowering of 
standards, what really matters is not primarily the standard of the programmes but 
the standard of our national life which will undoubtedly become debased if we 
increase the number of avenues by which money power can affect it' (HoC Debates, 
II June 1952: col. 260). The TUC adopted a similar anti-commercial approach and 
issued a statement opposing 'Sponsored Television': 'The potential influence of 
television on the lives of the people ... requires that in the public interest programmes 
should be controlled by a public authority which can give due weight to 
considerations of a non-commercial nature' (TUC, 1953: 175). 
12 This reflected the anti-Americanism, prevalent on the left but particularly inside the Communist 
Party, that fuelled the campaign against US horror comics at the same time (see Barker, 1984: 21-27). 4D 
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Both the TUC and Labour's official opposition to commercial television was marked 
by a firm defence of the status quo. According to H. H. Wilson this was no different 
to the position in 1946 when 'most of the crýtical opinion of the BBC seemed to 
centre in the ranks of the Labour Party, though the Party Leaders were then, as later, 
its staunch, unquestioning defenders' (Wilson, 1961; 42). Nevertheless, Labour 
leaders made important points that the Conservatives' plans were driven by the 
naked self-interest of the commercial lobby and that a public monopoly was to be 
merely supplanted by a private monopoly. In December 1953, Morrison and other 
Labour MPs proposed an all-party conference on the future of broadcasting that was 
brushed aside by the Tories. Labour tabled a series of amendments that were all 
rejected by the Government and then attempted, unsuccessfully, to block the 
legislation. 
If the Labour Party was opposed to the commercialisation of broadcasting, what was 
it actually in favour of? Labour leaders displayed a very ambivalent attitude towards 
change. If the BBC's services 'are probably the best to be found anywhere in the 
world' as Morrison had argued in 1952 (HoC Debates, II June 1952: col. 234), then 
why bother to change the system? Indeed, although Morrison praised both the 
achievements of the BBC and the possibilities of television in general, he also argued 
that 'we must remember about television that we can have too much of it' (ibid.: col. 
242). Too many hours of television viewing, he continued, would put people off 
reading books and restrict their education. When Morrison came to admit, fairly 
reluctantly, that a second channel was inevitable, he insisted that the 'most 
economical and most public-spirited way of promoting competition and viewers' 
choice' (HoC Debates, 14 December 1953: col. 76) would be to hand it over to the 
BBC as it was already running a 'responsible public service' (ibid. ). 
Labour leaders were desperately keen to be seen to be distancing themselves from 
the general principle of monopolies (see ibid.: col. 66), except in the specific case of 
the BBC. Anxious to appeal to the increasingly consumerist habits of workers, they 
were equally concerned to condemn the Tories as the stooges of American capital 
and champion Labour as the guardian of reliable British values. Labour's official 
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policy simultaneously lined it up with the voice of the 'establishment' and failed to 
articulate its supporters' desire for increased choice after years of austerity. 
The temperature was raised by Attlee's proTise at a miners' rally in June 1953 that if 
the Tories 'handed over television to private enterprise' then Labour would 'have to 
alter it when we get back to power' (quoted in Briggs, 1979: 897). This threat, 
repeated by Gordon Walker and Morrison during 1954, had the effect, according to 
Briggs, of polarising the issue along party lines. This position was also criticised by 
some on the left of the party who were unhappy with the trap the leadership was 
creating for itself. The Neiv Statesinan identified two problems with Labour's 
continuing hostility to commercial television. Firstly, the promise to repeal the 
legislation would most probably be an empty threat because several polls 
demonstrated commercial television's likely popularity. 13 Furthermore, 'Labour 
leaders may get led into an obscurantist and restrictive approach towards television 
in general. Nothing could be more deadly to the Party's chances of making an 
impact on the "unpolitical" voter' (Neiv Statesinan and Nation, 1954: 680). 
The left of the party had already begun to show some inclination to change the 
broadcasting status quo. For example, the Neiv Statesman displayed an early interest 
in the question of the structures of television. In 1952, an article advocated the 
creation of a series of local television stations accountable to elected Councillors 
which would 'help reffirbish the rich local cultural patterns of this country'. These 
competitive public local stations would provide an alternative to the BBC and 
safeguard against 'monopoly, bureaucracy and over-centralisation' (Neiv Statesinan 
and Nation, 1952: 396). A more detailed plan for broadcasting reform was suggested 
by the Bevanite Tribune newspaper with the following headline: BREAK UP THE 
BBC - BUT NO MR. MUGGS (in relation to the notorious chimpanzee who 
entertained American viewers in the commercial breaks during coverage of the 
Coronation). Tribune moved away from its earlier defence of the BBC and attacked 
opponents of commercial television for pretending that 'the present public monopoly 
is perfect' and for abandoning 'the idea of any competition in television or radio 
13 See Briggs (1979: 898 and 924) for poll evidence that substantial numbers of Labour supporters 
would welcome commercial programmes. 
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services' (Tribune, 1953). It proposed an increase in the license fee to pay for new 
television services (as people would otherwise have to pay for advertisements in the 
commercial system), the creation of separate public corporations for television and 
the devolution of the BBC into independentregional corporations. 'This is the way', 
I 
the newspaper argued, 'to remove the evils of monopoly without placing television 
and radio at the mercy of commercial interests' (ibid. ). 
The revisionist Socialist Commentary immediately hit back at these suggestions and 
attacked Ti-ibune for complicating the job of the Labour leadership, presumably for 
associating Labour with a tax increase. It urged a policy of pragmatism: 'It is 
attractive to ponder on the possibility of two or more corporations competing with 
equal resources and equal access to performers and public. The problem is one of 
finance' (Socialist Commentary, 1953: 287). 
The call for pragmatism was echoed in the unions. The Labour-affiliated 
Association of Cinematograph and Allied Technicians (ACT) declared its 
'unalterable opposition to the introduction of commercial television' but then faced 
two motions at its 1954 Conference recommending the adoption of "a more realistic 
attitude toward Commercial Television. If the Bill before the House is passed, which 
seems inevitable, then the A. C. T. should do everything in its power to ensure that 
A. C. T. technicians be employed' (ACT, 1954: 15). The BBC Staff Association 
(ABS), which was not affiliated to Labour, opted for an even more flexible line. 
Firstly, it condemned the government's decision and declared in 1954 that 'it will in 
the national interest take every step in its power to maintain the existing high quality 
of broadcasting with a view to counteracting any deterioration of standards which 
may follow intrusion of the profit motive' (ABS, 1954: 206). When the subject 
reappeared the following year the NEC decided that, 'while in no way relaxing our 
vigilance in regard to service standards, it would be inconsistent with our role as the 
representative of staff in commercial broadcasting undertakings to give any further 
publicity to this resolution' (ABS, 1955: 63). 
Given that ITV would soon become a reality, the fourteen unions in the 
entertainment industry collectively called for a quota of British material to be no less 
than 80%. This resolution was remitted at the 1954 TUC Conference on the basis 
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that the Television Bill was not law but the broadcasting unions received an 
assurance from the General Council that '[w] e are anxious that this new commercial 
television system shall reflect, as the Bill originally said it should, programmes 
which are predominantly British in tone andstyle' (TUC, 1954: 457/8). 
1 
It was not only the unions who had conflicting interests over commercial television. 
Sidney Bernstein, the Chairman of Granada Theatres and a long-term Labour 
supporter, was personally opposed to commercial television but wrote to Morrison in 
1953 informing him that Granada had already applied for a licence. 
This does not indicate any change of feelings about commercial or 
sponsored television; I still think the country would be better off without 
it. However, if there is to be commercial television in this country, we 
think we should be in, and this may very well be useful one day (quoted 
in Moorhead, 1984: 215). 
Eric Fletcher, the Labour MP for Islington and a vice-president of Associated British 
Pictures Corporation (ABPC), was involved with Mayhew's NTC and, according to 
H. H. Wilson, offered ABPC's services in the campaign (Wilson, 1961: 154). 
However, Fletcher also went along with the enthusiasm for commercial television 
shown by his shareholders and described his dilemna. Despite opposing the Bill, 
as a member of the Board I co-operated with the decision of the majority 
that an application should be made for a Television contract. Thereafter, 
I took a great interest in the activities of the new company, ABC 
Television ... and I became Deputy-Chairman (Fletcher, 1986: 177). 
Cecil King, the proprietor of the Labour-supporting Daily Mirror had always been in 
favour of commercial television. Not surprisingly, the Conservative postmaster- 
general wrote to him in 1954 inviting him to apply for a licence. King declined 
because 'fantastic restrictions had been introduced ... which hacked the original TV 
Bill to shreds' (quoted in Sendall, 1982: 72). He made it clear that he was simply 
biding his time: 'I was in favour of commercial television from the start as the only 
way of putting some life into BBC television. I told my people we would come in 
after the second bankruptcy as I foresaw a large expenditure before any possible 
return' (ibid. ). True to his word, in 1956 King stepped in with E750,000 to help 
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ATV's finances and Hugh Cudlipp, the Mirivi-'s editor, joined the board of ATV. 
According to Sendall, '[t]here was indeed no opposition to the Mirrorjoining ATV: 
notfivin any quarter' (ibid.: 191 - emphasis added). 
So despite the official position of the Labour Party and the TUC of complete 
opposition to commercial television, by early 1956 Labour supporters were playing 
key roles in three of the four ITV companies. This was not as surprising as it seems 
because, privately, not all Labour MPs were hostile to the idea of ITV. Indeed David 
Hardman, a fon-ner parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Education in the 1945 
government, associated himself with the Popular Television Association, the lobby 
group infavour of ITV. Richard Crossman, the editor of Neiv Fabian Essa and a 
leading Bevanite, declared that, although he was against the government's plans to 
set up a 'mixed' broadcasting system, 'I do not feel as passionately as most of the 
Party against the principle of sponsoring'. He further proposed that the government 
retain the BBC's monopoly but also allow two hours of sponsored progranu-nes every 
evening (Crossman, 1981: 109). More importantly, Hugh Gaitskell, the shadow 
chancellor and future leader of the Labour Party, was never convinced by the 
opposition to commercial television. His biographer, drawing on unpublished 
comments from Gaitskell's diary, confirrns that: 
As a politician he knew that independent television was popular, and he 
would neverjoin the Establishment's cultural crusade against it. As early 
as 1953 he told Crossman, who had asked if the next Labour government 
would reverse the newly proposed policy: 'No, and anyway, it's a pity 
we didn't encourage the BBC to lease out time to commercial 
companies' (Williams, 1979: 390). 
Gaitskell does not figure in any of the public debates or statements concerning 
television, but his views about the need for Labour to relate to the changing 
expectations of the 1950s were clear. In a post-1955 election analysis in Socialist 
Connnentary which prefigured many of the debates of the rest of the decade, he 
emphasised the importance of connecting the party to the desire for material 
advancement: 
No doubt it has been stimulated by the end of post-war austerity, TV, 
new gadgets like refrigerators and washing machines, the glossy 
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magazines with their special appeal to women, and even the flood of new 
cars on the home markets. Call it if you like a growing Americanization 
of outlook. I believe it's there and it's no good moaning about it ... 
We 
must talk in terms that appeal to the ordinary citizen' (Gaitskell, 1955: 
205). 
Labour's opposition to commercial television, therefore, was far from united and 
consistent. The party demonstrated a tactical flexibility in its attitudes towards the 
Television Bill that demonstrated a commitment more to electoral success than the 
defence of firm principles. Pressed in 1952 by the Tories on whether Labour would 
repeal the legislation, the former PMG Ness Edwards asserted that 'when we are 
returned to power our position will be completely reserved. This Government do not 
determine what the next Government are going to do' (HoC Debates: II June 1952, 
col. 322). After Attlee's rather rash promise in 1953 to scrap commercial television, 
Morrison argued the following year in Parliament that Labour's position was highly 
contingent on the specific circumstances of the time. 
I must make it clear that the whole of this scheme is highly objectionable, 
and there is already substantial evidence that it may prove to be 
unworkable. In that case we shall certainly not scrap the safeguards, but 
must reserve the right to modify or, indeed, abandon the entire scheme, 
and this may well include the complete elimination of the proposals for 
advertising (HoC Debates, 22 June 1954: col. 1473). 
The position was finally thrashed out in January 1955 when a short-lived 'Joint 
Committee on the Future of TV' was convened to sort out a party policy on 
television for the impending general election. The group included representatives 
from all sides of the party, from Tom Driberg on the Bevanite left to the Gaitskellite 
Patrick Gordon Walker. The minutes indicate a stormy meeting in which Morrison 
suggested 'an unconditional declaration' against advertising while another member 
proposed that the new Independent Television Authority be 'kept in existence and 
allowed to prepare its own programmes' with all advertising restricted to one hour 
each day (Labour Party 1955). It was agreed that 'although expensive, two 
programmes [channels] were needed' and that the BBC was best placed to deliver 
both, although there was no consensus on whether to increase the license fee. 
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Finally, a resolution was agreed that 'the Labour Party should declare itself opposed 
to advertising on TV, and in favour of the public service principle' (ibid. ). This 
important statement laid the basis for the party's eventual manifesto declaration that 
'[t]elevision is a growing influence for goO. or ill. Labour will establish an 
alternative public television service, free from advertising' (quoted in Craig, 1975: 
206). Commitments to repeal the legislation, to abolish the Independent Television 
Authority or to revoke the licenses of commercial television companies were all, 
however, noticeably absent. 
Opposition to the Conservatives' plans for commercial television was not completely 
in vain. The NTC's high-profile campaign certainly helped to block the worst 
excesses of sponsored television and its 'influence was important in the eventual 
creation of a public authority to own the transmitting facilities and licence the 
programme companies' (Wilson, 1961: 179). It is also likely that, although no 
Labour amendments were accepted by the government, its constant pressure was 
effective in securing the inclusion of various restrictions on commercial activities in 
the final legislation (see ibid.: 201-205). However, it is far from proven that it was 
vigorous parliamentary opposition which limited the total victory of free marketeers 
inside the Tory Party. There was a cross-party consensus that, given the importance 
of broadcasting, there would have to be some form of regulation. According to 
Bernard Sendall, the historian of commercial television, 
... since, as all parties to the debates seemed to accept, television broadcasting was a uniquely powerful means of influencing minds, then 
any person or persons granted the privilege of using that power should, in 
the public interest, be made subject to proper restraints. Thus in the 
debates that followed, Government spokesmen repeatedly asserted a 
willingness - provided the two prerequisites of competition and 
advertising finance, stayed untouched - to consider, possibly to adopt, 
any reasonable measures to dissipate whatever grounds orjustification 
there might be for the fears of the Bill's opponents' (Sendall, 1982: 34). 
In the end, Labour's resistance to the introduction of commercial television was 
undermined by a combination of factors. Television policy was not a central concern 
for the leadership and, given the likely popularity of commercial television amongst 
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Labour supporters (see Wilson, 1961: 179), it was not prepared to antagonise its 
electorate. Labour leaders were finn defenders of the broadcasting status quo and, as 
Wilson argued, 'never fully comprehended the stakes involved in maintaining public 
service broadcasting' (ibid.: 206) seen by m4ny as patronising and distant. Labour's 
opposition was further compromised by the inclusion in or association with the party 
of those who were set to gain financially from commercial television. Having 
accepted the principle of a mixed economy, sections of the leadership reserved their 
criticism not for the pursuit of profit but for the spreading of 'foreign' values and the 
domination of US capital; others welcomed 'Americanisation' and urged the party to 
embrace the consumer revolution. 
The left, also wedded to the idea of a mixed economy, intervened only occasionally 
in the debates as its real interest lay elsewhere in foreign and defence issues. Apart 
from the Tribune article already discussed, the closest the Bevanites came to tackling 
popular culture was Ian Mikardo's pamphlet on the Royal Commission on Betting 
and Gaming, It's a Mug'S Ganie (Mikardo, 1988: 122). The ground was left clear, 
therefore, for the growing revisionist wing of the Labour Party to articulate an 
approach to culture in general, and television in particular, that sought to connect 
with rising expectations and living standards in the 1950s. Attlee's defeat in the 
general election of May 1955, the launch of commercial television in September of 
that year and the election of Hugh Gaitskell as leader of the Labour Party in 
December 1955 provided the conditions that allowed this approach to evolve. 
Revisionism and 'The Age of Participation' 
In March 1955, T. R. Fyvel wrote an article for the revisionist journal Socialist 
Commentary which analysed the changing nature of British society and claimed that 
Britain had entered 'The Age of Participation'. In a buoyant economy, 
there is to-day an ever growing middle section of the population which 
can - and does - participate in the material good life of to-day which is 
based on the possession of cars, motor-cycles, radio and television sets, 
on super-cinemas, chain stores and organised holidays, on the Pools, the 
dogs, the mass circulation magazine, and the rest (Fyvel, 1955: 70). 
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He went on to argue that the Labour Party needed to recognise that this was a more 
dynamic and efficient form of capitalism where simply pledging to defend living 
standards would not be enough to appeal to the average voter. Labour's task was not 
to transform capitalism but to 'humanise' it,, to increase access to the wonderful 
opportunities of the new classless, consumer society. The key to unlocking electoral 
success was to champion equality of opportunity and to distance the party from 
6vague' economic questions such as the defence of living standards. 
This analysis was amplified in Anthony Crosland's 'bible' of revisionism, The 
Future ofSocialisin, published in 1956. Crosland developed the arguments from his 
contribution to Neiv Fabian Essays into a fully-fledged statement that 'capitalism' 
was no longer an adequate way of describing British society in the 1950s and that the 
Labour Party would have to redefine its socialism to meet this change. It was an 
approach that provided an important intellectual justification for the Labour 
leadership's determination to reposition the party away from the trade unions and 
towards cross-class organisation. 
Crosland argued that British industry had become more specialised and complex in 
the previous decade and that the domination by entrepreneurial owners was being 
challenged by the rise of salaried managers. Companies were more likely to reinvest 
profits and not to turn to 'outside' capital to finance expansion. Indeed profits were 
no longer the sole point of business as latter-day industrialists also sought the respect 
of their peers, intellectual prestige and a civic reputation, none of which could be 
guaranteed by capital alone. This did not mean, according to Crosland, that 'the 
profit-motive has disappeared' but that it was universal: 
It is a mistake to think that profit, in the sense of a surplus over cost, has 
any special or unique connection with capitalism. On the contrary, it 
must be the rationale of business activity in any society, whether 
capitalist or socialist, which his growing and dynamic' (Crosland, 1980: 
16). 
With the decline of 'traditional capitalist ruthlessness' in pursuit of profit, Crosland 
believed that private industry, to use Fyvel's term, 'is at last becoming humanised' 
(ibid.: 18). All the features of capitalism which Marx had identified in the previous 
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century had been superseded: laissez-faire had given way to state intervention, 
managerialism had replaced entrepreneurialism, 'the distribution of personal income 
has become significantly more equal' (ibid.: 3 1), private property had lost its 
ideological allure and, finally, class struggle, was no longer in evidence. Given 'The 
Growing Irrelevance of the Ownership of the Means of Production' (ibid.: 35), as 
one chapter was headed, it was no surprise to learn that in answer to the question, 'Is 
this still Capitalism', Crosland responded with a firm 'No' (ibid.: 42). 
While the theorising of the decline of entrepreneurialism and aggressive profiteering 
is especially curious when applied to the cash-rich experience of commercial 
television in the subsequent years, Crosland's account of the withering away of 
capitalism had an immediate impact. He helped to write the party's Industry and 
Society document, passed at the 1957 annual conference, which signalled a further 
attack on Labour's commitment to public ownership. As Keith Laybourn argues, 
Industry and Society was a key component of Gaitskell's belief that 'the Labour 
Party needed to focus upon the needs of a working class which was being imbued 
with middle-class values' (Laybourn, 1988: 155). Crosland therefore attempted to 
sketch out a strategy through which Labour could relate to this historic shift and 
realign itself as the party of social equality and not social ownership. 
There are two aspects of this strategy which are particularly relevant to the political 
status of television and culture in the late 1950s. Firstly, Crosland argued that it was 
essential to raise the level of average income because 
the higher the level of average income, the more equal is the visible 
pattern of consumption, and the stronger the subjective feeling of equal 
living standards ... the richer a country grows, the more equal the distribution of these particular forms of consumption becomes, almost 
regardless of the distribution of total income (Crosland, 1980: 208 - my 
italics). 
Crosland's evidence of this was the polarisation of wealth in developing countries in 
contrast to the more egalitarian situation in the USA with a much higher average 
income. In any case, given the context of a rapidly expanding British economy, this 
was a less than controversial plan. Indeed, Crosland argued that inequality was 
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bound to fall in the 'modem mass-production economy' (ibid.: 211) because as long 
as there is a limit to the consumption of the rich, the poor will be able to close the 
gap. What is more revealing is the emphasis on the pei-ception of equal living 
standards and the call for increased consumqrism, as opposed to any material 
redistribution of wealth. However, this plan required the correct sort of consumption 
if there was to be an 'atmosphere of greater equality' (ibid.: 215). The problem in 
Britain, according to Crosland, was that increased consumption usually centred on 
'low-status' goods peculiar to working-class interests, like magazines, cinema 
tickets, tabloid newspapers, alcohol and tobacco. What was needed, therefore, was 
for ordinary people to shift their expenditure onto 'high-status' goods like television 
sets and car ownership. 'There are clear political implications here for the Labour 
Party, which would be ill-advised to continue making a largely proletarian class 
appeal when a majority of the population is gradually attaining a middle-class 
standard of life, and distinct symptoms even of a middle-class psychology' (ibid.: 
216). 
The second task for Labour in the pursuit of social equality, according to Crosland, 
was to campaign over moral and cultural issues like sexuality, censorship and 
divorce in order to 'diminish existing restrictions on personal freedom' (ibid.: 354). 
This also required a break from Labour's previous economistic and puritanical 
attitudes and to 'turn our attention increasingly to other, and in the long run more 
important spheres... ' (ibid.: 353). In a celebrated passage, Crosland explained that 
this meant that: 
We need not only higher exports and old-age pensions, but more open-air 
cafes, brighter and gayer streets at night, later closing-hours for public 
houses, more local repertory theatres, better and more hospitable 
hoteliers and restauranteurs, brighter and cleaner eating houses, more 
riverside cafes ... and so on ad infinitzinz' (ibid.: 355). 
While it is easy to criticise Crosland's idealism and necessary to point out that the 
adoption of such ideas did nothing to rescue Labour in the 1959 General Election, it 
was at least an attempt to come to terms with changing circumstances. The Bevanite 
left, on the other hand, offered little organisational or intellectual challenge to 
revisionist ideas in the period between 1955 and 1959. Bevan's incorporation into 
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the leadership and a desire for unity in the party marginalised critics of revisionism. 
Pimlott talks of the 'persistent philistinism' (Pimlott, 1980: 185) that has always 
prevented the Labour left from contributing to future policy while Cliff and 
Gluckstein attribute its weakness to an ideol9gical failure. 
I 
While the revisionists wandered around the new post-capitalist 
Wonderland, the Bevanites, like the doormouse at the Mad Hatter's tea 
party, kept their eyes tight shut. They tried simply to deny the boom 
would last, saying that mass unemployment was only just around the 
comer. But facts are stubborn things (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988: 262). 
The facts were that, despite a few hiccups, the boom was continuing and the Tories 
once again benefited from rising living standards in the 1959 'You've Never Had It 
So Good' election. The reaction to defeat was swift as the right argued that Labour 
was being severely compromised by its continuing association with working-class 
interests while the left argued the party had shifted too far away from nationalisation 
and socialism. According to Ralph Miliband, both were wrong: 'By 1959, Labour's 
image was much too blurred to give either defeat or victory so precise a political or 
ideological meaning' (Miliband, 1961: 344). Nevertheless, the revisionists felt they 
were vindicated by the publication in 1960 of Must Labour Lose? (Abrams and Rose, 
1960), a short book which set out to examine Labour's role in the age of 
'embourgeoisiement'. According to Socialist Commentary's Rita Hinden, Labour 
was destined to keep losing as long as it was perceived as being based on a class that 
was shrinking, and continued to identify with unpopular notions of solidarity and 
nationalisation (in ibid.: 119). In reality, the survey on which the book was based 
found 'no homogeneous blanket attitude towards public ownership' (ibid.: 3 1) and 
provided no evidence that material advancement corresponded to voting 
Conservative. The sample of 724 people revealed that 'at least half the working 
class acquired durable consumer goods on at least as lavish a scale as their 
neighbours - but continued to vote Labour' (ibid.: 42). 
The rash of 'affluent worker' studies in the early 1960s that spoke of increased 
political apathy and a weak, functional attachment to Labour proved not that the 
working class had disappeared as a social force but that Labour had failed to link 
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material expectations to a programme of structural reform. As one commentator 
wrote: 
Developments since 1950 have had the effect, not of decomposing the 
class or making it selfish or intoa poor copy of its betters, but of 
allowing working people greater access to the opportunities and goods 
produced by an expanding economy (Cronin, 1984: 11). 
The result was a less instinctive loyalty to the Labour Party but hardly a sign of 
middle-class consciousness. 
The most trenchant criticism of the revisionists was provided by a group with only 
indirect links to the Labour Party. The New Left grew out of the dissatisfaction with 
both Stalinism and Bevanism and was composed of former members of the 
Communist Party, individuals from the Labour left, peace campaigners and radical 
students. It sought to keep alive a genuinely radical anti-capitalist tradition and to 
build a democratic culture in opposition to the intellectual stagnation of the 
Bevanites and Stalinists. Focusing on the anti-nuclear struggle of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the New Left made its impact with a 100,000 strong 
demonstration in Easter 1960 and the adoption of a unilateralist position at that 
year's Labour Party conference (albeit one that was reversed the following year). 
In the pages of the new j ournals, The Ne iv Reasoner and Universities and Left 
Review, activists and commentators stressed the importance of collective struggle 
and democratic organisation to change both economic and cultural circumstances. 
E. P. Thompson's account of the New Left railed against the intellectual conformity 
of the Labour Party and argued that 'the Fabian prescription of a competitive 
Equality of Opportunity is giving way, among socialists, before the re-discovery of 
William Morris' vision of a Society of Equals' (Thompson, 1959: 10). For 
Thompson, cultural questions were not secondary to what the Bevanite left called 
'bread-and-butter' issues but were intrinsic to debates on political power. While 
echoing the concerns of the revisionists to engage with questions of consumption, the 
New Left had different solutions: 'it become ever more clear that the fight to control 
and break-up the mass media, and to preserve and extend the minority media, is as 
central in political significance as, for example, the fight against the Taxes on 
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Knowledge in the 1830s' (ibid.: 11). Aware that the revisionists were attempting to 
monopolise debates on the consumer society, the New Left sought to win back for 
the left the idea of a democratic culture. 
In doing so, the New Left was influenced by two critics of the effects of the 
commercialisation of culture on working-class life. Richard Hoggart argued in The 
Uses ofLiteracy, first published in 1957, that the new cultural forms of popular 
music, sensationalist magazines and American television were usurping traditional 
working-class values. 'Everything has gone vicarious: this is puff-pastry literature, 
with nothing inside the pastry, the ceaseless exploitation of a hollow brightness' 
(Hoggart, 1960: 191). Hoggart and then Raymond Williams in The Long Revolution 
(196 1) counterposed the vision of an organic common culture which celebrated 
working-class life and institutions to the inauthentic commercial mass culture of 
contemporary Britain. Hoggart and Williams, according to Dennis Dworkin (1997: 
98), 'were two of the most important influences on New Left efforts at reframing 
socialist priorities, and they were instrumental in establishing the parameters of the 
debate on working-class culture. ' Their ideas were to be particularly important for 
socialists involved in the debates around television in the early 1960s. 
Although the New Left engaged in some of the sharpest, public critiques of 
revisionism and certainly helped to galvanise the peace movement, its impact on 
Labour policy is far from clear-cut. According to Foote (1997: 288), the New Left 
always had an 'ambiguous' attitude towards Labour, both attacking it for 
accommodation to capitalism and then looking to parliamentary change and seeking 
the support of the party. Despite the New Left's many critiques of revisionism and 
the lack of internal democracy, 
it stopped short of abandoning the Labour Party. It never doubted that 
Labour was the party of British working people or that it was 
indispensable to a socialist transformation. In short, New Left activists 
saw themselves as being both inside and outside the Labour Party, a 
position that evoked scepticism from both the radical left and committed 
Labour veterans (Dworkin, 1997: 61/2). 
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In the end, it was neither the traditional Labour left nor the New 'cultural' Left which 
weakened the grip of revisionism but a very old-fashioned phenomenon: the return of 
economic crisis. The slowing down of economic growth meant that '[r]evisionism 
took a new form. Hope of bright cafes, fashions and murals evaporated, along with 
major social reform and redistribution of wealth and income' (Cliff and Gluckstein, 
1988: 279). Nevertheless, Croslandite revisionism provided the main backdrop for 
Labour's television policy from 1955 until the election of Harold Wilson and a new 
Labour government in 1964. 
The Third Channel, ITV Profits and the Pilkington Report 
Once the 1955 election had passed and commercial television had started, Labour 
showed little inclination to discuss television policy. Preoccupied with the Suez 
crisis and the return of Nye Bevan to the fold, it was once again the question of 
political broadcasting which took centre-stage. Live broadcasts about the Suez 
situation by both Prime Minister Eden and an Opposition reply by Gaitskell in 
November 1956 preceded the trial suspension of the Fourtcen-Day Rule the 
following month. 
However, in November 1957, stimulated by rumours that the government was soon 
to decide on the status of a third channel, the Labour Party Public Information Group 
met to consider the party's attitude towards television. Tony Benn had, in that same 
month, advocated the creation of a competitive broadcasting system consisting of 
two public radio corporations and two public television corporations (including the 
ITA), all allowed to carry advertising (see ABS, 1957: 261). Benn opened the 
discussion at the meeting and noted that '[t]he reception was fairly frosty. Mayhew 
who followed, wants to nationalise the commercial programme companies. He is a 
little better than Scholefield Allen [Labour MP for Crewe], who does not even have a 
television set' (Benn, 1994a: 253). 
Seven months later in July 1958, convinced that the Tories were about to decide on 
the future of the 'Third Programme', Labour's Home Policy Committee (HPC) set up 
a sub-committee on television and radio to advise on broadcasting policy. The sub- 
committee, which included Tom Driberg, Patrick Gordon Walker, George Brown 
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and Richard Crossman, agreed that if an election statement was required on the 
subject it should state that: 'The Labour Party is in favour of maintaining competition 
in the field of television' (Labour Party, 1958a). The committee further decided to 
prepare papers on the short-term and long-term problems of broadcasting. Four 
months later the committee reconvened with a paper that addressed two issues 
concerning television: the technical arguments for moving to 625 lines of 
transmission and the nature of the Third Programme. 
Curiously, after years of uncritically defending the BBC, 'the case today for giving 
the Third Programme to the B. B. C. is far less plain' (Labour Party, 1958b: 5). The 
paper sketched out three objections to the BBC running a new network. Firstly, ITV 
was more popular and 'if popularity is the test - and it cannot be dismissed as of no 
consequence - the BBC's claim is weak' (ibid. ). Secondly, competition had been 
good for television in general and the BBC in particular: 'the I. T. A. has in three 
years blown away much of the stuffiness, timidity and paternalism that characterised 
British broadcasting' (ibid.: 5/6). Finally, the BBC was short of money and would 
require an increase in the licence fee if it was to operate a new channel. 
With the exception of eternal worries about a rise in the licence fee, these were very 
new arguments for the Labour leadership. It had never before publicly accused the 
BBC of either being stuffy, timid or paternalistic and it had certainly not claimed that 
popularity was the key test of public service in the debates in the early fifties. The 
document went on to argue that 'the most powerful claimant to the Third Programme 
is the I. T. A. ' (ibid.: 6) because its programmes were more popular, it would 
introduce more competition into broadcasting and, crucially, it had no financial 
problems. Although there were some concerns with programme quality and origin 
and media concentration, 'the reality [of commercial television] has been far less 
awful than was anticipated. I. T. A. has played its cards with skill' (ibid.: 8). The key 
problem for sanctioning a second commercial network was that 'we have not yet had 
any experience of competitive commercial television' (ibid.: 9- emphasis in original) 
and that, if it was allowed, 'the Queensbury Rules of the past three years may quickly 
be abandoned' (ibid. ). 
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Perhaps such a positive assessment of the first years of commercial television was to 
be expected given the political realignment taking place in the Labour Party and the 
undoubted popularity of the service. But the party was also reluctant to identify itself 
too closely with a system which, after all, was characterised by Roy Thomson's 
comment in 1957 that controlling an ITV franchise was 'just like having a licence to 
print your own money' (quoted in Sendall, 1982: 150). Instead the sub-committee 
proposed a new independent, competitive public service organisation: 'The Third 
Programme should aim to entertain and inform a wide public. Like the B. B. C. its 
output would include programmes of minority appeal, but it would not generally, let 
alone exclusively, cater for high-brow or specialist groups' (Labour Party, 1959b: 3). 
The network would differ from commercial television 'in that the new corporation 
would have the obligation to plan its own programmes' and would differ from the 
BBC 'in that its revenues would come in part from advertising' and in part from 
licence revenue (Labour Party, 195 8b: 10). It appeared that the committee was 
aiming to please a range of different constituencies as viewers would have more 
choice, advertisers would have more outlets, broadcasters would have an expanding 
and competitive system and goverm-nent would not have to risk unpopularity by 
increasing the licence fee. The paper promised that, if the principle was accepted, a 
more complete financial account of the new channel would be prepared. 
A new independent television corporation was both a convenient compromise for 
Labour and yet also an intriguing proposition which prefigured the discussions some 
fifteen years later concerning an Open Broadcasting Authority running a fourth 
television channel. The film and ITV technicians' union, the ACTT, broadly 
supported the sub-committee's plan for a more diverse channel and advocated a 
'Television Foundation', the same phrase used by Anthony Smith thirteen years later 
in his call for a National Television Foundation. This was to be based on a 'new, 
independent, lively and modem approach which will command the respect of the 
viewers both for its integrity and its awareness of contemporary thought and issues' 
(ACTT, 1959: 57). In fact there was a fairly broad consensus that, in order to 
increase programme diversity, neither the ITA nor the BBC should be given a new 
channel. Mayhew (1959), Greenwood (1959), Tribune (1962) and Crosland (I 962a) 
all supported the idea while Richard Hoggart (195 8: 3 6), although certain that 
commercial television should not get another channel, was not sure if the BBC could 
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rise to the challenge. In a substantial poll before the 1959 General Election, the 
ACTT polled candidates about whether they supported the idea of a new public 
corporation to run the third channel. Of Labour candidates who were elected, 79% 
were in favour with only 2% against; of tho5e were not elected, 94% were in favour 
I 
with none against (Elvin, 1959: 180). The demand for a new channel independent of 
both the BBC and ITV was evidently popular inside the Labour Party. 
The television sub-committee met again in February 1959 to consider a paper 
outlining the financial plans for the Third Programme. The original proposal had 
suggested that the new corporation would be funded both by licence and advertising 
revenue. Accordingly, the paper argued that the new channel could be launched with 
the money returned to the Treasury from the excise on television licences as well as 
the Treasury deduction of 12.5% from the licence fee itself. This would total around 
E16m in 1961 (compared to some D 1m for the BBC as a whole) of which some f2m 
could be given to the BBC in order to finance its extension of broadcasting hours, 
leaving L14m for the new channel. This would be supplemented by revenue from 
commercial television and the key question for the Committee was 'how to obtain 
money from the programme companies' (Labour Party, 1959a: 3). 
Two methods were considered: either a special tax on the ITV companies' profits or 
an increase in the rents charged by the ITA. The former suggestion 'appears to be 
justified because the programme companies are, to a large extent, monopolies, and 
are therefore making monopoly profits' (ibid. ). However the paper then presented 
four arguments against this proposal. Firstly, '[a]s all taxes are unpopular, the 
programme companies might well be able to wage a powerftil campaign against it' 
(ibid. ). Next, it might be seen as unfair to introduce this kind of windfall levy against 
only one type of monopoly profit. Thirdly, 'it would be difficult to explain the 
nature of monopoly profits to the electorate ... What, the television companies might 
ask, is freer than air? ' (ibid. ) Finally, and perhaps most coherently, the Inland 
ReVenue 'would find it difficult to distinguish television profits from those the 
programme companies make elsewhere' (ibid. ). 
The committee's reluctance to impose a tax of ITV profits was justified by the 
electorate's apparent inability to understand why the ITV companies were starting to 
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make vast amounts of money. The committee's decision, however, also revealed the 
party leadership's lack of commitment to intervene in private business matters and a 
desire not attack private profits per se. The document provides no detail as to why 
the population would be so baffled by the nqed to introduce a special tax on 
entrepreneurs with very lucrative monopolies on advertising, nor why legislation 
could not be introduced to force the ITV companies to be more transparent in their 
accounting practices. Perhaps it was the case that as Labour leaders were busy 
theorising the decline of entrepreneurial capitalism and the emergence of a new 
consensual relationship between the state and private business, this was a problem 
that simply could not be allowed to exist. 
The paper rejected the imposition of a special tax and opted for the second 
suggestion: an increase in the rents charged by the ITA that would amount to about 
f5m a year. The increase, however, would not be able to take place until 1964 when 
the contracts were due to be renewed. The paper asserted that the total sum available 
from the Treasury and commercial television, some E20m, would be more than 
enough to finance the Third Programme. Having treated the ITV companies so 
gently throughout, the paper then concluded with some extremely judicious 
language: '[t]he section which discusses the method by which money can be 
obtained from the programme companies assuines that it is decided to retain thenz 
when the I. T. A. 's charter comes up for renewal' (ibid.: 4- emphasis added). At the 
same time as expressing reservations about placing a special tax on monopoly profits 
for fear that its supporters would not understand why, Labour also reserved the right 
to revoke ITV licences at the first available opportunity. Of course it is not clear 
whether the phrase 'to retain them' applies to specific programme companies or the 
system in general, but it is noteworthy that Labour, despite its recent conversion to 
commercial television, was at least formally keeping its options open. 
The committee accepted the paper and, in the knowledge that an election was due 
that year, prepared two statements. One was a detailed outline of Labour's proposals 
for the Third Programme in response to any government policy on the matter; the 
second was a more general account of party policy on television for use in the 1959 
election campaign. This confirmed that the 'Labour Party is in favour of maintaining 
competition in the field of television', promised to enforce the safeguards on ITV 
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more stringently, looked forward to a 'further expansion of television services' and 
publicly stated that the 'Labour Party believes that the Third Programme should go 
neither to I. T. A. nor to the B. B. C. but to a new, independent and non-commercial 
organisation' (Labour Party, 1959b: 3). These pledges found their way into Labour's 
1959 election manifesto which repeated the party's promise not to abolish 
commercial television and recognised the strong case for giving the third television 
channel to a new public corporation (see Craig, 1975: 226). 
In March 1959, one month after Labour's decision not to impose a special tax on the 
programme companies, the question of ITV's profits became a public scandal. 'Why 
should you pay to make these men richT screamed the Sunday Express, pointing out 
that 'never before in British history, not even in the railway mania of last century, 
have profits been made so fast as they have from the commercial TV boom (Harris, 
1959). Even a Conservative-supporting newspaper like the Express (albeit one with 
no financial stakes in ITV) suggested forcing the ITV companies to contribute E2 
towards every television licence, a 'tax' of L16m in 1959. Robert Fraser, the ITA's 
director general was hauled before the Public Accounts Committee of the House of 
Commons and forced to explain how E6 out of every f 10 of income was kept as 
profit by the programme companies. By 1960, Fraser was arguing that 'public 
opinion would come to regard such profit levels as insupportable' and suggested 
some form of 'discriminatory taxation of television programme companies' (quoted 
in Sendall, 1982: 298). Given the widespread criticism of ITV avarice, the f5m 
increase on ITV rents that the Labour sub-committee had recommended to take place 
in 1964 pales into insignificance with the E21.5m that the companies actually paid as 
a result of Tory-inspired legislation. Labour's commitment to the broadcasting status 
quo and its desire not to antagonise ITV viewers undermined any attempts to tackle 
the question of ITV profits. 
Discussions about the Third Programme and ITV finances became more urgent when 
the Conservative government set up the Pilkington Committee in July 1960 to report 
on the future of broadcasting. Meeting in November 1960, Labour's Home Policy 
Committee claimed that with an inquiry 'now in being, it seems likely that the 
struggle for the third television service and for commercial sound radio will warm 
up' (Labour Party, 1960). The party was simultaneously engaged in producing its 
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policy statement for 1961 and a 3000-word draft had emerged in November that 
appeared to share the New Left's criticisms of the commercialisation of the mass 
media. One passage, leaked to the Neiv Left Revieiv (196 1 b: 9) argued that where 
4money is king there is little room for any other values ... Commercial television is 
primarily an organ for selling, and public service broadcasting is starved of 
resources. ' The second draft, produced in March 1961, included the sub- 
committee's proposal for an independent third channel and a further attack on 
commercial forces in the media. 'If we want a wide choice of programmes and 
papers, if we want entertainment and information for their own sake rather than as a 
by-product of commercial advertising, then the community must be ready to act to 
get them' (ibid.: 10). 
When the draft was discussed at a full meeting of the HPC in May, its chairman, 
Harold Wilson initiated a discussion which concluded that the draft was too long, 
that 'it ought to be written more as propaganda and less like an election manifesto' 
and that '[c]ertain of the priorities were wrong' (Labour Party, 1961 a: para. 168). 
The committee agreed to focus on only four areas - the economy, education, social 
services and land - and to publish the statement as Signpostsfol- the Sixties (Labour 
Party, 196 1 b) for that year's party conference. The result, according to the Neiv Left 
Revieiv, 'was inevitable. In the final version ... nothing at all is left of the cultural and 
libertarian ideas so reminiscent of dozens of New Left articles and discussions' (Neiv 
Left Review, 1961b: 10). All references to the need to challenge media monopolies, 
to the dangers of advertising and to proposals for a new independent television 
channel were dropped as the party leadership de-prioritised media issues that had 
been increasingly highlighted by the radical left. In the end, despite the activities of 
the sub-committee on television and its proposals for a third channel, the party failed 
to make a formal submission to the Pilkington Committee. 14 
The Pilkington Report was published in June 1962 and, according to Jean Seaton, 
14 Four Labour MPs (Ness Edwards, Christopher Mayhew, Woodrow Wyatt and Denis Howell) made 
brief individual submissions to the committee, although only Mayhew endorsed the idea of a new ZD 
public service corporation for the third channel (see Pilkington, 1962b: 1138). 
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was the product of two contemporary concerns: that the working class 
was being absorbed into the middle class, and that working-class culture 
was decaying because of the industrialization of leisure ... 
The committee 
had been asked to review the development of television. In fact they did 
much more, producing a report which judged the nation's culture (in 
Curran and Seaton, 1997: 175)., - 
Influenced by the presence of Richard Hoggart, the Pilkington Committee reserved 
its venom for the effects of advertising and the obsession with popular entertainment 
which it felt was demeaning British cultural life. Using language similar to that in 
Hoggart's The Uses ofLiteracy, the report argued that '[p]rogrammes which 
exemplified emotional tawdriness and mental timidity helped to cheapen both 
emotional and intellectual values. Plays or serials might not deal with real human 
problems, but present a candy-floss world' (Pilkington, 1962a: para. 10 1). The 
consumer culture represented by commercial television may have been popular but it 
failed to embody the breadth and depth of public life distinctive of 'good' 
broadcasting. Additionally, the advertisements on ITV were creating 'false needs' at 
the same time as the majority of its programmes were failing to meet the 'real' 
cultural and educational needs of viewers. The committee, therefore, recommended 
root-and-branch reform of commercial television, proposing that the ITA plan 
programming and sell advertising, leaving the ITV companies the job of simply 
making the programmes. The committee was much more sympathetic to the BBC 
and, although critical of the creeping triviality of its output, backed the corporation's 
bid to manage the Third Programme (ibid.: 287-298). 
Labour's reaction to the Pilkington Report demonstrated all the tensions and 
differences that underlay the party's attitude to television. Labour was, frankly, split 
over the issue, as observed by the BBC's political correspondent Hardiman Scott: 
'the Party was about equally divided between those who broadly accepted the whole 
of Pilkington and those who did not' (quoted in Briggs, 1995: 302). On the left, 
Tribune gushed that the 'strength of the Report lies in its brilliant diagnosis of the 
diseases of television and in the picture it paints of the medium in perfect health' 
(Craigie, 1962) but disagreed with two of the recommendations. Giving the ITA 
more power and the BBC another channel would 'achieve the very opposite of what 
is intended' (ibid. ) of extending the range of voices, subjects and debates on 
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television. Instead, Tribune suggested granting individual ITV companies 'fixed 
incomes but autonomy in matters of taste' (ibid. ) and supported the case for a new 
independent public corporation for the Third Programme. 
The Labour Party and TUC conferences both passed motions welcoming the 
Pilkington Report. The TUC resolution urged the government to 'adopt its 
recommendations which are designed to ensure that these most potent social, moral 
and cultural influences are used to bring enrichment and a high quality service to 
ordinary people rather than to further commercial interests' (TUC, 1962: 438). The 
Labour resolution supported Pilkington's proposals for the restructuring of 
commercial television and for the third channel to be awarded to the BBC (Labour 
Party, 1962: 147), rather than endorsing the party sub-committee's argument that a 
new public corporation was needed. Fred Mulley, speaking for the NEC, argued that 
the report was a 'slap in the face to the Tory Government, to the kind of society they 
are endeavouring to build up, one in which profit is preferred to people' (ibid.: 150). 
However when he then insisted that 'we are not against 'Coronation Street' or any of 
that kind of programme. We are not, in principle, against the advertisements used on 
the present Independent Television Service', he was greeted with cries of 'shame' 
from conference delegates (ibid. ). 
The divisions had already come out in parliament. Patrick Gordon Walker called the 
Pilkington Report 'a document of great social and political importance' and then 
defended ITV for having produced some genuinely good popular entertainment', 
concluding that 'I. T. V. is here now. For good or ill, it is part of our national life' 
(HoC Debates, 31 July 1962: cols. 435-7). Woodrow Wyatt called for curbs in ITV 
profits but argued against the restructuring of commercial television 'because, by and 
large, it has given the people much of what they want' (ibid.: col. 504). W. R. 
Williams, summing up the debate for the opposition, paid tribute to the work of the 
committee but concluded that cross-party consensus was more necessary than any 
particular vision of broadcasting. 
... we have now left behind the old battle on the question of commercial 
television v. the B. B. C or some other form of corporation, that this House 
may decide that, in the national interest and in order to get the maximum 
benefit for our people out of this powerful medium, we should be able to 
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bridge some -I do not say all - of the differences between us so that we 
can concentrate on ends which seem to be common to both sides of the 
House (ibid.: cols. 526/7). 
Behind the scenes, such a gentlemanly approach was not always in evidence. 
Crossman, an influential member of the shadow Cabinet, held the private view that 
Pilkington's desire to restructure ITV 'can be only of academic interest; and the 
Labour Party would be very silly to commit itself to endorsing it' (quoted in 
Robinson, 1962). As one letter from a Labour supporter in Socialist Connnentary put 
it: 'My fear is that the Labour Party may become so closely identified with the 
Report that people come to feel that the Party, too is trying to 'get at' them through 
TV reform. And that could hurt us a lot at the next election' (Cooney, 1962). The 
key critic of the Pilkington Report was the party leader Hugh Gaitskell who refused 
to be associated with press allegations that Pilkington - and by implication Labour - 
would scrap popular programmes. Richard Hoggart recalls that: 
Hugh Gaitskell said immediately after the Report appeared that we were 
unduly anti-Commercial TV. It was after all the favoured channel of 'the 
people'. I responded on TV that this was a mistaken and patronising 
view. A day or two later Crossman asked me to lunch. At least, he 
wanted to argue about the Report. He produced an ineffable snob phrase 
about the 'common man'. As he came in to our lunch at his house in 
Smith Square or nearby he was fresh from a Shadow Cabinet. He said: 
'Gaitskell asked me to kick your arse' (Hoggart, 1998). 
Hoggart also recalls that he was 'not surprised but sorry' that the Labour leadership 
was reluctant to endorse the report. 'Funny how most of them - Gaitskell, 
Crossman, Crosland - were ex-public school and Oxbridge types. Nervous 
patronage pretending to be honest Joe'ery' (ibid. ). 
So when the Conservatives rejected Pilkington's proposals to restructure ITV and 
instead introduced a levy on advertising revenue, the Labour Party showed no 
inclination to depart from a bipartisan approach. During the passage of the 1963 
Television Act, some Labour speakers appeared to be more concerned about the 
financial health of the programme companies than their Tory counterparts. Although 
fully behind the Conservative PMG Reginald Bevins' desire to stop excessive 
71 
profits, Ness Edwards, the fori-ner Labour PMG, expressed concern that the proposed 
levy on advertising revenue would force the ITV companies to cut back on 
programme spending. 'We want good commercial television but, if we are to have it, 
the means of providing it must be there. I dq not object to successful commercial 
I 
television, ' he argued, 'but I do object to bankrupt commercial television' (HoC 
Debates, 25 February 1963: col. 953). 
Ness Edwards' focus on the financial viability of the commercial television system 
was mirrored, in particular, by the behaviour of the ACTT. The Labour-affiliated 
television union agreed with Pilkington's analysis of the problems of commercial 
television but was less keen on the committee's recommendation to restructure the 
network. It was concerned that the report's proposals would undermine investment 
in commercial television and therefore threaten the jobs of its members (see ACTT, 
1962). ACTT general secretary, George Elvin, tried unsuccessfully at both Labour 
and TUC conferences to amend the motions on Pilkington so that they pressed, not 
for the implementation of the report's recommendations, but simply for the 
recognition of the ACTT inside the BBC (see TUC, 1962: 441-443 and Labour Party, 
1962: 148-149). This was then followed by a campaign by all the television unions 
to oppose the 1963 bill on the basis that the proposed levy on advertising would hurt 
ITV revenue and risk workers'jobs. The unions may well have been right to stress 
that a tax on ITV profits would be more effective and less likely to lead to budget 
cuts than a levy on advertising. However, the sectional nature of their campaign 
made it less appealing to those Labour MPs who, in the end, lined up behind the 
Conservative PMG to introduce the levy against the wishes of a few backbench 
Tories and television trade unionists (see Sendall, 1983: 190-201). 
Labour also supported the government's decision, following the Pilkington 
Committee's recommendation, to authorise the BBC to run the third channel. 
Labour's public position, as outlined in its 1959 election manifesto, was still in 
favour of a new independent public corporation, a 'third way' in broadcasting. In 
February 1962, the Times reported that Labour leaders had 'come down emphatically 
in favour of any third television service being provided by the B. B. C. or a new public 
authority' (Thnes, 1962). By the time of the parliamentary debate on the Pilkington 
Report, W. R. Williams in his summing up for Labour asserted that 'I am 100 per 
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cent in favour of the B. B. C. getting a third channel. I do not equivocate about this' 
(HoC Debates, 31 July 1962: col. 53 1). 
While there were sound economic and politiqal reasons for the BBC to run a 
'complementary' channel, Labour never provided an explanation of why it dropped 
its plan for a new corporation. Perhaps it was because the proposal had acquired a 
radical tinge as some of the evidence to the Pilkington Committee made clear. For 
example, the New Left, in its submission to the committee, embraced the idea of a 
new organisation which would cater for 'other voices, other faces, other interests, 
other interpretations of "entertainment", other approaches to "seriousness", other 
aspects of our community life' (Neiv Left Review, 1961 a: 47). It proposed a publicly 
owned and democratically structured network that would take advantage of new 
sources of talent in the universities, local councils, drama groups and community 
bodies which were then 'too small or too unorthodox to catch the official eye of the 
BBC, too uncommercial to Purchase time on ITV' (ibid.: 48). This was an argument 
which a Labour government would have to return to in the discussions surrounding 
proposals for the fourth channel which took place in the 1970s. In the early 1960s, 
however, the idea was ahead of its time and quietly dropped. 
Perhaps the most interesting reactions to the Pilkington Report from Labour 
supporters were to be found not in parliament or in the Labour headquarters but in 
the pages of the Labour and radical press. Here, debates on television were closely 
connected to those in the Labour movement about the party's ability to reach the 
'affluent worker'. An opening shot was fired by Anthony Crosland in Socialist 
Commentary immediately following the publication of the report. He argued that the 
main weakness of the report was that it exaggerated the impact of television on 
society and ignored the growing amount of American academic research which 
demonstrated that television was more peripheral to people's lives than Pilkington 
and his colleagues allowed for. If real proof was not required by the committee then 
'should we not, by analogy, ban or control the popular press, the cinema, the 
Communist Party, public houses, all teenage culture, coloured immigrants, 
homosexuality, and Lady Chatterley'S Lover? ' (Crosland, 1962a: 6) 
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Next, Crosland attacked the committee for denying the existence of a free choice of 
programmes and ignoring the wishes of ordinary viewers who watched commercial 
television in droves. This, he argued, was typical of 'all the worst patronizing and 
anti-libertarian instincts of the Left' (ibid.: 6). There ivas a case for intervention: not 
on the question of 'free choice' but to ensure that all tastes were catered for, 
including minority ones which were less economically viable. In treating television 
programmes as 'public goods', it was the case that the public might not call for 
minority programmes in advance but would welcome them once they had actually 
experienced them. He supported further restraints on ITV and the creation of another 
non-commcrcial television channel and concluded that the committee's 
recommendations were generally sound 'but for largely the wrong reasons' (ibid.: 5). 
The key problem for Crosland was that the report disapproved of the habits of the 
mass audience. 
The patronising and school-prefect attitude to popular culture can be 
found in an extreme form in the Pilkington Report, which showed no 
interest in the opinions of ordinary viewers and listeners (any more than 
in those of sociologists) and indeed was imbued throughout with a 
condescending horror at the idea that people might actually like to watch 
trivial programmes (Crosland, 1962b: 10)15. 
Crosland's rebuttal of the idea of working-class audiences passively reacting to the 
skilful inducements of advertisers to purchase things they did not 'need', was then 
developed in an further article on the mass media in November 1962, which was 
personally endorsed by Gaitskell (Williams, 1979: 875). He started by rejecting both 
the optimists who believed that television could be free of commercial values and the 
pessimists who believed it was responsible for delinquency and the atomisation of 
society. While the right was contemptuous of the 'mass-ness' of the media, the left 
blamed the decreasing militancy of workers on the influence of popular films and 
television programmes. There was no conspiracy according to Crosland; the 
aspiration for consumer goods was not due to the evils of advertising but 'represents 
13 Later criticisms of the report's underlying snobbery reinforce Crosland's comments. Jean Seaton 
observed that Tilkington seemed perilously close to despising what was popular and entertaining, and 
approving only that which was rigorous and demanding' (in Curran and Seaton, 1997: 179) 
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a basic human desire for choice, leisure, comfort, privacy, and a more spacious 
family life' (Crosland, 1962b: 4). 
Returning to the issue of choice, he insisted that workers do freely choose to watch 
quiz shows and listen to commercial radio, despite what some intellectuals may want 
them to do. The real problem was that minority tastes were neglected by market 
forces, not simply by virtue of being commercial, but because commercial television 
6cannot sell different programmes at different prices in different markets' (ibid.: 9). 
It is not possible to charge more for opera with a limited audience than it is for soap 
opera with a mass audience. Crosland's lack of awareness of the strategy of 
differential advertising rates was countered by his prescience that one solution to the 
problem would be pay-television, although the barrier to this, he argued, was that it 
was driven only by films and sports programmes. 
Crosland also attacked the efforts of various New Left intellectuals to 'foster from 
above a specifically Left-wing or "working-class" culture' (ibid.: 10) as being as 
pernicious as attempts to impose high culture on the masses. In order to undermine 
the authoritarian cultural approach of the left, Crosland called for a strategy of 
expanding choice: 'Our aim should be the maximum degree of cultural pluralism and 
availability of different aesthetic goods' (ibid.: 11). He therefore proposed two 
further non- commercial television channels: the first a general channel 'but 
deliberately biased towards minority, regional, cultural, and experimental 
programmes' (ibid.: 13), the second a specialist educational channel. According to 
Crosland, this 'would significantly increase the range and variety of choice without 
in any way denying the democratic right either of private citizens to conurumicate or 
of the majority to receive whatever entertainment or diversion it prefers' (ibid. ). 
New Left critics adopted a very different perspective on the relationship between 
broadcasting and democracy. Roy Shaw, a tutor with the Workers' Educational 
Association which had submitted evidence to the Pilkington Committee, penned an 
article for New Left Review in which he criticised the mainstream press and 
politicians for wilfully misunderstanding the committee's arguments and supported 
Pilkington's attacks on commercial television. The report, he argued, did not 
condemn all entertainment programmes for their triviality but took issue with the 
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growing tendency to trivialise subject matter in programmes which cut across all 
genres and channels, but in particular in ITV's light entertainment because of the 
financial pressure to maximise audiences. Furthermore, far from the report imposing 
its own tastes on the masses, it challenged the very notion that programme-makers 
could claim to know what the public wants simply by winning a mass audience. 
Given opinion polls which suggested that more people thought BBC was doing a 
betterjob than ITV but that, proportionately, more viewers watched ITV, Shaw 
claimed that 'the paradox is in the public mind, rather than in the Pilkington evidence 
or conclusions' (Shaw, 1962: 6). Reflecting New Left concern with the impact of the 
economic concentration of the media and the commodification of public life, Shaw 
argued that: 
Pilkington is resented because of its disturbing demand for a new 
conception of social responsibility in the field of culture. It is a call to 
give people wider opportunities for self-development, instead of giving 
them what is "patronisingly and arrogantly" judged fit for their present 
condition. It challenges the fixed cultural stratification of our society - 
the rich man in his Glyndboume and the poor man at his quiz show, and 
to each man his predetermined and unchangeable taste (ibid.: 8). 
The task facing socialists, according to Raymond Williams in a Fabian pamphlet the 
following year, was to fight for increased public control of the media and to shake 
off the usual associations of this objective with bureaucracy and censorship. 
Decisions about communications were decisions about what kind of society was 
needed. Either you can have a communications service run by 'rich men' in the 
pursuit of profit or, if it is to be a true democracy, television and the press must 'be 
held in trust by the society for use by the people directly concerned in their 
production' (Williams, 1963: 14). This was an urgent task for the Labour Party and 
Williams suggested setting up a working party of historians, economists, critics, 
media professionals and sociologists to give immediate attention to this issue. 
At one level the two sets of arguments are miles apart: the former reflecting the 
populism of the Labour revisionists, the latter the urgency for change of the New 
Left. However, both attach great importance to cultural stratification, the 
constitutive role of culture and to the rights and opportunities of the consumer. The 
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ideas of the revisionists, determined to relate to the consumerist aspirations of 
'affluent' workers, coincided with those of the New Left who saw in culture and 
media an opportunity to break free of the economism of Marxism. Revisionist 
socialism strove to line workers' pockets with enough money to satisfy their 
supposed consumerist desires and in turn deliver social equality; the New Left sought 
to mobilise the cultural concerns of a new generation in a quite different way, 
towards subversive and creative political action. Whilst the two had completely 
different origins and outcomes, both sets of views attempted to encourage the party 
as a whole to adopt a more sympathetic and proactive stance towards culture and 
communications. 
Conclusion 
Labour's approach towards television throughout its years in opposition in the 1950s 
foundered on the contradiction between its different constituencies. In attempting to 
reconcile anti-commercial sentiments with a defence of the mixed economy, Labour 
was bound to be an inconsistent champion of democratic reform. The party 
contained both ITV bosses and passionate critics of commercial television, 
supporters of private property and defenders of nationalisation, those who were 
frightened of television and those who saw it as the pathway to a whole new world. 
Party supporters expressed a range of competing visions of the media and some 
imaginative plans for reform that prefigured later developments like Channel Four. 
In the end, the leadership settled on a defensive position that satisfied neither 
revisionists nor New Left activists. 
This was a strategy designed to maximise party unity, popular appeal and electoral 
possibilities. Confidential committees on television policy were established before 
each election and dropped almost immediately afterwards, contributing to an ad hoc 
style of policyrnaking on this issue. Throughout the period, the adoption of 
principled positions co-existed with a tactical flexibility based on electoral 
requirements. By 1963, with a weakening Conservative administration, opposition 
members were in a confident and co-operative mood during the passage of the 
television bill. 'Under the pragmatic leadership of Harold Wilson they were not 
going to fritter away their appeal to floating voters by a display of doctrinaire 
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attitudes towards a popular television service' (Sendall, 1983: 177). A decade of 
revisionism and, in particular, thirteen years of opposition had convinced Labour 
MPs that, perhaps, commercial television was not such a bad thing after all. 
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Chapter Three: 1964-1970 
The Wilson governments in context 
The Labour government inherited substantial economic problems from the 
Conservatives when it came into office in 1964. Although British capitalism had 
expanded massively in the post-war boom, the rate of expansion had started to slow 
by the early 1960s putting Britain in a weaker position in relation to its international 
rivals. One assessment is that 'although the economy seemed to be fairly healthy, 
the true position in fact was more delicate than the bare figures suggested' 
(Woodward, 1993: 73). Clive Ponting puts it more bluntly: 'Low investment, wages 
rising faster than productivity growth and the handicap of a large number of 
declining industries (and an over-valued pound) lay at the root of Britain's economic 
problems' (Ponting, 1989: 393). In other words, structural economic difficulties 
were to blame for smaller GDP growth than in other advanced western countries, a 
declining rate of profit and an increasing rate of inflation. 
Harold Wilson's solution was to embrace economic planning so that Labour's 1964 
election manifesto promised a national plan that would defeat the Tories' 'stop-go 
economic policy' (Labour Party, 1964: 6). For Andrew Shonfield, whose 1965 book 
Modern Capitalism celebrated the productive benefits of indicative planning, it was 
ccentral to Labour Party thinking that a government of the Left should assume full 
responsibility for the task of national planning' (Shonfield, 1969: 154). Wilson 
promised to set up new ministries of economic affairs and technology and to 
revitalise the National Economic Development Corporation, set up by the 
Conservatives in 1962. 
According to Ben Pimlott (1993: 272), 'Wilson called for a sensible, gradualist social 
revolution. The instrument of that revolution was to be the centralized planning of 
science and technology. ' The soon-to-be prime minister expressed this vision most 
famously in his speech, 'Labour's plan for science', at the 1963 party conference. 
He argued that the choice was not ivhether but hoiv to relate to technological 
advance: 
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It is the choice between the blind imposition of technological advance, 
with all that means in terms of unemployment, and the conscious, 
planned, purposive use of scientific progress to provide undreamed of 
living standards and the possibility of leisure ultimately on an 
unbelievable scale (Wilson, 1963: 3). 
Wilson then went on to include developments in communications as part of this 
technological programme, calling for a 'University of the Air' (ibid.: 4) and arguing 
that it is 'very nice that we should be putting so much research into colour television' 
(ibid.: 6). 
The speech has been read both as rhetoric and as evidence of Wilson's commitment 
to innovation and planning. Booker (1992: 213) treats it as a brilliant piece of public 
relations, designed to smooth over the ideological differences inside the Labour Party 
which had proved so disruptive to the party throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Pimlott, on the other hand, argues that the speech genuinely struck a chord with the 
audience (and beyond) and represented an 'extremist' position in advocating 
4govemment intervention in almost every aspect of the nation's economic life' 
(Pimlott, 1993: 305). Tony Benn states that Wilson was deliberately misunderstood: 
'What he said was that in the white heat of the technological revolution, we will all 
be burned up with unemployment unless we plan it. He wasn't saying I'll put on a 
white coat and get a welding machine and modemise the economy' (Benn, 1997). 
Both approaches contain an element of truth. Of course Wilson was eager to 
associate the Labour Party with the dividends of technological growth and increased 
leisure time; he was also profoundly serious about replacing a laissez-faire approach 
to technology with a more purposeful one. Paul Foot argues that what was missing 
from the speech, however, was an indication of how the technological revolution 
could be realised without treading on the toes of big business. To implement 
Wilson's proposals meant 'a new range of taxes and levies upon industry, 
considerable state representation on boards of directors and, in many cases, 
wholesale nationalization. Not once in his speech did Wilson indicate the extent to 
which his Government would interfere with industry' (Foot, 1968a: 153). According 
to Foot, the speech was therefore not a simple public relations exercise (although it 
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worked magnificently as one) but an example of Labour's reformist belief that 'there 
is nothing wrong with the machine as such. What is wrong is the driver ... [Wilson's] 
aim was not to scrap the machine for another one, but to steer it round the obstacles 
in its path' (ibid). 
Was this approach a break from Gaitskellite and Croslandite revisionism? Dick 
Crossman, a key Cabinet member in the Wilson governments, argued that it was: 
'Wilson had provided the revision of Socialism and its application to modem times 
which Gaitskell and Crosland had tried and completely failed to do' (Crossman, 
1981: 1026). Wilson's redefinition of socialism, that Labour's radical social 
objectives needed to be underpinned by planned and sustained economic growth, 
won acclaim from all sides of the party in the run-up to the 1964 election. The vision 
of a revitalised capitalism encouraged the right while talk of trade union partnership 
helped to win support for an incomes policy at the 1963 Labour conference. 
Foote (1997: 23 1) argues that Wilson's intervention into state direction of the 
economy signified a return to corporatism rather than revisionism, with the conscious 
application of Keynesian techniques to stimulate the economy. Others highlight the 
continuities between the policies of Gaitskell and Wilson. Pimlott writes that the 
'new Leader's early objective was to present himself, both for public and for party 
consumption, as a sensible politician who would maintain existing Labour policies, 
yet who had a radical cutting edge' (Pimlott, 1993: 263). Alan Warde stresses the 
similarities between revisionism and corporatism under Wilson, that his socialism of 
1964 'had no use for the concept of class, was indifferent to the question of property 
ownership, and did not foresee a structural transformation' (Warde, 1982: 112). In 
response to Labour left claims at the time that 'revisionism was not on the agenda', 
Paul Foot responded that: 
In fact, of course, revisionism had in no sense, and not for a single 
moment, left the agenda, Gaitskell's policy on the Bomb had triumphed 
and the party's policy on economic affairs was still based on the ultra- 
revisionist Industry and Society. In more ways than one the policy of the 
Party, as opposed to the electoral rhetoric of its leaders, had swung, if 
anything, Rightwards since 1959 (Foot, 1968b: 19). 
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What had changed, it may be argued, was that Labour's revisionist objectives, those 
stressed by Crosland in The Future ofSocialism concerning social legislation, were 
intimately linked to the successful resolution of Britain's economic problems. 
Without a clear sign of industrial growth andý an end to stop-go cycles, there could be 
no talk of serious social reform nor of a sustained attack on inequality and privilege. 
The government, therefore, attached itself to a policy of 'pragmatism': virtually 
anything could be justified if it could be proved to be in the national economic 
interest. Wages, prices, public services and electoral promises were all subordinated 
to the priority of restoring growth to the British economy. Pragmatism itself became 
the dominant theoretical position associated with the Wilson governments in that, for 
David Walker, it was an understandable 'empirical response to events serving the 
immediate end of political equilibrium maintenance' (Walker, 1989: 189). Warde 
argues that this was a key part of Wilson's 'brokerage politics', his attempt to 
'ad udicate between competing interests and find a workable compromise' (Warde, j 
1982: 102). This is a vision of Wilson's pragmatism as a necessary balancing-act 
between the forces of the Labour left and right, the unions and big business and 
between domestic pressures and international requirements. On the other hand, 
Edward Short, who was close to Wilson throughout the period, simply argues that 
electoral pressure was paramount: 'It was a very pragmatic government as Labour 
always had the problem of how to stay in office' (Short, 1998). 
Winning office and then retaining it was a central concern of Wilson's government 
as its economic plans ran onto the rocks immediately after the 1964 election. 
Whereas for most of the 1950s Britain's trade with the rest of the world had led to a 
trade surplus, a Conservative-engineered pre-election boom led to a balance of 
payments deficit of E800m in 1964 (Wilson, 1974: 27). The Labour government was 
under pressure within days of taking office to make cuts in public expenditure and 
lower sterling to a rate which would make exports more competitive. Although 
Wilson triumphed in his first battle with the bankers (and went ahead with a budget 
which abolished prescription charges and raised pensions and welfare benefits), he 
persevered with a policy of protecting the pound at all costs. Shortly after winning 
the 1966 election with an increased majority, the Labour government introduced a 
massive deflationary package and a statutory incomes policy to support the pound. 
82 
With the economy still very fragile, Wilson held out until November 1967 when 
devaluation of the pound was quickly followed by a savage cuts package of over 
F-700m which included the re-introduction of prescription charges and the 
postponement of the raising of the school-leqVing age. Further deflationary packages 
were imposed for the next two years together with the ultimately unsuccessful attack 
on union rights, In Place ofStrife, all of which caused enormous upheavals and 
disappointment inside the party. 'For many in the Party, the Labour Government of 
1966 to 1970 had been a failure. It had revoked its mandate commitments, ignored 
Conference decisions and carried through policies which ran counter to some of the 
basic principles of the Party' (Minkin, 1980: 330). 
Opinion on Labour's economic legacy is divided. Recent accounts paint a 
favourable picture of Labour's economic record, particularly when considering rates 
of growth and productivity figures of later anti-interventionist governments (see 
Woodward, 1993, Pimlott, 1993 and Walker, 1989). On the other hand, Michael 
Stewart, an economic adviser to the government, wrote at the time of the 'failure of 
the central themes of Labour's declared policy - the commitment to maintain full 
employment, to curb rising prices, and above all to secure a faster rate of economic 
growth ... Here failure was massive' (quoted in Walker, 1989: 206). Unemployment 
increased by 60% between 1964 and 1970, inflation nearly doubled in the same 
period while the key statistic of economic growth remained rooted at 2%, half of 
what the national plan had anticipated and much lower than its international rivals. 
Indeed while exports increased even more than predicted in the plan, they still fell as 
a share of the world market, from 16% at the start of the decade to 11% in 1970 
(Ponting, 1989: 392-394). 
There is, however, more agreement about Labour's record in the social sphere where 
liberalization of laws concerning abortion, homosexuality, divorce and censorship 
were passed in spite of the economic problems. Commentators are eager to praise 
this part of Wilson's legacy, talking of 'notable successes in the field of social 
reform' (Wright and Carter, 1997: 115) and the 'impressive' achievements in social 
improvement (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 133). Even Ponting notes that 'the 
government's record [in social reform] is all the more commendable since it was 
achieved in the face of an awful economic legacy' (Ponting, 1989: 392). To what 
83 
extent did the Wilson governments demonstrate this commitment in their attempts to 
modernise and reform British television? 
The road ahead: television issues in 1964 
By 1964, the outgoing Conservative administration had presided over a number of 
decisions affecting television. In response to the Pilkington Committee's 
recommendations, Reginald Bevins, the postmaster general, had launched BBC2, 
imposed a levy on advertising revenue on the ITV companies and extended the 
charters of both BBC and ITA by twelve years. The Tories felt confident enough to 
include a separate paragraph on broadcasting in their manifesto for the 1964 election 
which boasted that 'we introduced ITV, authorised BBC-2, and have licensed 
experiments in pay-as-you-view TV by wire. We wish to extend the range of choice 
still further' (Craig, 1975: 41), particularly through proposals for a second 
commercial television channel and local sound broadcasting. 
The Labour Party's election manifesto, however, made no mention at all of 
broadcasting's role in the 'New Britain' that was to be built in the ongoing 
technological revolution, lacking even a reference to the University of the Air that 
Wilson had highlighted in his 'science' speech in 1963. This was not due to 
ignorance of the policy challenges in the sphere of broadcasting that faced Labour. 
Tony Benn, the newly appointed PMG, notes in his diary that he was immediately 
'confronted with important decisions over television broadcasting' (Benn, 1988a: 
165), notably the BBC licence fee, the question of a fourth channel, pay television 
and the introduction of colour. Neither was it because of a lack of interest by senior 
party members who had already had top-level discussions with broadcasters in the 
run-up to the election. For example, MPs Roy Mason and George Darling (both of 
whom were soon to be ministers of state in the Board of Trade) met with the BBC 
secretary Charles Curran in July 1964 to discuss a wide range of broadcasting-related 
issues. The meeting revealed the Labour frontbench's unhappiness with the request 
for an increase in the licence fee and its reluctance to endorse a fourth channel for 
education (Curran, 1964). It seems more likely that Labour's public reticence to 
discuss television simply reflected the divisions which had surfaced in party 
discussions at the time of the Pilkington Committee (see previous chapter) and which 
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remained unresolved, over criticisms of ITV and a defence of non-commercial 
television. 
Wilson, as we shall see, was particularly sensitive to the increasing influence of 
television and sought to use Benn's professional knowledge for electoral advantage 
and industrial benefits. 'A mark of Wilson's seriousness about television', argues 
Pimlott (1993: 270), 'was the introduction of Anthony Wedgwood Benn, a former 
television producer, into the inner circle. ' Beim, according to Briggs, 'was a young 
politician, who had hitherto made the most of the Labour Party's appeal to youth' 
(Briggs, 1995: 515) and who shared Wilson's desire to take advantage of 
technological developments to stimulate the British economy. His brief at the Post 
Office included not only broadcasting but also telecommunications, satellites and 
information technology. Decisions about television, he decided, had to be seen in the 
wider context of Britain's relative economic weakness and the imperative to 
modemize. In early 1965 he admitted that: 'Defence, colour television, Concorde, 
rocket development - these are all issues raising economic considerations that reveal 
this country's basic inability to stay in the big league. We just can't afford it' (Benn, 
1988a: 204). 
This approach, of considering television development in relation to the needs of the 
economy, was clearly evident to those in the broadcasting industry. During 
discussions in November 1964 about the introduction of colour, BBC director 
general Hugh Greene came up with the following ploy. 
The PMG was inclined to wonder whether colour might not be an 
unnecessary luxury. We therefore based our argument in favour of 
colour on exports and the development and modernisation of the 
electronic [sic] industry ... I am sure that this will be a better horse to ride 
with the present Government than the value of colour programmes in 
themselves. (Greene, 1964) 
Greene guessed right. Despite Benn's continuing reservations with the project, the 
introduction of colour in July 1967 was the culmination of a significant commercial 
lobbying exercise and international competition (see Briggs, 1995: 848-863). 
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Benn's stubborn refusal to ignore harsh economic facts led him to an early and 
gloomy appraisal of the finances of the BBC. The departing Conservative 
administration had left behind not only a substantial balance of payments deficit but 
had also saddled the BBC with a rising debt jn its preparations for BBC2. PMG 
Bevins told the cabinet in 1962 that 'most of his colleagues on the Ministerial 
Committee [on Broadcasting] shared his view that any increase in licence fee before 
1965 was "politically unrealistic"' because of electoral pressure and so left the 
licence fee at E4 (see ibid.: 306). In the context of competition from pirate radio and 
government reluctance to increase the licence fee, Benn wrote in January 1965 that: 
I can see ourselves moving steadily towards the starvation of the BBC 
through a failure to raise the licence fee and ultimately capitulation in 
favour of commercial sound broadcasting. That is unless we permit the 
expansion of broadcasting on the basis of public service with advertising 
revenue to finance it (Benn, 1988a: 212). 
There was certainly no love lost between Benn and the BBC 16 and one of Benn's 
main concerns as PMG was to create a space in which a genuine public service 
broadcasting could emerge, even if this meant a challenge to existing structures. 
Briggs writes that Benn was the only PMG who, 'while believing strongly in public 
service broadcasting, did not identify public service broadcasting with the BBC' 
(Briggs, 1995: 517), a definition he carried with him well after his years at the Post 
0 ffi c e. 
Benn was not the only Labour member to have reservations about the BBC. During 
the discussions about a possible third television channel, Labour's policy committee 
had recommended the creation of a new public service body, independent of both 
ITV and BBC (see p. 64). Although Labour had reversed its position after the 
Pilkington Report had suggested a 'BBC-2', the party still had an uneasy relationship 
with a BBC in the throes of the 'Greene revolution', the director general's attempt to 
modernise the Corporation and to compete more effectively with ITV. In opposition 
Labour had benefited from the BBC's new-found dynamism as the latter sought to 
shrug off its stuffy image. A programme like the notorious TJV3 was 'anti- 
86 
pomposity, anti-sanctimony, anti-snob and - blatantly - anti-Conservative' (Pimlott, 
1993: 269). The problem was that it was only a fine line between being anti- 
Conservative and being anti-govenu-nent, any government. Now that the Labour 
Party was in office, there was little reason to 
I 
expect that it would receive an easy ride 
I 
nor that its authority would be naturally respected by the BBC. Labour's ambiguous 
attitude to the BBC was to be a key factor in television policy during the 1960s. 
The other key area, ignored by Benn in his 'to-do' list, concerned the future of ITV. 
Although the Labour Party had now officially accepted the place of commercial 
television alongside the BBC, it would still be expected to do something to curb the 
tremendous profits which were being made despite the introduction of the advertising 
levy in 1963. Surely in Wilson's 'New Britain' where, according to the manifesto, 
cwe must ensure that a sufficient part of the new wealth created goes to meet urgent 
and now neglected human needs' (Labour Party, 1964: 8), there would be some plans 
to tackle the profits of commercial television and its neglect of minority audiences? 
The television critic Milton Shulman expressed this most forcefully: 
The country had witnessed a major financial scandal in which, through a 
Government monopoly, a few men had received returns on their 
investments out of all proportions to either the capital they had risked or 
the contributions they were making to the nation. A Socialist 
Government would presumably have been shocked and sickened by this 
spectacle (Shulman, 1973: 23). 
Yet the government was silent on the issue. This might have been due to the fact that 
Wilson's favourite programme was ITV's Coronation Street (see Pimlott, 1993: 267) 
or that senior Labour politicians had by now recognised the influence of ITV. David 
Haworth, in an article for Socialist Connnentary in 1965, attempted to provide an 
explanation for the lack of progress in government reform of television. 
I think part of the answer is that the Labour Party has never recovered 
from the memory of its opposition to the establishment of commercial 
television. As soon as the second channel became a fact, Labour found 
that its most enthusiastic audience was to be found among its own 
16 Benn described the BBC as 'wildly right wing' and Lord Normanbrook, its Chairman, as 'a real old 
Establishment figure and not at all knowledgeable on broadcasting' (Benn, 1988: 183). 
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supporters. After that the Party found singular difficulty in allowing its 
considerations on broadcasting to mature in any very coherent form 
(Haworth, 1965: 32). 
The renewal of the franchises in 1967 and the debates over the size of the advertising 
levy at the end of the decade forced Labour to once again address the question of 
commercial television. Before then, in the increasingly difficult economic climate, 
the govenu-nent had to make some firm decisions about other major areas of 
television policy. 
Harold Wilson and television 
'There is little doubt that the character and philosophy of British broadcasting as it 
enters the 70s has been moulded by the will and activities of Harold Wilson' wrote 
the TV critic Milton Shulman in 1973 (Shulman, 1973: 26). Wilson, it is claimed, 
played a decisive role in the development of Labour's television policy in the 1960s. 
He was an excellent television performer who, having read Theodore White's The 
Making ofthe President, appreciated the importance of the new mass medium and 
was keen to improve the professionalism of Labour's broadcasts. Additionally, 
Wilson 'planned to use the airwaves as a major instrument of government. He would 
make regular broadcasts to explain his policies direct to the people' (Cockerell, 1989: 
113). This would allow Wilson to communicate with voters without the troublesome 
mediation of the Fleet Street press who Wilson perceived rightly as generally anti- 
Labour. 
The strategy, however, counted on the compliance of the broadcasting establishment 
at precisely the time when the BBC, in particular, was expanding its political 
coverage and was keen to demonstrate its independence. The skirmishes between 
Wilson and the BBC started almost immediately after the election when, in January 
1965, Wilson was refused a ministerial broadcast without opposition right-of-reply 
(ibid: 115) and continued unabated. The prime minister complained regularly both 
about the number of left-wingers and government critics allowed by the BBC to 
speak on government policy and about systematic bias in BBC current affairs 
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programmes 17 . The result was that 'Wilson was to see British television as an 
instrument of conspiracy against the Labour Party, and especially against himself 
(Pimlott, 1993: 269). 
The problem was that while Labour had gained from TJV3's satirical portrait of the 
Tories in 1963, Wilson and Labour supporters had no wish to become the object of 
parody now that the party was in government. Wilson's antagonism towards the 
BBC was initially accepted by his fellow ministers and supported even by Labour's 
grassroots. One resolution from the Isle of Wight Constituency Labour Party in 
January 1966 noted that 'whilst appreciating the need for satire in TV programmes, 
we have noticed an increase in political satire on the BBC TV programmes 
prejudicial to the Socialist point of view' (Labour Party NEC, 1966). Wilson may 
have had a point about BBC bias but his sensitivity appeared to be more focused on 
preventing open criticism of government policies as economic problems started to 
open up fissures amongst Labour supporters. By the end of the decade, Wilson's 
hostility to the BBC had started to disturb even his close colleagues. Crossman noted 
in 1969 that Wilson 'is obsessed with the B. B. C., and this and his obsession with 
leaks are his most outstanding weaknesses as a leader' (Crossman, 1977: 387/8). 
'Throughout his career', echoes Pimlott, 'Wilson suffered from a dangerous inability 
to let a matter drop' (Pimlott, 1993: 445). 
Wilson had an entirely different attitude towards ITV and spoke of the 'absolutely 
scrupulous impartiality' of the ITA under the chairmanship of the former 
Conservative PMG, Charles Hill (quoted in Cockerell, 1989: 125). One of Wilson's 
biographers writes that 'Wilson preferred ITV from the first. It had sympathetic 
company bosses, such as Sidney Bernstein at Granada ... [and] was widely perceived 
as the popular and therefore more working-class station' (Morgan, 1992: 332). 
ITV's populism complemented Wilson's pragmatism and the prime minister was 
happy to do deals with commercial television at the expense of the BBC. In one 
celebrated incident on the morning after his 1966 election victory, Wilson refused to 
do a live interview with the BBC from a specially rigged train on the basis that he 
17 See for example Briggs (1995: 546-558), Cockerell (1989: 113-15 1), Goldie (1977: 282-293) and 
Shulman (1973: 25-54) for more detailed accounts of the stormy relationship between Wilson and the 
BBC. 
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had not been given any warning but was happy to accommodate ITN. This 
somewhat contradicts the notes of a conversation the previous day between Wilson 
and a senior BBC journalist, Stanley Hyland, where Wilson is quoted as saying that 
'I still haven't made up my mind about the train' (Edwards, 1966). 
1 
Clearly, Wilson's attitude towards television structures was influenced by the state of 
his personal relations with broadcasters and journalists. Does this mean that policy 
was being made not on the basis of public debate but of private passions? Michael 
Cockerell's view is that Wilson attempted to punish the BBC for its critical stance 
towards Labour, particularly in his unwillingness to sanction a licence fee increase. 
When Greene made this public in 1966, 'Wilson was enraged. He gave his backing 
to a Wedgwood Benn plan to refonn the BBC by introducing some commercials and 
hiving off parts of radio' (Cockerell, 1989: 134). Berm then 'went to see Harold who 
has confused the whole thing in his mind with his current dislike of the bias in BBC 
programmes' (Benn, 1988a: 387). However, as we shall see, this was not the plan 
that the government accepted, partly because Wilson himself had a more 
contradictory approach to the BBC than one of pure, unbridled antagonism. 
Despite his comfortable relationship with commercial television bosses and his 
concerns about BBC bias, Wilson was fundamentally reluctant to undermine the 
public structure of the BBC. In a meeting between Greene and Derek Mitchell, 
Wilson's private secretary, immediately after the 1964 election, Mitchell reassured 
the DG about Labour's plans. 'I said I thought that they [the BBC] should not worry 
unduly. A Labour Government was bound, other thing being equal, to be 
sympathetic to the B. B. C. as a nationalised corporation' (Mitchell, 1964). In the 
middle of heated negotiations about the licence fee, Crossman noted that Wilson 'has 
a conventional respect for the B. B. C. as a public corporation and won't allow 
advertising ... His main aim is to stay in office' (Crossman, 1976: 160). Wilson's 
commitment to pragmatism and corporatism partially softened his desire to discipline 
the BBC although, of course, other things were not equal and Wilson increasingly 
lost patience with the Corporation during the 1960s. As Philip Ziegler, Wilson's 
sympathetic biographer, puts it: 'The remarkable thing is not that Wilson eventually 
fell out with the BBC but that it took so long for him to do so' (Ziegler, 1993: 203). 
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One of Wilson's most controversial acts was his decision in 1967, after consultation 
with PMG Edward Short but not the cabinet, to appoint Charles Hill of the ITA to be 
the chairman of the BBC. Given his intimate association with both commercial 
television and the Conservatives, 'it was obvious, not least to Wilson himself, that 
the choice he was making would not appeal to many people inside the Labour Party' 
(Briggs, 1995: 599), a reaction which made little impact on the prime minister. 
Increasingly irritated by what he perceived as the BBC's partisanship, Wilson, 
according to Cockerell, selected Hill for three reasons: 'to control the exuberance and 
restrict the freedom of programme makers', to 'humiliate the BBC's senior 
executives' and finally to 'force Hugh Greene to resign' (Cockerell, 1989: 135). 
Short disagrees with any suggestion that it was a political decision. 
The press took the view that we were getting our own back at the BBC 
but it wasn't that at all. I think the BBC needed somebody like him - 
they were stodgy, they stood on their dignity about things ... There wasn't 
a political relationship ... Hill was an intelligent, cultured man. He wasn't just anybody, a great publicist, the Radio Doctor. He was never very 
political (Short, 1998). 
This is a slightly disingenuous description of a man who was a Conservative minister 
for broadcasting when commercial television was first introduced in 1955 and who, 
according to Wilson himself, 'has already cleaned up I. T. V. and [will] do the same to 
B. B. C. now I'm appointing him chairman' (quoted in Crossman, 1976: 442/3). 
The key point is that Wilson took a keen interest in television and assumed a 
leadership role when it came to government policy in the field. In January 1965 he 
set up the ministerial committee on broadcasting to oversee television development 
(see Mitchell, 1965b), and then took over the chair in October 1966 (Briggs, 1995: 
563n) in order to head off opposition to his plans. He met regularly with leading 
figures from the television world, kept a very close watch on television output and 
attempted to impose his will on television policy, even when he was not sure exactly 
where he stood. One historian has written that '[i]f Wilson believed in anything, he 
certainly believed in the influence of the media. And he was determined to exploit 
this to his own advantage' (Childs, 1997: 111). Accusations still abound that 
Wilson's interest in television, like a true modem-day premier, reflected an obsession 
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with presentation more than policy and that his pragmatism suffused any firm 
principles. 18 However, as we shall now attempt to illustrate, Wilson's approach to 
television policy, while rarely consistent, was nevertheless connected to one firm 
objective: to modernise and invigorate British economic and political institutions 
through the guidance of a Labour government. When BBC television programmes 
criticised this project, the entire Corporation risked the wrath of the premier; when 
leading figures from ITV identified themselves with Wilson, all of commercial 
television looked set to gain. Labour's approach to television in the 1960s was, 
therefore, caught between a partial desire for institutional reform and Wilson's 
pragmatic solutions to a declining economic situation. 
Preparing for the future: paying for the BBC 
Three months into a Labour government, letters were fired off between the Post 
Office and Number 10. Was it true, Derek Mitchell in Wilson's office wanted to 
know, that Benn would 'be asking the BBC to reconsider its whole structure and 
policy' in response to its request for more money? (Mitchell, 1965a). Benn's 
department replied that Benn had been 'linking this in his mind with other major 
broadcasting decisions that have to be reached, believing that the Government will 
want to look at the whole picture' (Tilling, 1965). Wilson reacted by setting up a 
ministerial committee on broadcasting, chaired by Herbert Bowden, Lord President 
of the Council, with the home secretary, the chief whip, the attorney-general, the 
financial secretary to the Treasury and ministers including Benn, Crossman, Jennie 
Lee and George Darling. The committee had a wide-ranging but crucial brief. to 
consider the allocation of a fourth channel, the future of the licence fee, the launch of 
a 'University of the Air', the possibility of local radio broadcasting and the question 
of television standards. In short, it was convened to plan the future of British 
broadcasting. 
18 While Ponting argues that Wilson's administration lacked a 'clear intellectual and theoretical 
structure to help it define long-terin goals and provide ajustification for its actions' (Ponting, 1989: 
400), Pimlott argues exactly the opposite: that 'it would be more appropriate to criticize Wilson for 
sticking to his ideas too rigidly than for not having any' (Pimlott, 1993: 273). 
92 
There was an immediate need for a decision about the BBC licence fee as the 
Corporation had been forced into debt to cope with the start-up of BBC2. Benn 
made it immediately clear that any increase was contingent on the general economic 
situation. Benn told Greene and Lord Normanbrook, the BBC's chairman, at a 
meeting in March 1965 that 'difficulties were being raised by the Department for 
Economic Affairs because of the reaction on incomes policy'. In the event that 
money could not be found, the PMG suggested that the BBC attempt to reduce 
revenue lost through licence fee evasion (Normanbrook, 1965). Wilson was even 
more uncompromising and placed the status of BBC2, less than a year old, in 
jeopardy. In response to Post Office figures that BBC2 was responsible for a large 
proportion of the BBC's deficit, Wilson replied that 'I do not see why we need to 
increase licence fees to pay for a programme that no one wants to see - and many 
can't see even if they wanted to' (Wilson, 1965b). During the discussions that 
followed the Pilkington Report in 1962, Labour had officially supported the award of 
a second channel to the BBC; now, in a harsher economic climate, Wilson was less 
willing to back what he saw as an elitist venture. 19 Less than two weeks later, 
however, Wilson was persuaded to agree to an additional EI on the licence fee as an 
urgent measure to stem the BBC's deficit. Rather than risk unpopularity in the run- 
up to an election, Wilson preferred to hide the rise among the general tax increases 
on personal consumption in the April 1965 budget. 20 His caution was perhaps 
unnecessary given that the BBC in this period produced some of their most popular 
and challenging programmes like Till Death Us Do Part, Steptoe and Son, Up the 
Junction, Cathy Come Home and the Wars of the Roses series. 
Negotiations on BBC finances over the next eighteen months highlight many of the 
divisions inside the Labour Party regarding its relationship to commercial forces, 
electoralism and pragmatism. Following more pressure on the pound that summer, 
the Cabinet introduced a further deflationary package in July causing Crossman to 
19 He was not alone in thinking this. Benn acknowledged at the time that 'there may be a case for 
taking BBC2 away from the BBC' (Benn, 1988: 239) while, according to Tain Dalywell MP, to 'save 
money, and the embarrassment of a Labour Government having to put up the licence, Dick 
[Crossman] wants to do away with BBC2' (quoted in ibid: 3 10/11). 
20 This is not something unique to Labour. The Conservatives had held similar discussions in 1962 
when discussing whether to increase the licence fee and provide the BBC with added revenue to 
finance BBC2. PMG Bevins told the Cabinet that 'most of his colleagues on the Ministerial CP 
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remark that '[t]his was the most violent, primitive, stupid fonn of 'stop-go' ever 
thought of (Crossman, 1975: 268/9). Discussions on television policy seemed to be 
following the same cycle with short-term decisions taking precedent over long-ten-n 
strategic thinking. By the autumn of 1965, the government 'could look forward to a 
stable pound in the run-up to the election' (Ponting, 1989: 83), a situation which 
encouraged ministers to find a solution to the issue of BBC finances. At a meeting of 
the ministerial committee in November 1965, three ways of meeting the BBC's 
financial needs were proposed: an increased licence fee, a grant from government or 
an injection of advertising. In the current economic circumstances, the first two were 
ruled out of order and so the committee opted for the latter. Berm argued that this 
was a 'tremendous success and if it goes through Cabinet, as I think it will, it will be 
the beginning of the reshaping of British broadcasting under public service 
conditions with some mixed revenue' (Benn, 1988a: 353). The committee then gave 
the green light for Benn to work on a white paper incorporating the proposal. 
Benn was convinced that allowing the BBC to carry a limited amount of advertising 
on its Light Programme (in radio) would both kill off the challenge of the illegal 
pirate radio stations and allow for reform of British broadcasting with local 
programmes and a national popular music station. Faced with the dilemna of the 
need to expand broadcasting at a time of public expenditure cuts, Benn felt there was 
no option other than attracting private finance. In May 1965, frustrated by the slow 
progress at the Post Office, he wrote in his diary about the 'central problem of 
socialist practice' in relation to innovation: 
The real drive for improvement comes from those concerned to make 
private profit. If, therefore, you deny these people the right of extending 
private enterprise into new fields, you have to develop some sort of 
alternative. You have to have some body which wants to develop public 
enterprise but our present Civil Service is not interested in growth. It is 
geared to care and maintenance (Benn, 1988a: 264). 
Short of a more radical solution and still politically attached to Wilson's programme, 
Benn's alternative was an entirely 'pragmatic' one: to turn to private investment and 
Committee [on Broadcasting] shared his view that any increase in licence fee before 1965 was 
"politically unrealistic"' (Briggs, 1995: 306). 
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advertising despite his personal hostility towards the cash-rich ITV sector and his 
party's traditional antagonism towards market forces. 
He immediately faced a challenge on three fronts: the conservatism of the civil 
service, resistance to advertising from within the party and, above all, an impending 
election. There was, however, no lack of debate between Labour MPs in the various 
broadcasting committees. In the Cabinet on February 15,1966, those in favour of 
advertising included Crossman, Barbara Castle, Bowden and, according to Benn, 
Harold Wilson himself (ibid: 388) with a majority hostile to the plan. However, as 
'no other additional source of finance was available; and in the light of the 
responsible attitude which the independent television companies had displayed', the 
Cabinet agreed that there were grounds for believing that limited advertising might 
be Politically acceptable (Cabinet minutes, 1966a). This was a rather surprising 
admission that, not only had the ITV companies been behaving 'responsibly' but that 
the BBC's finances should be related to the behaviour of its commercial 
counterparts. 
The following day at a meeting of the backbench communications group of Labour 
MPs, the Parliamentary Labour Party's occasional forum for discussing broadcasting 
issues, there was another split with two MPs arguing that 'the BBC should take 
advertising so that the public sector would not be starved of resources' (ibid: 389). 
The conclusion to the meeting is most interesting: 'there was a majority in favour of 
some advertising solution if it could be done properly but it was agreed that we 
shouldn't publish a White Paper at all' (ibid: 390). Although Benn had actually 
prepared a draft, the main task for the government was to avoid a damaging row in 
the run-up to the March election, even if this meant suppressing existing policy 
proposals. The, by now, urgent need to make some firm decisions on broadcasting 
was sacrificed for short-term electoral success. Crossman, despite supporting Benn's 
proposals in Cabinet, wrote two days afterwards that 'clearly, this is something we 
shall have to put under the mat until after the election' (Crossman, 1975: 459). On 
March 2, Wilson met Benn to brief him on the next day's broadcasting debate in the 
commons and told him that he should 'certainly not suggest that the Cabinet were in 
any way moving towards acceptance of advertising revenue on the Light 
Programme' (Wilson, 1966). 
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In any case, a tentative solution to the crisis of the licence fee had been reached. 
Wilson called in the DG to Downing Street and 
made it clear that it was not at all in his mind to eliminate the possibility 
of increases in the licence fee for all time. On the other hand, the 
Government was not willing to accept anything in the nature of an 
automatic obligation to increase the licence fee to meet the rising costs of 
broadcasting. He said that this was particularly difficult at a time when 
the Government was trying to hold down public expenditure (Greene, 
1966). 
Wilson suggested that the BBC make some efficiency savings by moving some 
operations out of London and by reducing licence fee evasion. Greene, somewhat 
surprisingly, accepted that the BBC would have to manage without an increase until 
1968 as long as the government did not extend broadcasting hours. Benn's reaction 
to the news was that this 'provided the Cabinet with an excuse for killing my 
proposals' and that another 'of my projects has been lost as a result of the Election' 
(Benn, 1988a: 394). The situation appeared to be resolved. 
The White Paper and advertising 
Benn's White Paper did not appear before the 1966 election and, despite the title of 
Labour's manifesto, Titnefor Decision, little had been decided about the general 
future of broadcasting. Apart from a reference to the planned expansion of higher 
education through a 'University of the Air', the manifesto ignored the entire question 
of broadcasting unlike the Conservatives who, following a well-worn theme, 
promised to 'provide more choice and competition in broadcasting' (Craig, 1975, 
76). Having substantially increased its majority at the polls, the government 
immediately ran into difficulties. The seamen's strike in May 1966, opposed by the 
governinent in an effort to protect its incomes policy, compounded pressure on the 
pound. In July, Wilson chose to opt for a; E500m deflationary package which 
included a six-month wage and price freeze as well as significant rises in indirect 
taxes. Both the parliamentary party and Labour supporters outside Parliament, who 
had been reluctant to criticise the governinent when it had only a slender majority, 
were now more vocal in their opposition to Wilson's policies. Backbench rebellions 
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became more frequent, there were regular demonstrations against rising 
unemployment by trade unionists and the left-wing national executive committee 
was increasingly impatient with the government's handling of the economic 
situation. According to Lewis Minkin, 'it wýas prepared now, for the first time in 
I 
Party history, to be publicly identified with critics and criticism of Labour 
Government policy' (Minkin, 1980: 300). 
Following Frank Cousins' resignation from the Cabinet over its handling of the 
seamen's strike, Benn was moved to the Ministry of Technology and his place was 
filled by Edward Short. Assessment of Benn's reign as PMG has been generally 
poor, that he 'managed to make no major decision about television during his term of 
office' (Shulman, 1973: 39). His biographers emphasise that Berm was continually 
constrained by internal opposition and electoral demands. Explaining the 
'impression of indecision', Robert Jenkins writes that '[w]hat emerges from Benn's 
actions and pronouncements on broadcasting is not so much personal indecision as 
government inaction, stemming from the contradiction between the Government's 
acceptance of its public responsibility for broadcasting and its fear of direct 
intervention' (Jenkins, 1980: 108). Jad Adams argues that Benn got 'an undeserved 
reputation for indecisiveness' as regards television because the real reason for the 
lack of action was government unwillingness to increase the licence fee near an 
election (Adams, 1992: 258). In fact, Benn did not give up in his attempts to reform 
broadcasting through the introduction of mixed revenue into the system and fought 
for the creation of a new public radio corporation, playing popular music, mainly 
financed by advertising. 21 
This was enough to rouse the anger of those, particularly on the left, who until now 
had been fairly silent about the government's lack of decisions about broadcasting. 
Firstly, in May 1966 a committee was set up by the Home Policy Committee of the 
NEC to specifically look at the increasing power of advertising in the mass 
21 The creation of a new radio corporation hinged on what to do with the pirate radio stations. While 
hostile to the entrepreneurial attitudes and unlawfulness of the pirates, most Labour MPs also 
recognised their increasing popularity and were therefore unwilling to ban the pirates just before a 
general election. By the time that legislation banning the pirates was introduced in July 1966, Labour IzI MPs were pressing for a 'sweetener', some sort of new, legal popular music channel to replace the 
pirates (see Briggs, 1995: 562). 
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communications industries. While the first draft did not appear for another year, it 
was clear that any immediate increase in advertising would face a strong challenge 
from the Labour left. Secondly, Tribune carried a lively debate about 'The Future of 
Broadcasting' which, although concentrating on radio, highlighted the attitudes of 
those in the Labour Party towards advertising in general. Hugh Jenkins, chair of the 
backbench communications group, supported Benn's proposals and argued that if 
advertising was good enough for Tribune it should be good enough for a new public 
corporation. In reply to Raymond Williams' plea not to hand over 'yet another major 
means of communication into private and irresponsible control' through its 
dependence on advertising (Williams, 1966), Jenkins simply applied Harold 
Wilson's theory of corporatism. 'Of course, advertising in the acquisitive society is 
often as pernicious as many other things in the market economy. That is a very good 
reason that the state should get itself in a position to control a section of it' (Jenkins, 
1966b). 
Debate continued in the Cabinet and ministerial committee throughout the autumn 
with, at one point, Benn's proposals seeming likely to be accepted (see Crossman, 
1976: 71). However, by December, after a fierce lobbying campaign by the left, 
advertising was rejected as an option and the White Paper, finally published in 
December, handed over the new popular music station to the BBC. Tribune argued 
this represented 'a considerable success for the anti-commercial forces in our 
society' (Tribune, 1966) while, according to Crossman, Harold Wilson 'had scored a 
complete triumph over his modernizing adversaries' (ibid: 154) in fending off 
advertising on the BBC. Wilson's role was clearly vital. Always the pragmatist, he 
had adopted an open mind towards advertising in the early part of the year in order to 
put pressure on the BBC and force it to do without a licence fee increase. If he was 
asking workers to tighten their belts to help the country through a crisis, why should 
the BBC be exempt from this? The White Paper warned that 'at a time when none 
may be content to rest upon present standards of efficiency and financial 
performance, good though they may be, the Government have thought it right to 
expect of the B. B. C. that they should set themselves even more exacting financial 
objectives' (White Paper, 1966: para. 11). 
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Once Wilson had forced the BBC to introduce efficiency savings, he was more able 
to reveal his 'true' corporatist colours. Crossman described Wilson at the time as 'a 
very conventional traditionalist' (Crossman, 1976: 71). Advertising, he wrote later, 
'has always been opposed by Harold, the Mýthodist... on the grounds that it's 
I 
immoral to permit a virtuous organisation such as the BBC to be in any way related 
22 
to commercial profit' (Crossman, 1977: 84). Wilson's modernising instincts 
combined the need to cut back on public expenditure together with the defence of a 
fine and upstanding British institution, even one which had antagonised him as much 
as the BBC. 
The Open University and the fourth channel 
Just as the post-war Attlee government is remembered for its founding of the 
National Health Service, the single greatest achievement of the Wilson governments 
in the 1960s is often reckoned to be the creation of the Open University (see for 
example Watkins, 1997). Pimlott describes it as 'a brilliantly original and highly 
ambitious institution which took the ideals of social equality and equality of 
opportunity more seriously than any other part of the British education system' 
(Pimlott, 1993: 515). While the OU was undoubtedly a massive step forward in the 
expansion of higher education, it is less clear whether it was a major example of 
broadcasting reform. Indeed the creation of a 'University of the Air' dominated by 
television was severely compromised by its birth at a time of financial cutbacks and 
rationalisation. By the time it started, the Open University was structured far more 
by educational principles than by a desire to transform the institutions of television. 
According to Stephen Lambert, had the Conservatives won the 1964 election, they 
would have extended commercial television by allocating the fourth channel to the 
ITA (Lambert, 1982; 17). The Labour Party, on the other hand, was hostile to this 
idea and was more interested in using an additional channel for educational purposes; 
indeed for most of the Cabinet, the idea of a fourth channel was intimately tied to a 
University of the Air. This reflected the debates in the party in the late 1950s and 
22 Wilson, as ever, maintained a tactical approach to the subject. Having passed over advertising at 
that time, Wilson specifically insisted that the 'White Paper should also avoid any indication that 
advertising had been rejected in principle as a source of finance' (Cabinet minutes, 1996b). 
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early 1960s which had seen the consensus in favour of a new public corporation run 
independently of both BBC and ITA. Briggs notes that Labour's interest in 
educational broadcasting dates from 1962 with the setting up of Lord Taylor's study 
group on higher education which recommenqed a 'University of the Air' (Briggs, 
1995: 491n). 
Wilson embraced this idea enthusiastically as an example of the planned use of new 
technology for scientific gain. The 'University of the Air' was to be a meritocratic 
institution, symptomatic of the 'new Britain'. In February 1965, he asked the 
education secretary to prepare a paper on the OU for the ministerial committee on 
broadcasting. In hand-written notes on the report, Wilson came up with three 
proposals. Firstly, that the ITA be given control of the University of the Air; 
secondly that the BBC and ITA run it together with the assistance of two 
universities; and thirdly 'for the BBC to run it exclusively, advertising extensively on 
late-night programmes and use the profits to subsidise licence revenue' (Wilson, 
1965a). 
Benn described Wilson's first option as an 'appalling solution' (Benn, 1988a: 236) 
but nevertheless met infon-nally with Lew Grade, the chain-nan of ATV, to discuss a 
public/private partnership for a fourth channel. 'It would be better than giving it to 
the BBC, though not as good as setting up another public corporation which would 
be a public service and inspiration, but would be allowed to take advertising' (ibid: 
239). Neither Benn nor Grade felt able to develop this proposal ftirther but it is 
nevertheless another example of the model that Channel Four was eventually based 
on nearly twenty years later. Backbench MP Hugh Jenkins was thinking on the same 
lines: he wanted to see a new public corporation, answerable to the Ministry of 
Education but partially financed by advertising, which would transmit University of 
the Air programmes as well as pay-per-view programmes. 'I see no other means of 
getting the Fourth TV Channel going' he wrote in the ACTT's j oumal (Jenkins, 
1966a). 
In the event, initiative for the project came not from the postmaster general but from 
the arts minister, Jennie Lee. In March 1965 Wilson transferred Lee into the 
Department of Education and Science to hurry the plans along. Lee was a dynamic 
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and enthusiastic ambassador for the project but immediately anticipated financial 
difficulties. 'I am convinced', she wrote to the prime minister in August, a month 
after the government's most recent deflationary package, 'that if you want the Open 
University, you can have it but only you caR break through the problems raised by 
costs and channels' (Lee, 1965). Lee lobbied hard in the ministerial committee for a 
fourth channel and seemed to be making some headway. Wilson wanted material for 
his speech at the I O'h anniversary dinner of the ITA in September and agreed with 
Bowden that 'it should be possible for some indication to be given of the 
Government's firm intention to establish a fourth channel largely devoted to 
educational broadcasts' (Mitchell, 1965c). 
Over the next few months, civil servants and ministers became increasingly nervous 
about the expenditure involved in setting up a fourth channel. At the same time that 
Wilson was pressing Lee to get her White Paper out in time for the election, the 
ministerial committee decided that her preferred suggestion was no longer financially 
viable. 'The industry will simply not support a fourth television channel which the 
University of the Air could use during peak hours' wrote the chief secretary to the 
Treasury, adding that it would cost about E40m to set up the channel. The solution 
was to use spare evening hours on BBC2 (Diamond, 1966). Lee wrote to Wilson the 
same day raging against this plan: 'I consider that to revert to a half -baked scheme, 
using an hour or two on B. B. C. 2 would completely undermine the whole purpose 
and spirit of a University of the Air' (Lee, 1966a). Four days later, on February 7, 
Lee wrote to Bowden and made it clear that using residual hours from other channels 
would not be enough. 'The fourth network is indispensable' she insisted and went on 
to challenge the chief secretary's 'inflated' figures, suggesting that the cost would be 
nearerfl7m. She concluded by saying that 'I am wholly convinced that unless we 
are prepared to establish a genuine open university, based on the fourth network, we 
shall expose ourselves to the charges of gimmickry' (Lee, 1966b). 
Cabinet met the following day to discuss the project where Lee continued to argue 
that a fourth channel was required. She was, however, firmly in the minority: 
'Concern was expressed ... at the demand which the fourth television network and the 
University of the Air would make upon resources' (Cabinet minutes, 1966c). With 
Lee's proposals soundly defeated, Wilson concluded the discussion by promising to 
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examine both the costs of a new network and the possibility of using spare hours on 
BBC2. He asked Lee to ensure that the revised White Paper should 'be confined to 
the educational aspects of the University and should omit references to finance and 
the fourth network' (ibid. ). Although Benn wrote in his diary that this 'must have 
been a terrible set-back for Jennie' (Benn, 1988a: 385), Lee herself appeared to be 
quite cheerful the following day. She wrote to Wilson's solicitor Arnold Goodman, 
who was helping with the financial discussions surrounding the OU, that she now 
considered the use of BBC2 between 6 and 9prn to be 'the ideal solution' (Lee, 
1966c) and was ready to amend the White Paper. The next draft, three days later, 
dropped any references to finance and the possibility of a fourth channel for the OU 
was never discussed again. 23 
At one level, this is an excellent piece of realpolitik as Lee had now managed to 
convince the Cabinet of the need for the OU and won a place for it in the election 
manifesto. This is very much the standard reading of the situation. Briggs argues 
that Lee 'was sufficiently assured that the new university would be brought into 
existence that she was prepared to compromise on the introduction of a separate 
fourth channel' (Briggs, 1995: 498). Patricia Hollis, a Labour life peer who has 
written a recent biography of Lee, presents it as a victory for skilful negotiation. 
'Had Jennie persisted in demanding the fourth channel, she would have sunk the 
entire project. Cabinet hostility to its cost was too great. Not even Wilson could 
have delivered it. She capitulated' (Hollis, 1997: 317). 
Perhaps Hollis is right and that even a project so precious to Wilson as the OU would 
have been sacrificed to help balance the books. Certainly, it is true that Lee's 
persistence meant that civil service and establishment opposition to the project was 
eventually swept away. The more important point, however, is that the cost of 
between fI 7m and f: 40m for the OU was insignificant compared to the D 00m cost 
of maintaining Polaris at that time (Ponting, 1989: 88). A pragmatic approach meant 
that, given that modernisation was an expensive business, some areas of policy had 
23 This is yet another example of a compromised solution which is not peculiar to a Labour 
government. During the passage of the 1963 Television Act, backbench Tories insisted that PMG C) 
Bevins commit himself to introducing a second commercial channel by 1965. They dropped their 
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to be higher up the pecking order than others. A consequence of the February 
decision, therefore, was the scaling down of the importance of television for the 
University. 'The major change from Wilson's original vision' wrote the OU's first 
director of studies in arts, 'was the realization that it was not possible for the 
University to rely solely or even primarily on broadcasting ... Broadcasting would 
have a significant role in association with other means of instruction' (Ferguson, 
1975: 15). While the Open University is a notable example of educational reform, its 
status as a key development in the history of broadcasting is less certain. 
With the proposed decision to move the OU to BBC2, Benn simply avoided any 
reference to the possibility of a fourth channel in the broadcasting debate in March 
1966. The increasingly difficult economic situation throughout the summer and 
autumn of that year ensured that the Cabinet would not change its decision and 
preoccupied the minds of those who might have otherwise have criticised the 
government for inaction. When the White Paper eventually declared in December 
that 'the Government do not consider that another television service can be afforded 
a high place in the order of national priorities' (White Paper, 1966: para. 17) and 
delayed any decision for at least three years, there was little fuss. 
After over two years in office, Labour had at last published a statement on the future 
of television. According to Labour's rather breathless conference report on 
broadcasting, 1966 had been a 'year of modernisation, development and expansion 
on all fronts, as befits a science-based industry in the throes of a technological 
revolution' (Labour Party, 1966: 102/3). True, colour on 625 PAL was definitely on 
its way, but decisions on modernising BBC finances, developing a fourth channel 
and expanding broadcasting hours had all been put on hold. The problem was that 
Wilson's technological revolution had coincided with a prolonged period of 
economic turbulence that meant that the Labour government's priority was survival 
rather than innovation. 'Instead of seeking to set the agenda for debate, seize the 
initiative and push through a clear programme, it seemed content to tackle issues as 
and when they arose' (Ponting, 1989: 173). Despite the appearance of the White 
claims when Bevins promised that the fourth channel would be launched as soon as financial 
circumstances allowed (see Lambert, 1982: 17). 
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Paper at the end of 1966, there was, therefore, little evidence of a strategic and co- 
ordinated plan for television reform. 
Labour, the ITV franchises and the levy 
Apart from its refusal to hand over a second channel to the ITA, commercial 
television had little reason so far to worry about life under a Labour government. 
Wilson attended the tenth anniversary dinner of the ITA in September 1965 and 
publicly praised the achievements of commercial television. Relations between 
Brompton Road and Downing Street were uniformly friendly with even Tony Benn 
privately admitting that he was fond of the ITA chairman, Charles Hill (Benn, 1988a: 
321). More importantly, while an ITV franchise was no longer a 'licence to print 
money', it was certainly an invitation to spend money. In the first ten years of 
operations, ITV bosses had embarked on an f 80m programme of diversification 
snapping up 'sports stadiums, television-rental shops, property companies, optical 
firms, publishing houses, sweet shops, hotels, agencies and a host of other 
businesses' (Shulman, 1973: 23). Television, in the minds of many ITV 
entrepreneurs, was a business that required accountability to both audiences and 
shareholders. 
The introduction of the levy on advertising revenue by the Conservatives in 1963 had 
proved to be only a slight inconvenience. 'The programme companies had learned to 
live with the additional burden of discriminatory taxation' writes the official 
historian of commercial television, 'and - despite their earlier cries of doom and 
gloom - they had continued to prosper' (Sendall, 1983: 335). Annual profits of the 
ITV companies between 1964 and 1968 averaged E18.3m, a profit rate of 50% as 
against the average of 13% in industry generally (see ibid: 319 and 370). Harold 
Wilson was more than happy to see this example of dynamic accumulation, 
particularly because his Exchequer was reaping the rewards, some F-40m going back 
into government funds in 1966 alone (Donne, 1967). 
In a climate in which the prime minister was calling for pay restraint and belt- 
tightening, it was the trade unions who provided some of the most vocal criticism of 
ITV's greed. At the 1965 TUC conference, Alan Sapper from the Television and 
104 
Screenwriters' Guild attacked the use of ITV profits for diversification together with 
the deteriorating quality of programmes. At the following year's conference, Sapper 
called on the government to 'ensure that the major proportion of television 
company's [sic] profits are used for the benýfits of British television (Sapper, 1966: 
485). The ACTT seconded the resolution and criticised the ITV companies for 
making vast profits and then withholding them from television production. 24 The 
issue was not debated, however, by Labour conferences. 
In December 1966, Hill invited applications for the fifteen commercial television 
franchises, now due for renewal. Any worries in the British economy caused by 
July's deflationary package failed to deter entrepreneurs enthusiastic about the 
possibility of earning easy returns of investment. 'The frenzied scramble that 
followed', according to Shulman, 'was a genteel British version of such other 
financial stampedes as the gold rush in Alaska, the uranium panic in Canada, and the 
nickel dash in Australia' (Shulman, 1973: 56). While the majority of the applicants 
were leading figures from the world of business and banking, individuals and 
institutions close to Labour including Arnold Goodman, Sidney Bernstein and the 
Neiv Statesinan were in the queue. 25 
The government made no attempt to interfere with the decisions of the ITA as 
Wilson had full confidence in Hill's ability. Those on the left were not so optimistic. 
Tribune complained that 'so long as profit is the main concern of the promoters we 
are unlikely to get a better commercial television service. The ITA could help by 
insisting that a fixed percentage of the profits be ploughed back into the industry' 
(Tribune, 1967a). When the franchises were announced two weeks later, Tribune, 
unlike the majority of Flýet Street who were generally 'pleased by Lord Hill's new 
look for commercial TV' (Shulman, 1973: 62), criticised the arbitrary and 
unaccountable process of dishing out television monopolies, particularly to 
politicians (Tribune, 1967b). The Neiv Statesman, not surprisingly given its 
24 The motion was remitted after the General Council asked for more time to consider precisely where 
the money should go. No further action was taken because of the franchise renewals the following 
year. 
25 Alan Sapper had previously called on the TUC to support a trades union channel as 'it is really 
imperative that this one-eyed serpent is constructively tamed' (Sapper, 1965: 517) but this had been 
firmly rejected by the General Council. 
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participation in the process, was less outraged but still deplored 'the general 
spectacle of a scramble for bids' (Neiv Statesman, 1967). Crossman, meanwhile, 
declared that this was 'an extraordinary part of our so-called free enterprise - the 
feudal deal in T. V. franchises which has beep given to I. T. A ... 
I wish our Labour 
I 
Government had done something about it, but we didn't' (Crossman, 76: 377). 
Indeed, the PMG vigorously defended the deal in parliament shortly afterwards. To 
those who called for transparency in the allocation of franchises, Edward Short 
replied that secrecy was needed to fend off the prying eyes of the media who would 
inevitably take sides. 'The consequence of open adjudication, therefore, would seem 
to be the exclusion of the Press from the programme companies' (HoC Debates, 28 
June 1967: col. 449). Given the growing dangers of media concentration and the 
high levels of press investment in ITV at the time, this would seem to be a 
worthwhile suggestion. Short, however, welcomed the fact that the press now had 
financial interests in more television franchises than before because this provided for 
an additional source of income which would only add to the security and diversity of 
the British press (ibid: col. 453). He was supported by the backbench Labour MP 
Christopher Rowland who attempted to divert attention away from criticisms of the 
commercial motives of ITV: 'I strongly take the view that the question of profits is 
not the most important point to watch. Throughout broadcasting, the most important 
thing is the programmes and their quality and standard' (ibid.: col. 434). He then 
went on to defend the right of MPs to be chairmen of ITV companies and 
congratulated the ITA on its 'shake-up' of commercial television. 
Labour had, in practice, accommodated to the commercial television companies 
while the left was busy either attempting to buy its way into ITV or calling on the 
ITA, and not the government, to insist that profits be re-invested back into 
programmes. Yet, just weeks after the new franchises were awarded, the NEC's 
advertising sub-committee (see pp. 96/7) produced its first draft report which proved 
to be extremely critical of ITV. Recognising the crucial influence that advertising 
revenue exerted on television, the committee stuck by the findings of the 1962 
Pilkington Committee that the needs of advertising clashed with the public's right to 
choose from a diverse range of quality programmes. The report finished by stating 
that: 
106 
We do not believe that the passage of time has done anything to soften 
the force of this hard criticism [of commercial television in the Pilkington 
Report]. Nor does the I. T. V. auction of licences to print money which 
we have recently witnessed encourage us to believe that the implication 
of the Pilkington Report was ever squarely faced. We still think that a 
greater degree of public control and public accountability is necessary in 
commercial television (Labour Party NEC, 1967: 23). 
While the government had missed the opportunity to reform commercial television 
by taking advertising sales away from the ITV companies, restricting cross-media 
ownership or introducing some transparency into the franchise process, the NEC's 
anti-commercial beliefs now came to the fore. This was just one of the differences 
that emerged between the NEC and the government in the period after 1966 (see 
Minkin, 1980: 298-300). 
Devaluation of the pound in November 1967 and the subsequent cuts in public 
expenditure threw the Wilson government into disarray. Divisions in the cabinet 
echoed massive dissension in Labour's grass roots. Time and again, the government 
turned on its own supporters to pay the price of economic crisis, implementing 
incomes policies and spending cuts. The theme of betrayal was taken up not just in 
the pages of Tribune but even in a series of leader articles in the Thnes in June 1968 
by an anonymous civil servant. On one occasion, 'C' used the example of 
commercial television to illustrate Labour's failure to sustain the hopes of its 
supporters and its retreat from substantial reform. It is worth quoting at length. 
As an example [of Wilson's pragmatism] the Government's attitude (or 
rather lack of attitude) to commercial television which the Labour Party 
had persistently attacked in opposition, is not inapposite. Nothing 
epitomized more ostentatiously the candy-floss society, nothing else, to 
pile Pelion on Ossa, had been such a Thrasonic demonstration of crude 
capitalism. Yet no change was made in the way the franchises were 
allotted and the consequent fortunes distributed according to the whim of 
the I. T. A. No one denies that the profits made out of commercial 
television were a national scandal which should have undermined the 
position of the Macmillan Governinent more seriously than the Profumo 
affair. What is beyond comprehension is that the same procedure should 
have been allowed to repeat itself under a Labour Government without a 
murmur ('C', 1968). 
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By 1969, the tide was starting to turn against the commercial companies: advertising 
revenue was declining because of economic uncertainty while one of the new 
franchise companies, London Weekend Television, was on the brink of collapse after 
financial mismanagement. Most disastrously for the ITV employers, the 
government, desperate for revenue to prop up the economy, increased the advertising 
levy by Orn in the April budget. The chancellor, Roy Jenkins, could no longer 
justify ITV's huge rates of return and argued that '[i]n my view the community 
should have a bigger share in the value of these publicly created concessions' (HoC 
Debates, 15 April 1969: col. 1014). 
This announcement was met with cries of horror from the ITV companies who 
warned of impending bankruptcy with a fall in profits from F_ I 5m in the mid- I 960s 
to some f 3-5m in 1969. Veteran opponents of ITV like Christopher Mayhew and 
Milton Shulman urged the public not to feel any pity while even the Economist 
warned not 'to exaggerate that crisis. ITV is not on the verge of utter financial 
collapse' (Economist, 1969). The Labour-supporting Neiv Statesman, however, 
adopted a more pragmatic approach. 'It is hard to weep for a bonanza industry 
which could once weigh itself in diamonds. But the balancing-up process is 
swinging too heavily the other way: if you rock the boat hard and often enough, it 
will capsize (Hunt, 1969: 725). Although commercial television had not been rocked 
hard or often by Labour, ITV bosses organised a high-profile lobby to rescue their 
ailing craft. Foriner Labour minister, Lord Aylestone, complained that the levy was 
too high, while figures like Peter Cadbury of Westward threatened that he 'would not 
apply for a licence again in 1974 if current problems continued. The levy is nothing 
but confiscation' (quoted in Moreton, 1970). 
Private Eye replied in an article called 'Con The Nation Street' that not enough 
confiscation had taken place. It pointed out that Westward's profits had consistently 
risen as had its dividends to shareholders and that the enormous profits of ITV over 
the years had never been invested back into quality programmes. It concluded that: 
In the last three years the Chancellor has taken some fl, 800m from the 
taxpayers. In this situation, it was hardly surprising that he should seek 
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to take an extra f3m from the rising revenue of some of the most 
profitable monopolies in the country. The result was a great chorus of 
rich men's protest, massive cuts in all forms of productive television, a 
lowering of already rock-bottom television standards, creation of 
widespread unemployment in the film industry, threats of total closure of 
TV stations, and perhaps more relevantly, a discreet reminder that this is 
the year in which a General Election will be fought, like none other, on 
the "television image" of the protagonists (Private Eye, 1970). 
The predictions were entirely correct. Several months later, John Stonehouse, the 
new minister of posts and telecommunications, refunded not only the f3m cut the 
previous year but handed back an additional f3m to the ITV companies. 26 In reply to 
an outraged Mayhew, Stonehouse, said that '[w]e are not giving a handout. We are 
taking less from the programme contractors than we announced we would take a year 
ago. That is not a handout. It is simply adjusting the amount we take from them' 
(HoC Debates, 23 March 1970: col. 1144). The decision to come to the rescue of the 
ITV companies had not been discussed in Cabinet or in the strategic economic policy 
group, where financial planning was supposed to be concentrated: 'The deal was 
fixed between the Chancellor and Stonehouse' (Crossman, 1977: 863). Even George 
Elvin, president of the ACTT whose members were directly affected by the 
temporarily troubled state of ITV's finances and who had therefore been reluctant to 
endorse a higher levy, criticised the government for not tying the levy cut to a 
requirement to invest more in production (TV Today, 1970). 
After all of Wilson's exhortations to workers to share in the nation's drive to 
economise and make sacrifices, it was perhaps to be expected that such an act of 
charity to television's top entrepreneurs should coincide with an impending election. 
Stuart Hood, the former controller of BBC Television and prominent left-wing 
commentator on broadcasting issues, argues that the concession to commercial 
television could be 'explained in part by the fact that Labour voters watch ITV and in 
part by the close links between the Wilson circle and show business interests' (Hood, 
1987: 76). The gradual upturn in the fortunes of the ITV companies in the following 
years further proved that there was no need for generosity on the part of the 
26 Headlines the following day (March 17,1970) ran 'ITV Firms Given Levy Lifesaver' (Sun), f6m 
Boost for the Needy TV Men' (Evening News) and 'TV shares soar as Whitehall steps down on levy' 
(Daily Express). 
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chancellor. It is, nevertheless, a revealing lesson that it 'took a Labour government 
to feel pity for the contractors' (ibid) and to ensure their continuing profitability. 
A mood for change 
Not all the issues dealt with in the 1966 White Paper had been resolved by the late 
1960s. In particular, the problem of BBC finances remained high on the 
broadcasting agenda. Having promised the BBC a ftirther licence increase in 1968, 
the government seemed anxious to postpone a decision. At the beginning of the 
year, Greene wrote to his chairman, Charles Hill, that the PMG's attitude to the El 
rise 'which was formerly positive seems, for unknown reasons, to have become 
negative. ' Answering his own question, he continued that '[o]ne wonders whether 
he has changed his mind or whether he has run into great difficulties on Cabinet 
level' (Greene, 1968). It was more likely that Wilson, gripped by the economic 
traumas of the time, was simply not prepared to sanction an increase. Philip Ziegler, 
quoting Wilson's private papers, notes that it was almost like a medical condition. 
On March 19,1968, Wilson declared that he was 'allergic to any increase in BBC 
revenue' and that the Corporation should make itself more efficient (quoted in 
Ziegler, 1993: 269). 
With the BBC's situation increasingly desperate, Cabinet discussed the matter again 
in May. As Crossman sighed to his diary: 'Up to the P. M. 's room to discuss the 
B. B. C. licence fee, which we've already been discussing for two years [actually 
nearer four years] ... The P. M. chose to indulge in one of his tirades [against the 
BBC]' and went on to compare the good old days of ITV under Hill to the bias of 
today's BBC (Crossman, 1977: 84). And yet, despite his vocal opposition to raising 
the licence fee, Wilson was eventually persuaded to agree to the increase which was 
finally introduced in January 1969, one year late. The same situation re-occurred the 
following year when Wilson only agreed to a further rise as long as it was postponed 
until after the next election. 
Labour was much more supportive of public service broadcasting when it came to 
the matter of pay television. The previous Conservative government had licensed 
some pay-per-view experiments that Labour had allowed to continue. Despite fierce 
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lobbying by Lords Mountbatten and Brabourne and some prevarication by PMGs 
Short and Stonehouse, the NEC's Home Affairs Committee decided in October 1968 
to reject any extension to Pay TV Ltd. 's licence. It argued that pay television was 
likely to hegemonise live sporting events ano that 'if Pay-TV made a success of their 
venture it would be necessary to license other commercial companies to provide a 
pay service, and that commercial considerations not subject to the restraints imposed 
on the BBC and ITV might thus predominate over considerations of public service' 
(Nunn, 1968). This decisive course of action was in stark contrast to Wilson's 
intervention in the matter. Having heard the HPC's rejection of pay television, Lord 
Moutbatten phoned Downing Street in a fury. 
Lord Moutbatten said that he had discussed this question with the Prime 
Minister at Lord Thompson's lunch on Thursday, October 17 [eight days 
before]. The Prime Minister had given him to understand on that 
occasion that he had no need to worry. From this he had gathered that 
the question had been settled favourably. He was wondering who was in 
fact in charge of the Government (Halls, 1968). 
This was, of, course, a question that was starting to gain some currency. Who was in 
charge of broadcasting policy? Was there a strategic plan or was government policy 
in the field of television designed to cope with crisis management? To what extent 
was policy led by Wilson's whims or party principles? With both the BBC and ITV 
under increased financial pressure, with debates on advertising still running under the 
surface, with no decision about the future of a fourth channel and with a growing 
lack of trust in the broadcasting authorities, there was an urgent need for a co- 
ordinated strategy for the broadcasting industry. 
The possibility of a systematic overhaul of broadcasting was originally raised by 
PMG Edward Short in his statement on the ITV franchise allocations in June 1967. 
Noting that the charters of both the ITA and the BBC were due to be renewed in 
1976, he argued that 'nine years from now, an opportunity will arise for a 
fundamental review of the whole system'. In the short term, he hoped that 'in the 
spring of 1969, a long, cool look will begin at the whole system of broadcasting in 
this country' (HoC Debates, 28 June 1967: col. 456). Before then, however, there 
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were plenty of opportunities to criticise the current arrangements. Commenting on 
the disappointing opening week of the new ITV regime, the Neiv Statesnian called 
for urgent government action to think of ways of making television a 'genuinely 
independent public service'. 'Whatever may have been done for the arts' went the 
cover story, 'the record on broadcasting suggests that the difficulties of interfering to 
increase independence have been too much for Downing Street's thinking' (Neiv 
Statesnian, 1968). 
The temperature was raised by two speeches in October 1968 calling for 
broadcasting reform by Benn and Crossman. Benn addressed some thirty people in 
his local constituency on the theme of 'Broadcasting in a Participatory Democracy'. 
While his words were taken to be a public attack on the BBC in particular, Benn was 
calling for a wider re-structuring of the airwaves. 
Broadcasting is too important to be left to the broadcasters, and somehow 
we must find some new way of using radio and television to allow us to 
talk to each other. We've got to fight all over again the same battles that 
we fought centuries ago to get rid of the licence to print and the same 
battles to establish representative broadcasting in place of the benevolent 
paternalism by the constitutional monarchs who reside in the palatial 
Broadcasting House (quoted in Jenkins, 1980: 144). 
Jenkins claims that the speech was part of a build-up for a resolution demanding 
media reform at the 1968 Labour conference, although no such motion was ever put. 
Crossman's speech, on the other hand, was far more moderate simply demanding 'a 
new atmosphere between the B. B. C, the Independent Television companies and 
ourselves' (Crossman, 1977: 229). While Crossman's speech was praised by Hugh 
Greene and Hugh Cudlipp of the Daily Mirror, Benn's was attacked by Wilson who, 
according to Benn, 'wrote me a memo saying 'gurus should be confined to 
Wolverhampton' trying to muddle me up with [Enoch] Powell. I wrote him a reply 
signed "the guru of Millbank Tower... (Benn, 1997). 
Benn's calls for deep-rooted broadcasting reform tapped into a mood of wider 
political radicalisation. The student revolt and general strike in France in May 1968 
together with growing protests against the Vietnam War had led to a critical concern 
with the political role of television (see, for example, Fisera, 1978,305-7). In 
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Britain, this connected to the revival of New Left ideas and the centrality of culture 
as a political battleground. Perry Anderson had outlined the specific demands of the 
New Left in relation to television in 1964: full implementation of the Pilkington 
proposals, 'the fullest freedom for producers to create and the fullest free availability 
of works for the community to experience' (Anderson, 1964: 27). Now, in the more 
militant atmosphere of the late 1960s where a space had developed for challenging 
the status quo, arguments for fundamental reform of broadcasting began to circulate 
more widely. 
Hugh Jenkins, the chairman of the PLP's communications group, laid out his plans 
for reform in the pages of the ACTT'sjoumal in July 1969. Firstly he called for 
reform of the mass media as a whole and not in parts. He attacked the undemocratic 
pattern of ownership of the press and recommended that, while BBC TV remain 
unchanged, the ITA should take over responsibility for selling advertising from the 
ITV companies so that the franchise holders would simply provide programmes for 
the authority. The opposition to advertising of some Labour Party members was, in 
his opinion, pointless: advertising 'is like fire. It can be used to comfort and inform 
or it can destroy and debauch. Socialists should know that what counts is ownership' 
(Jenkins, 1969: 16). As long as advertising is controlled by the state, Jenkins 
reckoned, socialists should have no reason to worry. 
This was almost immediately contradicted by the publication the following month of 
an NEC statement, Labour'S Social Strategy, (Labour Party, 1969) which challenged 
the growing advertising-led commodification of the cultural industries. Thinking 
along the same lines as the advertising committee (which had yet to publish its final 
report), the statement condemned the increasing grip of commercial forces on the 
mass media and argued that any proposals to introduce advertising in the BBC 
should be 'vigorously opposed'. In a direct challenge to Wilson's antipathy to 
licence fee increases, it then recommended that 'further finance should be sought 
through broadcasting licences or through general taxation. ' Finally, depressed by the 
impact of advertising on ITV, it called for a 're-examination of the control and 
operation of Independent Television' (ibid.: 102). 
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Further to the left, Stuart Hall questioned the entire framework of British 
broadcasting in an article for the New Statesman in July 1969. He advised readers to 
reject the 'narrow framework' of the usual debates about broadcasting which 
accepted predetermined notions of what waspossible and what was not. Challenging 
the myth of choice in British television, he argued that it was a mistake to 'see the 
alternatives as confined to either bureaucratic, administratively top-heavy, executive- 
oriented, paternalist broadcasting organised in a monolithic unit; or robber-baron, 
advertising-conscious, programme-starved, profit-oriented contracting companies'. 
The key was to 'transcend this set of alternatives' (Hall, 1969: 69). His analysis 
confronted the pragmatism of Labour policy which tied innovation to current 
financial priorities, but Hall offered no practical solution as to how these aims could 
be realised. 
The following month an editorial in Socialist Coinmentary, traditionally the house 
organ of revisionism, criticised the increasing concentration of media into fewer 
hands and urged the government to increase the licence fee in order to save public 
service broadcasting. 'This time of financial stringency may not be an easy moment 
for the Government to embark on bold courses, but if it ever needed the courage of 
its convictions regarding the virtues of public enterprise here is the time and place. 
Timidity now would be unforgivable' (Socialist Conzinentary, 1969: 5). The 
government's answer was indeed bold: it had bailed out the commercial companies, 
delayed a El licence increase for nearly two years and now promised in its next 
election manifesto 'to establish a high-powered Committee of Enquiry to report on 
The Future of Broadcasting' (Craig, 1975: 363), which was eventually to become the 
Annan Committee. There was no room in the manifesto for a commitment to reform 
ITV or to find additional finance for the BBC. 
Why did the Labour government suggest, at that particular time, a full investigation 
into the structures of British broadcasting? Partly, following the events of 1968, it 
was a response to the left-wing critique of the lack of accountability in broadcasting 
and of key institutions in general. Yet it was also due to some fierce lobbying by 
programme makers who were increasingly alienated by the state of the broadcasting 
duoPoly and who launched a pressure group at the end of 1969 called the 76 Group, 
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named after the year in which both the ITA licence and the BBC Charter were due to 
run out. According to Stephen Lambert, 
their aim was to urge the Government to appoint a Royal Commission to 
review the structure, finance and organisation of broadcasting. They 
believed that there was a general crisis in the industry and that two recent 
controversial events - the publication of the BBC's plans for 
Broadcasting in the Seventies and the LWT debacle - were symptomatic 
of this crisis (Lambert, 1982: 39). 
Broadcasting into the Seventies outlined the BBC's controversial plans to rationalise 
its radio output by replacing the Home, Light and Third Services with Radio 1,2,3 
and 4 in an effort to free up resources for local radio and unden-nine demands for 
commercial local radio. The 76 Group argued that the changes were explicitly 
concerned with efficiency savings and attacked the new 'managerialism' in the BBC 
which meant that 'everyone who has worked for BBC-TV over the last five years 
will have first-hand evidence of an atmosphere in which programme standards have 
increasingly suffered in the race for ratings' (quoted in ibid.: 41). In March 1970, the 
76 Group placed an advertisement in the Guardian with the headline, 'Crisis in 
Television and Radio -A Royal Commission Now! ' The text criticised both 'the 
subservience of programmes to profits' in ITV and the BBC's response to financial 
problems as one that favoured 'business rather than programme values'. The call for 
a Royal Commission 'to review the structure, finance and organisation of 
broadcasting' (76 Group, 1970) was signed by a long list of broadcasting luminaries, 
including Jim Allen, Humphrey Burton, Stuart Hood, Dennis Potter, Milton Shulman 
and Philip Whitehead, as well as two Labour MPs, Douglas Houghton and James 
Dickens, and one Liberal MP, Richard Wainright. 
Pressure for an inquiry was starting to worry senior broadcasting figures. 'What had 
begun as a revolt against changes in radio generally' wrote the BBC chairman, 'was 
developing into a fundamental attack on the whole system, BBC and ITV alike' 
(Hill, 1974b: 138). Grace Wyndham Goldie, head of television talks at the BBC, 
was even more alarmed. Such an inquiry 'could put the whole of British 
broadcasting into a melting pot and recommend to Parliament something quite 
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different from anything resembling the kind of British broadcasting which so far had 
existed' (Goldie, 1977: 304). Except that it did not. In reality, a Royal Commission 
must have seemed to the government like an excellent short-term strategy to head off 
any immediate decisions about broadcasting.. 
I 
The reformers got their way when on December 3,1969 the minister of posts and 
telecommunications, Stonehouse, raised the possibility of a full inquiry during a 
parliamentary debate. In May 1970, after five months of intensive campaigning, 
Stonehouse announced the creation of a public inquiry under the chair of Lord 
Annan, who had sat on the advisory committee of the Open University some years 
earlier. Crossman, once again, was puzzled when he heard the news in Cabinet. 'I 
asked why colleagues weren't consulted and Harold said some colleagues were. 
Here is another instance of a major decision being privately taken by Harold and a 
few others' (Crossman, 1977: 92 1). 
The irony is that Wilson himself had initially opposed the idea, even though he is 
now generally credited with pushing it through. The new BBC director general, 
Charles Curran, recalled that Wilson 'did not favour the setting up of a further 
Committee of Inquiry and had not been pleased when the Minister [Stonehouse] had 
mentioned this prospect in the course of the debate [on December 3]'. Wilson 
favoured resolution of urgent matters by the existing broadcasting authorities and 
'thought that to set up a Committee of Inquiry was simply to inject an amateur body 
in an area where professional knowledge was essential' (Curran, 1970). This was 
classic Wilson: what was needed was a body of scientists and experts who would 
take a purposeful look at the situation and not be put off by any ideological 
differences. What persuaded Wilson to change his mind is unclear. Perhaps 
Stonehouse convinced him that any changes 'could be made more acceptable to the 
public if they were made as a result of recommendations by an independent 
committee rather than as the result of an internal Government review' (quoted in 
Hill) 1970). Perhaps Wilson thought that the threat of a full review would be a useful 
lever to have during the course of the 1970 election. In any case, Wilson lost the 
election and Heath, anxious to avoid any negative publicity for cornmercial sound 
broadcasting, immediately cancelled the inquiry. 
116 
How productive was it that the energies of the reformers were channelled into the 
demand for a public inquiry and not into more concrete or immediate plan s for 
action? Royal Commissions are not the natural battlegrounds of those who wish to 
see significant or structural change, even if there ivas a real need for a full debate on 
how to increase accountability and transparency in the structures of British 
broadcasting. Royal Commissions may uncover useful facts and contribute to a 
pressure for change, but they are unlikely to be the cause of the sort of 
transformation so dreaded by Hill and Goldie. However, some on the left were 
prepared to go further than asking for constitutional reform. In 1969, a number of 
radical media workers founded the Free Communications Group (FCG) and 
published their manifesto as The Open Secret. They called for 'a radical 
contestation' of media ownership, content and organisations by 'all the workers in 
the industry', whatever their craft, grade or age. 'The whole debate about what free 
communications can be has never really taken place. It has been surrendered to 
Royal Commissions and pieties about nationalisation' (FCG, 1969: 4). It was a call 
to action that stood in opposition to the whole course of Wilson's governments in the 
1960s but one that was to find a fuller resonance in the debates on the media in the 
following decade. 
Conclusion 
What had almost six years of Labour government achieved for British television? 
Wilson had come to power on the back of popular enthusiasm for technological 
innovation and the modemisation of Britain's political and social institutions. Both 
Wilson and Benn had wanted television to be associated with these objectives and to 
play its part in an industrial and cultural revolution. In 1964, satirical shows were 
mocking the Tories for being obsolete while, within two years of Labour being in 
office, programmes like Up the Junction and Cathy Come Honie demonstrated how 
television could play an important progressive role in public life. 
By the end of the decade, some critics were claiming that innovation had turned into 
stagnation, boldness into caution, idealism into pragmatism. Milton Shulman (1973: 
103) noted evidence of a 'creeping conformity, a growing reluctance to cause 
trouble, a greater emphasis on light entertainment and sport. ' Christopher Booker, 
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the former writer on TW3, later described the prevailing mood as 'one at least of 
confusion and disillusionment, if not of considerable gloom' (Booker, 1992: 303). 
The atmosphere of apparently limitless novelty in which television in the 
late Fifties and early Sixties established itself as such as dominant force 
in the social and political life of the nation, had dwindled by the end of 
the decade into a kind of general resigned acceptance of the predominant 
triviality (ibid: 308). 
For Stuart Hall, the reason for the decline of the 'satire era' was simply that 'Harold 
Wilson is too serious a matter for satire' (Hall, 1969: 69). 
Whilst such a picture exaggerates both the creativity of an earlier 'golden age' and 
the bleakness of the picture in 1970, it is certainly true that government policy under 
Wilson did little to actively promote an atmosphere of confidence and 
experimentation. That British television did not go backwards was due more to the 
impact of producers, directors and scriptwriters attempting to relate to the profound 
political and social changes of the 1960s than to creative government steering of 
broadcasting. Tony Berm argues that the period was one in which all reforms had to 
be fought for in very difficult circumstances. People who wanted reform 'were 
struggling against a hostile press, a prime minister who began by being very radical 
and then very conservative, against a Treasury who hated your guts, against the right 
wing of the Labour Party who thought the whole thing was totally wrong - the early 
modernisers - so it wasn't exactly easy' (Benn, 1997). However, in some areas, 
there ivas real evidence of social reform with the liberalisation of laws concerning 
abortion, homosexuality, divorce and censorship. Why did this not extend to 
television? 
Partly, this was due to the fact that television policy, as opposed to output, was still 
not seen as central by many in the Labour Party. Housing, unemployment, health 
and education were all seen as important areas in which government ought to 
legislate. Television, on the other hand, was an area of private enjoyment in which 
Labour, still scarred from its initial opposition to the now successful ITV system, 
was reluctant to intervene. 
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Another explanation for Labour's failure to transform broadcasting in the 1960s lies 
with the contradictory role of Harold Wilson himself. On the one hand, Wilson 
sought to punish the BBC for its frequent criticisms of his government by blocking 
licence fee increases and supporting Berm's plan to introduce advertising on the 
BBC. At the same time, he was reluctant to allow advertising on the BBC in order to 
protect its status as a public corporation and to highlight the value of corporatism and 
was always persuaded, after some argument, to agree to licence fee increases. 
Wilson was extremely sensitive to the growing political importance of television and 
therefore infuriated by individual instances of BBC behaviour but he was 
simultaneously protective of the Corporation's cultural heritage. In practice, despite 
his animosity towards a range of programmes and journalists, Wilson demonstrated a 
very inconsistent commitment to reform the BBC and to modernise the institutions of 
broadcasting. However, as Paul Foot noted in 1968, 
To place the responsibility for the collapse of the reformist policies of the 
Labour Party solely on the shoulders of Harold Wilson is frivolously to 
dabble in personalities ... Wilson's 'mistakes' - that is errors of judgement brought on in his personal case by an obsession with public 
relations, a coterie of mediocrities, paralysing indecision and personal 
sentimentality - have only been marginal in dictating the course of events 
during this period (Foot, 1968a: 333). 
More important than Wilson's personal shortcomings is the fact that television policy 
is necessarily developed in specific economic and political contexts. In the 1960s 
broadcasting was affected by the declining state of Britain's finances and the 
government's response of a programme of public spending cuts. Labour's main 
contribution to the modernisation of the BBC in the 1960s consisted of a relentless 
financial squeeze that made it very difficult for the Corporation either to expand or to 
prepare a long-term strategy. Wilson's government recognised that real reforrn of 
British television would eat up precious resources. According to former PMG 
Edward Short (1998), 'there was no real intention of changing it [television]. I don't 
think we could have done it without a great upheaval and finding some way of 
paying for alternative channels. ' Faced with contradictory pressures from different 
constituencies in the party, the result of Wilson's approach was both an economy and 
a television policy that mirrored the 'stop-go' cycles of the early 1960s. Bound by 
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an economic and political consensus that put profitability and efficiency at the heart 
of all decision-making, the legacy of the 1960s Labour governments' approach to 
British television appears to be one of hesitation rather than modemisation and of 
pragmatism rather than transformation. 
- 
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Chapter Four: 1970-1979 
Demands for Reform 
Calls for fundamental reform of British television found some resonance inside the 
Labour Party at the start of the 1970s - the speeches by then cabinet members Benn 
and Richard Crossman in 1968, attacking the lack of accountability and creeping 
trivialisation of television respectively, were still relatively fresh. However the mood 
for reform was far more urgently expressed outside of parliamentary bodies, 
particularly by those groups motivated by the radical possibilities of the struggles of 
1968. While conservative groups like Mary Whitehouse's National Viewers and 
Listeners Association urged reform to 'clean up' television, the main critics of the 
existing structures of broadcasting came from the left. This 'reflected the growth 
since the early 60s of trade union militancy, a shift in the political mood to the left, 
new visions of gender and ethnic oppression, more forceful social and cultural 
liberalism and suspicion of a class- or Establishment-based state' (Goodwin, 1998: 
18). More accountability in decision-making, more diverse representations of 
minority groups, a less antagonistic portrayal of trade unionists and socialists were 
all 'New Left' demands that emerged at the start of the decade. By the early 1970s, 
the fact that some of the most popular programmes included Dad's Artily, Colditz 
and The Onedin Line - what Briggs calls 'the appeal to history' (Briggs, 1995: 946) 
- simply fuelled the desire for more contemporary and relevant output. 
One of the most militant groups that combined the desire for a new social order with 
a programme of media reform was the Free Communications Group. The FCG 
devoted itself to opening up public debate on key questions concerning the media - 
for example, ownership, workers' control and editorial coverage - from the 
perspective of workers in the media industries themselves. The FCG 'believes that 
newspaper, television and radio should be under the control of all the people who 
produce them' (FCG, 1969: 1). Co-ordinated by a steering committee composed of 
27 journalists and broadcasters , the group organised a series of public meetings (one of 
27 The Steering Committee of Neal Ascherson, Alexander Cockburn, Gus Macdonald and Bruce Page 
supported an elected council of 24 members. 
121 
which was addressed by Tony Benn) which received extensive publicity and within a 
year had recruited 700 members and earned a considerable degree of influence in 
broadcasting debates. 
The FCG challenged the lack of transparency in broadcasting decision-making by 
publishing the controversial (and hitherto secret) 1967 franchise submissions of 
London Weekend Television and Harlech, together with proposals by j ournalists 
across Europe for increased control over the editorial process. It helped to organise a 
'teach-in' of rank-and-file BBC workers in 1970 and published the ensuing 
discussions about democratic control over programme content and organisational 
structures under the headline of 'They Farted in the Cathedral - or how 35 BBC 
employees asked for democracy in the Corporation' (FCG, 1970: 21). Briggs 
confirms that the FCG 'had a footing inside the BBC' and that its activities helped to 
stimulate debates even amongst the Governors about increased participation and 
accountability (Briggs, 1995: 795). By its fifth issue, the Open Secret was claiming 
that the group can 'lay a fair claim to have initiated the debate that is now agitating 
almost all quarters of the communications industry' (FCG, 1970: 1). 
These debates, vigorously pursued by ordinary broadcasting workers, had permeated 
through to the official trade union movement by the early part of the decade. The 
Association of Broadcasting Staff, which represented staff at the BBC, successfully 
proposed a motion at the 1971 TUC conference calling for a committee to study 
television coverage of the trade union movement (TUC, 1971: 591). The ACTT, 
launched its own commission examining alternative structures for television and 
carried a resolution at its 1971 conference calling for the nationalisation of the film 
industry without compensation and under workers' control. 
Demands for radical media reform, therefore, were starting to be articulated in the 
early part of the 1970s, particularly by media workers and activists engaged in extra- 
parliamentary movements. Their concerns were not simply confined to legislative 
questions about the status of the BBC Charter or the ITA but dealt with fundamental 
questions of accountability, ownership, content and control of broadcasting. In a 
period in which the post-war consensus was cracking under the challenge of 
industrial militancy, economic decline and political struggle, broadcasting's role as a 
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unifying cultural force was less assured. Echoing this concern, Socialist 
Commentary's first editorial of the 1970s warned that the 'road to disaster lies in the 
break-up of the social cement which has long been so valuable an element in British 
society' and urged a 'higher degree of social co-operation than we are at present able 
to achieve' in order to combat increasing insecurity (Socialist Coninlentary, 1970: 3). 
How would Labour answer this challenge of seeking to transform British television 
to meet the needs of a less consensual and increasingly highly politically charged 
social order? 
The rise of the left inside the Labour Party, 1970-74 
The incoming Conservative government was greeted with a wave of militancy. The 
Industrial Relations Bill of December 1970 banned the closed shop and unofficial 
strikes, introduced secret ballots, a register of unions and a sixty-day 'cooling-off 
period before strike action could be taken. Massive demonstrations and protest 
strikes greeted the proposals and brought more and more workers into political 
action. In June 1971, workers at the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) were sacked 
and responded later that summer by occupying the yards, winning solidarity from 
workers across the country. In July 1972, the TUC called a one-day general strike in 
response to the imprisonment of five London dockers for breaking the industrial 
relations law. The dockers were freed. In both 1972 and 1974, miners went on strike 
for higher pay, in the latter instance contributing to the downfall of the Heath 
government. 
24 million working days were lost through strikes in 1972, the highest since 1926, 
the year of the General Strike (Pelling, 1996: 145). This huge increase in working- 
class militancy spread from economic matters of pay and conditions to more Political 
questions of workers' control as some workers, according to Royden Harrison, 
'began to exhibit an ominous concern with the conditions of distribution as well as 
production' (Harrison, 1978: 1). 
Union militancy was supplemented by the rise of the women's movement and gay 
liberation together with the increasing influence of grassroots movements and the 
revolutionary left. Initiatives for change, therefore, were more likely to come from 
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outside the Labour Party itself so that while large numbers of Labour members were 
involved in the various activities, they were not organised as party members but as 
trade unionists, socialists or feminists. Even those activists who were attempting to 
influence official party policies acknowledgýd the 'intellectual lethargy' of the 
leadership of the Labour movement. In their 1972 book on the 'new unionism', Ken 
Coates and Tony Topham argued that 
it is fair to say that the bulk of creative socialist thinking and writing goes 
on either outside the Labour Party or in its underground. Writers like E. 
P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, Perry Anderson and Ralph Miliband 
[leading New Left figures] are scarcely less outsiders in the present 
climate than such maverick Fabians as John Hughes or Peter Townsend. 
No one in the higher councils of the Party takes any notice of what the 
latter say (Coates and Topham, 1972: 185). 
However, even if the Labour Party leadership was not in the forefront of developing 
this militancy, the party was not immune from its effects and swung massively to the 
left in the opening years of the decade. Successive Labour conferences passed 
resolutions extending public ownership, adopting unilateral disarmament and 
condemned the party leadership's decision not to implement the more radical 
conference decisions. This shift was reflected in the unions where 'the most 
powerful men in the movement were now both left-wingers' (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 
132): Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon, leaders of the TGWU and AEU respectively. 
By 1973, even the right-wing shadow chancellor Denis Healey promised, in the heat 
of conference, that the party's aim was 'to bring about a fundamental and irreversible 
shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people and their 
families' (Healey, 1973: 128). 
The most high-profile left-wing Labour MP was Tony Benn, party chairman in 1971, 
who associated himself with the UCS occupation and the jailed dockers and spoke of 
the urgent need for increased participation in political and industrial decision- 
making. According to Philip Whitehead's history of the 1970s, the Labour Party was 
energised by Benn as its chairman: 'A hundred sub-cornmittees bloomed in the 
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exercise 'Participation 72 '28 and the chairman was everywhere, encouraging here, 
prompting there' (Whitehead, 1985: 119). Benn's involvement in grass-roots 
political activities and his support for industrial democracy was to be crucial in later 
initiating Labour's media reform programmp. 
I 
This was the context in which the National Executive Committee drew up the 
document that was to become, for Pelling and Reid (1996: 146), the most left-wing 
policy statement in the party's history, Labour's Pi-ogranime 1973 (Labour Party, 
1973c). The document proposed a strategy based on an expanded public sector, an 
interventionist National Enterprise Board co-ordinating economic activity, 
compulsory planning agreements involving government, employers and workers and 
foreign exchange controls to protect sterling. Embracing the language of industrial 
democracy and participation, the document promised action in a whole series of 
policy areas from prices, pensions and income distribution, to industrial relations, 
full employment and communications. Labour's aim, in the words of the 
programme, was 'no less than a new social order' (quoted in Hatfield, 1978: 174). 
The adoption of this programme, later known as the Alternative Economic Strategy 
(AES), was motivated both by the militancy of the period but also by the debates 
which had followed Labour's defeat in 1970. While the traditional Labour 
revisionists like Crosland and Roy Jenkins called for a renewed commitment to 
social justice and egalitarianism (see Foote, 1997: 236) to compensate for Wilson's 
indecision and failure, another group of Labour theorists called for a much more 
decisive form of economic planning. Writers and activists like Ken Coates, Michael 
Barratt Brown and Stuart Holland, organised around the Institute for Workers' 
Control, were influenced by the New Left emphasis on participation and 
democratisation and argued for strong state intervention into the private, not just the 
public, sector (see Holland, 1975). However, whereas the original New Left was 
'highly suspicious of Labour as a parliamentary party hostile to extra-parliamentary 
28 'Participation 72' was the Benn-inspired attempt to involve ordinary party members in prioritising Z, issues to be addressed. Some 2000 questionnaires were distributed to party branches with 600 
returned. Nearly 50% of responses indicated that social and economic policy were 'very important' 
while other areas marked out for future discussion included food policy, international affairs and EEC 
membership. The findings were later ignored by the leadership in any case. (See Hatfield, 1978: 72- 
75). 
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activity, the new Labour left saw no reason why parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary activity could not go together hand in hand' (Foote, 1997: 306/7). 
Labour was to be the vehicle for radical economic change. 
The Labour left presented the adoption of the programme as an important victory, 
despite Wilson's reluctance to implement the measures. For one supporter, Labour 
'now had a sophisticated and radical economic programme, and an aroused militant 
working class ready to follow its lead' (Hodgson, 1981: 91). It was in this 
atmosphere, of an increasing attachment to concepts of industrial democracy, 
participation and planning, that a commitment to television reforrn at last began to be 
seriously debated inside the Labour Party. 
Television Issues in the early 1970s 
Labour and the BBC 
The stormy relationship between the Labour Party and the BBC that had developed 
in the 1960s continued into the following decade. Wilson's highly personal vendetta 
against what he saw as systematic anti-Labour bias by the Corporation remained at 
an intense level. His controversial appointment of Lord Hill as chairman in 1967 
appeared to have made little difference to the BBC's coverage and he held the 
Corporation partially responsible for Labour's defeat in the 1970 election (see 
Briggs, 1995: 880). Immediately afterwards, one senior BBC figure reported that 
'Wilson is extremely bitter about the BBC, so bitter that he wishes in the future that 
Labour Party Political Broadcasts should be done by Granada Television' (Grist, 
1970). 
The situation was inflamed the following year by the broadcast of a programme in 
the 24 Hours documentary strand about Labour's fall from power. Yesterday's Men 
dealt with the consequences of losing power and took its title from Labour's 
portrayal of its Conservative opponents in the run-up to the 1970 election. 
According to Anthony Smith, it provoked 'the biggest and most furious row that a 
television programme in the English language has ever provoked' (Smith, 1972: 
820). While the programme was intended to be a fresh examination of the mixed 
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fortunes of the political class, it appeared to Wilson and the Labour Party to be a 
simple hatchet job. Tony Benn described the programme as a 'complete send-up' 
and claimed that the producers had 'knifed Harold as hard as they could' (Benn, 
1988b: 350). Outraged by the provocative qaestioning about his personal finances, 
the satirical incidental music and the trivial tone of the whole programme, Wilson 
asked his solicitor Arnold Goodman to seek an injunction against the BBC. Whilst 
this was not successful, the huge uproar which followed the programme forced the 
governors to issue a partial apology and led to a more cautious approach to current 
affairs output. 'For a long time afterwards, ' wrote Ben Pimlott, 'television pulled its 
punches when dealing with politicians. 'Better be safe than imaginative' became the 
bitter motto' (Pimlott, 1993: 578). 
Partly because of the consequences of Yesterday'S Men and partly because Labour 
was now in opposition and therefore only a secondary media target, Wilson's high- 
profile campaign against the BBC declined in the following years. Nineteen months 
after the BBC apologised to Wilson, he met Sir Michael Swann, the new BBC 
chairman, for lunch. 'Mr. Wilson started by saying he had had no serious causes for 
complaint in the last eighteen months, and that he felt the BBC had been making 
strenuous efforts to be fair'. As distinct from his earlier accusation of systematic 
bias, Wilson argued that 'alleged unfaimesses' were due not to 'malice or political 
partisanship' but to 'political inexperience' (Swann, 1973). Just as trade unionists 
and the left inside the Labour Party were starting to agitate around demands for 
balanced broadcasting coverage, Wilson and the Labour leadership were now making 
conciliatory noises to the BBC. 
Labour and ITV 
The Free Communications Group's publication of LWT's franchise submission 
highlighted the lack of transparency in the awarding of licences as well as the failure 
of some ITV broadcasters to stick to their promises. Meanwhile, the question of 
excess ITV profits had not disappeared. The short-lived downturn in advertising 
revenue of 1970-1 had turned around by 1972 so that, once again, the ITV system 
was awash with money. Profits increased by 40% for Thames TV, 46% for Scottish 
TV, 50% for Granada and Westward while Border doubled and Anglia tripled their 
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rates of return (Campaign, 1972). This was no doubt helped by the Conservative 
government's cut in the exchequer levy in February 197 1. Yet, while Labour had 
done precisely the same thing the previous year, this time its MPs were extremely 
critical. 'Disgraceful' shouted Labour MPs jn Parliament when the cut was 
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announced while the shadow telecommunications minister, Ivor Richard, called the 
move 'extraordinarily regressive' (Hoc Debates, 15 February 1971: col. 1212). 
One of the last acts of the Labour government in 1970 had been to set up a Prices and 
Incomes Board report to exarniiie the costs and revenue of commercial television. 
When it reported at the end of the year it made a number of recommendations about 
how to restore profitability but also drew attention, according to Caroline Heller, to 
'the problem of what level of profit is socially acceptable in the interest of stability' 
(Heller, 1970: 12). This was pursued by an even more extensive investigation in 
1971-2 into commercial television undertaken by the Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries, chaired by left-wing Labour MP Russell Kerr. While one 
historian described the report as 'Pilkingtonian in flavour', excessively aggressive 
towards ITV and therefore counter-productive (Potter, 1989: 64), the committee 
made it clear what had changed since the 1960s. 
There has been a shift of emphasis from considering the broadcasting 
media solely in terms of the programmes they produce to one in which 
the BBC and the [Independent Broadcasting] Authority are seen as 
powerful institutions in their own right, whose style of decision-making 
and action profoundly affects the community. It is this view which has 
led to the demand for public accountability and for increased public 
participation and access (House of Commons, 1972: para. 145). 
The committee was extremely critical of the current system and proposed a number 
of changes, including stronger regulation, more experimentation and education in 
programming, more opportunities for the smaller ITV companies and the. reduction 
of pressure for high ratings. No wonder that, according to Anthony Smith (1974: 
222), 'the document pleased the more radical wing of the broadcasting world. ' 
The report clearly echoed the concerns of the broadcasting unions, the Free 
Communications Group and the growing left inside the Labour Party about the need 
for industrial democracy, a qualification of the over-riding drive for profits and an 
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interest in altemative structures. Indeed, Kerr himself in a letter to the Thnes, made 
it clear that the system itself was up for grabs. 'Do you need, for example, an IBA at 
all? Do we wish to continue with a system whereby roughly half of the nation's TV 
is controlled by a handful of companies making very substantial profits indeed? Are 
these "ground rules" for the operation of this most powerful of all media divinely 
ordained and immutableT (Kerr, 1972) Thus while the relationship between the 
Labour leadership and individual ITV employers continued to be a close one, the 
commercial television system as a whole was increasingly subject to critical 
investigation by the Labour movement. 
Labour and the Fourth Channel 
The allocation of a fourth channel was a central issue to all those interested in 
television policy in the early 1970s. Since the previous Labour government had 
postponed a decision because of its economic difficulties, the Conservatives were 
now threatening to hand it over to ITV. When the ITA published proposals for an 
ITV2 in December 197 1, opponents of commercial television swung into action to 
prevent a precious national resource being handed over to private entrepreneurs. 
Research produced by Caroline Heller for the ACTT union showed that there was a 
weak economic rationale for an advertising-led ITV2 in the light of the Tory 
introduction of local commercial radio (ACTT, 1971). The Free Communications 
Group expressed its concern that advertising revenue would be diverted from 
upmarket newspapers and 'if it is the quality press which will suffer most, do we 
really want a fourth channel? ' (FCG, 1971: 36). Similarly, the Neiv Statesman 
declared its total opposition to a commercial fourth channel because of the 'parlous 
state of the British press, which cannot sustain the loss of further millions of 
advertising revenue' (New Statesman, 1971: 878). 
Opposition to an ITV2 cemented around the cross-party TV4 campaign that was 
backed by the FCG, Mary Whitehouse's NVLA, various unions and sympathetic 
Labour MPs like John Golding, Philip Whitehead and Hugh Jenkins. The latter 
group tabled an early day motion which argued that 'the fourth television channel 
should not be allocated to the present independent television contractors' and won 
the support of about a hundred MPs (Lambert, 1982: 45). According to Labour MP 
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Ivor Richard, the opposition were 'firmly and definitely opposed to the allocation of 
the fourth channel to I. T. V. at this stage' (HoC Debates, 15 December 1971: col. 
557). 29 
What vision of the fourth channel was the opposition in favour of? One important 
contribution to the debate was Anthony Smith's vision of an electronic publishing 
house in the form of a National Television Foundation (NTF). Endorsed by the 
ABS union, Smith's plan was to provide a 'right to broadcast' to a range of social 
groups so that the NTF 'would then play a kind of impresario role, merely by 
allocating resources to some, but fitting producers, writers, technicians, to others who 
arrived only with an idea, a grievance, a cause' (Smith, 1976: 296). Despite a lack of 
detail about how to fund such an operation, the model fitted with contemporary 
concerns to open up broadcasting to new voices on a more decentralised basis than 
existing broadcasting institutions and was to prove extremely influential in later 
discussions about the fourth channel. Others argued for an education-based channel 
or for a network of local community stations while one piece of academic research 
found that 63% of the public simply did not think that there should be a fourth 
channel (Halloran, 1977). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the other suggestion from the Labour movement at the 
time was to do nothing. Philip Whitehead MP, while welcoming the spirit of the 
NTF model, criticised the financial problems associated with the plan and argued that 
'the best thing we can do about that fourth button on the set is not to press it. Not for 
anyone' (Whitehead, 1972: 3). The ACTT, deeply concerned about the impact of a 
fourth channel on employment prospects in the industry, also decided that 
postponement was the best option. It would be 'improper to commit the Union to 
any particular scheme without opportunity for detailed analysis and comparison of 
the benefits offered to workers in the industry' (ACTT, 1973: 29). In the early 
1970s, therefore, the Labour Party was far more united about what it did not want 
than what it did want from a fourth channel. 
29 We may assume that the opposition was not entirely united about this. Only three years previously, 
the Labour minister of posts and telecommunications, John Stonehouse, told a broadcasting 
symposium that he supported a fourth channel going to ITV because 'it could provide an excellent 
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Labour and a public inquiry 
The issue that galvanised all of those around týe Labour Party who were interested in 
broadcasting policy was the demand for a public inquiry into broadcasting. Almost 
every decision that had any connection to television was linked to the need for a full 
and open debate on the future of broadcasting. Since the Conservatives had scrapped 
Labour's plan for such a committee back in 1970, the clamour for an inquiry from 
Labour quarters was now even more deafening. The problem for Labour was that 
having introduced local commercial radio (as promised in its manifesto), the new 
Conservative government was not keen to enter into a protracted debate on the role 
of broadcasting in a climate in which the left was setting the intellectual agenda. 
Labour seized every opportunity to raise the issue. The Early Day Motion rejecting 
an ITV2 in December 1971 tied the future of the fourth channel to a public inquiry 
as, for Philip Whitehead, all the possible alternatives for a new channel 'ought to be 
sifted through the fine mesh of a public inquiry' (HoC Debates, 15 December 1971: 
col. 532). The Labour chairman of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 
Russell Kerr, argued that his concerns about the IBA were tied to the 'urgent need 
for a wide-ranging enquiry' (Kerr, 1972). The Free Communications Group, the TV- 
4 campaign and the ACTT all pressed for an inquiry while the 1971 TUC conference 
called for a 'process of public enquiry into the ownership and control of the mass 
media' (TUC, 1971: 591). When in March 1973 the Conservatives announced the 
extension of both the BBC Charter and Independent Television Act from 1976 to 
198 1, 'the Labour Party immediately declared that if it returned to power it would 
not be bound by it' (Briggs, 1995: 888) without an inquiry. MPs, kept up the pressure 
on the Conservatives so that by October 1973, Philip Whitehead was promising that: 
I shall do everything I can to persuade the Labour Party not merely to 
oppose the coming legislation to extend the Charter and the Act in 198 1, 
but to pledge that one of the first acts in government should be to 
announce that wide-ranging inquiry ... We must not have a repetition of 
Opportunity for existing and new independent companies to experiment even more with adventurous 
programmes' (Stonehouse, 1970: 6). 
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the abandonment of Pilkington once Labour came to office in 1964 
(Whitehead, 1973: 488). 
Why was there such a consensus about the need for an inquiry? Anthony Smith 
argues that 'there was need then and there is now. If you're trying to find 
independent institutions within the public sector to run everything but particularly a 
cultural enterprise, the periodic inquiry is an essential form of public accountability' 
(Smith, 1999). Nicholas Garnham, an influential supporter of an inquiry at the time, 
wrote later of the 'liberal belief in an inquiry for its own sake as a way of letting the 
people into the debate on the future of British broadcasting' (Garnham, 1980: 47). 
Calls for an inquiry in the early 1970s fitted Berm and the left's demands for 
increased accountability in the television industry while it provided opponents of 
Berm inside the Labour Party with the opportunity to take the heat out of the 
situation. The need for a comprehensive review of broadcasting was one that all 
sections of the party could agree on. 
The Labour Party study group on the media and The People and the Media 
(TPA TAI) 
It was, however, the left inside the party who provided the backbone of Labour's first 
systematic broadcasting policy. In April 1972, the Home Policy Committee of the 
NEC under the super-vision of Tony Benn invited about 40 members of the Labour 
movement to a meeting on 'communications' to discuss many of the issues raised 
above and to establish a study group on the media. Noting that it was not yet clear 
whether the government would launch an inquiry, the introductory document 
suggests that it was nevertheless time the party began to 'clarify its view on future 
policy' and sketch out some of the key areas for debate. These included relations 
between the media and politicians, questions of bias, finance and ownership, the role 
of advertising 30 and the issues of access to, 'worker participation' in and 'alternative 
30 In February 1972, the party had finally published its Green Paper on Advertising which contained 
seven paragraphs on television. It repeated the Pilkington Report's criticism of ITV's relentless 
search for maximum ratings and argued that 'commercial television can best be understood as an 
adjunct of the industrial system, rather than as a service of broadcasting with the responsibilities that 
entails' (Labour Party, 1972c: 49). 
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structures' for the media. Heavily influenced by left-wing critiques of 
commercialism and media concentration, the document argues that what is needed is 
a 'thorough examination of the alternatives across the board, and the development of 
a comprehensive policy as to future structurg' (Labour Party, 1972a: 6- emphasis 
added). 
Labour MPs invited included James Callaghan, Ian Mikardo and Tom Driberg from 
the NEC together with a dozen other MPs, among them Crossman, Mayhew, 
Whitehead, Stonehouse and Kaufman, as well as representatives from media unions. 
The largest single group was listed as 'others': intellectuals, academics and industry 
people who had contributed to the recent media debates. This group included Neal 
Ascherson and Gus MacDonald from the FCG Steering Committee, Hilda 
Himmelweit from the LSE and James Curran from the Polytechnic of Central 
London, and New Left figures like Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall (Labour 
Party, 1972b). Although neither Williams nor Hall attended any of the meetings, the 
fact that they were invited onto an official Labour Party committee at all 
demonstrates the influence of the left in party discussions of media reform. 
The study group drew explicitly on ideological critiques of the media influenced by 
Marxism so much so that the original document contained a lengthy quote from Hall 
on the need to transcend the existing set of broadcasting alternatives. Hall had 
recently written another article on 'The Limitations of Broadcasting' (Hall, 1972) 
which spoke of a 'crisis' in broadcasting because of the breakdown of consensus 
politics. 'Regulated conflict between the mass parties has been 'transcended': first 
by the emergence of extra-Parliamentary opposition politics; second by a return to 
more open forms of class conflict' (ibid.: 328). According to Hall, this was Putting 
severe strain on mass media that had traditionally operated by legitimising a very 
narrow conception of assumptions that broadly reflected the interests of a ruling elite. 
'Impartiality', he wrote, 'often leads the broadcaster into the impasse of a false 
symmetry of issues. It also gives him a built-in interest in compromise, in conflict- 
resolution' (ibid.: 329), usually along parliamentary lines. But when the conflicts are 
too open, the divisions between classes too exposed, as in the period of the early 
1970s, broadcasting's function becomes more problematic. In this situation, Hall 
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concluded, broadcasting 'becomes the terrain of societal and class conflicts at the 
ideological level' (ibid. ). 
While Hall did not make his physical presence felt on the study group, another 
theorist with a similar ideological critique came to play a decisive role in drawing up 
Labour policy. Nicholas Garnham was the head of communications at the 
Polytechnic of Central London and had been active in ACTT debates about 
democratising the media. In Structures of Television, first published in 1973, he 
launched a savage critique of the existing broadcasting arrangements. The duopoly 
for Garnham was a 
system in which two powerful institutions responsible not to the public 
but to the real, though hidden, pressures of the power elite, big business 
and the cultural establishment, manipulate the public in the interest of 
that power elite and socialise the individual broadcaster so that he 
collaborates in this process almost unconsciously (Garnham, 1980: 16). 
Garnham attacked the myth of the independence of broadcasters and contrasted it 
with the real interventionist role of the state in determining the level of the licence 
fee or the levy or coverage of political matters. Instead of hiding the political control 
structures of the media, Garnham argued to make them transparent through an 
ongoing democratisation of media organisations. Television should be restructured 
into regional, independent non-profitmaking corporations where day to day control is 
in the 'hands of a works committee elected by all the workers' and where longer- 
term decisions are made by boards elected by both workers and local people (ibid.: 
45). 
Another significant influence on the study group was Caroline Heller who had 
drafted the ACTT's Television Commission report. This too proposed the social 
ownership of mass communications and highlighted the urgent need for open access 
to financial information, increased democracy in decision-making, security of 
employment in the industry, the centralised collection of advertising revenue, the 
abolition of spot advertising and the decentralisation of production units in 
broadcasting. It concluded that the ACTT looks forward to a 'system which will not 
only facilitate and encourage programme makers in their efforts to infon-n and 
134 
interpret society but also a system which thinks of broadcasting as a means by which 
society can hold a dialogue with itself' (ACTT, 1973: 28). 
While the voices of Garnharn and Heller were clearly heard on the study group, there 
were also conflicting points of view. Christopher Mayhew perhaps best represented 
the other extreme, telling Benn that the study group's proposals were 'disgusting, 
woolly, Marxist stuff (Benn, 1990a: 98) and eventually resigning from the Labour 
Party to join the Liberals. In between were individuals like Anthony Smith and 
Philip Whitehead who wanted to see serious reform but were very sceptical of what 
they saw as Benn's unrealistic and undesirable plans to nationalise the media. The 
debate between the 'radicals' and 'reformists' was a vigorous one. During the period 
of the study group, Garnham wrote to the Guardian championing the need for total 
structural reform of broadcasting and condemning Smith's idea of a National 
Television Foundation proposal as 'tinkering at the edges' and therefore 
'diversionary'. 'It is like building a small village in which to eke out a living at the 
mercy of the feudal barons, rather than laying siege to their fortresses' (Garnham, 
1973). Smith replied the following day, accusing Garnharn of 'revolutionary inertia' 
and of underestimating the importance that a different model of television, which 
might be introduced after a full-scale broadcasting inquiry, might make to the overall 
broadcasting system (Smith, 1973). However, while there were different political 
positions played out in the study group, the group as a whole was perceived as firmly 
belonging to the left. According to Garnham, the issue of media reform was then 
6scen as a platform by the left of the party and that it was no accident that Benn was 
chairing it' (Garnham 1997). 
The first meeting took place on May 17,1972 in the House of Commons, lasted 
nearly three hours and was attended by 23 people. It was resolved to reject a general 
formulation of media policy in favour of 'separate and detailed studies of the 
different aspects' of the media. Individual reports would therefore be prepared for 
the whole group which would 'act in a general advisory role' but would still be able 
to comment on or amend the proposals. The next question was whether to 
concentrate on the press or broadcasting. 
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Some felt that broadcasting should have first priority for study in view of 
the opportunity for changing the structure that 1976 presented; on the 
other hand, it was argued that the majority of trade unionists saw the 
Press as the major problem - partly because of the extent of anti-Union 
bias shown over the Industrial Relations issue (Labour Party, 1972d: 2). 
Whilst this issue was not resolved there and then, the view of both Philip Whitehead 
(1999) and James Curran is that it was clearly 'the press that was the leading edge in 
terms of the evolution of [Labour Party] media policy. It was concern about the 
press that led to The People and the Media rather than about broadcasting' (Curran, 
1997). It was later agreed that press and broadcasting would be examined at 
alternate meetings and that the proposals as a whole would be published as a Green 
Paper by the end of year. However the group did not meet again until seven months 
later, in January 1973, where it was 'hoped that some recommendations would be 
able to be included in the revised "Labour's Programme for Britain" [Labours 
Programme 1973] which would need to be completed by April. ' (Labour Party, 
1973a: 1-2). 
The first meeting that dealt exclusively with broadcasting was held on February 8 
1973 and heard several papers including one presented by Alf George of the Post 
Office Engineering Union, who argued for a national publicly-owned broadband 
cable system. 'There was general agreement that the development of cable should be 
under public control and that a publicly-controlled transmission system should be a 
fundamental plan of Labour policy' (Labour Party, 1973b: 3). Caroline Heller 
presented the ACTT Television Commission report while Roger Graef spoke of the 
need for a Communications Council 'to act as a forum for debate across the whole 
field of the media' (ibid.: 2). The main discussion concentrated on funding and, in 
particular, the difficult issue of the licence fee. The 'radicals' argued that the licence 
fee should be abolished as it was 'regressive, difficult to increase and, by having the 
BBC as its sole recipient, equated an increase in the fee with an increase in BBC 
power'. Others like Anthony Smith insisted that the licence fee provided a 'measure 
of independence' (ibid.: 3) and that most alternatives would lead to increased state 
control and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the meeting did discuss alternative methods 
of funding, most of which involved direct government revenue to the broadcasters, 
but reached no agreement. 
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The next meeting on broadcasting took place after the initial draft of Laboul-s 
Nogranzine had been prepared. This policy statement, seen as a declaration of intent 
by the left, contained one page on 'Commuqications', drawn up after consultation 
with the study group, and acknowledged the danger of 'market distortions' on 
freedom of expression in the media. It mentioned the activities of the study group 
but added that 'more work will be necessary before we are in a position to propose 
any definite solutions to the problems in this complex field' (Labour Party, 1973c: 
88). However, it did confirrn some firm principles on which party policy on the 
media would be based - industrial democracy, public ownership and accountability - 
and, in the spirit of the times, insisted on the need for a 'full-ranging inquiry into the 
future of broadcasting' (ibid. ). As vague as these comments were, it was already 
clear that the study group was firmly aligned with Tony Benn's way of thinking 
rather than the more conservative approach, embraced by Wilson and the majority of 
the shadow Cabinet, of generally leaving broadcasting institutions alone. 
A meeting between Wilson, Labour's broadcasting spokesperson John Grant and the 
BBC chairman, Sir Michael Swann, reveals some of the differences of opinion. The 
Labour leader insisted that the party 'really didn't have any firm ideas and were 
trying to evolve a policy ... they were implacably opposed to the fourth channel going 
to IBA and would rescind this when they got into power. They were also firmly 
opposed to advertising on the BBC, except possibly paid-for Government 
advertising' (Swann, 1973). When Swann raised the topical issue of public 
accountability, 
Wilson was vague but Grant came out firmly for a broadcasting council. 
I went over our arguments, i. e. that a council without power would only 
be yet another critical voice, while a council with power would 
undermine the Governors. Grant said this was "swimming against the 
tide", but after a good deal of argument, Mr. Wilson was, I felt fairly 
sure, firmly on my side. Indeed, discussion about the authority of the 
Governors, the D. G. and senior staff seemed to cheer him up no end 
(ibid. ). 
Of course, Swann may have misinterpreted Wilson's thoughts on the issue, but it 
would hardly be surprising had Wilson supported the authority of the BBC governors 
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and the broadcasting establishment against left-wing proposals for full 
accountability, as the lesser of two evils. 
The issue of a single publicly accountable body to govern the entire media dominated 
the discussion of the fifth meeting of the study group. While the group agreed on a 
series of eight objectives including the domination of public service values above 
commercial considerations, tighter regulation of advertising, democratic control over 
and wider access to the media, the issue of an executive commission controlling 
press and broadcasting was far more controversial. Tony Benn notes in his diary that 
such a body 'was broadly accepted and indeed widely welcomed' (Berm, 1990a: 3 1) 
while the minutes of the meeting actually state that 'opinions were divided about a 
ninth point which was a proposal for a commission with executive powers to be set 
up' (Labour Party, 1973d: 3). The 'radicals' led by Benn extolled the virtues of a 
commission that would be able to act strategically across the media, respond to short- 
term problems, 'focus debate on issues in terms of priorities, and provide a body for 
unions and other groups go to' (ibid. ). According to Whitehead, 'this was Tony 
Benn in his Gosplan mood, that there was some sort of enormous orchestra and that 
this would be the conductor which would do everything' (Whitehead, 1999). The 
'moderates' were reluctant to endorse a body that they saw as dangerously politicised 
and centralising and instead endorsed the importance of devolving power. Smith, for 
example, recalls arguing in the study group that 'you've got the right questions but 
you need a pluralising answer, that you need more institutions, not fewer' (Smith, 
1999). 
Whilst this debate was left open, the meeting nevertheless resolved to draft a Green 
Paper in the next few months. Four weeks later this decision was reversed. The 
HPC meeting on June 10,1973 considered the draft report and agreed to publish it as 
a discussion paper and not a Green Paper as the party had already published too 
many of them on various other subjects. The profile of the study group suffered 
another reverse when Labour's election manifesto in February 1974 excluded all 
mention of broadcasting, omitting even the party's support for a public inquiry. 
Despite the discussions on television policy taking place inside and outside the 
Labour Party, only the Conservative manifesto acknowledged television and pledged 
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to 'bring forward proposals for the allocation of a fourth TV channel when economic 
circumstances permit' (Craig, 1975: 389). 
The final draft was presented to the study grS)up on April 3,1974, over a month after 
Labour had won the general election. The broadcasting section was written by 
Nicholas Garnham and Caroline Heller and amended by committee in the light 'of 
the fact that the report now had a rather different relationship to a possible enquiry 
into broadcasting' (Labour Party, 1974a), an event confirmed by the home 
secretary's announcement the following week that such an inquiry would now take 
place. With pressure to complete and publish the report, the group met again at the 
end of the month and agreed to accept Heller's redraft on broadcasting. The 
document, eventually called The People and the Media (TPATM, was published in 
July 1974, no longer a Green Paper but a 'discussion paper' designed both to 
'stimulate thought outside the stricter confines of the Labour Movement' and to 
'assist [members of the inquiry] in their deliberations' (Labour Party, 1974b). 
The document opens with an expression of concern about the current state of the 
media. Economic concentration, the domination of the profit motive, the absence of 
accountability in decision-making, the lack of diversity of content, and the influence 
of government secrecy are all constraints on a genuinely free media. It repeats the 
call for de-centralisation and industrial democracy: 
As for the dangers of govermnental control, there seems little doubt to us 
that alternative structures of broadcasting, based on smaller units and 
more open decision-making ... would provide a far more effective 
safeguard for freedom of communications than is provided by these 
supposedly well-intentioned, anonymous and unaccountable guardians. 
Our aim must be to devise a framework for the media that avoids the 
twin dangers of government and commercial control (Labour Party, 
1974c: 7). 
It then lists eight objectives that need to underpin any democratic policy for the mass 
media, including a commitment to public service, public ownership and public 
funding, the diversification and decentralisation of media outlets and the broadening 
of access to media systems and authorities (ibid.: 8). 
139 
Two points are worth stressing about the document as a whole. Firstly, it is evident 
that press reform and not broadcasting is the driving force behind TPATMwith 
nearly eighteen pages devoted to the former and only five to the latter. Tribune, the 
house magazine of the Labour left, greeted týe report with the headline 'Don't just 
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save the press - change it' and completely ignored all the recommendations about 
television in its hurry to assess the impact on the press (Clements, 1974: 9). 
Secondly, the ideas of the 'radicals' permeate TPA TM far more than the 'moderates', 
to the extent that Anthony Smith is not even a signatory to the document. There is 
no mention at all of the spirited debates outside the party about the fate of the fourth 
channel, a sure sign that the views of Garnharn and the ACTT Television 
Commission of a reluctance to endorse expansion at any cost had triumphed over 
Smith's plan for a National Television Foundation. Defence of the licence fee as the 
'least worst option' had also been unsuccessftil as TPA TM proposed to phase it out. 
'Broadcasting services should not be subjected to severe instability of advertising 
revenues, but neither should they be shielded from economic realities and the need to 
order national priorities'. The solution, partially in the spirit of the Pilkington 
Report, was to centralise both the collection of advertising revenue and Exchequer 
grant (ibid.: 15). Finally, the debate over broadcasting authorities was also settled in 
favour of the 'radicals' as TP, 4 TM proposed a Communications Council to review 
the operations of all media and a Public Broadcasting Commission (PBC), replacing 
both BBC and IBA boards, which would be the overall administrative and ftinding 
agency for television and radio 
Two television corporations would supersede the BBC and ITV networks and would 
each run one national and one regional channel while '[p]rogramme-making itself 
would be carried out by a wide variety of dispersed progrannne units reflecting the 
creative talent of all parts of the UK' (ibid.: 14). These developments would be 
supplemented by the creation of a national publicly-owned cable network, Freedom 
of Information legislation and the abolition of both the Official Secrets Act and local 
commercial radio. 31 
31 Proposals for the press adopted the same principles and included the establishment of an 
Advertising Revenue Board to collect and redistribute advertising revenue, a subsidy to launch new 
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The report met with a hostile response, particularly from the broadcasting 
establishment. Lord Hill thundered in the Listener against the 'acts of vandalism' 
proposed by TPATMand 'the authors' doctrinal urge to weaken the broadcasting 
organisations in the interests of what they call "real internal democracy... (Hill, 
1974a: 66-67). 'Was it significant, ' Grace Wyndham Goldie astutely asked, 'that in 
the Labour Party's broadcasting plans there was so little mention of Parliament or the 
need to maintain Parliament's ultimate responsibility for broadcasting? ' (Goldie, 
1977: 327). Lord Annan continued this line of thinking later when he wrote of calls 
for internal democracy that 'to claim that the authorities should be largely comprised 
of members elected by, and answerable to, outside bodies because these bodies alone 
can discern the public interest, is really an attack upon the power of the minister and 
Parliament' (Annan, 1977a: 25). Of course this was precisely the political point 
behind the document: to express a more militant understanding of democracy which 
involved new sorts of extra-parliamentary structures and a wider range of voices 
taking part in the democratic process. 
Commentators in the broadsheet press were not quite as dismissive as those in the 
upper echelons of broadcasting. An editorial in the Thnes sympathised with the 
desire to tackle the future of media but argued that the proposals, if implemented, 
would lead to increased state intervention and further instability in the industries. It 
added that 'it is dangerous to seek improvement by pulling down existing institutions 
with a tradition behind them' (Thnes, 1974). The Guardian took the debates rather 
more seriously and only criticised TPA TM for excluding film, publishing and the 
theatre from the report and for not having enough input from the press and 
broadcasting fields (Guardian, 1974). Broadcast, the industry magazine, attacked 
the proposals as unrealistic and unable to deal with concrete questions of financing 
television, although the main problem lay elsewhere, with the intellectual fallacies of 
the argument. 'It is so strongly based on doctrinaire views about "internal 
democracy" and concepts of accountability that nobody has bothered to question 
those beliefs objectively' (Broadcast, 1974: 4). 
non-commercial publications, a publicly-owned national printing corporation and a commitment to 
industrial democracy in press strucrures (ibid: 16-33). 
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Even those involved in the study group expressed reservations. Eric Moomnan, a 
Labour MP on the group, argued later that they had 'ducked intellectual issues in 
favour of platitudes' (HoC Debates, 23 May, 1977: col. 1060) while Philip Whitehead 
signed TPATM 
with some misgivings about one part of it which was the idea of an 
overarching broadcasting authority that could control everything. I 
didn't write a minority report because I felt strongly that the ideas in the 
document were sufficiently good and radical that one could carry one 
single proposal that I thought then was unworkable (Whitehead, 1999). 
Anthony Smith is even more critical and argues that TPA TM 
was a vengeful plan. It wasn't a plan produced from a position of total 
detachment on the part of people thinking what would be best for this 
medium. It was produced by a group of people who felt that the system 
was against them and wanted a structure that would make it fair for 
them ... Also they were concerned primarily with the political role of 
television and not with its entertairunent and cultural role. As a former 
professional in the medium, I realised that news and current affairs is a 
by-product of television and that the real role of television is to enthral, 
to entertain and to compensate for hours of drudgery at work (Smith, 
1999). 
How valid were these criticisms? Firstly, Smith's objection to the report's lack of 
objectivity ignores the fact that the report was influenced by an ideological analysis 
of how 'objectivity' itself is naturalised through the limited agendas of the media - 
that the media 'are confining themselves to the narrow middle ground of what their 
controllers consider acceptable and uncontroversial' (Labour Party, 1974c: 6). A 
greater variety of programme sources, it was argued, would lead to the nurturing of 
creativity and a proliferation of views within the system. So while there may well 
have been a perception on the part of the left that the 'system was against them', 
TPA TM sought to add to the diversity of voices available and not to wipe out those 
offending ones. Secondly, the report marginalises popular entertainment not simply 
because of perceptions of its low status, but because innovative and minority-interest 
programmes are the more likely to suffer in pure ratings-led television. TPA TM, 
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therefore, did not prescribe what sort of Programmes and genres should be produced 
but it did seek to protect those areas of programming threatened by the logic of 
market-led broadcasting. 
Thirdly, while the majority of the broadcasting establishment savaged TPATMfor 
centralising and politicising broadcasting, the stated intention of the document was 
merely to extend the accountability of the mechanisms of decision-making beyond 
traditional political appointees. Instead of BBC governors or IBA board members 
appointed by the relevant secretary of state, the PBC would have a membership 
'made up of elected representatives from the broadcasting organisations and local 
government, plus members of parliament, in equal proportions, with the addition of 
nominees from important national organisations' (ibid: 14). Far from placing 
broadcasting under the control of the Labour Party NEC, TPA TM dared to challenge 
the accepted convention of supreme parliamentary control, reflecting the dominant 
political current at the time of grass roots-led democratisation and participation. 
Fourthly, the idea that the proposals had been drawn up in a hurry and without any 
professional input ignores the fact that no political party up to that time had held ten 
lengthy meetings, produced a number of discussion documents and consulted with a 
wide range of politicians, technology experts, broadcasters and academics on the 
issue of broadcasting. Whilst TPATMwas not 'objective' or indeed popular, it 
nevertheless contained a coherent set of proposals informed by a genuine 
consultative process and was intended to stimulate further discussion about television 
policy. 
A more valid criticism of the document is its lack of detail about sources of revenue 
to replace the licence fee and the precise structure of the new television corporations. 
However, since it was endlessly repeated after-wards that TPA TM was a discussion 
document and not a blueprint, this is an understandable omission. Perhaps the most 
serious accusation is that the document was a naYve attempt at democratic reform and 
that the proposals would never have been implemented by a Labour govenu-nent. 
Whitehead recalls that the 'word going out from anybody who on the 
industrial/financial side, apart from Tony [Benn], was that this was unrealistic and 
you should not take it too seriously' (Whitehead, 1999). Smith is adamant that these 
were 'not implementable proposals in the real world of politics. In power they would 
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have been confronted by all the commercial interests, all the other industrial interests 
which lie behind broadcasting. ' (Smith, 1999). 
At one level, Smith is correct to point out thýt if Labour failed to confront these 
interests TP, 4TMwould indeed be a utopian dream and as Labour was extremely 
unlikely, in practice, to antagonise such a powerful range of forces, the document 
was more hot air than practical politics. But it is also the case that any proposal for 
radical reform is likely to be attacked by establishment politicians and press as being 
unrealistic, poorly conceived and dangerous. This is particularly the case when such 
reform involves the abolition of media institutions like the BBC and ITV and which 
threatens the position of other media bodies in both press and broadcasting. A 
sympathetic hearing from these 'opinion-formers' is unlikely. The point is that these 
proposals were conceived as part of a generalised political challenge to market 
structures and traditional social democratic government and reflected a growing 
mood inside the country to press for alternative social and political structures. With 
hindsight, it is easy to write off TR4 TM as misguided and hopeless; at the time, as 
Stephen Lambert argues, 'structural reform was in the air' (Lambert, 1982: 57). 
TPA TM faced its first test with the Cabinet during the discussions of the party's 
manifesto for the October 1974 election which Wilson called in order to secure a 
larger majority than the one achieved in February of that year. Given that Labour 
finally had something approaching a media policy and that the government had 
announced the formation of a public inquiry into broadcasting, surely the inclusion of 
a paragraph or two on broadcasting would be appropriate. Indeed, ajoint meeting of 
the Cabinet and the NEC in June discussed a draft manifesto that contained several 
paragraphs on 'communications and the media'. Drawing attention to the 
forthcoming inquiry and the study group report on the media, the manifesto promised 
that Labour would 'ensure that a new and more open structure is built for the media'. 
The only concrete pledge was phrased as follows: 
We believe that the TV licence is a fonn of repressive and unfair 
taxation. We shall, therefore: 
(i) Abolish at an early date, the payment of the licence for such needy 
sectors of our community as pensioners, the disabled and single-parent 
families. 
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(ii) Phase out these payment [sic] altogether as soon as economic 
circumstances permit (Labour Party, 1974d: 36). 
Despite the puzzling wording of this promise, its inclusion in the manifesto was a 
clear victory for the 'radicals' on the study group. However, after a summer in 
which 'Wilson and his advisers were embarked upon a careful exercise: mellowing 
the manifesto, ' (Whitehead, 1985: 129) the entire section about communications was 
withdrawn when the manifesto eventually appeared three months later. Perhaps, 
television policy was simply not important enough to justify inclusion in the 
manifesto or perhaps the proposals were found to be too left-wing for the party 
leadership. In the year in which the Labour Party had spent longer than ever 
discussing television policy and in which the party's first systematic statement on the 
mass media had been produced, neither manifesto in 1974 included a single mention 
of what the party planned to do with television. Now that the party was back in 
government, would TPA TM form the basis of legislative action or would its more 
radical findings disappear under the strain of political office? 
The impact of the 1974-1979 government 
Speaking to the Labour conference in opposition in 1973, Denis Healey had 
promised a savage attack on the wealth and privilege of the rich. The following year, 
speaking to the Confederation of British Industry, Healey as chancellor declared that 
Labour wanted 'a private sector which is vigorous, alert, imaginative - and 
profitable' (quoted in Socialist Commentary, 1974: 1). Having entered office just as 
a world economic recession was developing, Healey and the Labour government 
needed all the friends they could get. By October 1974, inflation was up to 17% with 
wage increases running up to 22% (Whitehead, 1989: 246). As both unemployment 
and the balance of payments deficit increased, the demands for deflation grew 
stronger from the employers while the left found it increasingly difficult to win 
support for its programme of import controls and state-directed investment. 'To the 
right of the Labour Party, ' as one critic put it, 'the 'alternative strategy' was neither 
an alternative nor a strategy' (Holmes, 1987: 96). Far from leading an offensive 
against capital, Tony Benn found himself increasingly isolated in a government that 
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claimed it was forced to take desperate measures to protect the economy. Berm's 
defeat in the referendum on Common Market membership in March 1975 only added 
to his marginalisation in cabinet. 
Instead of the anticipated expansion of the public sector, the left found itself 
confronted with repeated cuts in public spending throughout 1975 and 1976. By 
autumn 1976, with sterling in steep decline, the chancellor negotiated a rescue 
package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for f2.5 billion worth 
of cuts over two years. When the new prime minister, James Callaghan, told the 
1976 Labour conference that the old Keynesian method of increasing public 
spending as a solution to economic crisis was no longer an option, the period of 
Labour revisionism - of equality founded on economic growth - was firmly at an 
end. Union leaders who had previously called for social planning in industry now 
called for a 'social contract' between workers and the government which involved 
holding down wages to help the country through its difficulties. Nationalisation was 
now less about taking control of the 'commanding heights' than about bailing out 
unprofitable firms. According to one government adviser, the National Enterprise 
Board, the cornerstone of the left's economic strategy, 'became a convenient casualty 
ward for finns the Governinent wished to rescue from bankruptcy' (Donoghue, 1987: 
149). 
While more recent writers like Martin Holmes (1987) argue that the government had 
little choice but to deflate and pass on the cuts, there was huge bitterness at the time 
from inside and outside the Labour Party. One supporter of the left complained that 
the IMF measures did little to halt economic decline but marked the end of any hint 
of progressive government. 'From the defeat of the Labour government by the IMF 
in December 1976 to its electoral defeat In May 1979 there is little else but a sordid 
and wearying tale of a government without any coherent strategy or policy, except to 
struggle for its own survival' (Hodgson, 1981: 114). Backbench revolts became 
increasingly familiar - between 1974 and 1979 there were 309 divisions with Labour 
MPs voting against their government compared to 109 between 1966 and 1970 
(Norton, 1980: 428). Annual conferences regularly voted against the executive 
while, perhaps most seriously, union members started to resist the pay norms until, in 
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1979, following the 'winter of discontent', Callaghan's government was defeated by 
Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives. 
In contrast to the grand plans for modemisation and innovation of the Labour 
government of the 1960s, the 1974-1979 government made fewer promises. Both 
governments were confronted by serious economic difficulties and both were forced 
to capitulate to public spending cuts and an abandonment of reform programmes. 
But, as Philip Whitehead notes about the later period, there was a 'growth of 
pessimism about future prospects [which] left its mark on the government. Times of 
contraction do not produce an enthusiasm for radical experiment' (Whitehead, 1989: 
254-5). According to Roy Jenkins, while his main aim as home secretary in the 
1960s had been 'the opening of windows of freedom and innovation', in his second 
term between 1974 and 1976, '1 saw my primary task as the maintenance of the 
proper authority of the state' (Jenkins, 1991: 376). The commitment to progressive 
legislation which had seen the introduction of a Health and Safety at Work Act, the 
Employment Protection Act and the repeal of the Tory anti-union laws by 1975, 
petered out under the strain of maintaining office and keeping the economy afloat. 
The dream of the Croslandite revisionists for progressive social reform underpinned 
by economic growth turned into the opposite. By 1976, there had been a 'sea- 
change' in British politics: '[p]ennissiveness, collectivism and social reforin, it was 
thought, had produced a crisis of authority. Governments were at best weak, at worst 
corrupt. Subversives lurked everywhere. The terrorist was at the gates' (Whitehead, 
1985: 202). It was at this time that the public inquiry into the future of broadcasting, 
desired for so long by Labour supporters, was launched. 
Labour and the Annan Committee 
One of the first acts of the incoming Labour government in March 1974 was to 
abolish the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and to place broadcasting 
policy under the remit of Roy Jenkins in the Home Office and technical matters in 
the Department of Trade and Industry. Neither Wilson nor Jenkins make any 
reference to this shift in their memoirs although Garnham is convinced that the 
purpose of the move was 'to make sure that Benn was not the minister in charge of 
broadcasting' (Garnham, 1997), despite his credentials for the job. One month later, 
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Jenkins announced the establishment of a committee to examine the ftiture of 
broadcasting to be chaired by Lord Annan. Given the narrow majority of the 
government and the pressure of far more urgent matters, for example the state of the 
economy and Britain's membership of the kEC, it is curious that it acted so quickly 
I 
to revive the committee. 
This may be explained in part in terms of practical necessity. With the BBC char-ter 
and IBA legislation due to expire in 1976, some firm decisions were needed about 
broadcasting and the development of new technologies. The government therefore 
extended the lives of both broadcasting bodies until 1979 when the committee would 
have reported on its deliberations. Anthony Smith argues that a decision on the 
fourth channel was getting to be a priority by 1974 and that the government 'could 
see that industrially it was quite important. Setting up a new channel meant that 
there was a lot of industrial potential in manufacturing and they wanted to help 
British manufacturing' (Smith, 1999). 
Given that deliberations about the industrial benefits of broadcasting were largely 
absent from the ensuing discussions, a more persuasive argument is that reviving the 
committee was an easy way of exacting revenge on the Conservatives who had 
scrapped the Annan Committee upon winning the 1970 election. Annan himself 
agrees that it was 'a tit-for-tat. You know 'you've slapped us down and now we're 
bloody well going to do it'. I don't know that Wilson was all that involved but Roy 
[Jenkins] certainly was and was extremely helpful and supportive' (Annan, 1999). 
Philip Whitehead concurs that 
one of the ways of wiping the Tory slate clean was to bring Annan back. 
But I think the main influence behind the scenes in 1974 was quite a 
complicated interplay of forces. There was a strong push among 
academics for, at the very least, a re-examination of what we wanted 
from an ITV2 ... and you can't underestimate Roy Jenkins. He had been a 
radical Home Secretary but now he didn't want to be Home Secretary 
again and didn't want to go through that tour of picking up on particular 
issues but here he had a ready-made issue (Whitehead, 1999) 
148 
As Whitehead suggests, academics were starting to take up broadcasting issues and 
to establish media research centres across Britain. Stuart Hall had been in charge of 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University since 1968 
while the Polytechnic of Central London hoýtcd Free Communications Group 
seminars and housed Gamham. himself The universities of Leeds and Leicester had 
set up communications research institutes in the 1960s and Cardiff launched a 
research centre in 1977 at the same time as the Open University started its course in 
mass communications and society. In 1973, academics committed to media reform 
and an official inquiry came together in the Standing Conference on Broadcasting 
(ScoB) and conducted a series of lively interventions into the debate. Billed as the 
'alternative Annan', ScoB was an influential pressure group and consisted both of 
academics involved in the Labour Party study group, like Garnham, Smith and 
Curran, as well as other leading figures in the field: Stuart Hall, Jay Blumler, Tom 
Bums, James Halloran, Hilda Himmelweit, Stuart Hood, Denis McQuail, Colin 
Seymour-Ure and Raymond Williams. 
Another academic research unit of particular interest to the Labour movement was 
the Glasgow University Media Group, founded in 1974, which published Bad NeIvs 
(GUMG, 1976), an account of the way in which the mass media systematically 
distorted coverage of trade unions. This reflected a growing concern in the trade 
union movement itself about media bias so that in 1976 the authors of Bad Neivs 
were invited down to London to address the TUC General Council. The 1975 TUC 
conference had already passed a motion arguing that '[b]iased and hysterical 
coverage' of unions 'is too important an area to be left to the activities of media 
managers' (TUC, 1975: 553) while two years later the TUC agreed to set up a Media 
Working Group to monitor the 'reporting and presentation of the trade union 
movement in the press and in broadcasting' (TUC, 1977: 375). 
The mid- I 970s, therefore, were marked by a high level of intellectual and political 
pressure in the Labour movement highlighting the need for media reform. It was in 
this climate that the Labour government set up both the Annan Committee and a 
Royal Commission on the Press to examine questions of press control and monopoly. 
However, as much as these inquiries were concessions to the left, they could also be 
seen as fitting the needs of the right. James Curran argues that the 'concern of the 
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Labour leadership has always been to have a good press and having a radical press 
policy was counter-productive in their eyes. Indeed what the Labour leadership did 
was to kick the issue into touch, quite consciously by setting up a Royal 
Commission' (Curran, 1997). The same caýe could be made for broadcasting. 
'Wilson's strategy, ' according to Garnham, 'was first to move broadcasting into the 
Home Office and get it away from Benn and then secondly set up Annan which 
meant that the whole thing was under wraps for three or four years. They didn't have 
to make any decisions - it became a non-political question' (Garnham, 1997). 
Wilson aimed to take media reform out of the hands of impatient broadcasting 
workers and activists and into the more trusted hands of Lord Annan and his 
committee. 
'Politics' was still an issue when it came to the membership of the inquiry team. 
Breaking the unwritten rule that 'nobody who has expressed any strong views on a 
subject should ever be on a committee' (Annan, 1999), Jenkins insisted that this 
political ally, Philip Whitehead, should be on the Annan committee. Whitehead had 
not simply expressed strong views on broadcasting but had actually been a signatory 
to The People and the Media and appeared to be a card-carrying member of pro-BBC 
and IBA abolition camp. Whitehead recounts how the deal was done. 
Annan's real terror was of politicians. Roy Jenkins got me on and 
overruled him on this. They were old mates and Jenkins said 'I know 
this man and he's all right and you can have a right-wing broadcaster and 
a right-wing politician' and he put both of those on. So I was neutralised 
by having Sir Marcus Worsley [MP] and Anthony Jay ... and it left me 
with fewer natural allies - Hilda Hinunelweit was really the only other 
person who had been in the Labour Party strand (Whitehead, 1999). 
This was despite the inclusion of two trade unionists, one of whom, John Pollock, 
was the former chairman of the Scottish Labour Party but who had no recorded ideas 
on broadcasting. The other, Tom Jackson, the general secretary of the Union of Post 
Office Workers and a former BBC governor, was a significant rebuff to those inside 
the Labour movement who wanted a more vocal opponent of the duopoly. So 
despite the massive contributions the left had made to media debates, Jeremy Potter 
is right to argue that 'the membership of the committee reflected the moderate 
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Labour leadership's desire for reform, not the revolutionary zeal of those behind The 
People and the Media and SCOW (Potter, 1989: 24 1). 
The most significant absence from the comrpittee was Anthony Smith, then a 
research fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford and a member of both SCoB and the 
Labour Party study group. His model of a National Television Foundation was one 
of the few coherent proposals for a fourth channel and Smith himself was an 
influential figure in broadcasting debates. Indeed, until quite a late stage, Smith was 
on the list and certainly was not blocked by Annan who was in favour of his presence 
on the committee (Annan, 1999). According to Smith, 'the civil servant in charge of 
broadcasting at that time came to see me about being on the committee and was 
surprised that the night before the announcement, the thing came back from Downing 
Street with this name scratched out' (Smith, 1999). Having argued with Wilson over 
the latter's support for the Stalinist regime of Husak in Czechoslovakia against the 
democratic opposition, 'the next time Wilson saw my name on a piece of paper he 
crossed it out' (ibid. ). Politics, despite Garnham's comment, was not totally absent 
from the inquiry. 
Once the government had organised the membership of the committee, the next 
challenge was to prepare Labour's submission. A draft document, closely based on 
the findings of the study group, was produced after consultation with Whitehead and 
presented to the Ilome Policy Committee in April 1975. Shirley Williams 
'complained that the document did not explain who exactly the broadcasting 
authorities should be accountable to' (Adeney, 1975) and asked for time to make 
some amendments. The revised document was then endorsed by the NEC itself the 
following month and sent to the committee. Williams' revisions were minor 32 and 
the Labour Party's formal submission consisted entirely of suggestions taken from 
TP-4TM. It recommended the abolition of the licence fee and the replacement of the 
BBC and IBA by a Public Broadcasting Commission backed up by a 
32 The second paragraph originally read: 'At present broadcasting seems to be characterised by closed 
and almost autocratic institutions - and, too, by a marked resistance to wider public involvement in its 
0 
decision-making processes'. Williams changed this to: 'Although it is conducted within a broad 
framework of public accountability, broadcasting in Britain today is controlled by closed and almost 
autocratic insitutions; and it is characterised by a market [sic] resistance to wider public involvement 
in its decision making process' (Labour Party, 1975a: 1). 
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Communications Council, exactly as in TPA TM. The only difference in wording was 
a strengthening of the commitment to accountability. A new paragraph was inserted 
which stated that: 
We are particularly concerned to ensure that the PBS is truly independent 
of government - as independent of government as the BBC and IBA are 
now, and preferably more so. We are in no way suggesting that the 
balance of power between government and broadcasting organisations 
needs to be tipped in favour of the fonner. We would strongly argue the 
reverse (Labour Party, 1975a: 4). 
Did the submission represent official Labour Party policy on broadcasting? Whilst 
Wilson was not prepared to make any manifesto commitments along the lines of 
TPA TM, he was less disturbed by the thought of these proposals being one small part 
of many contributions to a wide-ranging inquiry on which a Labour government 
would later legislate. The status of TPATMwas clarified by a letter to the Thnes by 
John Grant, Labour's broadcasting spokesperson, who insisted that TPATM 
is a discussion document. It commits neither the party nor the 
individuals who sign it, although they were in broad agreement with its 
general approach and felt it could usefully stimulate much further 
thought about this important subject. It is, ofcourse, in no sense 
Government policy ivhich is to aivait thefindings ofthe Royal 
Commission on the Press and the Annan Broadcasting Committee which 
were set up after the working party had completed most of its work 
(Grant, 1975 - emphasis added). 
In a clear example of the gap between party and government, the Labour 
Government's media policy was not the one proposed by the party's study group but 
one to be agreed following the recommendations of the public inquiry. Several 
months after Labour's submission was delivered to the Annan Committee, the 1975 
party conference passed a resolution that firmly welcomed the publication of TPA TH 
although both the motion and the debate concentrated exclusively on the state of the 
newspaper industry and ignored the study group's proposals for broadcasting reform. 
The ideas contained in TPA TM therefore remained in limbo: acknowledged by 
annual conference as providing the basis of the party's media policy but seen by the 
leadership as a mere discussion document. 
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Labour's submission was complemented by that of the Standing Conference on 
Broadcasting who argued that 'the BBC and IBA do not have a privileged place in 
society; they act as stewards of a publiý service. Whether they remain or whether 
alternative structures are set up to replace them, a reappraisal of the present system 
seems to us inevitable' (quoted in Broadcast, 1975a). SCoB called for centralised 
collection of advertising revenue, an emphasis on accountability and the creation of a 
National Broadcasting Policy Council to advise on policy and a National 
Broadcasting Commission to take over executive control. Such was the standing of 
what were fairly radical ideas that the committee gave over two whole days to 
considering SCoB's proposals after which, interestingly, SCoB organised a press 
conference at which Lord Annan was present. 'When asked why he was there, Lord 
Annan replied that SCoB's submissions contained "some very interesting 
proposals"... The unstated implication was that Lord Annan welcomed such thinking 
from an allegedly non-aligned group' (Broadcast, 1975b). The TUC departed from 
the lines of TPATMand SCoB, rejecting the need for alternative structures and, 
together with some of the teaching unions, called for the fourth channel to be handed 
over to educational broadcasting, with some Welsh language programming. 'In this 
respect for the present structure of the broadcasting organisations, ' wrote the 
Guardian, 'the TUC takes a markedly more conservative line' (Guardian, 1975) than 
the Labour Party. 
Whilst this is not the place for a detailed analysis of the Annan Report", it is 
nevertheless important to stress how seriously the committee took the more radical 
submissions, particularly those from the left and the labour movement. As Peter 
Goodwin argues, 'it is testament to their influence on the climate of broadcasting 
debate in the second half of the 70s that, even where it rebuffed them, the [left] 
critics largely set the agenda of the Annan Committee' (Goodwin, 1998: 21). In 
some ways, the whole premise of the report, finally published in March 1977, was 
based on the need, not simply for modernisation or renewal, but for the 
democratisation of broadcasting. 'It has been put to us, ' the report stated towards the 
33 See, for example, Potter (1989: 243-260) and Garnharn (1980: 47-57) for contrasting critiques of 
the report. 
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beginning, 'that broadcasting should be "opened up... (Annan, 1977b: 16). The 
duopoly, according to the committee, was proving to be a straitjacket on creativity 
and audiences so that 'major changes should take place in the structure of 
broadcasting if good programmes are to continue to be made for audiences who will 
be more varied, fragmented and perhaps better educated' (ibid.: 28). In a direct 
acknowledgement of the left critique of the narrowness of the broadcasting agenda, 
the report argued that contemporary culture 'is now multi-racial and pluralist: that is 
to say, people adhere to different views of the nature and purpose of life and expect 
their own views to be exposed in some form or other. The structure of broadcasting 
must reflect this variety' (ibid.: 30). 
In the section on accountability, the report referred to Caroline Heller and SCoB and 
quoted TPATMs assertion that 'broadcasting in Britain today is controlled by closed 
and almost autocratic institutions' (ibid.: 32) as representative of much of the 
evidence presented to the committee. It acknowledged the strength of feeling for a 
single broadcasting authority and devoted four pages to a consideration of Labour 
and SCoB's proposals for an executive broadcasting commission. The report 
confronted left-wing demands for greater trade union representation on broadcasting 
authorities and stated, apparently unambiguously, that 'management in broadcasting 
organisations must accept the principle of industrial democracy and be prepared to 
make radically new arrangements' (ibid.: 428_9). 34 
The report noted the increasing competition for audiences between ITV and the BBC 
that could harm public service commitments and insisted that ratings-building must 
not be the prime objective for the BBC: instead 'it should be to provide interesting 
and entertaining programmes which will amuse and enrich the experience of large 
numbers of people' (ibid.: 94). It further criticised the 'rigidity' of programme 
production structures and called for smaller production units to overcome the 
'bureaucratic fog which is said to envelop the upper slopes of the BBC' (ibid.: 106). 
Recognising the 'institutional malaise' of creative staff at the BBC, the report went 
34 Annan's reference to industrial democracy echoed the outcome of a public inquiry set up by Wilson 
in 1975 to consider workers' participation in industry. The Bullock Report was published only two 
months before the Annan Report in January 1977 and recommended that employees in large 
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on to condemn the 'overmanning' not at the grass-roots but at the highest levels 
where it 'seemed to us that there were far too many executives' (ibid.: 428). 
Decentralisation, regionalisation and flexibility were to be the BBC's buzzwords for 
delivering a public service. 
In terms of commercial television, the Annan Committee continued to ask the 
questions favoured by the left. 'Do the Companies make excessive profits? ' it 
pondered and concluded that '[w]e all think the risks for the ITV companies have 
been exaggerated and some of us think the rack of the levy should be stretched 
tauter' (ibid.: 182 - emphasis added). Given that the cries of the ITV companies 
about financial insecurity and near-collapse had led to levy cuts by both Labour and 
Conservative governments in recent years, this was an important admission. The 
committee firmly backed the use of the levy to restrain profits while a minority 
proposed to stop individual ITV companies from using their revenue to diversify into 
other fields. All agreed that ITV should not be handed the fourth channel. The 
report was particularly fierce when it came to the question of cable television. It 
proposed that the Post Office should be responsible for establishing a public 
broadband cable network and tore into pay television describing is as a 'ravenous 
parasite [which] lived off those who produced television and films' (ibid.: 220). 
Privately-financed pay television experiments would not extend choice but would eat 
up precious programming resources, hegemonise live sporting events and generally 
undermine the universal reach of public service broadcasting. 
In many areas, therefore, the report addressed the concerns of the left and 
acknowledged the demands for reform. The skill of the Arman Committee report, 
however, is that it embraced the need for change without undermining the basic 
authority of the existing broadcasting organisations and structures. Having 
recognised the left's critique, the report, in the main, rejected their proposals. An 
executive broadcasting commission was ruled out on the grounds that it 'would 
sooner or later lead to one body of people being in a position to impose their views 
companies should be able to elect their representatives onto company boards. Benn (I 990b: I 1- 12) 
discusses how the report was received in the cabinet. 
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on the whole of broadcasting output' (ibid.: 35), precisely the situation that had led 
the reformers to press for a single, democratically accountable broadcasting body. 
Workers' representation on governing bodies was also turned down on the basis of 
the distinction between industrial democracy, where workers have a say in the 
running of a company, and public accountability, which operates above and beyond 
the interests of specific social groups. Whilst there might be room for industrial 
democracy in broadcasting, argued the committee, this could not extend to matters of 
content: 'We are unanimous in our view that the unions should not be entitled to 
influence editorial decisions. Who determines what shall be said or transmitted, or 
who shall be asked to appear on television and radio programmes, is ultimately a 
matter for the Authorities and management to decide' (ibid.: 429). Union 
involvement could extend as far as consultation over shift patterns, but any idea of 
opening up the editorial process to broadcasting workers was firmly resisted by the 
committee. 
TPATMs proposals to abolish the BBC and IBA were, not surprisingly, rejected. 
The report left the BBC virtually unchanged, supported the continuation of the 
licence fee and even praised the improvements in ITV's programming although it 
reflected that '[w]hether the ITV companies give the country the service it deserves 
in view of the profits which they make is a debate to which there is no end' (ibid.: 
148). In light of this endless debate, the committee also rejected the proposals by 
SCoB, Labour and the ACTT for the centralised selling of advertising and 
highlighted the companies' 'incentive to maximise revenue' (ibid.: 164),, vhen selling 
their own advertising. The key demands of the left for structural reform were 
therefore confronted but turned down. 
So what were the 'major changes' that the committee acknowledged were necessary 
to implement? Far from increasing the accountability of BBC governors, the 
committee suggested reducing their number from twelve to nine; instead of re- 
structuring the ITV system, the committee suggested re-naming it. The duopoly was 
not 'ended' as promised but simply modified with the creation of other broadcasting 
bodies: a Public Enquiry Board to oversee occasional public hearings, a Broadcasting 
Complaints Commission and a Local Broadcasting Authority for local radio and 
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cable. The repeated demands for increased accountability and democracy in 
broadcasting were reduced to a recommendation that the existing authorities should 
'hold public meetings from time to time in different Parts of the country and should 
more openly seek the views of the public abput the conduct of the services for which 
I 
they are responsible' (ibid.: 475). The relations of power at the heart of British 
television were very much left in place. 
The Annan Committee did, however, propose one substantial change: the launch of 
an Open Broadcasting Authority (OBA) to run the fourth channel. As we have seen, 
the official Labour Party submission was silent on this issue while most of the labour 
movement was more united on what it did not want (an ITV-2), than on what it did 
(generally, an educational channel). Some, like SCoB, argued that a fourth channel 
was not a priority in the current economic circumstances and that any decision 
should be postponed. However, heavily influenced by Anthony Smith, who had 
participated in but who had not signed up to Labour's TPA TM, and his vision of a 
National Television Foundation, the committee agreed on a new authority to oversee 
an approach to scheduling and programming that would relate to the demand for 
diversity and difference in television. 
We do not see the fourth channel merely as an addition to the plurality of 
outlets, but as a force for plurality in a deeper sense. Not only could it be 
a nursery for new forms and new methods of presenting ideas, it could 
also open the door to a new kind of broadcast publishing (ibid.: 235). 
The OBA would commission programmes from a range of producers, including the 
ITV companies, the Open University and, most importantly for the champions of 
diversity, independent producers. Mixed sources of programming would be 
complemented by a mixed revenue base of sponsorship, block advertising, 
subscriptions and government grants. Furthermore, the OBA would act as a 
publisher, not a broadcaster, and therefore need not be responsible for ensuring 
balance in individual programmes but across its schedule as a whole. Such a 
structure would allow for the transmission of opinions not normally sanctioned by 
the other channels and therefore appeared to be at the heart of the committee's stated 
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aim to 'open up' broadcasting. This was complemented by the report's support for a 
fourth channel in Wales broadcasting in the Welsh language. 
The committee's concession to the radical dFmands for democratisation and access 
was countered by its insistence that the channel should not associate itself with any 
one political position and that 'if it allowed its service to be taken over by political 
extremists, it would soon lose its remit from Parliament ... In general, we recommend 
the [Open Broadcasting] Authority should have the maximum freedom which 
Parliament is prepared to alloW (ibid.: 23 6- emphasis added). Annan was 
determined that while new voices were to be heard, including those which expressed 
the breakdown of consensus, they must be organised according to the terms of the 
existing political consensus. The pressure for an expanded broadcasting sphere that 
arose in part from the extra-parliamentary struggles of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was to be accommodated in a new channel whose parameters of acceptability would 
have to complement those of parliament. 
The Annan Report was, therefore, a model of compromise: urging evolutionary 
proposals to marginalise more revolutionary ones, embracing change while 
preserving existing structures and encouraging new voices while retaining the former 
gatekeepers. According to Annan himself, 'the report was not a crusading one unlike 
Pilkington. This one was "look, steady as she goes, one great venture - Channel 
Four - is enough, and there is nothing very much more that we ought to be doing at 
the moment"' (Annan, 1999). However, just as Richard Hoggart was seen as the 
intellectual spirit behind the Pilkington Committee, it was the Labour MP Phillip 
Whitehead who best articulated the mood of the Annan Committee. Whilst there 
was little unanimity among its members (as evidenced by the number of notes of 
dissent), Whitehead's crusade for pluralism helped to focus the committee's work 
around a number of limited structural reforms. Having moved away from his earlier 
identification with a single broadcasting authority, Whitehead was for Annan the 
'hero of our report [who] won the heart of the majority of our Committee with his 
notion of realising diversity and flexibility by increasing the number of authorities' 
(Annan, 1981: 17). From a different perspective, Jeremy Potter, the historian of 
commercial television, acknowledges Whitehead's 'clear-mindedness and eloquence' 
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but attacks his 'dominance of the committee's thinking' (Potter, 1989: 255) which 
led to a hostility towards ITV and concessions to public service. 
Whitehead himself was rather more cautiouý about the report. Far from boasting that 
the committee's proposals were set to revolutionise broadcasting, he argued in 
parliament that the report 'is not a prescription for instant action or an attempt to say 
that certain things are terribly wrong now and must changed overnight ... It is, rather, 
an attempt to say that innovations must be made during the next ten to fifteen years 
and that they must take account of the way in which broadcasting has already 
developed' (HoC Debates, 23 May 1977: col. 1070). Despite the fact that the report 
firmly rejected the Labour Party's unofficial media policy, most Labour MPs 
welcomed the committee's findings. Eric Moonman, a signatory to TPATM, praised 
both the proposal for the fourth channel and the report's conclusion that 'competition 
between the BBC and ITV has not benefited the public (ibid.: cols. 1062/3). The 
reaction of home secretary Merlyn Rees was even more revealing: 'What impressed 
me most about the report ... is what the Committee did not recommend. It did not 
recommend any fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements for 
broadcasting in this country' (ibid.: col. 10 19). Arman's decisive backing of the 
existing framework of British broadcasting was a relief for those in the government 
who had little appetite for implementing radical broadcasting reforms. The re- 
emergence of a consensus about broadcasting policy was confirmed by the warm 
responses to Annan of Willie Whitelaw, the shadow home secretary, and the TUC 
respectively. 
The main source of opposition to the report lay not with its general approach to 
increasing diversity but in the details of the plans for funding the fourth channel. 
Lacking an economist on the committee, Annan's vision of an OBA was criticised in 
different quarters, including Austin Mitchell on Labour's backbenches, Willie 
Whitelaw (who favoured the fourth channel going to the IBA) and the ACTT 
technicians' union. According to the latter, reliance on sponsorship and block 
advertising had proved unstable in other countries while a 'laissez-faire' system for 
buying in programming was a dangerous precedent (ACTT, 1977a: 12). Reflecting 
the views of its permanently-employed ITV technicians, the ACTT's submission to 
the government tore into the plan for lacking any 'convincing proposals for a 
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guaranteed and adequate source of income for the OBA, which would not undermine 
the revenue of ITV' (ACTT, 1977b: 1) and pledged its support for an ITV-2 instead. 
When freelancers in the union attacked this position, Alan Sapper insisted that he 
could understand how members would found it difficult to accept the policy. 'In 
some senses ITV2 is ideological anathema: commercialism not public service 
broadcasting. But the actual interests of our actual membership in ITV are at stake' 
(Sapper, 1977: 16). Sapper's argument reflects the contradictions of the ACTT's 
approach to broadcasting reform. As Stephen Lambert notes (1982: 75), although 
6prone to examining radical rhetoric, the ACTT is, in practice, a passionately 
conservative union with regard to maintaining and improving its members' 
conditions of employment. ' Having campaigned politically throughout the 1970s for 
a structural transforination of the television industry based on its own commission's 
report, the ACTT, as a union, was immediately prepared to put sectional interests 
before political principles. Just as the ACTT was reluctant to endorse Pilkington's 
call for the restructuring of ITV in the early 1960s, the union once again 
demonstrated a corporatist concern with the financial health of the industry above an 
interest in seeing a political transformation of television. 
Opposition to specific details of the Annan Report while simultaneouslywelcoming 
its general approach helped Labour to distance itself from the more radical proposals 
suggested by SCoB and the Labour Party Study Group. Garnham, writing three 
years after the report, argued that this was precisely what Wilson had in mind when 
setting up the committee. 
Annan, like all such Committees of Inquiry, was expressly designed to 
lance the boil of radical discontent (and in particular to head off 
proposals for radical reform from within the Labour Party itself) by 
allowing all voices to express themselves in evidence to the Committee, 
there to be nullified, because by their nature unstructured and 
unfocussed, by the 'on the one hand and on the other' of committee 
compromise (Garnham, 1980: 47). 
Labour had pursued a similar path in terms of press policy. With TPATMs press 
proposals backed by party conference, the creation of a Royal Commission on the 
Press was evidence of the seriousness of Labour's intentions but also a useful way of 
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postponing any immediate decisions. James Curran, who actually drew up the ternis 
of reference, recalls that when the Commission had completed its work in 1977, '1 
had lunch with a senior civil servant and he said nothing will come of the report. I 
asked why and he said there was no political will behind it. He said that it would be 
in the inter-departmental committee where the findings would get lost and it turned 
out he was exactly right' (Curran, 1997). Proposals for a change in monopoly law 
and ownership rules were quietly dropped. 
The Annan Report was therefore both a full-blooded engagement with and a firm 
rejection of the critique of the broadcasting duopoly developed by socialist 
intellectuals and activists in the Free Communications Group, media unions, SCoB 
and the Labour Party study group. It recognised the need for change but only so long 
as its proposals, in the words of the report, 'would help to take the heat out of a 
number of controversies which rage today' (Annan. 1977b: 241). 'It was a genuine 
attempt to evolve the structures of broadcasting', as Anthony Smith puts it, yet its 
principal achievement 'was to confinn the idea of the broadcasting authority' (Smith, 
1999). Perhaps this contradiction helps to explain some very different interpretations 
of the report. Jean Seaton argues that Annan abandoned the tradition of universal 
public service and replaced it with a 'free markct-place in which balance could be 
achieved through the competition of [a] multiplicity of independent voices' (Curran 
and Seaton, 1997: 303). Peter Goodwin (1998: 96n) challenges this reading and 
asserts that, according to Annan, pluralism and diversity could only be delivered 
through public service structures. In a sense both are right. The report saw no role 
for an uninhibited private sector, downplayed competition between ITV and BBC as 
a force for creativity and championed the role of public service. On the other hand, it 
noted social fragmentation and called for a higher degree of pluralism and public 
responsibility to be ushered in through competing voices, partly mediated through 
independent, private production companies. 
In conclusion, while the Annan Report was not official Labour Party policy, it nlay 
as ivell have been. Firstly, it focused the principles of access, accountability and 
diversity, all of which underlay Labour's policy debates at the time, into a neat 
compromise package. Secondly, it largely satisfied both Labour radicals with 
promise of an OBA and Labour moderates with appeals to the preservation of public 
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service broadcasting and structural stability. Finally, it aimed not to antagonise its 
ideological foes too much: 'ITV received the report with more relief than dismay. It 
was not the threatened end of the world as they knew it' (Potter, 1989: 25 1) and, 
indeed, the report even left the door open to the increased commercial exploitation of 
broadcasting with its commitment to independent production. 
From Annan Committee to White Paper 
During the parliamentary debate on Arman in May 1977, the Labour home secretary, 
Merlyn Rees, claimed that he intended to implement proposals based on the report in 
the lifetime of the present goverrurient. However, he also made it clear that he had 
reservations about two aspects of the OBA: the uncertainty of its revenue base and 
the relaxation of the requirement to produce 'impartial' programmes. These 
criticisms were mirrored by civil servants in the Home Office but also by the 
Treasury which was anxious about backing a new public project at a time of great 
economic instability. According to Phillip Whitehead, 'the Treasury feared that there 
would be a financial shortfall and that we would end up bailing out another public 
service. Merlyn Rees was just a desperately cautious person and wasn't going to do 
anything within the Home Office if he could avoid it' (Whitehead, 1999). Instead, 
Rees passed on the bulk of the responsibility for drawing up a White Paper to his 
minister of state, Lord Harris. 'Together with the Home Office civil servants, ' notes 
Lambert, 'Harris ... favoured an extension of the existing ITV network' and indeed he 
went on to become the chairman of Westward Television (Lambert, 1982: 78) as 
well as leaving the Labour Party to join the Social Democrats. Thiswasnotan 
auspicious development for supporters of Annan, anxious to see the spirit of the 
committee embodied in future legislation. 
The first rumours emanating from the Home Office suggested that a possible way 
forward lay in postponing the fourth channel until the economy picked up. 
Unwilling to antagonise the left by scrapping the OBA in favour of IBA control and 
unable to convince the Treasury that this was the right time to use public funds for 
broadcasting, the govermnent was accused of stalling on a decision 'at least until the 
restoration of an upbeat economy' (Variety, 1977). However, Variety's assertion that 
any hopes held by ITV of winning a second channel were tied to a Conservative 
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election victory proved premature. In January 1978, a leak of Harris' draft White 
Paper confirmed that the Home Office had decided to defer a fourth channel for three 
years and then hand it over to the IBA, not the OBA. Both Annan and Whitehead 
still admit to being surprised at the Home Office's decision. Whitehead confesses to 
being 'amazed that senior Labour Party people were going around parroting the 
words of Sir Brian Young and the IBA' (Whitehead, 1999) while Annan claims that 
'I don't know what the pressures on him [Rees] were or why he wanted this. It was 
absolutely against the whole tenor of our report' (Annan, 1999). At the time Annan 
supporters were even more horrified. The industry magazine Canipaign carried the 
dramatic headline, 'Labour MPs fight for OBA' and quoted Whitehead raging that 
6we are all people who have thought a lot about broadcasting reform and we are 
angry at these stories coming out of the Home Office' (Campaign, 1978). Broadcast 
argued that the government had decided not to expand television services and that 
this had 'long been the assumption of the more pessimistic of the industry's 
observers, who could not see a Government faced with an election and still 
surrounded by economic problems devoting too much time, or money, to 
broadcasting' (Broadcast, 1978a). 
The battle reached the highest levels as Rees failed to win over the Cabinet to the 
proposals and indeed produced one of prime minister Callaghan's few decisions on 
broadcasting. Heavily lobbied by Whitehead, former arts minister Hugh Jenkins, 
Tony Benn and others, Callaghan agreed to set up and chair a new Cabinet sub- 
committee on broadcasting to make recommendations on the White Paper. 35 In 
particular, Callaghan asked Bernard Donoghue and David Lipsey from his Downing 
Street research staff to prepare a paper on the fourth channel that eventually favoured 
the OBA. By May 1978, the tide had turned and, to the relief of the reformers, the 
OBA had been reinstated and the concerns of the Treasury about increasing public 
borrowing had been defeated. This was partly due to new figures showing that the 
cost of a new service would be much lower than previously thought and partly due to 
persistent campaigning by Whitehead, Anthony Smith and others about the need for 
33 The committee was called GEN 114 and contained senior Labour ministers such as Merlyn Rees, 
Tony Benn (energy), David Owen (foreign secretary), Roy Hattersley (prices), Shirley Williams 
(education), William Rodgers (transport) and Joel Barnett (Treasury) (Hennessy, 1978). Callaghan 
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increased diversity. Stephen Lambert argues that the decision may also have had 
more internal political roots: 
Whether Callaghan was persuaded of the need for a new Authority for 
the fourth channel because of the merits of the argument, or more 
because it would be a relatively easy concession to the left wing of the 
Party at a time when such concessions were few and far between, is 
difficult to determine (Lambert, 1982: 79). 
Six months after the cabinet committee was launched and sixteen months after the 
publication of the Annan Report, Labour's White Paper on broadcasting appeared 
and it soon became clear that, with the important exception of the OBA and support 
for a Welsh-language channel, concessions to the left ivere 'few and far between'. 
Rees presented the White Paper as reflecting the spirit of the Annan Committee that 
broadcasting 'should continue to be provided as public services and the responsibility 
of public authorities. But, ' he continued, 'our proposals are also designed to 
encourage diversity in the range and variety of material available to the public and to 
enhance the accountability of the broadcasting authorities' (quoted in the Times, 
1978). Using the popular language of broadcasting reform, the White Paper 
committed itself to both increased pluralism and the existing structures of BBC and 
ITV, the licence fee and the levy. However, while in some places the White Paper 
and the Annan Report were very similar, 36 the former also contained a number of 
important deviations from the latter. 
Firstly, in terms of financing the OBA, the White Paper extended the range of 
revenue sources to include spot advertising and rentals from programme makers 
selling advertising in their own programmes. Given that the ITV companies were 
likely to be a major source of OBA programming, this would greatly increase the 
influence of commercial forces on the channel. Both of these proposals, 'represent a 
vetoed the original membership list prepared by the Home Office which exchided Benn, Hattersley 
and Rodgers, the leading proponents of broadcasting reform (Page, 1978). 
36 This is particularly true about the purpose of the OBA. For example, Annan: 'A great opportunity 
would be missed if the fourth channel were seen solely in terms of extending thepresent range of 
programmes' (Annan, 1977b: 235). White Paper: 'A unique opportunity will be missed if the fourth 
channel is not used to explore the possibilities of programme which say something new in new ways' 
(Labour Party, 1978: 9). 
164 
critical departure from Annan's thinking and caused a few gulps even among the 
paper's enthusiastic supporters' (Broadcast, 1978b). Secondly, the White Paper also 
challenged the OBA's editorial independence by insisting that the new authority 
should ensure that 'due impartiality is preserved in the treatment of controversial 
matters and that nothing should be broadcast which incites to crime or is offensive to 
public feeling' (Home Office, 1978: 10). This was a major blow not just to Annan's 
concept of pluralism but to the radical demands for a challenge to the establishment's 
control over what was deemed 'controversial' or 'acceptable'. Programmes which 
adopted a partisan stance on, for example, Northern Ireland, trade unions, anti-racism 
and, of course, the policies of government were now more likely to be ruled out of 
order. The White Paper aimed to reinforce the power of public authorities to decide 
what was offensive and assumed, despite the pages of Arman which talked of the 
increasing pluralism of social life, that there existed one 'public feeling' and not 
many. This was a top-down interpretation of diversity that led Broadcast to 
summarise the proposal as a demand for 'NO "committed journalism" on OBA' 
(Broadcast, 1978b). 
Any ideas that the White Paper would bend to the demands for increased 
accountability of the authorities themselves were also crushed. Far from OBA 
members being drawn from a variety of representative groups, it would be up to the 
home secretary to appoint members who would need to include people with 
4experience in broadcasting and business' (Home Office, 1978: 11). The Home 
Office would also be kept busy with the proposed creation of three Service 
Management Boards for the BBC to supervise and co-ordinate its television, radio 
and external services, ostensibly to improve management control and cut down on 
bureaucracy. Given that half of the boards' members would be appointed by the 
home secretary from outside the BBC, this was seen as a highly political attack on 
the independence of the BBC, too much for even the Neivs ofthe World (1978) to 
bear. 
The idea of peak-time Fourth Channel broadcasts of Moslem madrigals, 
recipes for curried caviar, and hints for gay joggers is a laugh. 
But the proposal in the Government's off-White Paper to intimidate the 
proud BBC into craven impotence is no laughing matter. 
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It is malicious. It is sinister. It is appalling. 
According to Peter Fiddick of the Guardian, the creation of these new supervisory 
boards was more important for the government than all the other features of the 
White Paper. He predicted that the proposal would 'be put before Parliament in the 
coming session even if there is no time for other legislation on the future of 
broadcasting' (Fiddick, 1978). Additionally, Annan's recommendation to end the 
duopoly through the creation of more authorities was undermined by the White 
Paper's scrapping of plans for a Local Broadcasting Authority and a Public Enquiry 
Board. A relatively toothless Broadcasting Complaints Commission survived as did 
a vague requirement for the BBC, IBA and OBA to 'conduct public hearings from 
time to time in different parts of the country to ascertain the views of the public' 
(Home Office, 1978: 5). 
One of the most curious changes from Annan concerned the future of cable 
television. While TPA TM had called for a publicly-owned cable network and Annan 
had suggested locating community cable services within a Local Broadcasting 
Authority, Labour's White Paper adopted a very different approach. It placed 
existing cable services under the authority of the commercial regulator, the IBA, and 
stated that the 'Government is not prepared at this stage to dismiss the possible 
advantages of pay-TV, or to conclude that the disadvantages which it might hold 
could not be overcome' (ibid.: 62). Whereas Annan had described pay-TV as a 
cravenous parasite', the White Paper promised to look favourably on new pilot 
schemes and considered the 'possibility that regulated pay-TV might increase the 
range and quality of television in this country' (ibid. ). This approach was not 
entirely unforeseen as, in 1975, Labour had allowed advertising on cable and 
permitted cable systems with extra capacity to carry ITV programmes from other 
regions. Indeed, a year before the White Paper, Rees himself had attended the annual 
lunch of the Cable Television Association, the trade body for private cable operators 
(Hollins, 1984: 45/6). 
The White Paper, therefore, was a mixed blessing for the advocates of reform. While 
it acknowledged the tone of the Annan Report, it sought to increase state intervention 
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into broadcasting, strengthen the grip of the existing broadcasting authorities and 
restrict the possibilities of access to and participation in broadcasting. For Anthony 
Smith, 
Where Annan gave us pluralism, the White Paper substitutes trioPoly 
with a dash of state direction. The White Paper gives us an Open 
Broadcasting Authority, but one that is pretty heavily enmeshed with 
existing commercial operators; it gives us cable, pay tv and local radio 
but inside the IBA and the BBC, so that these will grow in the next 
decades into vast supra-media conglomerates. It gives up public 
accountability but by way of Home Office appointees (Smith, 1978). 
The OBA was the key remaining link back to the ideas of the television reformers 
and was a significant achievement but, by then, it was not just the property of the 
left. Although shadow home secretary Willie Whitelaw may have been sceptical of 
the OBA's financial structure he was nevertheless supportive of its main purpose. 
With a growing consensus about the need to open up broadcasting, Labour did 
eventually take a bold decision by backing the OBA. However, those radical policies 
which had been conceived in the early 1970s out of a desire to see genuinely new 
structures and new sorts of television had been transformed by the end of the decade 
into a relatively narrow and cautious plan for the rest of broadcasting. The White 
Paper was the outcome of a long series of passionate debates for radical reform of 
broadcasting, twisted through years of public inquiries, cabinet committees, 
backroorn deals and economic crisis. 
It was no surprise that the White Paper's proposals had not been implemented by the 
time the Conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher, won the general election of May 
1979. Labour had lost its parliamentary majority and was relying on Liberal votes to 
keep it afloat. Broadcasting was neither a central issue for the party leadership nor 
one that was guaranteed to be uncontroversial. The 1978 Queen's Speech was non- 
committal about broadcasting while the Commons debate on the White Paper took 
place at the end of March 1979, by which time Labour had lost a vote of no 
confidence and was preparing to fight the election. Despite the near irrelevance of 
the debate, Rees nevertheless promised that 'the Government remain convinced that 
the fourth television channel should be run by an Open Broadcasting Authority, as 
proposed in the White Paper, and that the legislation we shall introduce in the new 
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Parliament will contain provisions to that effect' (HoC Debates, 29 March 1979: col. 
681). Labour's election manifesto briefly confirmed this pledge but there was little 
urgency to press for legislation in the short term. 'While inflation and industrial 
relations and devolution are matters that demand more or less immediate attention, ' 
wrote one commentator at the time, 'television and radio seem to be going along 
quite nicely as they are' (Television Today, 1979). The Labour leadership's broad 
satisfaction with the existing state of television meant that it would be another 
eighteen years before the party had another opportunity to transform broadcasting. 
Conclusion 
How significant were Labour's achievements in the area of television in the 1970s? 
Intellectual debate about broadcasting reform was dominated by a left-wing 
movement energised by the revolts of the late 1960s and early 1970s and anxious to 
stimulate a broadcasting culture that reflected the breakdown of what it saw as a 
stifling parliamentary consensus. Figures around the New Left conceptualised 
broadcasting as a means of democratic exchange and mass publishing instead of the 
more hierarchical structures represented by the BBC and IBA. In many ways, the 
Labour Party was peripheral to this movement as campaigning bodies like the Free 
Communications Group looked to industrial activity and political militancy to press 
for change. For example, one of the most influential critiques of the existing 
duopoly was written by Nicholas Garnham in 1973 at the same time as his 
involvement in the Labour Party study group. Structures of Television (Garnham, 
1980), however, mentions the Labour Party only once (critically), concentrating 
instead on broadcasting workers as key agents of change. 
However, inasmuch as these debates ivere expressed in parliamentary contexts, it 
was certainly the Labour Party that articulated them best. The establishment of the 
party's study group on the media with the involvement of a wide range of politicians, 
activists and intellectuals, and its publication of The People and the Media confirmed 
the issue of media reform as one belonging to the left of the party. While the 
suggestion to abolish the BBC and IBA was greeted with horror by the broadcasting 
establishment and with silence by the Labour leadership, it provides one of the few 
examples of a strategy for an entirely different vision of broadcasting. The whole 
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tenor of the Annan Committee borrowed heavily from these debates and placed 
broadcasting accountability and democracy at the heart of the mainstream political 
agenda in the latter part of the decade. 
Another notable achievement was the creation of an Open Broadcasting Authority 
which, although never introduced by Labour, owed its roots to debates conducted in 
the labour movement and which was given respectability by Labour's White Paper in 
1978. According to Phillip Whitehead, Labour's contribution to the debate 
changed the terms of broadcasting in the area in which it focused. I'm 
still intensely proud of Channel Four and S4C [Welsh language channel]. 
We had two things that mattered at a time when we could still do them. 
The first was to have an open channel that operated as a publishing 
channel where there were by definition many voices and where the remit 
was to let minorities be heard. And for S4C, we proved you could run a 
channel in the other national language and makes a success of that and 
revive the language in the process (Whitehead, 1999). 
These gains need to be offset against the far more substantial reforms proposed by 
the left of the party which were published and then buried by the leadership. We 
have argued that the process of a public inquiry and extended executive and 
parliamentary discussion proved to be an effective way of taking the heat out of more 
radical demands. But it must also be true that while the Labour left seized upon 
broadcasting reform, it was never a top priority as compared to issues of industrial 
relations, economic policy and national i sation. In 1978, the trade union official and 
ftiture Labour MP Dennis MacShane sighed that '[s] ince 1970 the Labour Party and 
TUC have managed to spend a total of three and a half hours on the ownership, 
control and role of the media at their respective conferences' (MacShane, 1978: 5). 
In any case, when the labour movement did discuss media policy, it consistently 
privileged press over television policy, as demonstrated by the reactions to TPA TM. 
A more important reason for the lack of commitment to a radical television policy is 
that the socialists on the Labour left shared the party with both moderates and right- 
wingers. Indeed the left itself was divided between those who favoured the abolition 
of the BBC and IBA and those who wanted more narrow reforms of the broadcasting 
authorities. Just as Labour's opposition to the introduction of commercial television 
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in the 1950s was compromised because of these conflicting interests, the party's 
attitude towards television in the 1970s still had to accommodate the views of both 
left and right. Instead of a television policy, we may say that Labour had several 
different policies. Anthony Smith speaks of the 'several coherent' plans that Labour 
had at the time and argues that the party was 'always very divided because there 
were those in the party who wanted commercialism - very few - there were others 
who wanted control, and there were some who were simply bewildered and did not 
know how to get what they wanted which was a level playing field' (Smith, 1999). 
The consequence of having these conflicting positions was to allow the government 
to strike a 'balance' which neutralised the more radical demands of the left but gave 
it concessions (some of them important, like the OBA) to keep it on board the 
Labour project. In times of economic growth, governments are more prepared to 
consider the expansion of services like television. In times of crisis, like that of 1974 
to 1979, the space for a radical re-structuring of television through parliamentary 
means becomes increasingly limited. Having set the agenda for broadcasting reform 
at the start of the decade, those radicals who pinned their hopes on Labour's ability 
to shake up broadcasting and usher in a new age of openness and diversity were 
sorely disappointed. There were some successes, such as the Open Broadcasting 
Authority, but at the end of the decade broadcasting was largely controlled by the 
same authorities and the same voices whose domination had produced the original 
demands for reform some ten years earlier. 'What is remarkable about the Wilson 
and Callaghan years, ' reflects Phillip Whitehead, 'is that they constitute a virtual 
holiday from institutional reform of any kind' (Whitehead, 1989: 266). Television 
appears to be no exception. 
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Chapter Five: 1979-1992 
The Labour Opposition in the Thatcher Years 
Just as the disappointments of the 1964-1970 Wilson governments had led to a 
leftwing shift in the early 1970s, experience of the collapse of the Wilson-Callaghan 
administration under the pressure of public spending cuts and pay restraint left a 
bitter taste in the mouths of many Labour supporters. Yet whereas left activists in 
the earlier period had turned their attention to questions of industrial democracy and 
involvement in growing social and political struggles, they now 'claimed that defeat 
[in the 1979 election] was the result of ministers failing to observe party policies as 
written by annual conference and the NEC' (Kogan & Kogan, 1981: 58). The 
solution, therefore, was to wage a constitutional battle to change internal party 
procedures to allow for more grassroots involvement and democracy at all levels of 
the party. Activists set their targets on achieving compulsory reselection of MPs, a 
more democratic way of selecting the party leader and forcing the leadership to 
include conference policies in the party manifesto. 
Rising inflation and unemployment together with negative economic growth boosted 
the opportunities for the left so that it was no surprise that activists won many of 
their demands at the 1980 Labour conference, including support for unilateralism and 
withdrawal from the European Community. The victory of Michael Foot over Denis 
Healey as party leader in November 1980, the success of the constitutional reformers 
at the special Wembley conference in January 1981 and the near-election of Tony 
Benn as deputy leader in October 1981 all confirmed the rising influence of the left. 
Policy-making flourished as over fifty sub-committees, composed of MPs, trade 
unionists, academics and supporters, were convened by the left-dominated NEC to 
draw up the radical proposals for Labour's Progranime 1982, the basis for the 
following year's manifesto. 
The shift to the left produced a sharp reaction inside the party. Four senior party 
members, including the former home secretary Roy Jenkins, split away from Labour 
to form the Social Democratic Party in 198 1, leading two academics to ask 'can the 
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Labour Party hold togetherT (Kogan & Kogan, 1981: 148). Others (for example 
Thorpe, 1997: 214), have since argued that the strength of the left was exaggerated, 
witness the election of a right-wing majority to the NEC in 1981 and the comfortable 
victory for Roy Hattersley over the left-wing candidate, Michael Meacher, as deputy 
leader in 1983. According to this view, the Bennite left always had a fragile grip on 
power inside the party and, indeed, depended on the unreliable support of 
sympathetic left-wing trade union general secretaries. 
The strength of the left was tested in the 1983 election, which Labour fought on a 
manifesto famously dubbed by Gerald Kaufman as 'the longest suicide note in 
history' (quoted in Davies, 1996: 389). Once again, Labour historians have claimed 
that its radical reputation was overstated. Pelling and Reid (1996: 169) describe the 
1983 manifesto as 'an ambiguous document' while Eric Shaw argues that it was far 
less left-wing than its 1970s counterparts with fewer commitments to public 
ownership and calls it a 'hybrid' compromise between Bennism and acceptance of a 
market economy (Shaw, 1994: 13). 
Labour's poor performance in the election, where it only narrowly beat the 
SDP/Liberal Alliance into second place, demanded that the party reconsider its 
strategies for change at a national level. Influenced by the idea that local government 
successes could 'provide an important test-bed for new socialist ideas, and ... become 
significant arenas in which to mount effective resistance to Conservative 
governments' (Seyd, 1987: 140), the left now redirected its attention towards the 
sizeable number of local authorities controlled by Labour, like London, Liverpool, 
Sheffield and Manchester. The concept of 'municipal socialism' suggested both a 
shield against Tory policies as well as a chance to launch innovative social and 
economic programmes appropriate to specific communities. Its key themes were 
decentralisation of local services and increased opportunities for participation, 
particularly for minority populations, in the life of the local area. Training schemes, 
enterprise zones, cultural subsidies and support for co-operatives were among the 
policies favoured by the municipal left, headed by the Greater London Council 
(GLC) and its industrial agency the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB). 
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In response, the Conservative government imposed restrictive upper limits on the 
amount of money local authorities could raise through the rates. Under the pressure 
of this 'ratecapping' in 1984-5, the councils conceded defeat one by one and set legal 
rates. Although there were some limited cuttural and economic achievements, 
significant gains were constrained by the status of local councils as what Goodwin 
and Duncan call 'small left-wing hillocks of power on a vast capitalist plain' (quoted 
in Seyd, 1987: 153). 
Municipal socialism's ideology of local democracy and community involvement 
proved to be an influential although short-lived development of left Labour thinking. 
In an effort to rid Labour nationally of its militant reputation, the recently-elected 
csoft left' Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, reftised to sanction a confrontation between 
Labour local authorities and central government. Kinnock had pursued a similar 
strategy, firstly during the 1984-5 miners' strike when he distanced Labour as far as 
possible from the views of the miners' leader, Arthur Scargill, and subsequently in 
his attacks on 'hard left' Militant supporters inside the party. Kinnock had won the 
leadership after the party's disastrous performance in the 1983 election and was 
determined to drag Labour towards the centre, ditching left-wing commitments and 
professionalising the party's image and campaigning strategies. Immediately after 
his election, he scrapped the myriad of NEC study groups and sub-committees,. vhich 
had been a bastion of the left and replaced them with a more centralised structure of 
joint policy committees, composed of representatives from the PLP, NEC and 
Gexpert' party members. Furthermore, in 1985, a new campaigns and 
communications directorate was set up with Peter Mandelson as its director. By 
1986, Kinnock, with Mandelson's approval, launched the shadow communications 
agency, whose role was to modernise Labour's PR strategy. 
Tudor Jones describes Kinnock's first four years as party leader as a strategy of 
'pragmatic adaptation' (1994: 573). Pragmatic both in terms of his policy 
pronouncements but also because of his cautious approach to changing the party and 
antagonising the left during the turbulent years of ratecapping and the miners' strike. 
The adaptation refers to Kinnock's 'growing revisionism in at least one ideologically 
crucial area: his attitude towards a market-orientated mixed economy' (ibid: 573-4). 
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From the very beginning, Kinnock attempted to reduce the identification of the 
Labour Party with nationalisation and hostility towards the market. Quizzed about 
the theme of his leadership some years later, he replied that his overarching objective 
was 'the enlargement of individual liberty ... feasible by the involvement of the 
collective contribution of the community' (Kinnock, 1984: 547). Combining the 
individualism of Thatcherism with the collectivism of the Labourist tradition, 
Kinnock sought to find a new role for the market in this relationship. Interviewed in 
October 1984, Kinnock claimed that: 
The first thing to understand is that we are in a market, it is called the 
world economy. We will to a great extent make our living by selling in 
that market and it therefore requires the most efficient organisation of our 
resources, human and material, in order to satisfy need at home and in 
order to be effective in that market abroad ... What we have to do is to find the system of stimulation and encouragement, the climate of 
enterprise which is most conducive towards meetings those domestic and 
international obligations. That means deliberate encouragement for the 
smaller businesses and co-operatives which are currently developing very 
rapidly (quoted in Hobsbawm, 1984: 8-9). 
Kinnock made these comments in an interview with Eric Hobsbawm in the magazine 
of the British Communist Party, Marxism Today, the main vehicle for a 
contemporary, if not new, set of ideas concerning the need for ideological 
reorientation in the working-class movement. According to Hobsbawrn (1978), the 
decline of manual occupations, the rise of the service sector, the fragmentation of 
class consciousness and the rapid rise in living standards had eroded Labour's 
support to such an extent that new alliances and new priorities were urgently required 
if Labour was to have any significant future. 37 Marxism Today analysed the 
phenomenon which it named 'Thatcherism' as a virtually unstoppable new sort of 
consumer capitalism combining economic libertarianism with social populism. The 
left it argued, needed to join forces with all anti-Thatcher elements, including the 
SDP, 'wet' Tories and the clergy to form a 'progressive' movement against the 
Conservative government. 
37 For empirical evidence against Hobsbawm's thesis, see Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1985). 
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The magazine updated the 'embourgeoisiement' thesis of the earlier revisionists who 
had argued that Labour had to shed its class image if it was to win power, and 
insisted that the left needed to relate to the consumerist aspirations of those voters 
increasingly drawn to Thatcherism. The traqitional language and icons of Labourism 
were less relevant to a population defined by share ownership, foreign holidays and, 
importantly, cultural consumption. The ideas of Marxisni Today, particularly in its 
sympathetic attitude to commercialism and consumerism, certainly provided part of 
the theoretical backdrop for Labour's shift towards acceptance of the market. Martin 
Jacques, the magazine's editor, wrote later that the 'Communist Party in the eighties 
acted like the Labour revisionists of the fifties' (quoted in Heffernan and Marqusee, 
1992: 64) while A. J. Davies argues that Hobsbawrn Provided 'intellectual sustenance 
for the Labour Party' and that 'the magazine did have some influence on Neil 
Kinnock' (Davies, 1996: 409,411). 
The Labour leadership took defeat in the 1987 election as an opportunity not to re- 
examine its rightward shift but to accelerate it. Traditional Labour icons were 
dropped - the red flag, the word 'comrade' and red membership cards all disappeared 
(Davies, ibid.: 417-8) - while, following the defeat of industrial struggles like the 
miners' strike and the 1986 printers' strike at Wapping, the leadership attempted to 
weaken Labour's links with the trade union movement. Kinnock then announced the 
launch of an extensive consultation process to 'modernise' the party's image and to 
consider appropriate policies for the 1990s. For Martin Smith, 'the Policy Review 
was an attempt to drop some of Labour's unpopular policies like nationalization and 
unilateralism and to appeal to individual consumerism and privatism in order to 
widen Labour's support (1992: 15). At one level, this was simply a continuation of 
previous efforts, following Gaitskell and Wilson in the 1950s and 1960s, to shed the 
party's working-class roots and to reposition itself as a national, social democratic 
party. What was new about Kinnock's revisionism, however, was the extent to 
which Labour was ready to embrace the market, as revealed by its 1988 consultation 
paper Democratic Socialist Ahns and Values. This stated that, apart from a few areas 
like health care, education and social services, 'the operation of the market, where 
properly regulated, is a generally satisfactory means of detennining provision and 
consumption (Labour Party, 198 8: 10), an argument the Conservatives could scarcely 
have disagreed with. The key difference was that Labour championed the idea of a 
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publicly regulated 'social market' as distinct to the Tories' idea of an unregulated 
free market. 
Although the mass movement against the pol! tax in 1990 and the subsequent 
resignation of Thatcher herself might have suggested a growing dissatisfaction with 
Tory policies, Kinnock was determined to proceed with Labour's courtship of the 
market. By 1992, any remaining calls for public ownership had been replaced by 
talk of 'public control' (Shaw, 1994: 88) and the need to engage with debates around 
'wealth creation' rather than traditional concerns about income redistribution. 
Labour confidently entered the 1992 election, therefore, as a very different party than 
the one that had lost power in 1979. It had moved away from its old appeals to 
nationalisation and high taxation, brushed up its image, reduced the influence of the 
left and the unions, and recruited the services of some of the most talented 
communications specialists in the country. 
Nevertheless, it lost the election. The party leadership blamed the defeat in 1992 on 
the impact of the anti-Labour press (see p. 224) and a Tory campaign which had 
successfully managed to portray Labour as a high-spending party. Further internal 
reform and ideological revision, it appeared, was necessary. Left-wing Labour 
supporters, on the other hand, argued that concessions to the market had undermined 
the ability of the party to offer a distinctive alternative to the government. The 
leadership, claimed two activists, 'threw away' the election and its 'strategy of 
appeasing the establishment, capping working-class aspirations and taming the 
membership left Labour vulnerable to the Tories on polling day' (Heffernan and 
Marqusee, 1992: 323). Had the leadership gone too far or not far enough in pulling 
Labour to the right? It is our belief that the development of Labour's television 
policy throughout the 1980s was caught up in this tension between those determined 
to embrace 'social market' principles and those committed to defending public 
ownership -a battle overwhelmingly resolved in favour of the 'new revisionists'. 
1979-1983: The fourth channel, the study group and new technology 
The most pressing television-related issue for the incoming Tory government in 1979 
was the question of the fourth channel. The Labour govenunent, acting on the 
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recommendations of the 1977 Annan Report, had thrown its weight behind proposals 
for an Open Broadcasting Authority to oversee a channel, funded by advertising, 
grants and sponsorship, that aimed to provide experimentation in broadcasting and to 
cater to minority audiences. In opposition, William Whitelaw, the Tory shadow 
home secretary, had backed the remit of the channel but disagreed with the strategy 
of a new television corporation, instead arguing that the ser-vice should be controlled 
by the IBA, the corm-nercial television regulator. As home secretary, he fleshed out 
his vision in a speech in September 1979 at the Royal Television Society convention 
in Cambridge. Far from envisaging a mainstream commercial service, Whitelaw 
repeated his desire for a distinctive channel with 'programmes appealing to and, we 
hope, stimulating tastes and interests not adequately provided for on the existing 
channels' (Whitelaw, 1979: 25). ITV companies would fund the channel by selling 
advertising in their regions, thus removing any threat of commercial rivalry between 
ITV and the new channel. He made it clear that he saw a significant role for a new 
generation of independent producers as progranune suppliers to the channel but 
retreated on the principle of a separate Welsh-language service. 
Although Whitelaw had decisively rejected Labour's official position, he appeared to 
have stuck fairly closely to the spirit of the OBA. Indeed, Labour supporters were at 
the heart of the Channel Four Group that quickly sprung up to hold the home 
secretary to his word and to lobby against any idea of an ITV2. The group placed an 
advertisement in the Guardian in October 1979 to press its case that the channel 
should look to the independent sector for the bulk of its programmes. The ad, 
however, was far from hostile to Whitelaw: 
We, the undersigned, wholeheartedly endorse the spirit of your address. 
It remains for the Independent Broadcasting Authority to whom 
responsibility has been given to follow through the Government's 
challenge which will demand a radically different approach to 
broadcasting in this country ... The Fourth Television Channel must 
accord with the Government's stated view that it should "extend and 
enhance" the range and quality of British television (Channel Four 
Group, 1979). 
Four Labour MPs were signatories to this statement, including one former 
broadcasting minister (Tony Benn), one former broadcasting spokesperson (John 
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Grant) and one former member of the Annan Committee (Philip Whitehead). The 
advertisement united left-wing academics, broadcasters, trade unionists and 
filmmakers who had campaigned throughout the 1970s for increased diversity in 
broadcasting with independent producers and facilities companies who were simply 
eager to increase their production opportunities. 38 The pressure paid off as proposals 
drawn up by both the IBA and the government in its broadcasting bill placed a heavy 
emphasis on the need for independent production and programme innovation on the 
new channel. 
Even Merlyn Rees, speaking from the Labour frontbench in parliament, found it hard 
to firmly reject the government's plans, promising that 'we shall nudge the 
Government to live up to the remarks of the Home Secretary at Cambridge' (HoC 
Debates, 18 February 1980: col. 65). The backbencher Shirley Surnmerskill was far 
more critical, describing the legislation as a 'compromising hybrid Bill', which will 
be 'schizophrenically torn between the desire to produce high-quality original 
programmes and the need to attract advertising revenue with mass audiences' (ibid.: 
col. 149). She was, however, rather disingenuous when she claimed that '[w]e on 
the Labour Benches are totally opposed to the Government's proposals for the new 
channel' (ibid.: col. 148) and simply wrong in arguing that many young writers, 
producers and directors 'have been strong in lobbying against the proposal in the Bill 
for a fourth television channel' (ibid.: col. 153). 
Just as it had been left-wing arguments that had dominated the debate in the 1970s 
for a new service to challenge the duopoly, it was Labour supporters who were most 
clearly identified with the initiative for a fourth channel in 1980. Appointments to 
the channel over the next year confirmed this. Edmund Dell, a former Labour 
cabinet minister, was selected as chairman of the Channel Four board with Richard 
Attenborough, another Labour supporter, as his deputy. The appointment of yet 
another Labour Party member, Jeremy Isaacs, as the channel's chief executive in 
September 1980 further undermined the ability of the party to confidently resist 
38 Apart from the MPs, signatories included Stuart Hall, Anthony Smith, Richard Hoggart, Stuart 
Hood. Denis Macshane (a future Labour MP) and Bruce Page as well as The Robert Stigwood Group 
Ltd., the Filmfair Group of Companies, David Graham (associated with the Institute of Economic 
Affairs), Molinare Ltd (facilities company) and Picture Palace Productions. 
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Whitelaw's Plans. Indeed the only really effective opposition was posed not by 
Labour but by the Welsh nationalist Plaid Cymru party whose leader promised to fast 
until the government backed down on its refusal to allow a Welsh-language channel. 
Goodwin (1998: 26) argues that the issue 'gqnerated perhaps the only genuinely 
mass campaign on a television issue during the Thatcher and Major governments, 
that went beyond the ranks of the broadcasting industry and the political elite'. 
So on the first key issue of the decade involving television, there was more 
consensus than conflict between the two main parties. The left was happy that a 
commitment to diversity and innovation had been embedded in the remit of the new 
service while the government was assured that the new channel would not upset the 
balance of the broadcasting status quo. The Conservatives also had another reason 
for welcoming the new channel that connected to their wider neo-liberal political 
programme. According to Stephen Lambert (1982: 89), '[t]he enterpreneurial. 
aspects of independent production were repeatedly emphasised to the Conservative 
Party during 1979'. He goes on to argue that 
It was put to the Conservatives that a fourth channel supplied largely by 
independent producers would diversity television production in Britain 
and perhaps, at the same time, break the union's grip on the industry and 
alleviate the existing hidebound industrial relations. It was a persuasive 
line of argument to certain elements in the Conservative Party, and helps 
explain the support that the independent producers received from free 
marketeers such as Keith Joseph's Conservative policy group (ibid. ). 
While Goodwin (1998: 34) is probably right to insist that it was the left's argument 
for alternative voices that provided the key rationale for the creation of Channel 
Four, it is nevertheless surprising that Labour failed to draw attention to this free 
market agenda at the time. Indeed, when pressed by the Channel Four Group, even 
ACTT technicians at their 1979 conference welcomed 'the creation of a new 
organisation under the IBA, which would operate the fourth channel and would draw 
the majority of its programmes from a variety of British independent production 
sources other than the existing ITCA [ITV] companies' (ACTT, 1979: 12). Many 
Labour supporters and media workers, therefore, celebrated the creative potential of 
the independent producers while the joint activity between left-wing activists and 
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commercially-orientated television entrepreneurs around the Channel Four Group 
created a precedent that was to lead to problems later in the decade. James Curran 
recalls that 
the right saw it [independent production] as a way of breaking the trade 
unions and as a way of incubating business entrepreneurship. The left 
saw it as a way of introducing excluded voices so we kind of came 
together and held hands under the table in supporting this initiative 
which, for good or bad, made an enormous difference to public service 
broadcasting (Curran, 1999). 
The left and the labour movement were, however, interested in much more than the 
fate of the fourth channel at the turn of the decade. By 1980, the Glasgow University 
Media Group (GUMG) had produced two books highlighting the systematic anti- 
trade union bias in BBC and ITV news (GUMG, 1976,1980). The TUC's media 
working group, set up in 1977 under the influence of earlier GUMG research, 
published a discussion document on the media in September 1980. Behind the 
Headlines noted the growing monopolisation of the media industries and the regular 
editorial distortion against trade unionists and posed a general question about 
balance. 'We are not just asking whether the trade union Movement is getting a fair 
deal from the press, but whether the media as a whole are "doing the job they are 
paid to do... (TUC, 1980: 4). In 1981, Tony Benn penned an extensive critique of the 
fundamentally anti-democratic nature of British press and broadcasting which 
condemned the ideological conformity of what he called the 'consensus media' and 
their unremitting hostility to groups and ideas which challenged the 'centre' (Benn, 
1981: 102-120). During the debates around TPA TM in the early 1970s Benn had 
supported proposals for workers' participation in and alternative structures for the 
media. A decade on, he now argued more defensively that 'our task is to try to re- 
establish the right of dissent' in the light of contemporary media which played a 
similar role to that of the medieval church (ibid.: I 10). 
It was in this atmosphere that, in May 1980, the Labour Party NEC decided to 
convene a second study group on the media with the aim of publishing a discussion 
document. This was one of the many sub-committees launched at that time by the 
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left-dominated NEC as part of the process of internal democratisation and wider 
participation in policy formation. Given the publication of the Annan Report and the 
Royal Commission on the Press together with technological developments around 
cable and satellite, an update of the policy pýoposed in the first study group's 
document, The People and the Media, was now necessary. The new study group's 
terms of reference were: 
To propose ways of achieving a more balanced presentation of news and 
opinion in the media by improving opportunities to publish and broadcast 
a diversity of views; to consider the implications of new technology and 
the development of new services such as local radio and the fourth 
channel; and to examine alternative forms of ownership, organisation and 
finance of the press and broadcasting services, which would guarantee 
freedom from both government and commercial ownership (Labour 
Party, 1980a: 1). 
In ten-ns of television in particular, the group was to examine the structure of the 
BBC, the licence fee, the fourth channel, industrial democracy, new technology and a 
complaints procedure. Omitted from the NEC's list, however, was any mention of 
restructuring ITV or of considering the role of advertising as a source of broadcasting 
finance, although these were confronted in subsequent discussions. 
The study group was chaired by NEC member Frank Allaun and included a number 
of left-wing Labour MPs, like Tony Benn, Eric Heffer, Bob Cryer and Michael 
Meacher, as well as academics like Nicholas Garnham and James Curran who had 
served on the first group and who were deeply critical of the existing duopoly. 
There was a tendency within the Labour Party at that time of people who 
came out of the 60s and remembered the BBC as rationing pop music and 
having an enormous store of resentment against that tradition of public 
service broadcasting. The second thing was that they remembered the 
way in which broadcasting had joined with the press in the attacks on 
trade unions. So we were terribly hostile to the institution of public 
service broadcasting while being very strongly in favour of public 
broadcasting. That was the central dilemna at the heart of the period 
(Curran, 1999). 
They were joined on the group by others, including Austin Mitchell MP and a layer 
of trade union officials (for example Alan Sapper from the ACTT, Ted O'Brien from 
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print union NATSOPA and Paddy Leach from the ABS) who were more sympathetic 
to or had vested interests in the present organisation of television. 
As in the 1970s, the main emphasis of the 1980s study group concerned press 
reform. Frank Allaim recalls that 'the most important matter we discussed and 
agreed on was the diversification of the press' (Allaun, 1999) and proposals for an 
Open Press Authority that would award newspaper franchises (see Allaun, 1988: 87- 
89). There were, however, a number of noticeable differences between the two study 
groups. Firstly, while the 1970s study group had been encouraged to examine 'the 
alternatives across the board' (see p. 133), the terms of reference eight years later 
were more narrowly focused on achieving 'balance' and examining largely 
predetermined options for reform. Next, whereas the first study group had met 
during a time of heightened class struggle and had been deeply influenced by militant 
and syndicalist ideas, the 80s group coincided with a decline of workers' confidence 
and the rise of a left whose power lay largely inside the Labour Party and the trade 
union leadership. Thirdly, while the first group met only ten times in two years, the 
confidence of the left allowed it to produce a coherent, if unpopular, document at the 
end of its deliberations, with an impressive range of signatories across the Labour 
movement. Such was the atmosphere of experimentation that MPs and others were 
willing to put their names to TPA TM, if only to stimulate an open discussion about 
the media. The 80s group, on the other hand, met more than twenty times over three 
years and never produced a public document in its own name. This was partly 
because an election intervened before discussions were finished but also due to the 
irreconcilable internal disagreements about how to reform broadcasting that emerged 
in the study group. 
The group did agree on some issues, for example on the need to develop some sort of 
mechanism to achieve balanced coverage of the labour movement. One of the first 
decisions of the study group was to initiate a monitoring exercise of specific radio 
and television programmes and 'to report any bias, unfair reporting or choice of 
sub ect which might justify a complaint' (Labour Party, 1980b: 2). By the ninth 
meeting in May 198 1, the group agreed to support a legal right of reply across press 
and broadcasting as a means of correcting biased reporting against the labour 
movement. This right to reply was to be enforced by legal tribunals although 'the 
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composition of the tribunals - whether those with expertise in the media should be 
included or specifically excluded and whether they should follow the Industrial 
Tribunal model - should be finalised later' (Labour Party, 1981 a: 2). The idea that 
systematic bias against the left could be corrected through statutory remedies was 
itself a step away from the proposals in TPA TM to tackle the causes of bias through a 
radical restructuring of the press industry itself (Labour Party, 1974c: 16-33). The 
policy was, however, warmly welcomed by the NEC which published a statement on 
the right to reply in March 1982 (Labour Party, 1982c). There was also general 
agreement in the group on the need for a communications ministry, despite some 
reservations about its Stalinist connotations. 'Most members felt, however, that a 
centralised ministry which would coordinate the separate responsibilities of the 
Home Office and the Department of Trade was badly needed if the public interest 
was to be adequately defended' (Labour Party, 1981b: 2). 
While the study group was able to coalesce around constitutional and legal reform of 
the media, there was a polarisation around issues concerning the financing and 
structures of television. Radical ideas which took their cue from The People and the 
Media attracted some of the strongest opposition. Nicholas Garnham's proposal for 
a National Communications Authority and a National Communications Commission 
supplemented by regional commissions which would supersede existing regulatory 
arrangements 39 , were sharply criticised for involving 
'too great a concentration of 
power' (Labour Party, 198 1 d: 1). Similar proposals in further papers by Garnham, 
Greg Lanning and Alan Horrox were also opposed for being 'too centralist and 
bureaucratic and would result in too great a concentration of powers. It was utopian 
to believe that they would achieve a more pluralist broadcasting structure' (Labour 
Party, 1982a: 1). Demands for a reduction in advertising were described 'as being 
out of touch with the realities of the broadcasting industry since a significant cut in 
advertising would necessitate large sums from the Treasury. ' Furthermore, there was 
'disagreement about whether the introduction of advertising had led to a drop in 
39 The NCA would be responsible for the collection and distribution of income from a variety of 
sources, including advertising and government grants while the NCC would co-ordinate media policy 
and act as a complaints body. Membership of the various bodies would be on the basis of direct 
elections. Allaun praises the plan as the most 'coherent' put forward to the study group but argues 
that they were 'so far-reaching that it is not surprising that not only did they attract opposition within 
the study group, but they also ran out of time' (Allaun, 1988: 90). 
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standards' (Labour Party, 198 1 c: 1) and a rejection of the left's preferred option of 
the centralised collection of advertising. 
A key critic of these proposals was Paddy Leqch of the BBC staff union, the ABS, 
, %vho 'did not wish to see the break-up of the BBC/IBA set up or the abolition of the 
licence fee which he felt insulated broadcasting from Government interference' 
(Labour Party, 1981d: 2). Similarly, Labour MPs Philip Whitehead and Austin 
Mitchell opted for a strategy of decentralisation within the existing broadcasting 
structure and the creation of separate regulatory bodies for national and local radio, 
ITV, BBC and cable. JR]ather than establish a new central body, ' argued 
Whitehead, 'it would be better to develop the best elements of the present system. 
This would avoid opposition from the trade unions and the public' (Labour Party, 
1982b: 1). 
On some issues there was barely any discussion. The fourth channel was barely 
mentioned, presumably because there was little to complain about. The new 
technologies of cable and satellite were broached only towards the end of the group's 
life (as we shall discuss later) and there was only a brief attempt to debate industrial 
democracy in the television industries. Legalistic and constitutional remedies 
therefore co-existed in the study group with far more radical suggestions for 
democratising the media. Trade union sectionalism and political pragmatism blunted 
the edge of attempts to launch a fundamental restructuring of the current 
broadcasting structures. This impasse certainly undermined the possibility of 
publishing the discussions in any coherent form and indeed its proposals, as Allaun 
regretfully notes (198 8: 8 9), were never agreed by the NEC. 
Nevertheless, the group was able to contribute to Labour's Programme 1982, the 
party's 280-page blueprint of its policies, based on the work of the dozens of NEC 
sub-committees and study groups. The four-page section on the media was produced 
partly from existing policy statements, conference resolutions and advice from the 
media study group and contained the party's most substantial and left-wing official 
programme of media reform to date. The policy was premised on Benn's notion that 
the media were failing to live up to their democratic role and borrowed phrases 
directly from The People and the Media. It opens by claiming that 'although we are 
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led to believe that we live in a free and open society, our [media] system is, in fact, 
remarkably closed' (Labour Party, 1982d: 211) and goes on to lament the absence of 
impartiality as 'the process of selection makes objectivity impossible (ibid.: 213). 
The section is littered with radical critiques I of 
the existing broadcasting system: 
I 
We believe that separate radio and television corporations should replace 
the present very centralised structure of the BBC and Independent 
Broadcasting Authority ... we also suggest that programme making itself 
should be carried out by a wide variety of dispersed programme 
units ... We believe that it [advertising] should not be used for private 
profit, as now, but recycled within the system ... We believe broadcasting 
needs a much more secure and diverse financial basis. It should be 
funded by a long-term grant awarded by parliament (ibid.: 213-4). 
There is, however, an important difference between the party's beliefs and 
suggestions and its actual policies. Apart from a firm commitment to create an arts 
ministry and to phase out the licence fee in favour of an exchequer grant, the 
document contained few concrete promises about television and many vague hints 
about the future: legislation requiring broadcasting to honour diversity, an alteration 
of broadcasting's 'monolithic structures', increased public access to programme 
making, training programmes to challenge sexism and racism and a 'genuinely 
independent' complaints procedure (ibid.: 213). These were, by now, relatively 
established themes of left thought concerning broadcasting but the section lacked any 
firm discussion as to how any of the above was to be achieved. For example, the 
detailed proposals contained in TPA TM for a Communications Council and a Public 
Broadcasting Commission had disappeared as had any discussion as to the nature of 
the mechanism of recycling advertising revenue within the broadcasting system. 
However loosely-worded they may have been, the proposals contained in Labour's 
Prograinine 1982 nevertheless bore the imprint of the left and demonstrated its 
continuing suspicion of the duopoly and its commitment to tackle British television's 
lack of impartiality. The few sentences that made it into Labour's election manifesto 
the following year were more obscure and contained 'strong generalities, but few 
specific plans' (Allaun, 1988: 90). Gone were the promises to abolish the licence fee 
or to introduce an arts ministry while references to broadcasting's 'monolithic 
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structures' had been transformed into a commitment to make broadcasting 'more 
accountable and representative' and to 'promote a more wide-ranging and genuine 
pluralism in the media' (quoted in Craig, 1990: 38 1). By the time the NEC met in 
November of that year to reconsider the futuKe of the party's policy formation, the 
media study group was described as non-essential and wound down. This time, 
unlike in 1974, there were no formal proposals and no published document for the 
leadership to marginalise. 
The short section on cable and satellite in Labour'S Prograinine 1982 reflected the 
lack of attention inside the study group to new communication technologies. The 
document acknowledged the profound impact of the new technologies and made two 
important commitments: that Labour would place a national cable system under the 
control of British Telecom and regulate cable and satellite services in the interests of 
'diversity and pluralism'. Closing the space which the previous Labour 
government's 1978 White Paper had opened up for pay television, the document 
insisted that Labour was opposed to it because 'we believe that all citizens should 
receive an equal public service regardless of wealth and geographical location' (ibid.: 
214). The message seemed to be that while Labour intended to reform the existing 
duoPoly for terrestrial television, it also wanted to bring new cable and satellite 
systems under the umbrella of precisely that duopoly, or at least the principles of that 
duoPoly. 
This brief response was hardly surprising. Both TPATMand the Annan Report had 
sidelined technological issues in the 1970s while Labour was now forced to react 
quickly to the activities of the Tories. From 1980 onwards, the government had 
initiated several reports and inquiries into the possible industrial benefits of satellite 
broadcasting and broadband cable networks and appeared enthusiastic to introduce 
commercial multi-channel television in the short-term. 40 The response of some 
Labour policyrnakers was to cast doubts on the need for expanding broadcasting at 
all: 'There is no need or indeed demand for extra TV services' wrote Nicholas 
Garnbarn (1982: 3 1). As cable and satellite projects required huge investment, how 
could the drain on the public purse be justified, particularly during a recession? 
40 For a full discussion of these developments, see Goodwin (1998: 38-68). 
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However, Garnharn also recognised that 'the chance to see a wide range of 
international programming in addition to our present services seems attractive and to 
resist such developments seems not only Luddite but also parochial and puritanical' 
(ibid.: 30). This combination of opposing oiýtright commercialisation but also 
I 
attempting not to appear hostile to all technological innovation proved to be a regular 
feature of Labour's approach to cable and satellite. 
The different delivery systems raised different issues for Labour policyrnakers. 
While cable could be regulated on a national basis, satellite's supra-riational 
footprints, according to Garnham (ibid.: 32) 'present an altogether more difficult 
problem and a real challenge to the internationalism of the British labour movernent. ' 
Garnham therefore argued for a European solution including a strategy of convincing 
Labour's fraternal parties on the continent to co-operate in the regulation of satellite 
systems in order to create some sort of pan-European public service 'cultural space' 
(ibid.: 30). This was agreed at the media study group and incorporated into the 
proposals in Labow-'s Progrannne 1982. However, there was a clear gap between 
left and right over the issue as when William Whitelaw announced in March 1982 
that the BBC was to be allowed to operate two satellite channels, the thought of a 
British-led satellite initiative with substantial industrial benefits appealed to several 
Labour MPs. Shirley Surnmerskill, replying on behalf of the opposition to the home 
secretary's statement, welcomed the proposals 'because satellite broadcasting will 
allow the BBC further to inform, educate and entertain millions of viewers, and it 
will provide increased job opportunities in the television, aerospace and electronics 
industries' (HoC Debates, 4 March 1982: col. 415). Former prime minister Harold 
Wilson was even more effusive and praised the statement 'as giving British satellite 
technology and programmes a great boost' (ibid.: col. 416) and complained only 
about the exclusion of ITV from the proposals. 
Perhaps because of the sizeable delay before the start of any service together with the 
international dimension to the development, satellite television appeared to be a less 
urgent question and did not occupy the minds of Labour activists to any major extent. 
Cable was a different matter. In 19 8 1, the government had created an information 
technology advisory panel to examine the possibilities of cable and IT while the 
following year it had set up a committee of inquiry, chaired by Lord Hunt, to 
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investigate the prospects for cable broadcasting. Both reports recommended the 
immediate construction of privately-financed broadband cable systems which would 
provide not only economic advantage to British industry but would also help to 
liberalise British broadcasting. Acting on tlýis advice, the government initiated 
legislation and, before this was complete, awarded eleven franchises to the private 
sector at the end of 1983. Cable, therefore, appeared to present a much more short- 
term danger Labour requiring an urgent policy response. 
Stuart Hood described this in the Neiv Socialist as the 'most immediate threat to 
public service broadcasting' (1982: 21) while the ACTT's Alan Sapper warned the 
1983 Labour conference that an unregulated cable system 'would undermine and 
destabilise the whole idea of public service broadcasting in this country' (Sapper, 
1983: 208). According to the Labour MP and broadcaster Austin Mitchell, a Tory 
cable policy would mean 'wall-to-wall orgasm, constant pornography and potential 
trivialisation' (HoC Debates, 2 December 1982: col. 477). The most immediate and 
detailed response, however, came not from the media study group but from the trade 
unions and Labour local authorities. In March 1982 the Hunt Committee invited 
submissions about the future of cable and received responses from a range of unions 
and political parties including the majority of the media unions, the Post Office 
Engineering Union (POEU), the TUC, the Liberal Party and the Scottish National 
Party. Despite an individual document from Garnham, there was no official 
submission from the Labour Party because the study group had not been able to 
produce one. 
The submission from the POEU, the Labour-affiliated union that organised British 
Telecom (BT) engineers, welcomed the possibilities of cable but criticised the 
government's reliance on the private sector. This approach, it argued, 'would spread 
the provision of cable systems on a fitful and partial basis and the end result could be 
an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of broadcasting and telecommunications 
networks' (POEU, 1982). The POEU's preferred option was to entrust the entire 
system to BT with its experience of running a national network and its knowledge of 
the most advanced fibre optic cable systems. Furthermore, programme provision 
should be kept wholly separate from the operation of the cable system itself. The 
TUC's evidence argued along the same lines and emphasised the need for proper 
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regulation of broadcasting content. Far from loosening regulation, there ought to be 
can extension to cable systems of the obligations placed on other channels 
concerning content, quality, balance, range of subject matter, taste, decency and 
suitability for children' (TUC, 1982: 2). 
The unions' arguments were fed into both the media study group and the NEC's 
science and technology study group and certainly influenced the leadership's attitude 
towards cable. In the Commons debate on the Hunt Report, the shadow home 
secretary Roy Hattersley supported the idea of a properly regulated national cable 
system run by British Telecom. The problem was not the technology, he argued, but 
the policy: 
No one on the Opposition Benches has the slightest wish to stand in the 
path of history. The error of the Luddites was that they wished to smash 
the new machinery. We want to accept and welcome the existence of the 
new technology, but to make sure that it works on behalf of the 
community as a whole and not simply in the interests of a narrow group 
of speculators (HoC Debates, 2 December 1982: col. 426). 
The community referred to was most definitely the Bi-itish community. Hattersley's 
attack was predicated not on hostility to private capital in general but to foreign 
capital in particular: it would beforeign technology that would undercut the prices of 
the British cable industry andforeign companies which would undermine the quality 
of British television. A substantial quota of British programmes was needed because 
if we 'start off with cheap foreign rubbish we shall end up with it' (HoC Debates, 30 
June 1983: col. 735). But apart from a demand for British Telecom and British 
content, Hattersley failed to elaborate on precisely how Labour would finance and 
operate a national cable network. The media study group continued to grapple with 
the issue of cable but, by its last meeting in 1983, could only agree that 'the 
introduction of cable systems is a matter of great importance. The party should, 
therefore, be well prepared to respond to any proposals in the forthcoming white 
paper' (Labour Party, 1983: 3). The issue was then passed onto the NEC's Home 
Policy Committee for further consideration. 
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A more detailed vision of the democratic use of cable technology emerged out of 
Labour-controlled local authorities. Cable's potential to wire up local communities 
and to offer interactive services complemented the decentralising and participatory 
models of municipal socialism. Several of the larger authorities like London, 
Sheffield and Manchester were attracted by the proposition of a democratically 
controlled local communications infrastructure. One report published in November 
1982 by a new left-wing pressure group, the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting 
Freedom, advocated precisely such a strategy. 
Given that the State has abdicated responsibility at a national level, 
Labour-controlled local Authorities could take the initiative in 
formulating an oppositional communications policy, including proposals 
for democratic control at a regional level of the whole range of activities 
within the communications sector (CSE Communications Group, 1982: 
2). 
The report suggested setting up 'industrial consortia' composed of local authorities 
(which had been excluded by government from cable systems) and private 
companies to bid for regional franchises to establish an 'alliance between capital and 
labour' (ibid.: 65) representing the interest of non-commercial needs. 41 One of the 
key objectives of the left, claimed the report, should be to politicise the debate 
around cable and challenge the arguments of the free marketeers. 
The GLC's Economic Policy Group published its report on Cabling in London the 
following month and repeated many of these arguments. It too recognised the 
democratic potential of cable if freed from the restrictions of private sector control, 
rejected the exclusion of local authorities and called for 'other interested parties to 
build a consortium of public sector and private sector interests to bid for a 
Londonwide franchise (GLC, 1982: 77). The report identified the rise of an 
'information economy' (ibid.: 10) which might, if properly developed, provide real 
industrial benefits to Londoners. The best way to change the government's mind 
41 This resembled the basis of the French Socialist government's 1982 Plan Cable, a giant public 
programme designed to wire up millions of French homes and provide them with a series of 
interactive applications. While the state-owned telecommunications operator provided the national 
infrastructure, public-private partnerships were required to operate local franchises. Ultimately a 
combination of economic crisis and internal differences between the public and private sector forced 
the demise of the plan (see Gueherno, 1987: 283). 
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would be to convince it of the uneconomic nature of its proposals and to produce a 
more efficient financial model based on the public/private consortium. This was to 
be achieved through a further public inquiry into cable, the creation of a 
Communications Sub-Committee and a campaign against the private development of 
cable (ibid.: 76-77). 
Others on the left adopted a different strategy. Instead of bidding for a regional 
franchise and spending public money on cable systems, the Sheffield TV Group 
argued that there should be two separate franchises: a commercial channel and a 
community access channel funded by an annual levy on subscribers. Far from 
wasting scarce resources on the infrastructure, local authorities should 'play a 
leading role in establishing independent sound and video workshops' (Sheffield TV 
Group, 1983: v) which would form the core of community access programming. The 
report, prepared for the GLC and Sheffield City Council, even prepared a financial 
strategy outlining the cost of staffing and equipping these independent workshops. 
In the end, little came of the debate. Firstly, central government was not persuaded 
to change its mind on the involvement of local authorities; secondly, the amount of 
money which even the larger authorities could afford would have had little impact on 
constructing and maintaining broadband cable systems; finally, the government's 
own plans for cable were undermined by the failure of the initial broadband 
franchises. In retrospect, Nicholas Garnham, who was brought in by the GLC to help 
it develop a cable policy, identifies an idealistic streak at the heart of the municipal 
socialists' plans. 
The argument was that we could develop local policies for making use of 
the technology. This did come out of the American debate that the 
technology could be either used for increasing commercial domination or 
for local participation. The GLC and one or two metropolitan areas were 
influenced by that thinking and were trying to put up alternative policies 
for cable. First it was a debate about community access ... My line was that most of that stuff about community participation was extremely 
utopian and unrealistic and was being used as a fig leaf for something 
quite different which was in fact the introduction of cable ... The danger 
was that there was a kind of utopian, anarchist, pro-technology strand in 
left thinking - we can set up these things, give a bit of money to local 
cable companies to do all these local things. My line was wouldn't it be 
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better to spend the money somewhere else. Why do you want to spend it 
on cabýle? (Garnharn 1997). 
The problem was that the Labour leadershipappeared to have no intention of 
answering this awkward question nor of opposing the development of cable, for fear 
of being seen as anti-technology and anti-progress. Peter Humphreys' accurate 
assessment of the cable debate is that 'political opposition [to the Conservatives' 
plans] was surprisingly mute and overshadowed by opposition to the specific 
institutional reforms involved in privatisation and deregulation of BT' (Humphreys, 
1986: 167). Despite the contributions made by a range of Labour supporters, the 
official policy was all too often reduced to championing Labour's commitment to BT 
and repeating the threat that unregulated cable would present to public service 
television. 42 By the time that the 1984 Broadcasting Bill was read for the last time in 
parliament, the Labour frontbench had all but abandoned its opposition. Denis 
Howell, responding to the home secretary's introduction, could only retort that 'we 
welcome the Government's principal philosophy which is that we should provide the 
maximum choice for the people of this country' (1984: col. 839). Despite the views 
of the left, the Labour Party had succumbed to the soon-to-be irresistible lobby for 
consumer choice. 
1983-1987: Labour and the Peacock debate 
Labour's heavy defeat in the 1983 election both demoralised the Labour left and 
gave extra confidence to the rising generation of neo-liberal theorists. Free market 
think-tanks like the Adam Smith Institute and the Institute of Economic Affairs 
increasingly captured the attention of Downing Street while their leading lights 
scoured the British landscape for institutions and industries to privatise and 
liberalise. The television industry, it seemed, was a prime candidate. Dominated by 
a duopoly which had little incentive for competition, fiercely protected by a 
cumbersome regulatory regime and infested with trade union closed shops, the think- 
42 Labour's 1983 manifesto followed along precisely these lines. 'The high standards of British public 
service broadcasting are threatened by Tory plans to introduce cable TV on free-market lines ... To 
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tanks gleefully produced a series of reports urging the radical restructuring of British 
broadcasting. 4' Documents like Choice by Cable (1983) and The Omega File: 
Communications (1984) argued that broadcasting needed to be treated like any other 
commodity, rather than being given special status because of its cultural importance. 
The reports called for free-market initiatives including the deregulation of broadcast 
television, the introduction of subscription television, the privatisation of key units of 
broadcasting and the auctioning of ITV franchises. Tom O'Malley concludes that 
the 'general thrust of this view was that broadcasting should be more controlled by 
market forces and that the state should be used to facilitate this' (O'Malley, 1994: 
30). The result, according to Peter Goodwin (1998: 69), was that 'Tory television 
policy radically but unacknowledgely shifted emphasis - away from new channels 
and new means of delivery, and towards an attempt to reform the established 
television system. ' 
Not surprisingly, the BBC was the focus of much of the neo-liberals' strategy, given 
its position as a publicly-funded, non-commercial institution and its reputation 
amongst the right for being obsessively bureaucratic and biased in favour of the left. 
Prime minister Thatcher was particularly open to this view, harbouring a hostility 
towards the Corporation from its coverage of the 1982 Falklands War almost as great 
as Harold Wilson's had. been in the 1960s. Alasdair Milne, the BBC's director 
general, described a meeting where Thatcher 'cheerfully accused us of insanity over 
our reporting of the disembarkation of troops from the QE2 in the Falklands, quoting 
as a parallel what she described as American television losing the Vietnam War 
(1988: 123). When the Corporation asked the government for a substantial increase 
in the licence fee at the end of 1984, it was received less than enthusiastically in 
Downing Street. In March 1985, the home secretary agreed to a partial increase in 
the licence fee but also set up a committee of inquiry, chaired by the free-market 
economist Sir Alan Peacock, to investigate alternatives to the licence fee, particularly 
advertising and subscription. 
avoid wasteful duplication, we will entrust the provision of the national cable system to British 
Telecom (quoted in Craig, 1990: 3 82). 
43 O'Malley (1994: 13-30) provides a thorough analysis of the output of the various think tanks. 
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Labour's reaction took a number of forms. The first was a distinct ambivalence by 
those on the left to jump to the defence of the BBC and an inclination to support 
other types of broadcasting, notably Channel Four and the model of independent 
production. James Curran, latterly the editoý of the Neiv Socialist and a figure 
associated with the Bennite left, recalls that 
The context of where we were at was that Channel Four had been a 
terrific success and Channel Four wasn't meant to be like Channel Four. 
Lord Tebbitt came out and said it was supposed to be about golf and 
yachting and gardening and not about gay and lesbian rights. That was 
how they conceived of it and their project was basically subverted. So 
flush with the new success of Channel Four, we were trying to think that 
the more you open new initiatives, [the better] (Curran, 1999). 
Three academics writing in the Neiv Socialist in the spring of 1983 criticised the 
Labour leadership for its silence in the light of vicious attacks from the 
Conservatives on Channel Four programmes which were 'basing themselves to a 
large extent upon the Left critiques of the media formulated in the 1970s' 
(Schlesinger et al., 1983: 45). Geoff Mulgan and Ken Worpole from the GLC's 
Greater London Enterprise Board went even further, counterposing the creativity of 
the independent sector to the conservatism of the BBC. 
Many of the best and most innovative ideas have come from outside [the 
BBC]: from the illegal pirates, independents unable to survive the 
hierarchies of the BBC, from advertising and radical local groups. In the 
second half of the 1980s it is Channel 4, ostensibly commercial and 
financed by advertising that is doing most to innovate with new forms of 
television and a new understanding of what public service can mean 
(Mulgan and Worpole, 1986a: 60). 
In celebrating the cultural achievements of the new channel, left-wing supporters of 
Channel Four had some unlikely allies. Writing in the Times in May 1985, Curran 
welcomed the Peacock inquiry as 'an opportunity for the left as well as the right to 
help reform British broadcasting', noted the similarities between the policies of both 
left and right for the BBC and supported the idea of an independent production quota 
'which would breathe new life and diversity into the BBC' (Curran, 1985). While 
distancing himself from free-market proposals to privatise the Corporation, Curran 
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declared that he was not hostile to the introduction of limited advertising on the BBC 
if it did nothing to undermine the advertising revenue of Channel Four and ITV. 
Noting later that 'very strange bedfellows got into bed over independent production', 
Curran explains that 
We'd been shat upon. We were the people who were the hard left, we 
were the people who were the Bennite bogeys, we were the people who 
were denied reasonable access ... We were deeply indignant at what we 
saw as the centrist arrogance of public service broadcasting and there 
were other people who were angry as well. It was as if the left and right 
were trying to attack the centre (Curran, 1999). 
Curran's support for the independent sector was echoed by the 25% Campaign, a 
small group of producers lobbying the government for a fixed quota of 
independently-produced programmes. The group included David Graham, a friend 
of Peacock and a member of the free-market Institute of Economic Affairs, who 
arranged one meeting of the campaign in the Institute of Directors (Barnett and 
Curry, 1994: 59). By mid-1986, the steering committee of the campaign included 
Philip Whitehead, until recently a Labour MP, and was urgently lobbying ministers 
for a quota (ibid.: 62-3). By November 1986, it had succeeded when, following the 
recommendation of the Peacock Committee (see p. 202), the government eventually 
conceded a quota of 25% of independently-produced material for all channels. 
According to Barnett and Curry (ibid.: 65), '[t]he Thatcherites had won an 
opportunistic victory with tha help of allies among the growing band of independent 
producers who conveniently gave the attack cultural credibility. ' 
Another Channel Four supporter was Joe Ashton, Labour MP and Daily Star 
columnist, who declared to his readers that 'I think Channel 4 is great. I'm a 
compulsive viewer'. Anticipating some of the economic arguments of the free- 
market thinkers, although perhaps in a slightly more accessible manner, Ashton 
argued that 
Over the past 10 years, both BBC I and ITV have gradually turned 
television channels into supennarkets. Everything has been packaged 
into bland, soggy, comflakes designed to offend nobody ... But because 
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Channel 4 is a small delicatessen, it doesn't mean its goods are rubbish 
(Ashton, 1983). 
Determined to demonstrate his support for commercial television, Ashton introduced 
a private members bill into the Commons in january 1985 arguing for the BBC to be 
allowed to take advertising. The bill coincided with the second of three high-profile 
editorials in the Tinies attacking the BBC's request for more money and demanding 
that the BBC must eventually take advertising (Goodwin, 1998: 74-75). Ashton 
argued that the licence fee was both an unacceptable poll tax, the official party line 
from 1982, but also asserted that if left-wing newspapers took advertising, then why 
shouldn't broadcasting? (Ashton, 1985) Although this was not a new position (Hugh 
Jenkins, the chair of Labour's communications group in the 1960s, had argued along 
the same lines in 1966), the idea of financing broadcasting in a similar way to the 
press was precisely one embraced by the Thatcherites in the mid- I 980s. Despitethe 
defeat of Ashton's bill (by only 159 to 118), the whole debate played into the hands 
of Tory refon-ners far more than it helped those determined to democratise 
broadcasting. 
The second influence on Labour's approach to the television debate was that of the 
'cultural industries' approach, pioneered by the Greater London Enterprise Board of 
the GLC. Inspired by the economic success of the Italian region of Corm-nunist- 
controlled Emilio Romagna, based around networks of small co-operatives linking 
new technologies to older craft skills, GLEB developed its own Cultural Industries 
Unit. This was partly a reflection of the increasing grip of 'cultural politics' 
advocated in the pages of Marxisni Today, but also a strategy to deal with the de- 
industrialisation of major metropolitan areas, particularly like London. According to 
Nicholas Garnham, 
The argument I put forward was that a major employer in London are 
media industries, they are growth industries. It's much better to focus on 
how you can maximise conditions of work employment there rather than 
trying to bring shipbuilding back or docks or empowering people through 
video cameras (Garnham, 1997). 
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GLEB's Mulgan and Worpole wrote that '[a]t least half a million people are 
employed in some form of cultural production, distribution or infrastructure, and it is 
one of the few growth sectors of the economy (I 986a: 14). The challenge was to 
devise strategies to direct investment towards. socially relevant areas and to increase 
employment opportunities for the most disadvantaged groups in the hope that this 
would also allow previously marginalised voices to emerge. GLEB therefore 
supported a number of independent film and video production and distribution 
companies to take advantage of the space opened up by Channel Four. Similarly, a 
levy from the ITV companies allowed the ACTT union to collaborate with Channel 
Four to franchise eight film workshops to produce material for the channel. A 
further levy from the film industry supported a substantial training programme for 
women and ethnic minorities in film production. 
The cultural industries approach depended on working with the market to promote 
both diversity andjobs. Industry levies, grants, cross-subsidies andjoint ventures 
were the preferred mechanisms of supporting innovative new projects. 'The market, ' 
according to Mulgan and Worpole, 'has never been separate from the state ... but 
there can be little doubt that it has provided many people with far more pleasures and 
entertainments than official, state-sponsored culture' (1986b: 22). Such a statement 
would have been a welcome tonic for a Labour leadership engaged in undermining 
the party's opposition to market forces. While the radical politics of some of the 
cultural industries' ventures may have worried Labour frontbenchers, the principle of 
a public/private partnership and of the creativity of small co-ops was one that Neil 
Kinnock shared. 
In the end, the cultural industries strategy was unable to buck either the market or the 
government. Before its abolition by the Conservatives, the GLC had managed to 
allocate a total ofjust under El million to London's film and video sector over four 
years. Independent film and video workshops, which the GLC had been particularly 
keen to support, were given at niost E50,000 each over that period (GLC, 1986: 88). 
Channel Four's budget for the ACTT-franchised workshops was cut from E875,000 
in its first year to E500,000 in the following year. 'Things haven't quite worked out 
the way they might have' admitted Alan Fountain, the channel's commissioning 
editor for independent cinema and community programmes (quoted in Comely, 
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1983: 34). By 1986, one independent producer was complaining that innovative 
programmes were being 'stifled' because of competition and cuts in the sector. 
Workshops, she argued, were being 'pressured, by the weight of the economic 
factors, into working as production houses, churning out as much material as fast as I 
possible to demonstrate their worth to funding bodies' (Butter, 1996: 25). 
What both the independent production and cultural industries approached shared was 
a hostility to large-scale state intervention into broadcasting and the paternalism of 
the BBC. Tom O'Malley of the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom 
believes that this 'anti-statist position' undermined the effectiveness of the left in 
opposing Tory attacks on public service broadcasting. 
In the 1980s, people who were around the Labour Party and sometimes in 
it had a very critical attitude towards the BBC and ITV at a time when, 
they should not have known better, but had they stopped and thought a 
little harder about the general political context in which policy was 
developing after 198 1, would have been more hesitant about developing 
an anti-statist position ... A lot of people in and around the Labour Party 
were influenced by two sorts of shifts. One is the general shift to the 
right in political elites; secondly, by the influence of Marxism 
Today ... which by the mid to late 80s had accommodated itself very 
rapidly with the priorities of new conservatism (O'Malley, 1999). 
While there was a need for a critique of the established broadcasters and support for 
more grass-roots forms of communications, activists could not afford to ignore the 
changing political context of the mid-1980s where neo-liberal ideas were dominant. 
In contrast to the anti-statist position, others in the labour movement simply urged 
defence of the status quo. Gerald Kaufman, the shadow home secretary, contrasted 
the shoddy state of Britain's Physical infrastructure with the excellent output of its 
broadcasting. 'The race for commercials, and for ratings to attract the commercials, 
would drive down the level of BBC programmes' which, he argued, were 'still 
envied throughout the world' (Kaufman, 1985). Alan Sapper, general secretary of 
the ACTT, warned of the imminent 'breakdown of Public Service Broadcasting. 
Thatcher is a privateer, hell-bent on deregulation and she hates broadcasters. ' 
Independent producers, he argued, were 'the Trojan Horse of a deregulating 
government' (quoted in Blakstad, 1985: 18) that was determined to break union 
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organisation and destroy public service principles. Responding to Curran's Thnes 
article in which he had posed the possibility of limited advertising on the BBC, 
Sapper supported the present arrangements for regulating the BBC and ITV stating 
that '[i]t is essentially important for us to retain what we have with as little 
interference as possible' (Sapper, 1985). The ACTT's evidence to the Peacock 
Committee backed up this line of thinking and defended the present arrangements of 
not competing for the same source of revenue as allowing 'the UK to develop a 
resource rich-broadcasting system producing wide ranging and high quality 
programming' (quoted in Television Today, 1985). Similarly, the TUC's submission 
opposed any talk of sponsorship, subscription or advertising for the BBC and indeed 
argued that the government 'should be examining ways of entrenching the licence 
fee as a consistent and equitable source of finance' (quoted in Financial Thnes, 
1985). 
Labour's official evidence to the Peacock Committee was prepared by Norman 
Buchan, the party's shadow arts minister. Buchan was deeply committed to raising 
the profile of cultural politics and indeed wrote the introduction to Saturday Night or 
Sunday Morning, the book on cultural policy written by GLEB's Mulgan and 
Worpole (1986a). Now, he had to accommodate those concerns about democratising 
the media with the powerful lobby in the party and the broadcasting unions to 
preserve the status quo. The submission (Labour Party, 1985), prepared in the 
summer of 1985, ran to 22 typewritten pages and reflected the influence of both sets 
of ideas. 
The submission opens with qualified support for the duopoly but makes it clear that 
'the BBC has never been above reproach. It has often been paternalistic in its 
outlook and practices, and dominated by a small Oxbridge educated elite based in 
London' (ibid.: 3). Further on it states that 'the BBC has no monopoly on quality or 
diversity. Indeed the work of Channel 4 over the last 3 years has shown up just how 
unadventurous the BBC had become in its attitudes to many issues, often adopting an 
unjustifiably patronising and protective attitude to its public' (ibid.: 18). 
Government initiatives in broadcasting, however, are not about any desire to 
challenge elitism as much as the wish 'to open up broadcasting as a source of profit 
for whoever is the highest bidder' (ibid.: 3). Nodding in the direction of the media 
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unions, the document claims that such an objective is likely to lead to substantial 
redundancies in the major broadcasting organisations. The key, therefore, is to look 
at the television industry holistically: 
British broadcasting operates very much as a system. Commitments to 
quality and diversity exist as much in ITV and Channel 4 as they do in 
the BBC. The whole economy of broadcasting is beginning to 
experience what is likely to prove a prolonged period of rapid change 
driven by new technologies of diffusion such as cable, the VCR and 
satellite, and by powerful commercial forces which see broadcasting as a 
relatively untapped area of profit (ibid.: 4). 
Even by examining only one area of broadcasting, that of BBC finance, government 
plans will still damage the whole ecology of the television system 
Moving on to an examination of the licence fee, the submission both supports the 
principles of preserving the independence of the BBC from government interference 
and of treating broadcasting as a public good, but criticises it for increasingly failing 
to do so in practice. The key argument against the licence fee, however, is that it is a 
'highly regressive form of taxation ... [dating] from an age when television was 
considered a luxury service' (ibid.: 6). The document then proposes to 'restructure', 
though not to abolish, the licence fee either by putting a levy on multi-set households 
and passing on the savings to the poor, or through a government grant. It recognises 
that the latter idea might compromise the independence of the BBC but notes that 
'the idea that the BBC is independent involves more than a little mythology' (ibid.: 
7) given the range of powers that the state already has in influencing the Corporation. 
Distance from government might be maintained through a system of rolling finance, 
over three or five year periods, overseen by an independent review body (ibid.: 8). 
The next, longer, section deals with the impact of advertising and quotes research 
demonstrating that advertising is a more expensive way of financing television than 
the licence fee. The report then works through the negative effects on other media 
sectors of the BBC taking advertising. Indeed the report suggests that 'it would be a 
salutary exercise for your committee and those submitting evidence to pose the 
question the other round and to question whether advertising does not already play 
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too large a role in our society' (ibid.: 16-17). In a particularly teasing paragraph, the 
submission raises the point that 
if it is legitimate to question the licence fee should it not be equally 
legitimate to question the existhig role of advertising as a means of 
financing broadcasting. For example, ifadvertising 1vas replaced by an 
expanded licencefee (perhaps moderated by direct taxation) there would 
be a wide range of immediate benefits ... Financing television through 
advertising ... shifts the primary economic relationship to that 
between 
advertisers and sellers of media space. Instead of providing programmes 
for viewers, the main function of broadcasters becomes the sale of an 
audience to advertisers. Replacing advertising by a more direct forin of 
finance would open the way for new mechanisms of accountability and 
responsiveness (ibid.: 17 - emphasis added). 
The absence of any other initiatives at the time to abolish television advertising 
suggests that this was a rather rhetorical proposal but it nevertheless indicates 
Buchan's desire to engage with more radical thinking on broadcasting. The 
suggestion itself has far more in common with the tone of 1970s discussions around 
TPATMthan with the more cautious debates in Allaun's study group. Branching out 
from the narrow economic remit of the inquiry, the submission lists a number of key 
issues to be tackled if the BBC is to maintain its public service role. There needs to 
be increased access for 'unrepresented minorities to make programmes', attention to 
equal opportunities, far more accountability among the board of governors, the 
introduction of 'certain basic principles of industrial democracy' and the enshrining 
of universal access to BBC services in the charter (ibid.: 21-22). In conclusion, the 
report makes one promise, repeatedly publicised by the press at the time: 'should 
advertising or sponsorship be introduced into the BBC, a future Labour government 
would remove it' (ibid.: 22). 
Buchan's submission was a thoughtful and challenging addition to the other pieces of 
evidence from the labour movement. It committed the party to doing nothing but 
provided an articulate analysis of the economics of broadcasting and identified with 
both the creativity of the Channel Four model and the responsibility of opposing the 
further commercialisation of broadcasting. The firm pledge in Labour's Prograinine 
1982 to phase out the licence fee had now been superseded by a proposal to either 
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extend the licence fee or to replace it with general taxation while advertising was 
now either to be abolished completely or to be kept at its present level. 
The Peacock Committee's report was published in July 1986 and probably 
disappointed Thatcher more than Kinnock as it rejected the introduction of 
advertising on the BBC and the need for specific controls on content. 44 While 
recommending the auctioning of ITV franchises and subscription to replace part of 
the licence fee in the medium-term, it argued that in the present immature 
broadcasting market, scrapping the licence fee altogether would damage public 
service broadcasting, for which it envisaged a continuing role. One decision that 
might have pleased the Labour left as much as the radical right was the 
recommendation of a 40% quota for independent production across all channels. In 
its conception of the incremental development of market forces in broadcasting 
alongside a public service remit, '[t]his was a free-market strategy with considerable 
sophistication and intellectual coherence behind it' (Goodwin, 1998: 82). Shadow 
home secretary Gerald Kaufman, however, was far from impressed. 'The report is a 
mess' he argued in parliament when the report was released and stormed that 'the 
proper place for the report is not a pigeon hole, but a wastepaper basket' (HoC 
Debates, 3 July 1986: col. 1179). Kaufman rejected the committee's proposals one 
by one - except the plans for an increase in independent production - and even 
accused the committee for going 'wildly beyond its ternis of reference' (ibid.: 1178) 
even though the official Labour Party submission had accused the remit of being far 
too narrow. Others were equally disturbed by the committee's vision of a free- 
market future for broadcasting but more puzzled by the actual recommendations. 
Norman Buchan noted its 'curious combination of arguing the case for a totally free 
market in broadcasting and saying it was inevitable in any case' (Buchan, 1986: 13). 
Roy Lockett for the ACTT described the disastrous impact of its 'curious ragbag of 
proposals' on 'an effective, economic and resource-rich industry' (Lockett, 1986: 1) 
but gave no clues as to how broadcasting workers could challenge it. 
44 For a full analysis of the Peacock Report see Goodwin (1998: 78-92) and O'Malley (1994: 106- 
117). 
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The attack continued in the full parliamentary debate on the report later that year. 
Labour MPs, having decided that its immediate recommendations were not too 
threatening and that there was little they could do about them, concentrated on 
Peacock's 'intermediate proposals' and, not I 
for the first time, on the dangers of 
Americanisation. 'Commercial objectives would reign supreme over a variety of 
choice, ' warned Kaufman, 'and lead to a bland mash of quiz shows, chat shows and 
soap operas - the kind of thing which prevails in the United States' (HoC Debates, 
20 November 1986: cols. 724-5). Buchan's contribution was a lengthy and 
impassioned attack on neo-liberal arguments, combining a critique of the 'philosophy 
of the Hayeks, Friedmans, Tebbits and Thatchers of this world' (ibid.: col. 760) with 
a first-hand account of the deregulated television system in Italy. The debate, he 
concluded, was about 
the type of civilisation that we wish to create. That cannot be left in the 
hands of the profit-makers, not only because that is the greater 
immorality, but because they have no vision or concept other than of 
profit. Indeed, they cannot, because by the nature of the beast, that is all 
it can do. Freedom will not remain if it is entrusted to the pockets and 
the purses of the Murdochs, Maxwells and Berlusconis. They will not 
preserve the quality of broadcasting, ensure the diversity of programmes 
nor will they seek to eliminate bias by extending genuine access (ibid.: 
col. 763). 
Peacock's recommendations might have opened some possibilities for an effective 
opposition to the commercialisation of broadcasting. According to Goodwin, the 
committee's 'anti-censorious liberalism' and its re ection of Thatcher's desire to put 
advertising on the BBC 'threw Tory television policy into disarray' (Goodwin, 1998: 
85). Labour's opposition to the Peacock Report, however, was blunted in two ways. 
Firstly, Labour was not alone in defending public service principles -a substantial 
part of the Home Office, Tory 'wets', most of the other political parties and the vast 
majority of the broadcasting establishment were all committed to preserving the BBC 
in its current form. Secondly, Labour's attack on the consequences of commercial 
forces was undermined by the moves at the top of the party to seek some sort of 
accommodation with the market. A distinct political alternative to both the status 
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quo and a market-led future was difficult to develol) in the context of Labour's 
increasing revisionism. 
Perhaps predictably then, Buchan's eloquen It attack on 
the profit system and the 
motives of the media moguls only served to highlight the growing divide inside the 
Labour Party between left and right over the question of market forces and the 
party's commitment to tackle the growing conglomeration and concentration of the 
media. A month after Buchan made his speech in parliament attacking the 'beast' of 
commercialism, he had been sacked from his position as shadow arts spokesperson 
over a seemingly secondary issue. Buchan had long argued that a single arts ministry 
was necessary to co-ordinate the different branches of arts and cultural activities and 
that this ministry should have full responsibility for broadcasting. He was fully 
supported by the left and the media unions who saw it as a key demand for media 
reforin 45 and as clear evidence, should it be implemented, of Labour's willingness to 
prioritise media issues. During discussions in January 1987 about the forthcoming 
election manifesto, Buchan once again raised the issue but was rebuffed by Neil 
Kinnock who, according to Tony Benn, told Buchan that 'I'll be in charge anyway, 
and the Home Office must be in control ýf broadcasting' (quoted in Benn, 1994b: 
488). Buchan refused to back down and was sacked. 
At a PLP meeting nine days later, the debate resurfaced. It was clear that those on 
the right of the party, particularly Gerald Kaufman, were less than enthusiastic about 
the idea of a broadcasting post with Cabinet status while Roy Hattersley was keen 
not to let go of his 'fiefdom' (O'Malley, 1999). Benn recalls in his diary that Buchan 
repeated the argument and Kinnock once again asserted his authority. 'He [Kinnock] 
said Party policy was contained in the 1983 manifesto, and to go back to the policy in 
1976 and 1977 was to go back to the Old Testament. "I shall decide who is in the 
Cabinet and we will have an inquiry into broadcasting... (Benn, 1994b: 489/90). 
Actually, the 1983 manifesto was silent on the issue, neither changing nor repeating 
the pledge made in Labour's Prograninie 1982 for a minister of arts with Cabinet 
rank. 
45 For example, see Curran (1986: 134), Meacher (in Allaun [1988: 97]), and Mulgan and Worpole 
(1986: 125). 
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Mark Fisher, who replaced Buchan as shadow arts spokesperson, provides one 
interpretation of events. 
'Norrie' [Buchan] actually won the argument and convinced Neil 
Kinnock that this is what should happen and he convinced the shadow 
Cabinet. But having been convinced in the second half of 1986, Kinnock 
said 'right, I accept your case, but with an election likely to be some time 
in the next twelve months, I'm not going make this radical change now. 
We'll put it on the backbumer'... Norrie unfortunately wouldn't accept 
that and, with a short temper, he put himself into a position where felt, 
quite wrongly, that he had to resign ... He should have, like a good trade 
union negotiator, taken the 70% of the spoils that were on the table and 
come back for the other 30% after the election (Fisher, 1999). 
Others saw the whole event as a sign of Labour backing down from any programme 
of media reform and as an assertion of Kinnock stamping his authority on the party. 
Brian Sedgmore, commented on the affair at the time that 
Policy on broadcasting is not apparently about art, entertainment and 
communication, but is to be treated on a par with regulations on the 
opening hours of pubs, parking restrictions and fines for dog shit ... In 
other words Labour intends to maintain the status quo (1987: 39-40). 
Tom O'Malley's reading is that 
it was a re-establishment of control type move. One thing was that 
Norman's face didn't fit, too linked to a traditional cultural politics of the 
Labour movement. It was also a question of asserting control of that area 
- on the verge of Kinnock's move to modernisation and following the 
expulsion of Militant. So their response to the politics of the period was 
to try and tighten control and they may have thought that this whole area 
was a mess, which of course it was (O'Malley, 1999). 
For Labour left-wingers Heffernan and Marqusee, the whole affair suggested that 
Kinnock was desperate not to antagonise broadcasters before an election. 'It was his 
[Kinnock's] own conviction that anything that could be seen as a challenge to the 
status quo in media control would provoke the wrath of the establishment' (1992: 
123-4). 
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The latter reading is borne out by the 1987 manifesto itself While it promised to 
introduce an arts ministry it made it plain that the 'Home Office will remain 
responsible for regulatory and statutory powers in relation to broadcasting' (quoted 
in Allaun, 1988: 91). The rest of the sectign simply reaffirmed Labour's defence of 
the existing broadcasting structures in the light of the Peacock proposals. 'We will 
protect the independence of the BBC and the independent broadcasting 
organisations. We reject subscription television for the BBC and the auctioning of 
ITV franchises' (ibid. ). The Labour leadership had put aside all the left's comments 
on BBC bias, media conglomeration, the distortions of advertising and the need for 
reform and lined up firmly with the duopoly. 
Labour and the 1990 Broadcasting Act 
Neil Kinnock reacted to Labour's third consecutive election defeat by stepping up 
the pace of the party's accommodation to market forces with the launch of the policy 
review process. The Conservatives celebrated their victory by turning their attention 
away from the BBC and towards the restructuring of commercial television in 
particular. In June 1988, a parliamentary select committee examining the future of 
broadcasting published a report that broadly followed the spirit of the Peacock 
Committee and proposed 'a tendering competition for the [ITV] franchises based on 
the ability to meet programme requirements and a bid based on a profit formula' 
(Home Affairs Committee, 1988: para. 170). While it was hardly surprising that the 
Tories on the committee were in favour of such a process, the agreement of the four 
Labour members was perhaps more unprecedented. For Shirley Littler, deputy 
director of the IBA, this cross-party consensus was particularly important. '[A]s far 
as I was concerned, the thing that absolutely ended the debate was that it was All- 
Party report. And if the Labour Party is now saying they didn't like competitive 
tender, they jolly well went along with that... ' (quoted in Bonner, 1998: 370). 
Goodwin argues that the report demonstrated the general acceptance of the Peacock 
principles that had permeated both main parties. 'The Labour front bench might 
appear to continue its opposition to an auction in principle, but thereafter the real - 
although still fierce - arguments were in practice about the precise mechanism of the 
auction' (Goodwin, 1998: 91). 
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The situation was not so clear at the 1988 Labour conference which discussed the 
media for the first time in four years. Anticipating the forthcoming White Paper on 
broadcasting, the conference passed a motion condemning the commercialisation of 
broadcasting, the privatisation of Channel Four and, indeed, the auctioning of the 
ITV franchises. By this point, the idea that the independents were the cutting-edge 
of experimentation and innovation had been challenged by the support for an 
independent production quota at the top level of the Tories. Alan Sapper of the 
ACTT, proposing the motion, warned that such a quota was simply a cover for 
allowing foreign interests to take over: 'it really means that the megalith, 
multinational areas of America, Australia and Europe will move in under a British or 
European cover company and take over the job and products of our own people' 
(Sapper, 1988: 115). This was a clear reference to Rupert Murdoch whose increasing 
domination of the British media and anti-union activities had earned him the 
accolade of being one of Labour's most hated figures. Hostility to Murdoch was a 
theme that was to be repeated frequently over the following years. 
The White Paper, Broadcasting in the 90s: Competition, Choice and Quality (Home 
Office, 1988) was published by Douglas Hurd's department on November 7,1988 
and promised a commercial overhaul of substantial parts of British broadcasting with 
the auctioning of ITV franchises and the creation of a more 'light-touch' regulatory 
structure for commercial television. 46 The one area that departed significantly from 
Peacock's proposals was in the government's determination to highlight issues of 
taste and decency through the launch of the Broadcasting Standards Council on a 
statutory basis. Goodwin argues that there were two responses to the White Paper - 
one 'general and apocalyptic', the other 'critical ... of particular details of the 
proposals' - which together 'were to produce considerable modifications as the 
White Paper blueprint was translated into statute in the 1990 Broadcasting Act' 
(Goodwin, 1998: 100). The question we wish to consider is the extent to which 
Labour contributed to this process. 
Labour's parliamentary opposition veered between the 'general and apocalyptic' and 
the specific and tactical. What united it was the emphasis on protecting the high 
46 For details of and responses to the White Paper, see Goodwin (1998: 93-108). 
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standards of British television. Roy Hattersley, the shadow home secretary, wasted 
no time in attacking the document 'as a giant retreat from the concept of public 
service broadcasting. Its result will be less diversity and lower standards' (Hoc 
Debates, 7 November 1988: col. 32). Tony Panks wanted to know 'how [home 
secretary] Mr Hurd could expect MPs to take seriously his assurances on preserving 
standards while he was abolishing the IBA and clearly announcing his intention to 
move towards privatizing the BBC' (ibid.: col. 41). Labour's amendment to the 
motion on the White Paper argued that the document would 'discourage a wide 
variety of programme choice, and generally reduce the high standards and consistent 
quality of broadcasting in this country' (HoC Debates, 8 February 1989: col. 1017). 
The comments by broadcasting spokesperson Robin Corbett that the home secretary 
simply 'wants to do a demolition job' on public service broadcasting (ibid.: col. 
1069) emphasised Labour's belief that government plans were destroying everything 
that was good about British broadcasting and that Labour would rush to its defence. 
Labour speakers demonstrated a particular attachment to the concept of quality. This 
was, of course, a highly malleable term used by all sides in the debate over the White 
Paper reforms. Whereas Reithian public service broadcasting depended on the 
imposition from above of particular sets of ideas, free market reformers argued that it 
was more important to simply provide audiences with what would be popular. 'In 
this scenario, the generation of quality television would not so much be initiated 
from the 'top down' but would be the result of demand from the 'bottom up'. The 
emphasis on creative innovation by producers is shifted to an emphasis on a 
'businesslike' sensitivity to consumers' (Comer et al., 1994: 14). So while the 
Tories were anxious to paint the left's notion of quality in terms of elitist, minority 
programming, Labour was quick to embrace both 'high culture' definitions as well as 
more populist meanings in order to present itself as a consumer-friendly party. 
Indeed, Hattersley repeated the word 'quality' ten times in his speech on the White 
Paper and noted that, Ja]s "high quality" is a subjective description, I make it clear 
that I include in it "Bread" as well as "Brideshead Revisited, " and "Coronation 
Street" no less than "Jewel in the Crown... (HoC Debates, 8 February 1989: col. 
1018). 
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Labour's opposition to specific parts of the White Paper focused on the vagueness of 
the proposals for the ITV franchise auctions, the dangers of conglomeration and 
possibilities for foreign ownership of commercial television interests and the 
censorial power of the Broadcasting Standarqs Council. These disagreements co- 
existed, however, with a recognition of the need for change, not on the basis of faults 
with the current television system but only because, 'thanks to technological 
advance, what we broadcast in the future can be better' (ibid.: cols. 10 17-8). Indeed, 
Labour had little desire to complain about the existing arrangements. According to 
Hattersley, ITV companies already existed 'as profit-making organisations. 
Therefore it is right and reasonable for those who run the programme companies to 
try to make a profit' (ibid.: cols. 10 18-9). ITV franchise renewals already involved 
scrutinising standards, Channel Four was doing nothing wrong and should be left 
alone and, all in all, 'we believe that British broadcasting is among the best in the 
world' (ibid.: col. 1027). Labour, nevertheless, was to identify with the need for 
change because, as a leak of the party's response to the White Paper put it, 'Labour 
must embrace the enthusiasm for expanding choice in broadcasting' (quoted in 
Cainpaign, 1989a: 21). 
The party's formal response was published in March 1989 and contained few 
surprises. Perhaps this was because, according to Television Week, '[s]ome Labour 
MPs have argued in private that large parts of the white paper are acceptable... ' 
(Lewis, 1989: 2). It demanded a tightening of the 'standard threshold' for franchise 
applicants, stricter controls on cross-media ownership and the prevention of non-EU 
companies to hold a franchise, the maintenance of Channel Four's funding structure 
and the abolition of the Broadcasting Standards Council. The document also called 
for 'the creation of franchises authorities which would issue franchises only where 
the range, content and quality of programmes were guaranteed' (Hughes, 1989: 4), 
precisely what Hattersley was arguing the IBA was already doing. 
These debates were taking place in the final run-up to the publication of the party's 
two-year old policy review, which appeared as Meet the challenge, Make the change 
(Labour Party, 1989a) in May 1989. The section on the media was part of the group 
examining "Democracy for the Individual and the Community', chaired by Hattersley 
himself. The actual proposals, 'Broadcasting in a free society', repeated the concerns 
209 
expressed and promises made in the White Paper response. The licence fee would 
stay while the Broadcasting Standards Council would go; franchise renewals on the 
basis of programme range and quality would stay, franchise renewals on the basis of 
money alone would go. The language, however, most definitely reflected the new 
terms of the broadcasting debate. Criticisms of media bias and lack of accountability 
were replaced by a fascination with the, by now, familiar trinity of competition, 
choice and quality: 
Quality and integrity are determined by ownership. The ownership of 
independent television franchises therefore needs the most careful 
scrutiny. We are particularly concerned about the cross ownership of 
newspapers and television and will immediately refer this issue to our 
strengthened Monopolies and Mergers Commission ... We are not only 
concerned about the reduction in quality, diversity and standards 
throughout public and independent broadcasting system [sic]. We are 
equally determined to protect the standard of impartial and independent 
broadcasting of which we, as a country, are right to be proud (ibid.: 9). 
The target of the attack here was clearly not private ownership per se but the creation 
of new private monopolies that would undermine choice and restrict competitive 
behaviour. Hattersley stressed the real target of the policy when he introduced the 
'Democracy' policy review proposals at that year's Labour conference. 
In a free society we need a diversity of media ownership. Without it, the 
whole industry will follow Rupert Murdoch nearer and nearer to the 
gutter, and will characterised more and more by the concept which the 
Murdoch empire is built: profit, prejudice and prurience (Hattersley, 
1989: 121). 
Delegates may have been puzzled by his attack on one man's right to make profits 
but not that of the existing ITV companies. They may also have been surprised that 
while Murdoch was being lambasted inside the conference hall, over at stands 50 and 
51 just outside the hall his satellite company, Sky Television, was inviting 'all 
conference delegates to stop by its exhibition stand to learn more about its unique 
range of broadcasting services' (Labour Party, 1989b: 8). 
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Not all delegates were impressed with the leadership's policies. Tony Hearn, general 
47 
secretary of BETA , the union representing 
BBC workers, criticised the 'lamentably 
too brief media proposals in Meet the Challenge 
It is alright as far as it goes, but, frankly, it does not go terribly far, and I 
question whether it fully highlights the crucial political issues of control 
and access to broadcasting that have got to be seized by this confderence 
if a Labour government is going to be able effectively to implement its 
programme (Heam, 1989: 126). 
BETA and its sister union, the ACTT, had already initiated a joint campaign in 
February 1989, the Public Service Broadcasting Campaign (PSBC) which was co- 
ordinated by Tom O'Malley of the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. 
The campaign's aim was to raise broader political questions than those raised by 
Labour in parliament, for example of workplace rights, continuity of employment, 
the role of advertising and sponsorship and general regulatory structures. 'What we 
did, ' according to O'Malley (1999), 'was to channel to a wider political audience 
within the labour and trade union movement the issues of accountability and quality 
that were being posed by the post- 1986 situation. ' 
However, the tone of the unions' campaign was far more defensive than their 
approach to media reform had been in the 1970s, reflecting the political climate and 
the impact of defeats for media workers at Wapping in 1986 and at TV-am in 1987. 
The PSBC's pamphlet, government plansfor broadcasting in the 1990's 
(ACTUBETA, 1989/90) was subtitled, 'campaign for choice, standards and quality 
in television in radio', mirroring the concerns of the official Labour campaign. The 
focus was very much on lobbying MPs and writing in to local newspapers (see, for 
example, the 'Action Plan' in ibid. ), more than attempting to organise industrial 
action among broadcasting workers in defence of their jobs and conditions. Instead, 
the campaign opted for an alliance with other progressive groups who wanted to 
defeat the government's plans. 'We reached out and were part of that general 
political noise that was created, ' argues O'Malley (1999), 'which involved the 
47 The ABS had merged with entertainment workers in the National Association of Theatrical, 
Television and Kine Employees (NATTKE) to form BETA in 1984. BETA than merged with the 
ACTT in 1990 to form BECTU. 
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Church of England, Oxfam and the trade unions, which also sustained the culture of 
the Campaign for Quality Television' (CQT). 
The CQT had a quite different background.,, Bankrolled by a E5000 donation by 
David Plowright, the chairman of Granada Television (Bonner, 1998: 389), the 
campaign proved to be a highly effective front group for the ITV sector. It mobilised 
a range of high-profile television personalities, like Rowan Atkinson, Esther Rantzen 
and Michael Palin together with politicians from both main parties, including shadow 
arts minister Mark Fisher, who were opposed to various aspects of the White Paper 
(Davidson, 1992: 17-26). In particular, it concentrated its efforts on resisting a blind 
auction process and negotiating a 'quality threshold' which ITV franchise applicants 
would have to meet. There is little doubt that the CQT's activities influenced 
Labour's broadcasting spokespeople more than the unions' campaign. Robin 
Corbett, the party's official broadcasting representative recalls that he saw 'a lot of 
the ITV companies' during the passage of the bill. 'You're not against what they're 
doing because you've got a lot of constituents watching and liking what they're 
doing and that's the way I chose to do it' (Corbett, 1999). Fisher (1999) remembers 
taking advice at the time from 'loyal party members' like Plowright and Denis 
Forman (both senior executives at Granada TV) and Greg Dyke, chief executive of 
London Weekend Television, as well as Labour-supporting academics like James 
Curran and Jean Seaton. 
By September 1989, there was some discussion about the fragility of Labour's 
opposition to the White Paper. Despite growing Tory backbench unease with the 
impact of government broadcasting plans on programme quality, left-wing MP 
Michael Meacher argued that 'we are in danger of becoming too reactive and too 
nervous in putting forward policy. There is a temptation to bend in the wind, to give 
a little ground in the hope of appeasing the critics. But however much ground you 
give it is never quite enough' (Meacher, 1989: 9). Following an inter-view with 
Hattersley, one journalist described Labour's strategy as a 'timorous reaction to the 
present government's proposals. New and positive ideas which would set an 
alternative agenda for the media are absent' (Wohrle, 1989: 21). The one proposal 
that shook up the debate in the following few months was Labour's threat to reverse 
the auction of ITV licenses should the party win power before the process was 
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complete. Should, however, the licences have already been awarded, Labour 
promised to honour the contracts fully (Mares, 1989: 4). In hindsight, given that 
there was a six-month gap between the announcement of the licenses and the 
subsequent election, the promise does not now appear as dramatic as it was at the 
time. 
The bill was published in December 1989 and Labour's team on the committee 
overseeing its passage was announced the following month. Labour MPs filled 
eleven out of the thirty-one places and included a number with experience of 
broadcasting issues. Corbett and Fisherjointly led a team that also included Norman 
Buchan, Tony Banks (formerly of the ABS), Dianne Abbott (sponsored by the 
ACTT) and Austin Mitchell (now a Sky Television presenter). According to 
Canipaign (I 989b: 3), Hattersley had already 'signalled that Labour was prepared to 
drop its outright opposition to competitive tendering' if changes to the procedure of 
the tendering process were made. Labour's strategy, therefore, was not to press for 
the scrapping of the principle of an auction but to soften its impact as far as possible; 
similarly, if the IBA was to be abolished, then its successor needed to have equally 
strong regulatory powers. Corbett, summarising his approach, states that '[NV]hoever 
is leading [opposition to a bill] has a choice. You either say, "right, we'll fight for 
every half-inch of ground, fix bayonets", which we could have done. Or you try a 
more intelligent approach and try to take some of the television interests with you' 
(Corbett, 1999). 
After two months, David Mellor, the broadcasting minister in charge of the bill, had 
conceded an 'exceptional circumstances' clause that would allow the regulator to 
reject the highest bidder for a franchise and to select another on the basis of the 
higher quality of its offering. By the time the act received royal assent in November 
1990, substantial changes had been made which blunted the most severe free-market 
proposals. Tony Banks commented at the time that 'I have done 14 or 15 bills at 
committee stage. This was the one in which most movement was achieved' (quoted 
in Goodwin, 1990: 7). To what extent can this be related to Labour's opposition? 
Corbett (1999) argues that 'I think,, ve did better than we could have hoped. We did 
end up laying down some quality requirements on both the national and regional 
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news and very diminished but nonetheless public service obligations [on ITV]. ' In 
part, he attributes this to his very close working relationship with Mellor. 'I'm not 
saying that there was total agreement. Individually there probably was but he wasn't 
acting as an individual ... I think that in the circumstances that we did quite well I 
because she [Thatcher] would have tipped it all in the sea' (ibid. ). Mark Fisher, 
however, remembers it quite differently. 
I think that is accepting at face value the line that David Mellor would 
take, that David would cast himself for a variety of reasons as the 
defender of broadcasting against the govenu-nent. I never believed that 
was the case and I think Mellor knew exactly what he was doing and that 
any victories won against the forces of Thatcher were actually victories 
that were going to be won anyway. His attempts to paint Hurd as an 
arch-Thatcherite home secretary - not withstanding the White Paper - 
were not very convincing and I think that both Hurd and Mellor were 
sufficiently non-Thatcherite to want to defend some things in 
broadcasting ... Mellor was perfectly cordial but he did not attempt to 
create ajoint front with the opposition (Fisher, 1999). 
O'Malley (1999) argues that the most effective opposition came from the CQT, the 
ITV companies and the IBA who were able to 'bend the ear' of Home Office 
ministers who had always been sympathetic to the arguments of the broadcasters. 
Mellor himself argues that the CQT were particularly influential as 'they provided 
the pressure that gave me the ability to tell my elders and betters that change [to the 
legislation] had to be made... ' (quoted in Bonner, 1998: 419). 
Yet whoever's voice was most influential during the passage of the bill, it remains 
the case that the government's main objective of further commercialising British 
broadcasting was intact. Labour may have provided the backbone of the opposition 
during the committee stage, but the agenda had already been set by a wide range of 
groups: backbench Tories, ITV executives, television personalities, broadcasting 
unions, church groups and perhaps even the broadcasting minister himself. Labour's 
weakness was that it had failed to articulate an imaginative and distinctive argument 
against the free-market vision of broadcasting together with a coherent plan of action 
for how to defeat it. As an editorial in Broadcast put it at the time, 'Labour's answer 
has been to argue for a status quo which, if only because of the changing economic 
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and technological realities facing the industry, appears to be increasingly untenable' 
(Broadcast, 1989: 6). 
Fisher now accepts this accusation but argues that: 
The reasons for it are not a lack of political nerve and will, but probably 
have more trivial roots in the realities of opposition. Whereas the 
government prepares for a broadcasting bill and has the resources of a 
small department and civil servants' time, the opposition can't prepare in 
any detail until they see the bill and you're pretty much swept into 
it ... You've got quite a narrow range of advice and you have to move 
quite quickly and you tend to react to what the government is saying 
rather than to set your own agenda and that is in the nature of scrutinising 
legislation. The government proposes, all you can do is criticise. You 
have an opportunity to put down new clauses and have symbolic debates 
on different approaches but on the whole the agenda-setting is done by 
government (Fisher, 1999). 
While this may be true about the complexities of responding to the details of 
legislation, our argument is that Labour had no shortage of sympathetic academics, 
trade unionists, broadcasters and ordinary party members who were willing to give 
advice nor of policy documents in the party's recent past. Curran et al. (1986), 
MacShane (1987) and Allaun (1988) are just a few examples of discussions of 
television policy which were circulating in the labour movement at that time. 
A more persuasive argument is that the front bench had little inclination to tackle the 
broadcasting establishment and jeopardise its project of shedding a left-wing image 
in search of electoral respectability. While Kinnock was certainly bitter at the 
behaviour of the British press, he reserved no such venom for British television. 
Asked in 1993 about Labour's relationship with the media during his leadership, he 
replied that 
So far as the telly is concerned it is much healthier [than the press] 
because the television, both by charter and by culture, does accommodate 
the requirements of balance. There are some mistakes - but they are 
human institutions after all. Generally speaking, the mistakes go against 
us, but then I would say that, wouldn't I? But it is not enough to be a 
real source ofsustained coinplaint (Kinnock, 1994: 552 - emphasis 
added). 
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From 1982, when the party had criticised 'the closed and autocratic institutions' of 
broadcasting, Labour had shifted rapidly towards making peace with the 
broadcasting establishment. This was all the more important given the 
overwhelming hostility of sections of the press, most notably the Murdoch-owned 
newspapers, and the efforts of the shadow communications agency to improve the 
televisual nature of Labour's campaigning. Once again, Fisher attributes this to 
realpolifik. 
Did the party become more, I wouldn't say friendly, but more 
understanding of the existing realities? Instead of starting from a blank 
sheet and saying 'what sort of broadcasting policy ought an incoming 
socialist government to haveT, we were asking that, given that we were 
coming into government and would inherit this configuration of 
broadcasting, how would we actually handle it? (Fisher, 1999) 
The task was left to Fisher himself to draw up a media policy that privileged 
pragmatic considerations rather than socialist principles in time for the 1992 election. 
In September 199 1, he produced a 32-page document, Arts and Media: Our Cultural 
Future (Labour Party, 1991) which presented a detailed series of commitments about 
the party's desire to take advantage of the growing economic importance of the 
'cultural industries'. In terms of television, Labour promised to 'maintain the licence 
fee as the main source of the BBC's income for the forseeable future', to abolish the 
Broadcasting Standards Council, to continue with the present system of funding 
Channel Four and to introduce a Freedom of Information Act to 'strengthen editorial 
independence' (ibid.: 31-32). It repeated its commitment to a ministry for arts and 
media, although only with 'growing [i. e. not full regulatory] responsibilities for 
broadcasting' (ibid.: 9) and signalled its desire to tackle the issue of cross-media 
ownership. This latter point resurfaced in the party's 1992 manifesto which made no 
further comments on television policy but stated that it would 'establish an urgent 
enquiry by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission into the concentration of media 
ownership' (Labour Party, 1992: 24). This was to be a subject of great importance in 
the debates to take place later in the decade, but for now it looked like small 
consolation for the setbacks the party had suffered at the hands of the free marketeers 
during the 1980s. 
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Conclusion 
What achievements could Labour point to iý its opposition to government policies 
concerning television broadcasting during the thirteen-year period we have 
discussed? There was little real resistance to Whitelaw's plans for the fourth channel 
and the Labour left had been just as enthusiastic as the free-market right in 
celebrating the rise of the independent production sector. It had failed to dent the 
government's enthusiasm for the cable and satellite 'revolution'. a phenomenon that 
was undermined far more by inconsistencies in the government's own approach than 
by a sustained or imaginative challenge from Labour. The party had countered the 
deregulatory ideas underpinning the launch of the Peacock Committee but were 
simply part of a broad alliance, including many Tories, who were uneasy about 
commercialising broadcasting. Indeed O'Malley stresses the internal divisions in 
government as the key: 'Thatcher was not politically strong enough to force 
advertising on the BBC. She faced opposition from the Home Office and from her 
most senior Cabinet colleague, Whitelaw' (O'Malley, 1994: 115-6). Finally, while 
publicly criticising the philosophy of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, Labour 
frontbenchers had privately conceded the need for some of the government refonus 
and had limited themselves to opposing specific details of the legislation. Labour, 
far from co-ordinating a distinct challenge to the bill was, once more, just part of the 
general 'noise' against the plans. 
O'Malley argues that, given the general success of the Thatcher government in 
crushing all opposition, there were very limited possibilities of resisting market 
reforms in broadcasting. 'The sheer weight of the economic and political forces 
behind the changes made opposition inside and outside the state very difficult' (ibid.: 
173). Yet, the debates over the 1988 White Paper took place at precisely the same 
time as a successful series of strikes by BBC workers while the passage of the 1990 
Broadcasting Act coincided with the largest popular mobilisation against the 
Conservatives in the shape of the anti-poll tax campaign. Indeed, Thatcher resigned 
as prime minister because of a lack of support from within her own party in exactly 
the same month as the broadcasting bill became law. It was not that there was any 
lack of support for a coherent alternative to the free market from the left, but that the 
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Labour leadership was reluctant to provide one. According to Labour activists 
Heffernan and Marqusee (1992: 206): 
Again and again, Labour conferences have demanded media reform, 
some minimal tilting of the balafice away from the Conservative Party 
and the employers, but again and again Labour in Parliament has 
declined to pursue these demands, even when they were begging to be 
raised, as during the debates on the Broadcasting Bill in 1990. 
By 1992, Labour had published a substantial number of policy documents on the 
media while debates on press and broadcasting, Murdoch and monopolisation, were 
regular features of party conferences. It was not that Labour did not have a 
television policy but that its commitment to implement the policy, and increasingly 
the policy itself, was shaped by the party's acceptance of market forces and its desire 
not to antagonise the broadcasting establishment. In the 1980s, the left continued to 
dominate the intellectual discussion within the labour movement concerning 
television policy, much as it had in the 1970s. The problem was that this took the 
form of ideas - such as the cultural industries approach and Marxism Today's 
emphasis on communications - which were either unable or unwilling to stop the 
party's march to the right. 
What difference might Labour have made had it been in office in the 1980s? It 
would probably have set up an Open Broadcasting Authority to run the fourth 
channel but with a very similar remit to the one imposed on Channel Four and with 
many of the financial problems predicted back in the original debates. British 
Telecom would have been entrusted with running a national broadband cable 
network, although there is no certainty that this would have avoided the problems 
experienced by the French socialist government's more innovative Plan Cable (see 
p. 190n). While Labour would have been far less influenced by radical right ideas of 
forcing the BBC to take advertising, such a proposition had already been 
contemplated by Labour ministers in the 1960s. Furthermore, it is unlikely that, 
given its past behaviour, Labour would have been any more generous with licence 
fee revenue or any less interventionist in its dealings with the BBC. Finally, while 
Labour would not have introduced the ITV auction, there is little reason to believe 
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that it would not have pressed for a more commercially-minded television system at 
the end of the decade to complement its wider political shift towards the market. 
Under pressure from neo-liberal arguments, the Labour leadership pursued a 
defensive strategy in the 1980s and by 1992 ýad aligned itself with the view that the 
I 
commercialisation of television was both desirable and inevitable. 
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Chapter Six: 1992 - 2000 
The Creation of New Labour, 1992-1997 
Appointed as Labour leader in July 1992, John Smith consolidated the party's 
attempt to relocate itself ideologically in the 'centre' and to reduce the influence of 
the union block vote by introducing 'one member, one vote' for the selection of 
parliamentary candidates. Yet Smith was reluctant to step up the pace of reform and 
was soon criticised by some shadow Cabinet members, like Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown, who wanted to intensify the process of what they saw as 'modemisation'. 
Wright and Carter (1997: 169) note the 'rumblings of discontent' that existed by 
1993 over both Smith's consensual style of leadership and his gradualist attitude 
towards fundamental internal change. Tony Blair was then given the chance to 
implement his drive for root-and-branch reform of the party by John Smith's sudden 
death in May 1994. New Labour, as Blair's project came to be known at the end of 
1994, could be characterised by its emphasis on three features: 'modernisation' of 
party policies, ideologies and structures; the professionalisation of the party's 
presentation and campaigning skills; and the neutralisation of the influence of a 
traditionally anti-Labour mass media. 
The call for modernisation was a mantra for the leaders of New Labour. In practice, 
it resembled less Harold Wilson's tirade in the 1960s on the outdated mentality of 
those running British boardrooms than Neil Kinnock's attack on the left for being a 
barrier to electoral success. Indeed, Blair was particularly keen to be identified as a 
friend of business and to reposition Labour as the party of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. Blair and his shadow chancellor, Gordon Brown, toured the City 
convincing chief executives and managing directors that New Labour was no longer 
the party of high taxes and fiscal irresponsibility, but one that promised low inflation 
and low levels of public spending. The modernisers decided to prove this by tackling 
the sacred cow of the Labour left, Clause IV of the constitution that committed the 
party to 'common ownership of the means of production'. Blair launched a 
campaign to replace the clause with one in praise of wealth creation rather than 
distribution which, in the context of an increasingly desperate mood for unity against 
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the Conservatives, was easily passed at a special conference in April 1995 . 
48 The 
abolition of Clause IV was partly an example of political public relations but it also 
signified a genuine recognition that, as Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle put it in 
an early clarification of what New Labour stgod for, '[p]rofit was no longer a dirty 
I 
word - profits are accepted as the motor of private enterprise' (1996: 22). 
It was in this context that New Labour's ideological framework developed, applying 
the Labour right's long-held belief in the notion of 'markets as tools of egalitarian 
choice' (Freeden, 1999: 44) to the new circumstances of the 1990s. Firstly, New 
Labour leaders seized on globalisation as the key challenge facing politicians, 
business leaders and workers around the world. From the outset, the speeches of 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were littered with references to the 'modem global 
economy where capital, raw materials and technology are internationally mobile and 
tradeable worldwide' (Brown, 1994: 1). For Blair (1996: 118), the 'driving force of 
economic change today is globalisation. Technology and capital are mobile. 
Industry is becoming fiercely competitive across national boundaries'. Their 
definitions of globalisation all emphasised the triumph of free market flows and the 
mobility of capital: that new centres of production were emerging outside of 
established centres of manufacturing, that imports and exports were now playing an 
increased role in the lives of national markets and that economies and societies had 
become increasingly interdependent. New Labour figures, however, were also keen 
to conceptualise globalisation in terms of developments concerning communications 
and culture. Tony Blair argued that globalisation could be best understood as a 
media-related metaphor. 
It is as if someone has pressed the fast-forward button on the video and 
there is no sign of it stopping. I also believe that the intemationalisation 
of culture has played a significant part. In Tokyo and London, 
increasingly we are sharing the same rock music, the same designer 
clothes, the same films and surely, over time, the same attitude and tastes 
(ibid.: 118/19). 
48 The new statement of aims supported a 'dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in which the 
enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of partnership and co- 
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The consequences of what New Labour saw as the relentless process of globalisation 
were two-fold. Firstly, it meant that national governments were almost helpless 
against global market forces and multinational capital. According to Mandelson and 
Liddle (1996: 6), 'the new international ecoqomy has greatly reduced the ability of 
any single government to use the traditional levers of economic policy in order to 
maintain high employment'. To put it more crudely, as did the former lord 
chancellor, Lord Irvine, 'the global economy makes redistribution impossible' 
(quoted in Hattersley, 1997). Globalisation provided, therefore, a key justification 
for cutting public spending, championing 'flexible' work patterns and for not 
challenging redundancies that could be blamed on multinationals and the 'world 
market'. 49 Secondly, it increased the importance of New Labour's call for 
international competitiveness and for the application of techniques that would 
increase efficiency on the global stage. One of New Labour's early economic 
documents argued that 'in an age of constant technological advance ... [t]he task is 
now to restore more industrial companies to the front rank of international 
50 innovation, productivity and profit' (Labour Party, 1995a: 3). 
Tony Blair's attempt to marry globalisation developments with government action 
found expression in what Philip Gould calls New Labour's defining idea (Gould, 
1998: 255): the stakeholder society. This was launched at a speech given by Blair to 
business leaders in Singapore in January 1996 where the Labour leader once again 
talked of the huge changes being brought about by globalisation and the 
communications revolution but also of the need to engage citizens in adapting to 
change. Attacking the increase in social exclusion and alienation under the Major 
government, Blair called for 'a country in which we acknowledge an obligation 
collectively to ensure each citizen gets a stake in it' (Blair, 1996: 292). This would 
require reform of the welfare and education system as well as the deployment of new 
operation, to produce the wealth the country needs' (quoted in Jones, 1996: 144). 
49 See, for example, the government's reluctance to intervene over BMW's decision in March 2000 to 
sell the Rover factory at Longbridge with the loss of thousands ofjobs. 
50 Jim Tomlinson criticises the obsession with international competitiveness and the need to reduce 
unit labour costs and calls instead for more attention to low levels of domestic investment, poor 
management skills and a lack of training opportunities. Talking about the service sector in particular, 
Tomlinson (1997: 18) argues that the issue 'is not that these parts of the economy are not 
internationally competitive - rather the point is that most of their output is not internationally traded, 
so competitiveness is not the nub of the issue. ' 
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technologies and partnership strategies between business and the state to provide new 
opportunities for training and employment. 
The problem was that stakeholding was a copcept that could mean different things to 
different audiences, that it was a 'portmanteau terni which can hold a rich diversity 
of ideological baggage' (Thompson, 1996: 37). For unions, it suggested more 
inclusion in boardroom matters and a more sympathetic legal framework for trade 
union activity than the one that currently existed. For the Labour left, it suggested 
more investment in public services like health and education and higher levels of 
public spending. For the Keynesian economist Will Hutton, whose popular book The 
State We'I-e In (Hutton, 1995) had first developed the concept of stakeholding, it 
meant an attack on laissez-faire capitalism and the selfish values of the 
Conservatives. For New Labour, however, it meant an attack on all barriers to 
competitiveness and flexibility - particularly welfare provision and trade union 
militancy - in exchange for an ill-defined 'stake' in an expanding market economy. 
Political reorientation was accompanied by the marginalisation of annual conference, 
traditionally the bastion of Labour activism, the further centralisation of candidate 
selection with the ability of the national Party to impose candidates on local branches 
and the transformation of the role of the NEC to make it an 'auxiliary to the 
parliamentary party, rather than the other way round' (Panitch and Leys, 1997: 234). 
The second task central to the creation of New Labour was the improvement of the 
party's presentation and campaigning skills. According to Butler and Kavanagh 
(1997: 62), 'Tony Blair was impatient with talk of big ideas ... He thought the party 
had enough policies and should concentrate on projecting them'. With this in mind, 
Blair resuscitated the communications infrastructure set up in the mid- I 980s that 
John Smith had only recently dismantled. For New Labour, presentational and 
communication skills were to be not external to policy-making but at its very core. 
Blair therefore brought into his private office individuals, like Philip Gould, Peter 
Mandelson, Patricia Hewitt and Alastair Campbell who were particularly versed in 
political communications and marketing, and sanctioned the creation of a purpose- 
built campaigns and media centre at Millbank. The effectiveness of Labour's 
communications and public relations strategy was seen as decisive, not simply in 
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terms of electoral success, but in the actual creation and definition of New Labour. 
For the historian Brian Brivati, the true meaning of New Labour lay in its ability to 
co-ordinate its campaigning and communicating to build and sustain electoral 
popularity. 
The essence of the real Blair revolution - rooted in the Kinnock years - 
has been in the transfon-nation of Labour's perception of political 
competence. (By this I mean the emphasis on the need to control and 
master the things that a Party, and a Government, can control, most 
importantly political communication) (Brivati, 1997: 184). 
One area in which Kinnock had failed, however, and in which Blair was deten-nined 
to succeed, was to correct the party's poor relationship with the media and, in 
particular, with the tabloid newspapers which the previous leader had blamed for the 
1992 defeat. Kinnock had claimed that the unrelenting hostility of papers like the 
Sun and the Daily Mail had made it virtually impossible for Labour's case to be put 
properly and for the party to win. 'I know it people it's weak to blame the media for 
everything, but they do deten-nine the environment of politics' (quoted in Linton, 
1995: 5). This argument was ftirther put by the soon-to-be Labour MP Martin Linton 
in a report that provided statistical analysis of the impact of the tabloid press in 
turning voters away from Labour in 1992. Yet while his argument concentrated on 
the role played by the tabloid press, Linton, partly influenced by media magnate 
Silvio Berlusconi's control of Italian television, urged Labour not to take television 
for granted. 'Television is the most dangerous medium because it has semi-hypnotic 
qualities and is watched disproportionately by those with little education, low 
incomes and weak political commitment' (ibid.: 38). 
This uncritical conception of media influence was firmly adopted by New Labour 
who saw it as a priority to court j ournalists and broadcasters in order to undermine 
hostility towards Labour. In the words of Robin Corbett, the party's broadcasting 
spokesperson at the time, 'if you couldn't make friends, at least neutralise 
opposition' (Corbett, 1999). The principal object of Labour's new-found enthusiasm 
for media proprietors was Rupert Murdoch, owner of the most bitter anti-Labour 
newspapers in 1992 and key player in British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB), the 
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increasingly popular satellite ser-vice. The first dinner between Blair and Murdoch 
took place in August 1994, a month after Blair's leadership victory, marking the start 
of articles attributed to Blair being published in the Sun (McKie, 1997: 117). 
Murdoch, however, was equally keen to impress Blair in order to soften Labour's 
1992 manifesto commitment (clearly aimed at Murdoch) to launch a monopolies and 
mergers investigation into media concentration. Murdoch, furthermore, was 
disillusioned with John Major's administration and was seriously considering 
switching his support to New Labour. 
In July 1995, Blair flew halfway across the world to address the annual conference of 
senior executives at Murdoch's News Corporation. Blair's speech combined an 
appeal to 'moral purpose' with a condemnation of the Conservatives' proposals for 
capping cross-media ownership that would prevent Murdoch from expanding in the 
UK (Blair, 1996: 203-214). New Labour's courtship of Murdoch paid off when, 
shortly before the 1997 election, both the Sun and the Neivs ofthe World firmly 
endorsed Labour. 
How important was New Labour's systematic and successful courtship of the media 
between 1994 and 1997? For Tony Blair himself, a positive relationship with 
editors, owners and broadcasters was both symptomatic of a 'modemised' party and 
essential for electoral success in what he described as a 'mass-multimedia society' 
(Blair, 1996: 205). Blair was so struck by the power of the tabloid press and so 
grateful for its backing in 1997 that, after the election, he sent a letter to Sun editor 
Stuart Higgins thanking him for the paper's 'magnificent' support. 'It really did 
make the difference' he wrote (quoted in Draper, 1997: 129). Other commentators 
were less convinced, arguing that there was little need for the Labour Party to 
appease media moguls as the latter groupwas lobbying what it already suspected 
would be the next government (see Goodwin, 1998: 145-46) because of the enormous 
unpopularity of the Conservatives. As a leading group of academics put it after the 
election: 
There is no evidence that the switch of the Sun and News of the Morld 
threw the election to Labour. In fact support for Labour declined slightly 
in the polls after these tabloids publicly endorsed Tony Blair ... Labour 
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did not win because the Sun backed it; rather the Sun backed Labour 
because Labour was going to win (Bartle et al, 1998: xix). 
Labour did win and captured 43.2% of the vote next to the Conservatives' 30.7%, a 
Labour landslide and a Conservative catastrophe. Was this simply due to New 
Labour's presentational and campaigning skills? 'Labour made a breakthrough in its 
methods of campaigning before and during the election. But the differences between 
the parties in using these skills and techniques did not decide the election' conclude 
Butler and Kavanagh (1997: 252-53) arguing that economic and political factors in 
the preceding five years were more decisive. Indeed how new ivas 'New Labour'? 
Anderson and Mann (1997: 3 86) emphasise the continuities between past and present 
and argue that 'the making of New Labour has been going on a long time - and New 
Labour owes a lot more than it cares to admit to the old Labour right of the 1960s 
and 1970s'. This analysis underplays the real differences between 'Old Labour' and 
'New Labour'. New Labour's accommodation with media power, together with its 
obsession with political communication, its unapologetic embrace of profits and 
competition, its rejection of traditional Labourist policies and its centralisation of 
party structures, suggest that a real transformation did occur between 1992 and 1997. 
To what extent was this mirrored in the party's media policies? 
Labour's television policy, 1992-1997 
Shortly after his victory in the 1992 general election, John Major removed 
broadcasting from the Home Office and created a new Department of National 
Heritage (DNH) with full responsibilities for arts and media. Given that the 
Parliamentary Labour Party had had heated arguments about precisely this subject in 
the 1980s and that a commitment to move broadcasting to a new ministry was 
eventually left out of the 1992 manifesto, this gave Labour one less issue to argue 
about. The main focus concerning television policy for both main parties soon 
became clear as, after the drama of the 1990 Broadcasting Act and the ITV auctions, 
attention shifted back to the future of the BBC. With the Corporation's charter due 
to expire in 1996, the government published a Green Paper in November 1992 and 
invited responses by April 1993. The Green Paper had a quite different stance to the 
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antagonistic positions adopted by the Conservatives in the 1980s when Mrs. Thatcher 
had raised privatisation and advertising as possible scenarios for the BBC. 
By 1992 the government seemed to have no intention of replacing the 
licence fee as the major source of BBC funding, no intention of getting 
the BBC to take advertising, no intention of cutting the BBC's two 
television channels to one ... or of breaking up the Corporation (Goodwin, 1998: 124). 
Goodwin (ibid.: 125-129) argues that this change of approach was partially in 
response to the unpopularity of the ITV auctions but also in response to the BBC's 
own enthusiasm for efficiency savings and commercial operations, particularly in its 
introduction in 1991 of an internal market. Whatever the reason, the moderate tone of 
the Green Paper provided Labour with an ideal opportunity to mount a stout defence 
of the principles of public service broadcasting and an attack on the 
commercialisation of British broadcasting. 
The broadcasting brief in the shadow cabinet was then held by Ann Clwyd, a left- 
winger, who brought in Mike Jempson from the Campaign for Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom to draft the response to the Green Paper. Jempson had helped 
to organise the media unions' campaign during the 1990 Broadcasting Act (see p. 
211) and was a keen opponent of the commercialisation of British broadcasting. 
Indeed, the submission, Putting the Citizen at the Centre ofBritish Broadcasting 
(Labour Party, 1993) pursued a vehemently anti-commercial line and departed from 
the general enthusiasm for market principles at the top of the party. The document, 
published in April 1993, condemned the 'damage of deregulation' and argued that 
'deregulation stems from a political decision to stimulate market forces, by 
commercialising every aspect of public life' (ibid.: 2). Narrow objectives of 
efficiency and lowering units costs were no guarantee of increased diversity or 
programme quality and the document criticised the view that 'broadcasting should be 
guided increasingly by the demands of advertisers and sponsors, with audiences 
treated as consumers, passive in all but their spending power' (ibid.: 9). For Labour, 
the viewer was a citizen participating in the broadcasting process and not simply a 
consumer with a wholly commercial outlook. 
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The document was unequivocal in its support for the licence fee but criticised the 
Conservatives' squeeze on funding as they had pegged the licence fee to the level of 
RPI. Labour's solution to growing political interference in the BBC's finances was 
to suggest the creation of an independent reyiew board that would recommend 
suitable increases to the licence fee over a sustained length of time to allow the BBC 
to plan ahead. Furthermore, showing foresight of the debates that were to occur at the 
end of the decade over the introduction of digital television, the document suggested 
the possibility of 'occasional 'one-off additional levies to fund specific development 
projects' (ibid.: 22), although it failed to identify any examples of such projects. 
The document, however, was also critical of the BBC and recognised that damage 
had been done to the BBC's public service structures under the Conservatives, noting 
its Poor accounting practices, the politicisation of the appointments system and the 
unrepresentative nature of the governors. It therefore suggested a number of reforms 
to increase the institution's accountability. Firstly, in lieu of the charter, an Act of 
Parliament should formalise the BBC's position in law and should be backed up by a 
'covenant' that set out the BBC's obligations to licence-fee payers. Secondly, the 
board of governors should be replaced by an independent set of trustees with 
responsibility not for management but for overseeing the BBC's remit. Thirdly, the 
report called for the creation of a number of representative councils and panels to 
increase the transparency and accountability of the regulatory structures. A 'Viewers 
and Listeners Council' should take over the responsibilities of the Broadcasting 
Complaints Commission and the Broadcasting Standards Council; an independent 
'Broadcasting Appointments Commission', set up by select committee authority, 
should assume responsibility for selecting the trustees; finally, an 'Autonomous 
Broadcasting Council' should be established to represent regional groups and to 
advise on regional programme issues. In summary, the 'Labour Party is committed 
to a domestic broadcasting system whose first concern is to viewers and listeners, 
rather than advertisers and sponsors' (ibid.: 26). 
The tone of Putting the Citizen... was a far cry from the wide-ranging and 
impassioned critiques of the duopoly and the BBC that Labour had produced in the 
1970s and 1980s. It focused exclusively on the constitutional framework of the BBC 
and effectively marginalised questions of bias and political diversity. However, the 
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document was also a clear indication of a mood inside Labour to resist further 
commercial i sation and to halt the extension of the market to all areas of social life, 
indeed to treat people as 'citizens' and not as 'consumers'. Although Clwyd 
presented it to the shadow cabinet and recall's that 'it was well received by the 
leadership' (Clwyd, 2000), the document was not circulated to the party conference 
as originally planned and its proposals were not developed before the govenu-nent's 
White Paper on the BBC appeared the following year. 
In September 1993, Clwyd criticised the government's plans to relax the rules on 
ITV mergers and called for an extension of the existing moratorium on ITV 
takeovers. Hostile to any further loosening of cross-media ownership rules, Clwyd, 
according to the Guardian, was determined to renew 'the party's attack on Rupert 
Murdoch, who "must and will be stopped... (Culf, 1993). Clwyd never got the 
chance as she was thrown off the shadow Cabinet the following month and replaced 
as shadow heritage secretary by the former shadow minister for citizen's rights and 
women's issues, Mo Mowlam. This was a key moment for Labour in the evolution 
of its market-led television policy. When the ITV moratorium ended in January 
1994 (with a flurry of takeovers5l) and the government announced a review of media 
ownership restrictions, Mowlam 'who has been pressing for an inquiry into cross- 
media ownership, said she was pleased. "The emphasis must be on diversity and 
choice for the consumer... (Culf, 1994). By July 1994, the Labour-supporting Lord 
Hollick, a key backer of Tony Blair and leading ITV businessman, was attacking 
existing cross-media ownership controls, 'calling them confused, lacking in clarity 
and piecemeal' and calling for a redefinition of what constituted a monopoly 
(Broadcast, 1994). The process of Labour 'removing the citizen from the centre of 
British broadcasting' was underway. 
Tom O'Malley from the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom recalls that 
there was a shift in television policy from precisely this time and that 
Mo Mowlam was a pivotal figure in that shift and she was clearly 
involved in courting, in a political sense, News International. I went to 
many a meeting where she had that man David Elstein, a lobbyist for 
51 Granada bought London Weekend Television for f600m while Carlton bought Central for E758m. 
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Sky, and it was in that context that she organised the 2 I't Century Media 
conference (O'Malley, 1999) 
The conference, ivhich tookplace even before Blair had ivon the leadership contest, 
was designed to familiarise media executives with Labour's plans for the industry 
and was the clearest sign yet of a repositioning away from traditional concerns about 
media concentration and long-established hostilities between Labour and the media 
industries. At E230 per head, it was attended by Labour's front bench and by top 
executives from the British media world, including ITV, BBC and News 
International, but not by consumer groups, trade unionists or ordinary party 
members. Peter Goodwin described the conference as 
a distinctly new-look Labour gathering. It is sponsored by the Cable 
Television Association - one of only two organisations which responded 
to the BBC Green Paper advocating the replacement of the licence fee by 
subscription. It is organised by Mike Craven - who doubles as paid 
lobbyist for the [British] Media Industry Group ... established last year to 
get the cross-media ownership rules relaxed (Goodwin, 1994: 18). 
For Mike Jempson, who had recently drafted the party's policy on the BBC, the 
conference came as somewhat of a surprise. 
There was talk of a consultative conference to update Labour media 
policy, and we all rather assumed that conventional Labour allies would 
be involved, although Mo was making noises about potential sponsors 
from the commercial sector. Offers ofjoint sponsorship with the CPBF 
etc. were ignored. In the event ... we ended up with a razzarnatazz event 
at the Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, chaired by Mo, at which Sky/ 
News International thanked a rather uncomfortable Margaret Beckett for 
allowing them to contribute to Labour Party policy. There was no trade 
union involvement ... The worm had turned, and most of us saw little 
point in being associated with policies that now apparently favoured 
greater deregulation especially re ownership and control measures, 'in 
order that UK media companies could compete freely in the global 
market'. I have not been approached for advice on broadcasting policy 
since; I assume commercial lobbyists have literally plugged all the gaps 
(Jempson, 2000). 
Labour's new-found enthusiasm for relaxing cross-media ownership rules was 
provided with a degree of intellectual rigour by the launch in early 1994 of a high- 
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profile research project into media regulation at the Labour-supporting think-tank the 
Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR). The programme was backed by Patricia 
Hewitt, the deputy director of the IPPR, previously Neil Kinnock's press secretary 
but now part of the unofficial advisory circlý around Tony Blair. It was funded by 
many of the companies who had attended the 2 Vt Century Media conference and 
who represented the heavyweights of the UK communications sector: BT, the Cable 
Communication Association, LWT, Pearson, Mercury Communications and News 
International. In fact, according to one of the project's founders, Richard Collins, 
News International was the first company to commit to funding on condition that at 
least two others also backed the work. (R. Collins, 2000). The research aimed at 
providing a systematic and integrated approach to the communications industries at a 
time of convergence. For James Purnell, one of the IPPR researchers, now a media 
policy adviser in Downing Street, the project was based on two key assumptions. 
Firstly, that markets weren't necessarily bad things, that there were some 
things that they were the best tool to deliver. Secondly, we had to adapt 
to the fact that technology was changing incredibly fast and that whereas 
policy was based on the idea that you would have a very small number of 
channels and newspapers, those assumptions were being overturned 
(Purnell, 2000). 
The research, eventually published as New Media, Neiv Policies (Collins and 
Murroni, 1996), strongly criticised the left's unerring hostility to market forces and 
called for a 'new, radical, synthesis' (ibid.: 10) of neo-liberal and old left approaches, 
a kind of broadcasting 'third way'. 
The book examines a wide range of issues including the provision of universal 
service in telecommunications, the need for freedom of information, plans to 
disaggregate the BBC into semi-autonomous units and the reform of a regulatory 
structure defined by 'feudal muddle, patronage and preferment rather than what is 
appropriate to a modem state and to a vital sector of the UK economy' (ibid.: 170). 
The spirit of the IPPR's call to modernisation, however, is best exemplified by the 
book's discussion on ownership where it seeks to overturn another of the left's 
assumptions, that media concentration needs to be curbed. Collins and Murroni 
distinguish between cross-oivnership, not in itself a problem, and the more 
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undesirable concentration of oivnership. They suggest, for example, that seven 
proprietors, each controlling about 15% of the total media market (as measured by 
audience numbers) would seem to be 'a reasonable definition of a floor for 
ownership regulation' (ibid.: 70) and that the 
I 
fewer cross-media interests a company 
I 
has, the more share it can have of an individual media field. 
By emphasising the unstoppable process of convergence and the need to consider the 
total media market, the IPPR's research both implicitly sanctioned the existence of 
monopolies in specific media fields and explicitly welcomed the development of 
communications behemoths. 'Large, concentrated media organizations are not 
intrinsically undesirable', conclude Collins and Murroni (ibid.: 75). 'Large size 
tends to bring the resources required for comprehensive high quality reporting and 
the case of the BBC suggests that large organizations with a share of media markets 
can serve the public interest' (ibid. ). This concession to the advantages of the 
centralisation of production and distribution, rather than the Labour left's preferred 
route of decentralisation, and the emphasis on the ability of large firms to deliver 
public service outcomes, perhaps explains why Richard Collins was so impressed by 
the behaviour of News International during the project. After all, how much did 
media moguls have to fear from the IPPR's proposals? 
It is striking that given the reputation of News International in Labour 
Party circles, our experience was that they were very robust and fair in 
providing evidence. They never overstepped the line of legitimate 
influence, never attempted to improperly influence, never twisted our 
arms, never threatened (R. Collins, 2000). 
Both Collins and Purnell deny that the IPPR project had a direct influence on front 
bench thinking about television. 'I don't think we had a terrific impact on Labour 
frontbench politicians but we were taken very seriously in some quarters of the 
policy community' recalls Richard Collins (2000) and points to the fact that many of 
those involved in the IPPR's advisory group are now in influential positions in 
policymaking, from the Competition Corm-nission to the board of Channel Four. 'I 
think we probably played a part in the process of moving on to a different type of 
policy and a lot of the assumptions and conclusions rom the project have now 'f 
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become government policy' argues Pumell (2000). Even though Collins talks of a 
'diffuse model of influence', it is clear that the IPPR project was part of a broader 
realignment between the business community and New Labour and that it helped to 
crystallise new ways of thinking about comnýiunications policy for the Blairites. 
I 
The party's shift on cross-media ownership did not please everyone in the labour 
movement. The 1994 TUC conference passed a motion opposing relaxation of 
ownership restrictions and calling for the rules to be extended to include satellite as 
well as terrestrial media. In moving the motion, the delegate from the print union, 
the GPMU, argued that 'it is extremely disconcerting to find the Labour Party's 
Marjorie Mowlam. suggesting "That some loosening of cross-media restriction is 
inevitable". Any further loosening of cross-media restrictions would be disastrous' 
(Burke, 1994: 390). Labour's liberalisationjuggernaut continued, however, until the 
issue was highlighted once more with the publication of the government's White 
Paper on media ownership in May 1995 (DNH, 1995). The Conservatives were by 
now anxious to win back ground from Labour on the subject of media ownership and 
proposed that newspaper groups controlling less than 20% of total circulation would 
be able to buy into television companies, up to a limit of 15% of the television 
market. For Goodwin (1998: 147-48), this was a technically ingenious as well as a 
politically pragmatic move as it allowed the owners of the Financial Tinies, 
Guardian, Telegraph and Mail newspapers to build up television interests, a demand 
for which they had been lobbying extensively during the previous year under the 
umbrella of the British Media Industry Group. The losers were the Labour- 
supporting Mirror Group and, perhaps more surprising, Murdoch's News 
International, the backbone of Tory support until 1992, both of whose newspaper 
interests exceeded the 20% limit. 
What was New Labour's reaction to the possibility of some of the party's fiercest 
critics expanding their media interests? 'I welcome a broadened perspective for the 
media industry' commented broadcasting spokesperson Graham Allen criticising the 
proposals only for being too 'vague' and 'far too nebulous' (Allen, 1995: 3). When 
they were published in the broadcasting bill in December 1995, Labour's response 
was even more emphatic: the problem with the government's proposals on relaxing 
cross-media ownership rules was not that they went too far but they did not gofar 
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enough. The new team of shadow heritage secretary Jack Cunningham and his 
broadcasting spokesperson Lewis Moonie were anxious to make this clear. 
We will not go for the government's system, I can pretty much guarantee 
that. My own preference is forComplete deregulation and allowing the 
Office of Fair Trading and the MMC [Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission] to sort things out. Cross-media ownership is a good thing. 
The whole point is to ensure the creation of bigger companies that can 
compete abroad (Moonie, quoted in Prescott and Hellen, 1996). 
For New Labour, broadcasting diversity now referred not to a genuine cross-section 
of political viewpoints but to a plurality of ownership that could be policed by the 
competition authorities (see Collins and Murroni, 1996: 61-71). Moonie clarified his 
position during the committee stage of the bill, arguing that the 20% rule was 
deliberately discriminating against the Labour-supporting Mirror Group and not 
Murdoch as the latter was more interested in developing satellite rather than 
terrestrial interests. 'If the Government really believe in full and fair competition, 
they should accept that adequate rules and tests already exist and remove the 20 per 
cent rule altogether' (HoC Debates, 21 May, 1996: col. 412). Labour then joined 
with two right-wing Tory MPs in voting against the proposal to introduce the 20% 
ceiling on newspaper circulation but was still defeated as the Liberal Democrats and 
Plaid Cymru MPs voted with the government. 
Such a wholehearted passion for deregulation was bound to provoke a reaction from 
critics of New Labour. The heritage secretary, Virginia Bottomley, said that Labour 
had 'lurched from a paranoid terror of large media groups to a sycophantic devotion 
to them' (quoted in Smithers, 1996). The left-wing journalist Paul Foot attacked 
New Labour not only for betraying its principles but also for playing a dangerous 
game in accommodating to media moguls. 
The switching of Labour's policy, and the abandonment of long- 
established opposition to private monopolies in the media, not only stinks 
of the same back-scratching sleaze for which Labour are constantly and 
properly attacking the Tories. It is also counter-productive. It hands 
power, strength and confidence to unelected, irresponsible media 
oligarchies which, if their commercial interests are threatened for a single 
second, even by a Labour government, will turn on their former 
benefactors and tear them to pieces (Foot, 1996). 
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Ownership was not the only issue related to television policy that the party leadership 
turned to in its attempt to create and publici. se the New Labour project. During the 
1992 US elections, Bill Clinton and Al Gore had embraced the promise of the 
'information superhighway' and the 'broadband revolution' as part of their own 
modernising ambitions. The terminology and excitement soon followed across the 
Atlantic so that, by 1994, British politicians were queuing up to be associated with 
cutting-edge developments around multimedia and digital technologies. The 
Conservatives' response was a rather dry Trade and Industry Select Committee 
report urging the development of a privately-built broadband infrastructure to take 
advantage of the likely economic benefits of optical fibre networks (see Goodwin, 
1998: 141-43). New Labour's initiative was much bolder and far more high-profile. 
Initially, Tony Blair set up a policy forum on the superhighway in November 1994, 
chaired by the new shadow heritage secretary, Chris Smith, who had taken over from 
Mo Mowlam. With a membership of 32 people, drawn from all over the Labour 
Party, communications industries, academia and the unions, the policy group 
received over 200 %vritten submission from interested individuals and some oral 
presentations from leading media and communications companies like News 
International, BT, Microsoft and the BBC. Its report, Connnunicating Britain's 
Future (CBF) (Labour Party, 1995b), was published in the summer of 1995 52 
(distributed on disk as well as hard copy) and was breathless about digital 
developments. 
We stand on the threshold of a revolution as profound as that brought 
about by the invention of the printing press. New technologies, which 
enable rapid communication to take place in a myriad of different ways 
across the globe, and permit information to be provided, sought, and 
received on a scale so far unimaginable, will bring fundamental changes 
to all our lives (ibid.: 3). 
52 and launched at the second 21" Century Communications conference with very much the same 
audience as the previous year's event. According to the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting 
Freedom, the conference 'was a sort of meeting for the faithful. The CPBF and the media unions 
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Yet this communications network would be one developed only by private finance so 
that the government's role was essentially to create the appropriate competitive 
environment and to promote the use of the networks. Unlike Harold Wilson's 
invocation of the 'white heat of the technological revolution' to attempt to 
9 
purposefully plan an industrial strategy, Blair's 'revolution' would have to be left to 
the mercy of market forces. 
Blair used the rhetoric of the superhighway and broadband technology as the 
backdrop for his highly successful speech to the 1995 Labour conference. He 
triumphantly announced that he had concluded a deal with British Telecom in which, 
in return for BT being allowed to offer entertainment services down its phone lines 53 
it had agreed to connect every school, hospital, college and public library to the 
superhighway for free. It was a very rare example of communications policy, 
particularly Labour communications policy, hitting the headlines. 
The superhighway initiative impacted on television policy in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it signalled Labour's acceptance of the inevitability of convergence and the 
need to adapt policy and regulation to meet the needs of converging media. This 
meant that New Labour saw less space for separate media policies and an urgent 
requirement to formulate a 'communications policy' in tune with the demands of a 
more competitive environment. Although CBF contained few references to 
television, it made a firm promise to combine the telecommunications regulator, 
Oftel, and the commercial television regulator, the ITC, into a more streamlined 
structure, an 'Ofcom', that would 'regulate the whole communications infrastructure 
and ensure fair competition' (ibid.: 8). In a clear hint at deregulation, a 'revamped' 
ITC would regulate content 'albeit with a lighter touch' (ibid.: 9). 
Secondly, CBF provided clear evidence of New Labour's willingness to consider 
broadcasting as part of industrial policy, which until that point had been more of a 
feature of the Tories' rather than Labour's approach. Although the brief was initially 
received no publicity about the event and had to make a direct approach to attend and have a stall' 
(O'Malley, 1995: 3). 
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given to Chris Smith as shadow heritage secretary, Smith himself was aware that 
many of the issues were industrial ones 'about how you get the network in place and 
how you make sure you get as near to a nationwide network as you can. The issues 
that then follow on very rapidly are content issues' (Smith, 1996). Lewis Moonie, 
shadow industry minister at the time, argues that Tony Blair was 'mistaken' in giving 
the brief to Smith and that there was tension between the shadow heritage and trade 
teams during the superhighway forum. 'I saw no very good reason from the point of 
view of that time for the heritage team to be having anything to do with it at all. 
Superhighways at present are largely a matter of creating infrastructure and that is 
entirely at present a matter for the DTI [Department of Trade and Industry]' 
(Moonie, 1996). Ironically, in a further example of the overlap of the broadcasting 
and industry briefs, both Moonie and Jack Cunningham, the shadow trade secretary, 
were moved to heritage before the 1997 election while Smith was moved to health 
and the superhighway brief itself moved to industry. 
The clearest sign that New Labour was Preparing to approach broadcasting on the 
basis of industrial concerns and economic regulation was provided by its attitude to 
Rupert Murdoch'sgrowing control of the pay-television market. In early December 
1996, several of the broadsheet newspapers carried lengthy articles criticising both 
Tories and Labour for doing nothing to wrest control of pay television away from 
Murdoch and for failing to enforce open standards for digital television. Moonie's 
response was to criticise the 'hysteria' of the press and to argue that Murdoch should 
be rewarded for his investment. 
I back having open systems and standards but I don't necessarily think 
that everybody should be able to have a free lunch. If they [the other 
broadcasters] want to use Murdoch's technology, then they're bloody 
well going to have to pay for it because that's what they would do in any 
other commercial field. No free lunches, a fair system and no unfair 
gatekeeping: that's what we're trying to achieve (Moonie, 1996). 
New Labour's preferred way of ensuring free and fair competition, therefore, was to 
be through the use of the competition authorities and economic regulators and not the 
53 In 1994, the Conservative government had prevented BT from offering broadcast entertainment 
services on its network in order to maintain competition in the communications infrastructure and to 
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traditional broadcasting regulators whose remits are defined in terms of cultural as 
well as economic objectives. For academic Stephen Barnett, this has the advantage 
of being transparent and consistent but, nevertheless, media policy 'thus becomes 
defined more in terms of Labour's industrial strategy: a free market, closely 
scrutinised for abuse by powerful and effective regulators' (Barnett, 1996). 
New Labour's enthusiasm for the knobs and fibres of the superhighway and the 
broadband revolution was replicated in its support for the government's plans for 
digital terrestrial television (DTT), embodied in the 1996 Broadcasting Act. 
Although expressing some reservations about the prospects for DTT in the light of 
strong competition from cable and satellite, Moonie spoke for the whole of the 
heritage team in wishing DTT well. 'We have no quarrel with the Government 
inasmuch as we want digital television to get going, as everyone else does' (HoC 
Debates, 16 April 1996: col. 605). Labour's pre-election arts and media document, 
Create thefiture, promised to 'promote the digital revolution' (Labour Party, 1997a: 
8) and added that 'it is important that we maintain universal access to a wide range of 
television services in the digital age' (ibid.: 11). If this meant, guaranteeing the free- 
to-air broadcasters a place on the new digital channels, then Conservative legislation 
had already provided this assurance. More likely, it was a New Labour promise to 
ensure that no one should be denied access to the multi-channel revolution but with 
no fUrther suggestion as to how to deliver on this pledge nor to provide public money 
to make it happen, Labour's approach was virtually identical to the Tories. 
Create thefitture made few new promises about television, repeating its support for a 
new regulator, Mom, pledging its support for the BBC 'as a flagship for British 
creativity and public service broadcasting' (ibid.: 8) and promising not to privatise 
Channel Four. The document emphasised the economic value of UK television and 
argued that there was no room for complacency in an internationally competitive 
market. However, 'the growing globalisation of media does not mean that we should 
be prepared to trade creativity or independence for a large-scale monoculture' (ibid.: 
11). New Labour's policy aims for television may be seen as reaching out to all 
constituencies, embracing tradition and innovation, creativity and diversity, public 
protect the investment of the cable companies. 
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service and commercial success. These principles were then embodied in the party's 
manifesto, Neiv Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better (Labour Party, 1997b) 
where the single paragraph on media and broadcasting - longer than the section on 
sport but shorter than the one on the national 
, 
lottery - managed to include references 
to 'competition' or 'competitiveness' three times. 54 
How much of a change had there been since the last election manifesto? The shadow 
arts minister in 1997, Mark Fisher, blames the rapid turnover of broadcasting 
spokespeople for the lack of development of a coherent Labour television policy 
between 1992 and 1997. 'It wasn't so much that there was a philosophical turn 
[from the I 980s] but when you're playing pass-the-parcel with political responsibility 
as was the case in those five years, it's almost impossible to sustain either the 
contacts or the thinking' (Fisher, 1999). Yet New Labour's balancing act between 
the market and public service in the 1997 manifesto does little to obscure the fact that 
substantial changes had taken place between 1992 and 1997. In the five years since 
its last manifesto commitment to tackle media concentration, Labour had 
transformed itself into the party ofmedia concentration; its pledge to curb the power 
of Rupert Murdoch and News International had been rethought as a campaign to 
cow-t the power of Rupert Murdoch and News International. By 1997, New Labour 
had provided the clearest signal of any incoming Labour administration of its 
intentions for broadcasting once in office. 
New Labour in office 
According to New Labour, the party's triumph in the polls in May 1997 was due to 
Blair's firm endorsement of an alternative to both traditional social democracy and 
the free market: the 'third way'. At one level, this had long been a theme of Labour 
54 The full paragraph reads as follows. 'Labour aims for a thriving, diverse media industry, combining 
commercial success and public service. We will ensure that the BBC continues to be a fla, -, ship for 
British creativity and public service broadcasting, but we believe that the combination of public and 
private sectors in competition is a key spur to innovation and high standards. The regulatory 
framework for media and broadcasting should reflect the realities of a far more open and competitive 
economy, and enormous technological advance, for example with digital television. Labour will C, balance sensible rules, fair regulation and international competition, so maintaining quality and 
diversity for the benefit of viewers (Labour Party, 1997b: 3 1). 
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revisionists who had sought to tread a Path between 'socialism' and 'capitalism'. 
But, for Blair, the 'third way' suggests a whole new sort of politics: 
My vision for the 21s' century is of a popular politics reconciling themes 
which in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic - 
patriotism and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the 
promotion of enterprise and the attack on poverty and discrimination 
(Blair, 1998: 1). 
Values of social justice, opportunity, responsibility and community are not 
antagonistic to market imperatives but indeed can only be delivered through market 
mechanisms. 'With the right policies, market mechanisms are critical to meeting 
social objectives, entrepreneurial zeal can promote social justice, and new 
technology represents an opportunity, not a threat' (ibid.: 4). 
Anthony Giddens, theorist of globalisation, director of the London School of 
Economics and New Labour's 'intellectual-in-chief, as Will Hutton (1998) put it, 
has best articulated the principles of 'third way' politics (Giddens, 1998). Firstly, he 
argues that class politics have been marginalised and that the traditional divide 
between left and right is no longer appropriate or able to express the more complex 
fractures in social and political attitudes. Secondly, 'third way' economics 
encourages competition but checks monopoly behaviour and recognises that not all 
goods or services may be best served by the market. Next, there is a need for greater 
transparency in public life and new forms of democratic participation like referenda 
and community action to stimulate civil society. Fourthly, the 'third way' requires a 
new form of national identity in a multipolar world to act as a 'stabilising force; a 
counter to endless fragmentation' (ibid.: 20) which Giddens calls 'cosmopolitanism'. 
Finally, there is the need for a new sort of welfare state, 'a social investment state' 
which invests in 'human capital rather than the direct payment of benefits' (ibid.: 
21). 
Much of this is far from original and is, in reality, an invocation of market 
competition, patriotism, welfare cuts and revisionist ideas about the disappearance of 
class antagonisms. Michael Freeden (1999) argues that Blair's 'third way' is simply 
the latest in a long line of middle ways between 'first' and 'second' ways of social 
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democracy and neo-liberalism but with a new emphasis on community, responsibility 
and equality of opportunity. 
According to Blair, the first policy objective, for 'third way' government is to create a 
'dynamic knowledge-based economy founded on individual empowerment and 
opportunity' (Blair, 1998: 7). The new economy is a top priority for industry 
secretary Stephen Byers who argues that 'we need a knowledge driven society. 
Knowledge can be both empowering, liberating and a source of economic well- 
being ... The key is the provision of a comprehensive electronic communications 
network' (Byers, 1999: 42-43). The government has therefore pushed to introduce 
more competition into the local phone loop, to develop new broadband services and 
to sing the praises of e-commerce as the preferred mode of trade for the new century. 
The key to success in the new economy, however, lies not so much with the 
provision of a physical infrastructure or the production of material goods but with the 
nurturing of a far less tangible commodity: creativity. Drawing on the ideas of 
Charles Leadbetter (which eventually ended up as the book Living on Thin Air 
[Leadbetter, 1999]), Tony Blair claims that the new economy is 'radically different. 
Services, knowledge, skills and small enterprises are its cornerstones. Most of its 
output cannot be weighed, touched or measured. Its most valuable assets are 
knowledge and creativity' (Blair, 1998: 8)55. 
One major policy response to the recognition of the economic value of the 
commodification of knowledge lay in New Labour's vision of 'Creative Britain' or, 
as the press dubbed it, 'Cool Britannia'. This initiative sought to establish the UK as 
a cultural powerhouse whose television programmes, music, films, fashion and 
software programmes triumphantly saturate world markets and make a significant 
impact on the UK's trade balance. One of the government's first actions was to 
launch the Creative Industries Taskforce in 1997 to examine ways of maximising the 
value of a sector that contributes about E50 billion of activity to the UK economy 
(Smith, 1998a: 3 1). For the new culture minister, Chris Smith, these are the key 
'55 For a critique of these notions of the 'weightless', 'new' and 'knowledge' economies, see Ursula 
Huws (1999). 
241 
industries of the knowledge economy, overshadowing traditional manufacturing and 
growing faster than any other sector: '[t]hey are where the wealth and the jobs of the 
future are going to be generated from' (ibid. ). 
Tony Blair handed the heritage brief to Chris Smith immediately after the election. 
Both Labour's victory and Smith's appointment ahead of the incumbent shadow 
heritage secretary Jack Cunningham were welcomed by media professionals. For 
Ron Zeghibe, the chief executive of Maiden Outdoor Advertising, 'Labour may be 
m ore receptive to certain concentrations of ownership and commercialisation in a 
broader sense than the rather dogmatic approach the Conservatives took' (quoted in 
Beale, 1997). Media trade journals Media JVeek and Broadcast greeted Smith's 
selection with the latter noting, in a dig at the Cunningham/Moonie regime, that 'he 
will have more sympathy with his brief than some of his predecessors' (Lewis, 
1997). Two months later, the New Labour government 'modernised' the national 
heritage department out of existence and introduced a new Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS), described by Smith as 'a department of the future. It is 
about creativity, innovation and excitement' (quoted in Thomcroft, 1997). The 
message from the Treasury, however, was that the new government would stick to 
the harsh limits on public spending laid down by the Tories so that there ivould be no 
additional public nzoney to pay for more creativity, innovation and excitement. We 
will assess the government's approach to television in its first few years in office by 
drawing on the DCMS' five objectives for public policy in broadcasting. 
" To promote the success of digital television on all platforms, in order 
to increase the number and variety of services available to consumers, 
and as a key component of the information age; 
" To promote innovation and competition in the broadcast-related 
industries and support the development of new media; 
" To sustain strong public service broadcasting which will continue to 
underpin quality and ensure that all consumers have access to varied 
programming which caters for the full range of needs and interests in 
our society; 
" To ensure that regulation develops in step with changing markets and 
technology, in order that the consumers interest continues to be 
protected without placing unnecessary obstacles to the development 
of the industry; 
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To promote the interests of the UK-based broadcast-related industries 
in international fora (DCMS, 1999a). 
To promote digital 
Labour inherited the architecture of the 'digital revolution' from the previous 
government and, far from changing policy on the licensing of new services, 
immediately sought to step up the pace of digital take-up. Smith commissioned an 
independent report from the National Economic Research Associates (NERA) to 
consider the barriers to the adoption of digital and, in particular, the economic costs 
associated with switching off the existing analogue spectrum. When NERA reported 
that the government should consider analogue switch-off in ten to fifteen years time, 
Smith responded that 'I would not wish to switch off analogue broadcasters until 
digital receivers are as universally installed in households as analogue ones are now' 
(quoted in Gapper, 1998). Digital was also high on the list of priorities when he first 
addressed the television industry as secretary of state, stressing the New Labour 
themes of access, competition and efficiency. 
I want digital services to develop on the basis of fair competition 
between providers to bring content to consumers - not as a war between 
different receiving equipment or delivery systems. I also want to ensure 
universal access to the current free-to-air public service channels and I 
want that access as soon as possible to be through digital services, so as 
to end the current wasteful use of valuable radio spectrum for analogue 
terrestrial broadcasting (Smith, 1997: 10). 
These promises were scarcely controversial. As we have already discussed, the free- 
to-air channels had been guaranteed access to digital platforms under Conservative 
legislation and the policing of competition between different providers was to be 
done by the existing regulators and competition authorities, precisely as the Tories 
had envisaged. Furthermore, the switching-off of analogue spectrum, given its 
market value in the billions of pounds, was a prize that every government was 
anxious to win. Smith repeated these pledges the following year arguing that 'it is 
not a question of whether digital television will succeed, but only of how quickly it 
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will win acceptance' and praised the digital providers for promising that 'their 
respective platforms will be interoperable' (Smith, 1998b). 
His government's reliance on the market an4 competition authorities to stop a 'set- 
top box war' came unstuck fairly quickly. BSkyB launched its digital satellite 
service in October 1998, followed a month later by the DTT service, On Digital, both 
using distinct operating systems and separate boxes. The need for 'interoperability' 
was explained away by the fact that digital providers were giving away their boxes 
for free in order to increase consumer demand. Even if the end result of this for 
viewers wanting access to all channels was a substantial increase in subscription 
fees, the government could still claim that there was 'fair competition' for digital 
services. The Observer countered that the government had failed to use its power to 
enforce interoperability and that if 'the Government wants the consumer to come 
first it could do a lot worse than to start knocking a few heads together in the worlds 
of television and regulation' (Bell, 1999). James Purnell, the media adviser at the 
Number Ten Policy Unit, not surprisingly sees things differently and claims that a 
key achievement of the government is in 'having an effective competition policy 
which has meant that digital has so far been introduced in a pro-competitive way. 
We're having a unique subsidy of set-top boxes' (Purnell, 2000). The importance of 
market subsidies is set to be a popular topic for television policyrnakers in the future. 
In September 1999, the government decided that, after observing digital television in 
the UK for nearly a full year, it was ready to announce its plans for the digital future. 
Analogue transmission would cease some time between 2006 and 2010 but only on 
the basis of two tests: availability and affordability. Digital signals would need to 
match the availability of current analogue ones, approximately 99.4% of the UK 
population, while 95% of consumers would have to have access to digital equipment 
in their homes before switchover was completed (Smith, 1999a: 9). The definition of 
affordability, however, was far less precise: ji]t means prices which are within the 
reach of people on low and fixed incomes, particularly elderly people for many of 
whom television is the most important and reliable companion in their daily lives' 
(ibid. ). Smith provided no clue as to what the government would do should prices 
not be within the reach of the poor or the elderly, apart from to rely on the charity of 
the digital providers as 'it will be in the interests of the television broadcasting 
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industry to ensure that the final 5 per cent are helped directly to make the switch- 
over' (HoC Debates, 29 October 1999: col. 1210). 
One solution that has definitely been discoupted is the provision of public subsidies 
I 
to encourage the take-up of digital services. According to the head of general 
broadcasting policy at the DCMS in 1997, Harry Reeves, it is 
highly unlikely that there will be crude subsidies, partly because of 
public finance considerations, partly because the government genuinely 
believes that this is something for the public to determine the pace and 
direction of development. I don't think there will be a subsidy, crude or 
sophisticated (Reeves, 1997). 
If New Labour was serious about facilitating a digital revolution in which all citizens 
have a 'stake', it might well consider spending some of the billions it is already 
earning from the sale of radio spectrum to lower the cost of access to digital services. 
This, however, would conflict with the government's determination to keep a tight 
rein on public spending and its reluctance to entertain any notion of subsidies, 
particularly in the provision of market goods. It would also conflict with its 
philosophy for digital, that new services will succeed or fail on the basis of consumer 
demand above all else. 
The problem with this argument is that the government was clearly not just reacting 
to but anticipating consumer demand for digital in its ambitious timetable for switch- 
off. Curiously, in his speech to the 1999 Labour conference, Smith failed to dwell on 
the part of the government's digital philosophy that said that a minority of 
households would have their television sets switched off should they not be able to 
afford digital conversion. Instead he described the social implications of digital for 
the deaf, the housebound, flexible workers and the elderly and promised that 'we've 
told the broadcasters that the digital revolution in television must work for everyone' 
(Smith, 1999b). Once again, no mention was made of the penalties commercial 
broadcasters would incur should they fail to live up to this aim nor was there a 
clarification of the incentives for the industry to 'work for everyone', including the 
poorest households. New Labour's faith in the market allows them to articulate a 
vision of digital in which all groups would find a range of benefits but one where 
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entry is guaranteed only to those who can afford to pay. Broadcasting minister Janet 
Anderson's comment that the government 'is only prepared to facilitate the handover 
to digital if it is in the interest of the public' (Anderson, 1999: 32) therefore needs to 
be considered both in the light of govenu-nerlt's enormous financial gain from 
analogue switch-off and its reluctance so far to enforce any positive regulation on the 
digital providers. New Labour has certainly promoted the digital revolution but it 
remains to be seen who will be the winner and who will be the losers. 
To promote competition 
So important is this aim for New Labour that of the six economic and social 
objectives for public policy on communications in the party's 1998 Green Paper, 
Regulating communications (DCMS/DTI, 1998a), two are listed as 'competitiveness' 
and 'competition' (ibid.: 13). New Labour's understanding is that for a media firm 
to be 'competitive' and efficient in relation to its rivals, nationally or internationally, 
the task of government is to encourage a high degree of competition in the home 
market. This is not the relatively stable sort of competition for viewers that marked 
the early years of UK broadcasting but a fully-fledged battle for revenue, audiences 
and market domination. However, while introducing competition into the home 
market is fairly straightforward, achieving true competitiveness is more difficult 
although absolutely essential in an era when multi-billion dollar cross-media mergers 
are taking place: 
Since markets are increasingly global - particularly if they are mediated 
electronically across global networks - domestic firms increasingly must 
compete with strong players from abroad. It is clearly central to the 
health of the UK economy that UK firms are fully competitive in world 
markets, not only to defend the domestic position, but also to attract a 
share of global revenues and jobs to the UK (ibid.: 14). 
New Labour's preferred way of building up strong, domestic media firms to cope 
with convergence is to further review existing cross-media ownership rules and 
continue the process it started while in opposition. In developing this strategy, the 
government was able to draw on the conclusions of a report, The nnilti-niedia 
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revolution (House of Commons, 1998), produced by the influential Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport. Chaired by the Labour MP, Gerald 
Kaufman, a firm believer in the process of convergence and the need for 
liberalisation, the committee insisted that size matters: 
excessive concern over ownership and size in a domestic context might 
create a market so fragmented that the United Kingdom lacks 
organisations with the range of skills and the investment capital to 
compete effectively in increasingly global markets. Dominant positions 
are often beneficial viewed in an international context; they are also often 
a legitimate reward for risk and innovation. The aim of regulation should 
be to reduce the possibilities for the abuse of a dominant position, not to 
reduce dominance (ibid.: para. 81). 
Just as the IPPR research distinguished between the desirability of cross-ownership 
and the undesirability of media concentration, Kaufman's committee was keen to 
distinguish between market dominance and the abuse of dominance. 
A single paragraph in Regulating communications followed up this point and argued 
that '[s]ome concentration of ownership has been regarded as inevitable, and 
possibly desirable, since it confers advantage in tenns of global competitiveness' 
(DCMS/DTI, 1998a: 16). However, the document also acknowledged the need for 
particular controls on media ownership that may be necessary to protect the aims of 
diversity and plurality of voice. The problem was that there was no firm indication 
about whether these rules were still necessary apart from a clear hint that 'the 
changes which are unfolding in broadcasting and telecommunications will call into 
question existing approaches to the achievement of those aims' (ibid.: 18). In any 
case, it was an extremely brief overview of one of the key areas of Labour's media 
policy up to the 1990s. 56 
The government made its intentions even clearer with the publication of The Way 
Ahead (DCMS/DTI 1999), its review of the consultation process following 
Regulating communications. Here, while its key policy aims were to 'foster 
56 It is notable that a far more comprehensive account on the need for cross-media ownership rules 
may be found in the Tories' White Paper on media ownership published three years before Regulating 
communications. 'Special media ownership rules, which exist in all major media markets, are needed 
therefore to provide the safeguards necessary to maintain diversity and plurality' (DNH, 1995: 3). 
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competitive markets' and to 'ensure that the United Kingdom builds on its 
competitive strength' (ibid.: para 1.1), there was no mention at all of the need for 
continuing with cross-media ownership restrictions. Instead, the document 
confirmed that more use should be made of ttie competition authorities and economic 
mechanisms rather than specific media regulation. General competition law, it 
suggested, would be enough to check any abuse of a dominant position while in no 
way discouraging the pursuit of dominance. Several months before The Wa Ahead, Y 
the government had scrapped the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and 
introduced a Competition Commission that, together with the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT), was given tough new powers to rule on anti-competitive behaviour without 
any political interference affecting key merger decisions. According to James 
Purnell at the No. 10 Policy Unit, 
our approach [to ownership questions] will be very similar to what is 
now. Our primary tool is competition. As a government we're very keen 
on effective competition policy, we've replaced the Competition Act 
which is as tough as any in the world and we'll apply those principles to 
the media (Purnell, 2000). 
The first example of this 'depoliticised' approach to media mergers happened in 
November 1999 when Stephen Byers, the trade and industry secretary, referred a 
merger between two cable companies, NTL and Cable & Wireless Communications, 
to the Competition Commission against the express advice of the OFT. The referral 
was inspired by government concerns not so much about the concentration of the 
cable television industry than by the threat that a powerful cable company might 
present to BSkyB. Byers' action, wrote the Observer, 'opened the way for criticism 
that the Goverriment's relationship with Rupert Murdoch ... was more important than 
its aim of promoting competition' (Morgan, 1999). The decision of the New Labour 
competition minister, Kim Howells, to have lunch with the chief executive of BSkyB 
shortly afterwards did not help (see Wighton, 1999). 
A further challenge to the new media ownership regime was set in motion by the 
proposed merger, also in November 1999, of two ITV companies, Carlton and 
United News & Media, the latter controlled by Labour peer Lord Hollick. Byers 
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referred this merger and the subsequent bids by Granada Television for both Carlton 
and United, to the Competition Commission. Once again, his rationale was less 
likely to be a concern over the centralisation of the ITV network and the resulting 
impact on regional broadcasting than an oppýrtunity to review the upper limits 
currently imposed on ITV companies' share of the advertising market and the 
television audience and to reflect on the desirability of a single ITV company. While 
officials at the DCMS claim neutrality on the latter issue, Sarah Thane, director of 
programmes at the commercial television regulator the Independent Television 
Commission (ITC), states that 
I get the idea that the government, certainly at DCMS level, are 
extremely tom. For the first few years of Chris Smith in opposition and 
once he became secretary of state, every conference speech he gave said 
"the key things are choice for viewers, quality of programmes and 
plurality of ownership". Now that's started to slide away of the speech 
list because anyone now would be intimidated by the scale of the deals 
that are going on in America and are thinking to themselves "are we 
really being a bit ridiculously careful and narrow here and are we 
hampering our companies on a global stage by trying to keep a diverse 
media provision with UK shores? "... I think they [DCMS] are in the 
camp, like most of us are, in thinking that in due course there will be a 
single ITV but it's how long that course needs to run and how quickly 
you ought to facilitate that (Thane, 2000). 
The government has now prioritised the redrafting of cross-media ownership rules 
for its forthcoming White Paper and, according to the DCMS official responsible, 
'everything is very much up for grabs' (M. Collins, 2000). New Labour, therefore, 
has vigorously embraced competition in the communications sector and has 
promoted the idea that the public interest - in television as in other areas - is best 
served not through regulation but through effective competition. The problem is, as 
yet, there are no obvious signs of effective competition in broadcasting. Indeed the 
fact that, in the UK, one company dominates satellite television, two companies 
dominate cable, two companies are set to dominate ITV, and one company 
dominates digital terrestrial television - and that company is owned by the 
companies who dominate ITV - is hardly a ringing endorsement of vigorous 
competition and certainly not of diversity. The government's activity in this area 
increasingly points to a conception of broadcasting not as an area of cultural life with 
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distinct needs and rules but as an industrial sector to be exploited using standard 
economic tools and arguments. 
To ensure that regulation develops in step with changing markets and technology 
Although New Labour came to power proclaiming the onset of a digital revolution 
and promising to shake up the existing regulatory system, the government proceeded 
cautiously to begin with. Plans for broadcasting legislation were postponed while the 
proposals for a single regulator, an Ofcom, were shunted to one side. According to 
the government's media policy adviser: 
We thought it was the wrong time to do it because that was the time 
digital was being introduced and regulatory changes in the media are 
incredibly destabilising. Sometimes change is good but when people 
were taking very big risks in investing on new platforms, it was 
important to have regulatory stability (Purnell, 2000). 
This was an early sign that New Labour's media policy would do nothing to 
antagonise corporate interests in the media industry and that the immediate task for 
television policymakers was to protect the substantial investments of companies like 
Carlton and Granada. 
The government's strategy of maintaining 'regulatory stability' was undermined by 
the publication of two reports within a year of taking office. Firstly, in December 
1997, the European Commission released its highly deregulatory Green Paper on 
convergence, calling for the adoption of market mechanisms to embrace the 
possibilities of convergence and for the scrapping of any regulation that would act as 
a barrier to the creation ofjobs and profits (European Commission, 1997). Next, in 
May 1998, the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee published its report on 
The nuilti-media revolution attacking the plethora of regulatory agencies in the UK 
communications field as being 'more reminiscent of a feudal State than a regulatory 
structure for the multi-media age' (House of Commons, 1998: para. 157). The report 
called for the creation of a new Department of Communications and for a 
Communications Regulation Commission, modelled on the American FCC, to 
replace the existing alphabet soup of regulators (ibid.: para. 158). 
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While the government was sympathetic to the view expressed in both reports for 
increasing the use of competition law and reducing the scope of regulation, it 
concluded that there is '-sufficient flexibility ýyithin the current system of regulation 
to cope with developments over the next few years and the Government is actively 
encouraging co-ordination within the existing framework' (DCMS/DTI, 1998b: para. 
xx). Co-ordination took the form, not just of closer working relationships between 
the current regulators, the ITC, Oftel and the OFT, but also between the industry and 
culture departments of government. At one level this was particularly ironic as, 
having spent over a decade arguing for a dedicated media ministry, as soon as 
Labour had set one up, it was forced to share responsibilities with one of the most 
powerful departments in Whitehall. At another level, this was simply evidence of the 
direction in which New Labour was headed - towards a conception of media policy 
as a branch of industrial policy - and therefore a very logical move. 
The two departments published their joint Green Paper, Regulating communications 
(DCMS/DTI, 1998a), in July 1998. The document conceives of viewers purely as 
consumers - there are ten references to 'the consumer' in the executive summary 
alone - and sets out to find a balance between recognising the needs of the 
'providers' and protecting the interests of the 'consumers'. It is quite clear, however, 
that it will be market forces, wherever possible, that mediate this relationship: '[t]he 
government will seek to provide a structure which reflects market realities and will 
seek to distort them as little as possible' (ibid: 10). Given the inescapable fact of 
convergence, it was time for traditional assumptions to be overturned: from now on, 
regulation should be the exception and not the rule. 'Regulation should be the 
minimum necesssary to achieve clearly defined policy objectives. The presumption 
that broadcasting and communications should be regulated should therefore in 
general be reversed' (ibid.: 23). Furthermore, even the argument for any remaining 
regulation to be based on fixed principles was now too rigid. 
The regulatory structure must also be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new 
developments in a fast-changing environment. We have to regulate for 
the reality of the market today and tomorrow, not for a snapshot of 
yesterday's market frozen in time, nor for a vision of the day after 
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tomorrow which may never materialise in the form we anticipate (ibid.: 
24). 
. 
Following the Green Paper's notion that 'market forces represent a natural "default 
position" against which any regulatory intervention has to be justified as a special 
case', as the media union BECTU stated in its response (BECTU, 1998: para. 9), the 
document's support for public service broadcasting seems a little shaky. The role of 
positive content regulation in promoting diversity, impartiality and quality is 
acknowledged but treated almost as an historical curiosity. For example, the 
document notes that 'there is a long tradition in broadcasting of regulation to ensure 
that broadcasters observe due impartiality' and that 'intervention has been necessary 
to ensure that the needs of all sections of the community are met' (DCMS/DTI, 
1998a: 17) but says nothing about future plans to safeguard minority interests or 
balance. Indeed, public service broadcasting and non-commercial objectives are 
marginalised as compared to the bright new future of interactivity and converging 
markets. 
Regulating coininunications was notable more for the way in which it shifted the 
agenda towards regulation only 'in the last instance' than for any specific policy 
proposals. It repeated the argument that there was no need to change the regulatory 
arrangements in the immediate ftiture, preferring instead to adopt a 'wait and see' 
attitude to development in the communications market. The DCMS/DTI's The Way 
Ahead, published the following year, reaffirmed this stance of following market 
developments and pledged to 'continue with the evolutionary approach to adapting 
communications regulation set out in the Green Paper' (DCMS/DTI, 1999: para. 
1.19). However, it stressed the importance of the two new committees that had 
recently been set up: the G3, comprised of members from the OFT, Oftel and the ITC 
and the G6 including officials from the DCMS and the communications policy and 
competition policy directorates of the DTI (ibid.: para. 2.2). Both committees were 
clearly weighted towards the interests of economic regulators, deprioritising the 
traditional concerns of broadcasting regulators. Indeed, although the report pledged 
the need for continuing content regulation of generalist television services 'to guard 
against misleading advertising and prevent viewers being shocked or harmed' (ibid.: 
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para. 3.12), there should be as little interference as possible. 'It is important to 
consider whether regulatory objectives in communications can be achieved with a 
lighter touch and to ensure that the regulatory impositions on commercial 
broadcasters are no more than is necessary to protect the public interest' (ibid.: para. 
3.10). Given that government was now defining the public interest in terms of fair 
competition and the efficient use of spectrum, 'light-touch' regulation was evidently 
to be the preferred option. 
This deregulatory approach was echoed by the secretary of state's comments in 
September 1999 when announcing the proposals for analogue switch-off The 
Guardian, under the headline 'Smith signals TV free-for-all', quoted the minister as 
saying that there 'is a sensible discussion to have about whether there is a place for 
content regulation beyond those basic provisions [of impartiality and the watershed]' 
(Gibson, 1999). The amount of positive programming requirements would have to 
be weighed up against commercial considerations and the need for competitiveness. 
In February 2000, the secretaries of state for trade and for culture finally announced 
plans for a White Paper on communications to be followed by primary legislation in 
the next year or two. Their objective was broadly similar: to consider how to re- 
regulate the media and communications sector to enhance the UK's market share. 
While the DTI's Byers wants to 'ensure that the UK remains a world leader in 
providing communications services', for Smith the 'government's aim is to promote 
the global competitiveness of our media and communications industries, as well as 
protect the interests of the consumer' (DCMS/DTI, 2000). In terms of television, 
this would mean examining 'how to achieve deregulated but distinctive content 
regulation' (Smith, 1999a: 8). 
Is a single regulator likely to be the outcome of their deliberations? The DCMS' 
head of general broadcasting policy claims that 'Ofcorn is one of the options, but 
there are other options. There's no favoured option at present. The important thing 
is to determine what the objectives are and then see what sort of structures would 
best meet those objectives' (Dawes, 2000). Yet, the government has made it 
abundantly clear that its key objective is to increase competitiveness, so whatever 
institutional form the new regulatory structure takes, positive regulation is likely to 
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take a back seat. James Purnell from No. I O's policy unit, puts this down to the 
unstoppable effects of technological convergence. 
This area of policy has functioned partly on the basis of trading, giving 
people spectrum for them to provide you with public service goods. That 
kind of bargain is becoming less easy to strike as the spectrum becomes 
less valuable because of the penetration of multi-channel television. So 
we'll need to consider, as those tools slip away, what are the tools which 
remain to us (Purnell, 2000). 
Three years into New Labour's term of office, it is evident that the tools Purnell 
refers to will increasingly be those of the market, that 'lighter touch' regulation will 
become more common and that the influence of industrial policy on broadcasting 
ever more stark. 
To sustain strong public service broadcasting 
In the light of a more commercial broadcasting environment, the role of public 
service broadcasting in providing an oasis of non-commercial aspirations would 
seem to be particularly important. No one has made this point clearer than Chris 
Smith himself. Attacking the notion that public service is dead, Smith (I 999a: 8) 
argues that it is more vital than ever: '[i]n an era of multiplying services and an ever 
tighter squeeze of budgets, quality is under unremitting pressure and it is part of the 
function of public service broadcasting to set and sustain benchmarks for quality. ' 
The government's aim, therefore, is to vigorously cormnercialise the broadcasting 
system at the same time as championing those institutions which are not solely 
driven by market considerations. One example of this broadcasting 'third way' is 
Smith's reluctance, so far, to privatise the highly successftil advertising-funded 
Channel Four. Indeed, in 1998, he strengthened its public service remit and forced it 
to promise to commission more original programmes and to broadcast fewer repeats. 
Its licence was revised to clarify its public service status and to formalise its 
commitment to 'experiment, innovation, originality and diversity' (ITC, 1997). For 
some, Channel Four is a testament to the possibility of public service objectives 
being met through market mechanisms; for others, however, Channel Four today is a 
testament only to consumerism and the power of marketing. For Anthony Smith, one 
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of its first board members, the channel has lost its distinctive experimental vision 
and, in its obsession with youth-oriented programmes, 'doesn't seem to have a 
mission to be anything other than another television channel' (quoted in Beckett, 
2000). 
Of course, the key example of any government's support for public service 
broadcasting lies in its relationship to the BBC. While Gerald Kaufman, the Labour 
chair of the Heritage Select Committee, welcomed Labour's election victory as an 
opportunity to privatise the BBC (Kaufman, 1997), Smith has shown no such interest 
and has placed the future of the BBC at the heart of broadcasting policy. This is not 
to say that the government's relationship to the Corporation has been particularly 
warm. In August 1997, Labour accused the editor of The World at One, Kevin 
Marsh, of waging a 'vendetta' against the government for concentrating on Peter 
Mandelson's news management techniques. In December of that year the party's 
chief media spokesperson threatened to sever all contacts with the influential Today 
programme after a particularly bruising interview between one of its presenters and 
the social security minister. As one New Labour MP, Barbara Follett, argued in a 
parliamentary debate on the BBC, the 'original three "I"s - impartial, informed and 
intelligent - are in danger of being replaced with a new trio; impatient, interruptive 
and imitative' (HoC Debates, 29 October 1999: col. 1242). 
However, just as Harold Wilson had regularly fallen out with the BBC in the 1960s 
before subsequently agreeing to licence fee increases, in October 1998 Chris Smith 
extended the licence fee until at least 2006 and announced the setting up a committee 
to examine the funding of the BBC until that time. With the government determined 
to build up large multimedia companies to compete on the global stage and with the 
BBC demanding a substantial rise in its revenue to meet the demands of digital, 
Smith turned to Gavyn Davies to head the committee. As a multi-millionaire partner 
at the investment bank Goldman Sachs, Davies was perhaps not the most obvious 
choice to consider the future funding of a public service broadcaster. As a personal 
friend of both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown and a supporter of New Labour's 
economic policies (see Laurance, 1999), he was at least a reliable person to turn to. 
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The left-wing Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom immediately attacked 
the narrow remit of the committee. 'Bracketing the issue [of finance] off in this 
manner, and forcing discussion into a tight timetable suggests that the government 
57 does not want a ftill open public debate (CPBF, 1999a: 5). The campaign's 
demands for a public inquiry were turned down unequivocally, although the fact that 
there were some two thousand submissions to the Davies Committee suggests a 
lively interest in the BBC's future. It soon became clear, however, that Davies was 
considering the introduction of a supplementary licence fee for digital households, 
dubbed the 'digital levy', of between f 30 and Ma year (see Hutton, 1999). This 
suggestion was greeted with horror, largely by commercial broadcasters like BSkyB, 
Carlton and Granada who had already invested heavily in digital television. These 
broadcasters launched a vigorous lobbying campaign against the levy, claming that it 
would deter the take-up of digital services and undermine the government's plans for 
analogue switch-off. 
The committee's report, released in August 1999, proposed a lower than expected 
digital levy of E24 a year in order to placate the commercial lobby, a maintenance of 
the existing index-linked licence fee and privatisation of some of the Corporation's 
activities. This was a neat package that fitted with New Labour ideology: a partial 
sell-off of public assets to demonstrate its commitment to efficiency, together with 
the shouldering of an extra burden by the minority of viewers who could afford to do 
so. The former minister, Peter Mandelson, supported the levy as it would mean that 
'only those with digital televisions will pay for the costs of new digital services, 
rather than as now the poor subsidising the services received by those able to afford 
digital' (quoted in BBC, 1999a). With this approach, New Labour matched the 
language used by the Wilson government in arguing for a levy for colour television 
back in the 'white heat' of the 1960S. 58 However, this was still nowhere near enough 
to satisfy the digital broadcasters who resumed their campaign to scrap the levy 
57 This resembled the attack by the Labour Party itself on the parameters of the Peacock Report some 
ten years earlier. 'The extremely narrow remit of the Peacock Committee is a major cause for 
concern. By restricting it to purely financial issues it demands answers which are likely to preempt 
future developments in broadcasting' (Labour Party, 1985: 1). 
58 'It is the Government's view that the cost of colour programmes, which are likely at the outset to be 
available only to a small minority of viewers because of the cost of receivers, should not fall upon 
viewers in general. Accordingly a supplementary licence of E5 [a 100% increase] will be required 
from those equipped to receive colour programmes' (White Paper, 1966: 6). Z, 
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entirely. BSkyB, in particular, indicated that it would only drop its opposition if the 
government put pressure on the BBC to scrap its dedicated news channel, News 24, 
perceived as a rival to the Sky News channel. 
By September, the Financial Tinies was able to reveal that Tony Blair, although keen 
on the digital levy, was concerned about the amount of opposition it had generated 
and was considering alternatives including, according to one Whitehall adviser, 
advertising. 
Just raising the licence fee is less politically attractive even than the 
digital licence fee. If Number 10 decides that the digital licence fee is 
something the government shouldn't go for because of the impact on 
digital, it will have to look at alternatives, namely advertising on [the 
BBC's] digital channels or advertising on the main BBC channels 
(quoted in Newman, 1999). 
This marked a return of an old solution to an old problem. As with Tony Berm in the 
1960s and with Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, leading politicians were prepared to 
supplement the licence fee with a dose of advertising, partly because of an 
unwillingness to be seen as raising taxes. Indeed, even when Chris Smith suggested 
the compromise of a reduced digital levy combined with a small rise in the analogue 
licence fee, this was countered by Treasury officials 'wary of setting a precedent by 
reopening a five year settlement' (Newman, 2000). 
James Purnell, media policy adviser at the No 10 Policy Unit insists that 'there 
wasn't actually a sort of pitched battle around the DTI and the DCMS and that all 
were agreed on the importance of the BBC's role in a multimedia ftiture' (Purnell, 
2000). This analysis appears to fly in the face of splits that had already developed. 
The prime minister initially supported the levy but was to prepared to contemplate 
alternatives in order to pacify BSkyB and ITV, the Treasury was against the idea of 
any tax-raising schemes, the DTI was anxious not to undermine analogue switch-off 
while Smith at the DCMS was keen to keep all sides happy. 
The tortuous negotiations were finally concluded in February 2000 when the 
goverment announced that there would be no digital levy but instead that the licence 
257 
fee would increase by RPI plus 1.5% until 2006/7, giving the BBC an extra E200m a 
year. For the BBC, however, the deal came with a few strings attached: t4e 
government was to review the future of News 24, as BSkyB had demanded, while 
the Corporation would be expected to make over El billion in efficiency savings and 
to develop more public/private partnerships. The emphasis of the 'tough love' 
package was very much on efficiency savings, cutting red tape and increasing 
commercial competitiveness. The headline of the Financial Thnes was that 'Private 
sector is a TV winner in BBC funding deal' (Harding 2000). David Elstein, the chief 
executive of Channel 5, claimed that '[tjhis is a big win for the commercial boys. 
There's no digital levy, limited BBC expansion, tighter control of BBC activities and 
no premium channels. It's a small win for the BBC. The only loser as usual is the 
poor, honest, single-set, non-digital licence payers' (quoted in Broadcast, 2000). 
Given the government's vocal support for the BBC in the digital age, it could hardly 
do less than sustain its current funding but what appeared to be more important 
during the course of the negotiations was the government's desire not to antagonise 
its commercial allies in the broadcasting industry. 'This is a very political 
settlement', one broadcasting executive commented. 'It gives Sky and Rupert 
Murdoch what they wanted. It gives the BBC more money. And it tightens the 
screws on the BBC in terms of efficiency and transparency' (quoted in Harding, 
2000). 
The irony of the situation is that the settlement satisfied neither the BBC nor Rupert 
Murdoch. While welcoming the retreat from the digital levy, the Sun complained 
about the huge amounts of money being extorted by the BBC and that 'of course, it 
isn't the government's money to give away in the first place - it's YOURS (Sun, 
2000). The fact is that the settlement amounted to a tax rise which, given the 
regressive nature of the licence fee, would hit the poor the hardest. The 
government's commitment to public service broadcasting and its enthusiasm for the 
BBC to join the digital revolution was therefore to be funded not by income tax 
receipts nor by the billions of pounds raised by the auction of radio spectrum, but 
from the pockets of those least able to afford it. 
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To promote UK broadcast interests in the intemational market 
One of the most consistent themes of ministers' statements on contemporary 
broadcasting concerns the need to take advantage of the popularity of the English 
language and to increase the exports of UK television output. This approach was 
first taken up in the early 1990s when Conservative government thinking 'had been 
stimulated by a sudden realisation that the country's pre-eminence in the cultural 
industries offered the UK tremendous export opportunities in a rapidly expanding 
international market' (Barnett and Curry, 1994: 221). Michael Heseltine at the DTI 
and Peter Brooke at the DNH embraced the possibilities of an export-led strategy and 
incorporated this line of thinking into the government's 1994 White Paper on the 
BBC, optimistically titled Serving the nation, coinpeting ivorld-ivide (DNH, 1994). 
The monthly magazine Sight and Sound immediately described the BBC's plans to 
sell more programmes abroad as a 'fantasy': 
The central illusion of the whole strategy ... is the belief that the world of 
multi-channel television is panting to pay big money for British 
programming. The global television market is highly skewed. The big 
terrestrial channels in each country will continue to take most of the 
audience (Sight and Sound, 1994: 3). 
Despite this warning, New Labour politicians followed up the vision of increased 
television exports with particular enthusiasm. In 1995, Tony Blair announced to 
Labour's conference that Britain has 'such huge advantages. Some of the finest 
telecommunications companies in the world. World leaders in broadcasting. The 
world's first language, English. Together, they could put us years ahead in education 
and technology and business' (Blair, 1995). The following year, Peter Mandelson 
wrote that what he had learned from his visit to the Far East was that '[slpreading the 
word is Britain's secret weapon. Expanding the activities of the BBC and the British 
Council around the world ... are essential economic policies for Britain' (Mandelson, 
1996). Globalisation developments together with the increased saliency of television 
as a cultural force had moved broadcasting from the domestic to the international 
stage. Tony Blair characterised this as a constituent feature of 'third way' politics: 
'[flree trade has proved itself a motor for economic development, political co- 
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operation and cultural exchange. The development of global modem media will 
intensify this process' (Blair, 1998: 18). 
The most successful British exponent of global television at the time was long- 
standing Labour supporter and backer of Tony Blair, Greg Dyke, the then chief 
executive of Pearson TV. According to Dyke, 'in every industry the globalisation 
concept is happening ... The trick is can you globalise programming and make 
it 
local? You own a load of formats, you make them in different countries, you take 
them from one to another... (quoted in Baker, 1997). The consequence of this sort of 
globalisation is that Pearson owns three versions of Fandly Feud in Indonesia and 
controls the rights to Neighbours across the world. Was this what Blair had in mind 
when he talked of the media facilitating 'political co-operation and cultural 
exchange'? 
Once in office, Chris Smith and his civil servants at the DCMS eagerly adopted this 
approach and prioritised exports on the policy agenda. For Harry Reeves, the head 
of general broadcasting policy in 1997, there appeared to be no contradiction 
between the demands of the UK audience and the potential for increasing sales 
internationally. 
It [global television] is very high on the list of policy objectives. We're 
in one of those situations where it's move on or die ... There is a 
widespread perception that there is a conflict between the cultural 
objectives and the economic objectives and to a degree there is. But I 
don't think that it has ever been demonstrated that the kind of 
[requirements for] quality and variety that is placed on broadcasters 
necessarily impairs their competitiveness in international markets 
(Reeves, 1997). 
His colleague, Paul Heron, head of the DCMS' public service broadcasting branch, 
also saw no problem with the BBC following the guidelines laid down in Serving the 
nation, coinpeting world-wide. 'There are great opportunities, great markets ... extra 
revenue for the BBC which goes into quality public service broadcasting. The 
government would certainly not want to curtail the BBC's commercial activities ... I 
don't see any contradiction [between public service and commercial activities]' 
(Heron, 1997). The government therefore encouraged the activities of the BBC's 
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commercial ann, BBC Worldwide, and welcomed its commercial partnerships with 
companies like Flextech and the Discovery Channel, arguing that international sales 
could only benefit domestic viewers. 
Smith at the time was relatively sanguine about the UK's position in the international 
market. 'Britain is the second biggest exporter of television programming in the 
world. We are ahead of the game in what is a rapidly growing market of great 
cultural and commercial significance' (Smith, 1998a: 101). Other Labour supporters 
in the television industry were more impatient. The then independent producer 
Waheed Alli, recently made into a life peer by Tony Blair, argued that '[w]e focus on 
domestic market share when we should be focusing on global market share as a 
group of television companies (Alli, 1998: 42). The DCMS therefore commissioned 
a piece of research to quantify the UK's share of the export market and to suggest if 
there was room for improvement. The report, Building a global audience: British 
television in overseas markets, was co-written by David Graham, a former member 
of the free-market think-tank the Institute of Economic Affairs, and backed by the 
sales anus of some of the UK's leading broadcasters like Carlton, Pearson, Granada 
and the BBC. 
The survey made for some grim reading. It found that British television was not 
perceived as the best in the world, that it had a relatively small share of the global 
export market and that the UK had a substantial trade deficit in television of some 
E272 million in 1997 (Graham, 1999: 8). This was partly because while UK 
programmes 'are praised by international executives for their high production values, 
quirky sense of humour, and high standards of acting ... our drama is too dark; too 
slow; unattractive; too gritty or socio-political' (ibid.: 24) . 
59 The report also found 
that the length of programmes or series that was designed for the UK market was 
often too short for the international market and that the more popular genres abroad, 
like TV movies and the mini-series, were not ones produced in any quantity in the 
UK. The logic was that an emphasis on gritty dramas relevant to a UK audience 
should be replaced by output that is more internationally packageable: Benny Hill, 
59 Variety's headline was 'Bleak fare blights export' (Dawtrey, 1999). 
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Mr. Bean, Teletubbies, Thomas the Tank Engine, Survival and Dont Forget Your 
Toothbrush were all mentioned as successful exports. 
The recommendations of Building a global qudience were particularly interesting 
and concentrated on one central issue: that the 'Government and regulators should 
consider whether domestic regulation hinders export performance' (ibid.: 11). The 
report heartily suggested that any rights agreements with creative staff that might 
hinder the sale of programmes abroad should be re-negotiated and that domestic 
scheduling patterns might be changed to suit international markets. The report was 
littered with hints that, despite the optimism of DCMS civil servants, 'excessive 
regulation can leave catalogues of material that are incompatible with overseas 
audiences' (ibid.: 32) and concluded that 'it is important to recognise that domestic 
regulation and export performance are in tension, if not in conflict ... Another of our 
recommendations is that the Government and regulators consider this tension 
carefully. It may be constraining the UK's export potential' (ibid.: 40). 
This invitation to consider whether domestic regulation was undermining 
international sales was eagerly received by a government engaged in its own 
discussions about whether to maintain the existing regulatory arrangements. Chris 
Smith immediately set up a creative industries taskforce panel to 'take forward the 
recommendations' (DCMS, 1999b) made in Building a global andience. The panel 
comprised of representatives from the commercial broadcasting and independent 
production sectors as well as the ITC and the British Television Distributors 
Association. After only four months of discussion, the taskforce produced its own 
report that firmly rejected the line of thinking adopted by David Graham. Its key 
findings were that 'the UK is performing well in television exports' and that '[W]e 
are firmly in the number two position, as we would expect and hope' (DCMS, 1999c: 
40). Just as pertinently, it rejected any idea that domestic regulation should be 
loosened to allow for increased sales abroad. 
Developing the international business is important for the industry, but 
serving the UK audience is essential. Dramatic modification to the style 
of UK programming is not, therefore, a realistic aim. Itisnotjustthe 
UK that prefers its own programmes - this is true across all territories. 
Local productions consistently attract the highest ratings (ibid.: 47). 
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Indeed, according to panel member Sarah Thane of the ITC, the whole discussion of 
regulation as an impediment to exports 'was the dog that didn't bark. It basically 
became very clear to people on the taskforce 
* 
that it was a non-issue' (Thane, 2000). 
For the panel, the strength of UK television was precisely its orientation on domestic 
audiences and domestic issues and so it would simply not be possible to develop 
formats with a global appeal without undermining the domestic production base. 
Another non-issue was the notion that UK television was failing to take advantage of 
the popularity of the English language. Again, Thane disputes this. 
I felt quite strongly that we may use the same language but the lingila 
franca of television worldwide is American not English. All those 
cultural references, the language, the phraseology ... 
is Disney English. 
We were kind of flagellating ourselves about not exploiting the English 
language fully when it's much more complex than that (ibid. ). 
To what extent is New Labour justified in its concentration on the economic 
importance of television exports given these criticisms from one of its own 
committees? Firstly, the BBC's global strategy, backed by the goverm-nent, has 
hardly transformed its financial base. Revenue from commercial activities outside 
Britain has risen from E44 million in 1990 to F-153 million in 1999, up from 3% of 
total revenue to around 5.5% today (see BBC, 1990 and 1999b). The remaining 
94.5% of income continues to derive either from the licence-fee or commercial 
revenue inside Britain. State-based audiences are still the economic foundation of 
the BBC. Secondly, as Colin Sparks puts it (1995: 156), 'the attempt to direct 
resources into programming that has an appeal to an audience wider than that of the 
state diverts from attempts to satisfy the plurality of the population of the state itself. ' 
In other words, an obsession with export sales is bound to compromise any 
remaining commitment to provide a diverse and relevant range of programming in 
Britain. Thirdly, the initiative resembles elements of the 'Cool Britannia' strategy of 
re-branding the UK as a dynamic, cutting-edge creative economy more than an 
informed analysis of the complex nature of international broadcasting. According to 
Sarah Thane, 
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I don't want to sound pejorative about people who are highly 
intelligent 
... But what I got a sense of was that there was a 
lot of activity 
going on in all sorts of government, particularly the DTI and the 
Treasury, showing Britain as a very entrepreneurial, forward-looking sort 
of place and that the DCMS wanted a slice of that. I take my hat off to 
Chris Smith and others for engendering a sense of the economic power 
and importance of the creative industries ... But I'm saying that all he 
needed to do was just test whether our television industry was batting as 
effectively as it could do (Thane, 2000). 
Strangely enough, in the same month in which the taskforce published its critical 
report on building up television exports, another DCMS committee published its own 
findings, creative industries exports: our hidden potential (DCMS, 1999d). The 
Creative Industries Export Promotion Advisory Group (CIEPAG) examined the 
export potential not just of broadcasting but film, design, publishing, music, 
performing arts, heritage and tourism. The report concluded that the 'UK's content 
industries offer perhaps the best prospects of any UK industrial sector for substantial 
export growth' (ibid.: 14) and discussed the main barriers to achieving this. 
Although it did not specifically refer to regulatory impediments, it did note that 
British television programmes, for all their quality, 'can be regarded as elitist in 
international markets' (ibid.: 15). Chris Smith welcomed the report saying that in an 
cever more competitive world economy Britain has to play to its strengths. We must 
exploit this potential and assure our place in the world market' (DCMS, 1999e). 
New Labour's enthusiasm for the expansion of international trade in television 
appears, therefore, to be both undiminished and unwarranted. 
Conclusion 
What achievements in television policy can New Labour point to since winning 
office? The government has adopted the Conservatives' legislative approach to 
digital broadcasting but has proposed an ambitious timetable for analogue switch-off 
that, as we have argued, is driven more by consideration of the prize to be gained for 
the Treasury than by the perceived needs or demands of viewers. It has maintained 
'regulatory stability' but has shifted the balance of power towards the DTI and the 
competition authorities and has marginalised traditional concerns about the dangers 
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of media concentration. In championing the importance of public service 
broadcasting in the multi-channel age, the government has insisted any additional 
income must be matched by efficiency savings and commercial revenue. Finally, the 
government has encouraged strategies for inc 
I 
reasing television exports when the 
I 
evidence points to the fact that this can only be done at the expense of the UK 
viewer. 
In all of this, New Labour has adopted the policy framework and ideological 
parameters of the previous government who set in motion many of the above 
developments. The process of commercialisation, developed under the 
Conservatives, has been consolidated and accelerated under the present 
administration so that commercial success and economic efficiency have become the 
'benchmark' of contemporary broadcasting, alongside which all other considerations 
aretobejudged. According to Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1999: 118), the 
movement of what they term the new 'orthodoxy' of marketisation 'from the margins 
to the center of policy debate represents a major gain in corporate control over the 
communications system and a corresponding weakness of initiatives designed to 
defend and extend the public interest. ' 
To what extent does New Labour's approach depart from that of its Tory 
predecessors? For Sarah Thane of the commercial television regulator, the ITC, 
'Labour governments [including the current one] tend to be more interventionist, 
tend to want to manage the process with regulators and with key players in a slightly 
greater way than Conservatives who will set a framework and broadly let you get on' 
(Thane, 2000). The imprint of New Labour has found its way into a whole series of 
television-related issues that would ordinarily be the preserve of the regulators, from 
the scheduling of the former Neivs at Ten to the government's plan for soap operas 
be more 'on message' (see McSmith, 2000). New Labour has also stressed the need 
for more transparency and accountability within public (though of course not private) 
broadcasting organisations and has advertised vacancies for BBC governors and ITC 
members. Indeed, the government has now appointed two black people as BBC 
governors and the average age of the board has fallen from 59 in 1995 to 55 today as 
part of New Labour's determination to embrace more representative institutions. 
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Both examples, however, point to another development: the increased politicisation 
of media policy. The 'modemisation' of the appointments process has led to 
criticisms similar to those made against the Conservatives in the 1980s when Tory 
supporters were packed onto the BBC board. In 1998, the filmmaker Lord Puttnam 
was rejected by the selection panel in favour of the apparently more acceptable 
Baroness Young. The Guardian wondered 'whether the process is an improvement 
on the old one' and quoted a BBC insider asking whether the changes 'really made 
the system more open, or simply created a different sort of charmed circle' (Brown, 
1998). Accusations of political intervention are increasingly common. According to 
the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, '[t]he Blair/Murdoch connection 
ensures that media policy is kept under careful scrutiny from Downing Street and it 
is rumoured that a section on cross media ownership was withdrawn from the 
Government's Green Paper on Convergence' (CPBF, 1999b). More recently, the 
decision by Stephen Byers to refer the NTL/CWC cable deal to the Competition 
Commission was also seen to be motivated more by political than economic 
concerns. 
Whatever the truth of these accusations, there is a lingering perception that the 
government is beholden to its media allies, in particular to Rupert Murdoch, for their 
role in supporting the New Labour project. When Tony Blair intervened on behalf of 
Murdoch in 1998 and telephoned the Italian prime minister to recommend to him 
Murdoch's acquisition of an Italian television station, Downing Street justified this 
as Blair speaking up on behalf of British business. The Financial Thnes reported one 
Murdoch aide as saying that 'you'd have thought Blair would have wanted to avoid 
the faintest suggestion of cronyism. Fortunately for us it doesn't seem to bother him' 
(quoted in Preston and Blitz, 1998). Blair has certainly been loyal to his wealthy 
backers from the television industry, appointing Lord Hollick as a special adviser at 
the DTI and Granada TV's Gerry Robinson as chair of the Arts Council. The former 
head of Pearson Television, Greg Dyke, who described global television as a 
'financial buy. You do it for money. This is a business not a cultural pursuit (quoted 
in Baker, 1997: 16) was asked to chair the NHS taskforce before being appointed as 
director general of the BBC in 1999. 
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Given all this activity, it is clear that New Labour has demonstrated its eagerness to 
develop close relations with corporate interests in the media. Leading figures in the 
television industry are no longer to be feared by the Labour Party but to be embraced 
and nurtured. New Labour in government may have followed in the steps of the 
previous administration but it has demonstrated an 'activist' stance that suggests that 
Curran's formulation of the party's innately conservative approach to television 
policy may be obsolete. This should not, however, suggest that New Labour has 
produced any real innovations in the field but simply that television has moved closer 
to the core of Labour's policy agenda and that New Labour is determined to intensify 
the processes of deregulation and marketisation launched by the Tories. As we enter 
the age of multi-channel television and digital convergence, New Labour's greatest 
achievement in the field of television may be that it is increasingly the home of 
media millionaires. MAI's Lord Hollick, Carlton's Lord Alli, the BBC's Greg Dyke 
and Granada's Gerry Robinson are all examples of the fact that there is no 
contradiction today - if there ever was one - between being a millionaire television 
executive and being a Labour supporter. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This thesis opened with the proposition that the Labour Party has traditionally 
adopted a conservative and reactive stance tqwards broadcasting developments and 
that the party's lack of policies concerning television stems from its ambivalence to 
questions of culture and communications. The rest of the thesis has, I hope, 
illustrated that the real picture is more complicated. Labour has not only had 
extensive discussions about the role and the structures of British television but both 
right and left have turned to the subject of television as part of a wider political 
argument about the direction of the party as a whole. Revisionists in the 1950s 
referred to the popularity of ITV and advertising as justification for dropping policies 
on public ownership in favour of attempts to identify the party with consumerism and 
choice. Harold Wilson then used developments in communications as part of his 
attempt in the following decade to paint Labour as the party of science, technology 
and progress. More recent Labour leaders like Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair have 
used the alleged power of the media as a reason for shedding left-wing policies and 
embracing the market. The Labour left, on the other hand, has been deeply involved 
in discussions concerning television reform and, in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
prioritised this area as an important part of its struggle for industrial democracy and 
grass-roots involvement in politics and the community. 
Party members and committees have made positive and innovative contributions to 
all the main debates about television since 195 1. Anticipating contemporary 
discussions about the need for local television and regional identity, Labour MPs like 
George Darling and Tony Benn and publications like Tribune and Neiv Statesman 
proposed plans for the decentralisation and regionalisation of broadcasting back in 
the early 1950s. Over twenty years before Channel Four was launched, Labour had 
already decided that it was in favour of a new corporation independent of the BBC 
and ITV while a key figure like Anthony Crosland was publicly committed to a new 
channel for minority and experimental programmes in the early 1960s. Similarly, 
well before Margaret Thatcher pressed for the introduction of advertising onto BBC 
services in the mid-1980s, Tony Benn and Hugh Jenkins had already argued that 
advertising finance might be used to supplement the licence fee and improve the 
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quality of public service broadcasting. Also in the 1960s, Labour ministers had 
pondered the industrial benefits of broadcasting, discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of pay television and even proposed a public-private partnership for a 
new fourth television channel. 
The issue, therefore, is not that the party leadership has been lacking in proposals for 
television reform but that it has shown a weak commitment to implement them, 
leaving the initiative for television development to the Conservatives. This is partly, 
as I suggested at the beginning of the thesis, because the Tories have been in office 
for longer and have been able to benefit from policy initiatives developed under 
Labour governments. For example, the initiative to set up Channel Four lay with the 
Annan Committee instigated by Labour although it was the Conservatives that 
eventually took the credit for launching the new network. A more important reason, 
however, for Labour's thin record in television policy is due to divisions within the 
party itself. Conflict between left and right has repeatedly prevented Labour from 
developing a policy on which all sides could agree. In the 1970s, the party had 
several television policies running concurrently: the one developed in The People 
and the Media, the one contained in the party manifestos and the one discussed at 
Cabinet level. Furthermore, there has also been a concern on the right of the party 
that radical proposals for television, like the left's opposition to commercial 
television in the 1950s, would be electorally damaging. 
These battles between right and left over television policy have led to the 
establishment of compromise positions that fall back time and again on the 
broadcasting status quo, inviting accusations that the party has no firm proposals for 
television. This is a mistaken view as the party's apparent conservatism regarding 
television policy is the consequence not of indifference but of profound 
disagreements concerning the issue of television reform. The party leadership's 
formal opposition to commercial television in the 1950s, to a fourth channel in the 
1960s or to the marketisation of broadcasting in the 1980s was not the result of an 
instinctive desire to block broadcasting developments. Rather, this opposition 
masked a variety of positions that were argued out at different levels of the party, 
including suggestions for radical reform as well as a defence of the broadcasting 
establishment. 
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Labour's television policy has been developed through the input of a range of 
competing groups and constituencies. Forums like the NEC and annual conference, 
which were dominated by the left from the I? ite 1960s to the early 1980s, regularly 
expressed their desire for democratisation and their disdain for the commercialisation 
of television. Left activists were the most vocal opponents inside the Labour Party of 
the duopoly and pressed hard for new voices to be heard and new structures to be 
established. Socialist arguments for television reform, culminating in the publication 
of TPA TM in 1974 and Labour's Progainnie in 1982, were favourably received in the 
party at a time when the left had won control of key sections of the party. The left 
dominated discussion of broadcasting reform throughout the 1970s but socialists 
influenced the terms of the debate from much earlier, particularly with the rise of a 
New Left that articulated a 'cultural politics' in the early 1960s. Indeed, all sides of 
the party purported to agree with left-wing arguments against media concentration 
and it was not until the 1990s that these arguments were systematically challenged 
with the emergence of New Labour. 
Labour's parliamentary leadership has approached television policy with rather 
different concerns in mind. Firstly, it has aimed to reach out to, or at least not to 
alienate, floating voters. Both Gaitskell and Crosland considered media policy in the 
second half of the 1950s as an opportunity to relate to the aspirations of the growing 
television audience and sought to distance the party from threats to scrap ITV. 
Secondly, the leadership has pursued policies designed not to antagonise media 
owners and television executives. Whilst this is clearly the case with New Labour's 
behaviour in recent years, it also characterises Harold Wilson's close relationship 
with the ITV companies in the 1960s. In an effort to placate these two crucial 
electoral constituencies, floating voters and corporate interests, the leadership has 
attempted to marginalise the party's more left-wing media proposals in several 
different ways. When Labour's annual conference voted for the restructuring of ITV 
in 1962, the leadership simply ignored the resolution and went on to be a firm 
supporter of commercial television. In the 1970s, the Labour government dealt with 
the pressure for radical media reform expressed in TPA TM and at TUC conferences 
by setting up the Annan Committee and therefore postponing difficult decisions for a 
substantial period of time. 
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A key pressure, therefore, on the leadership not to establish or implement radical 
media policy has been the party's close relationship with media entrepreneurs. We 
have seen how Labour's opposition to the development of commercial television was 
compromised by its links with businessmen like Sidney Bernstein, Eric Fletcher and 
Cecil King. In the 1960s, PMG Tony Benn met with Lew Grade of ATV to discuss 
plans for a public/private partnership for a new channel while, more recently, the 
media tycoon the late Robert Maxwell and the millionaire publisher Geoffrey 
Robinson have both been Labour MPs. New Labour can now count on the backing 
of an unprecedented number of media moguls but it was not New Labour that 
initiated the link in the first place. 
The media unions have played a more ambiguous role in policy-making because of 
both political and organisational reasons. Firstly, for most of the period covered in 
this thesis, the vast majority of television technicians were organised in different 
unions, ITV workers in the ACTT and BBC staff in the ABS, undermining the 
possibility of a united lobby on behalf of workers employed in television. While the 
ACTT was affiliated to the Labour Party, the ABS (until its merger with NATKE in 
1984 to form BETA) was not. BBC staff, therefore, did not have the fonnal 
representation in Labour policy-making circles that ITV workers were always 
entitled to. While BETA and ACTT did work together in the Public Service 
Broadcasting Campaign in the run-up to the 1990 Broadcasting Act and eventually 
merged to form BECTU in 1990, this distinction may partially explain Labour's 
particular identification with commercial television interests. 
Secondly, the ACTT has on many occasions separated its often politically radical 
proposals for the industry as a whole (see ACTT, 1973) from its more conservative 
approach to changes affecting the pay and conditions of its members. Despite 
opposing the introduction of commercial television in the early 1950s, the union 
reserved the right to change its position and recruit ITV members to the union. 
Despite its criticisms of ITV's excess profits in the early 1960s, it sought to amend 
Labour and TUC motions supporting the Pilkington's Committee's proposals to 
reform ITV for fear that they would undermine the economic viability of the 
commercial companies. Despite calling for the social ownersbip of mass 
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communications in the 1970s, the ACTT backed the call for an 'ITV-2' instead of an 
Open Broadcasting Authority. Representatives of the media unions played an 
important role in the party's various study groups and sub-committees on 
broadcasting but consistently placed the sectignal interests of their members above 
the movements to democratise television structures. This sectionalism has reinforced 
the more conservative approach towards television policyrnaking of the party 
leadership and stands in stark contrast to the activities of media workers, especially 
those in the Free Communications Group, who have sought to connect questions of 
pay and conditions to broader issues of media content and accountability. 
Influenced by these different constituencies, the Labour Party has regularly divided 
along the lines of a 'democratising left' versus a 'conservative right' in debates over 
television policy, although that division is by no means comprehensive. There are, 
for example, those on the left who want to increase social ownership of the media 
and those who favour public service objectives in a mixed economy. The People and 
the Media, for example, is the product of debates between different sections of the 
left, with some arguing for nationalisation and others for reforms within the existing 
structures of television. There are also divisions on the right of the party between 
those who want to embrace market structures and those who contend that 
broadcasting has a moral and cultural responsibility that requires strong guidance 
from the state. The market-led conception of broadcasting advocated by the IPPR in 
1994 is distinct from the then shadow home secretary Roy Hattersley's defence of 
public service broadcasting following the 1988 White Paper. Indeed, the model of a 
'radical' left and a 'conservative' right does not necessarily reflect the debates in 
broadcasting policy in the party. In the 1950s it was mainly the revisionists on the 
right of the party who took up the issue of television while the Bevanite left largely 
ignored it. Similarly, in recent years, it has been New Labour that has sought to 
reform television along market lines while the left has attempted to defend the 
party's traditional positions against the 'new revisionists'. In these situations, we 
may instead talk of a split between a 'radical' right and a 'conservative' left. 
This echoes James Curran's argument that 'the simple dichotomy of left and right 
does not adequately describe the politics of the media' (in Curran and Seaton, 1997: 
353) and his point that there are similar tensions in the Conservative as well as in the 
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Labour Party. We have seen how parts of the 'libertarian' Labour left shared the 
radical right's desire for independent production in the 1980s. Critical of the narrow 
consensus of the duopoly, left-wing Labour supporters were prepared to join with 
free-market theorists in the Conservatives in pressing for an independent production 
quota which both groups thought, for very different reasons, would help to open up 
broadcasting to new voices. 
Nevertheless, disagreements between the Labour left and the parliamentary 
leadership have regularly surfaced throughout the periods of government and 
opposition covered in this thesis and have been crucial in determining the eventual 
outcome of television policy. In practice, the shadow Cabinet did not share the 
enthusiasm for a new television corporation in 1958 and attempted to distance itself 
from the party conference's firm support for the Pilkington Report's attack on ITV in 
1962. The majority of the Cabinet did not share the NEC's criticisms of advertising 
in the 1960s and profoundly disagreed with TPATMs proposals for abolishing the 
BBC, ITV and the licence fee. Kinnock refused to act on the left's demand for an 
arts ministry with Cabinet status while Blair totally ignored the criticisms from union 
and grassroots activists over his plan to relax cross-media ownership restrictions in 
the mid-1990s. However, unlike other areas of policy (for example over public 
spending cuts and incomes policy) where there has been particularly vocal opposition 
to the leadership, television policy has rarely resulted in public displays of 
dissension. With the exception of the resistance to the proposals in the draft White 
Paper in 1978 to hand over the fourth channel to the IBA, there were no high-profile 
backbench revolts against Wilson's attacks on the BBC nor against Callaghan's 
accommodation to cable interests. 
This is a reflection of the fact that, up until the emergence of New Labour, television 
policy was simply not a key issue for the party leadership. In opposition and 
government, the leadership was always far more interested in the use of television to 
project a modem image and to publicise personalities and policies. To the extent that 
it did consider policy, television was used as a means of identifying Labour with key 
themes: the consumer revolution in the 1950s, technological developments in the 
1960s, questions of accountability and democracy in the 1970s and with issues of 
quality and standards in the 1980s. From its very inception, however, New Labour 
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focused on broadcasting as a vital part of 'rebranding' the party as modern and 
dynamic and as an important area of policy in the 'knowledge economy'. yet 
although New Labour's television policy has involved some dramatic changes to the 
party's traditional views on media concentration and the role of the market, there are 
nevertheless examples of commercial forces driving television policy in previous 
discussions within the party. Both the revisionists in the 1950s and Neil Kinnock in 
the late 1980s emphasised the need for Labour to accommodate to the growing 
consumerist instincts of the population while Harold Wilson was loath to tame the 
profit-making instincts of the commercial television companies in the 1960s. It 
would, therefore, be too simplistic to suggest that New Labour has transformed what 
was previously a monolithic policy on the media into a more relevant and multi- 
dimensional one given that there are strong continuities in the evolution of Labour's 
television policies. 
For example, Labour's relationship with the BBC has followed a predictable pattern 
characterised by both loyalty and criticism. Whenever the Conservatives have 
attacked the BBC because of its status as a public body with non-commercial 
principles, the Labour leadership has tended to jump to the Corporation's defence. 
This was the case particularly in the early 1950s and 1980s when Labour was in 
opposition and prepared to champion the cause of public service broadcasting as a 
necessary corrective to the market. However, when Labour has been in government, 
it has been just as ready as the Tories to withhold or minimise licence fee increases 
either because of difficult economic conditions or because of hostility to what it 
perceives as anti-Labour coverage. This was especially true for Harold Wilson who 
continually threatened to starve the BBC of funds in the 1960s and then agreed to 
licence fee increases because of the lack of suitable alternatives. It is also broadly 
similar to New Labour's attitude towards the BBC that combines hearty praise for 
the Corporation's high-quality brand name with warnings that it must improve its 
efficiency and temper its attacks on government. Labour, therefore, has been 
simultaneously supportive of the BBC's public service mission, reluctant to fully 
fund that mission and hostile to its occasionally critical political interventions. 
The BBC has also always faced dissenting voices from within the Labour Party. One 
strand in the centre has accused the Corporation of being too bureaucratic and stuffy 
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and has argued that its monopoly status has resulted in complacency rather than 
innovation. George Darling's attack on the BBC monopoly in his submission to the 
Beveridge Report in 1950 and, more recently, the IPPR's proposals to restructure the 
BBC along federal lines typify this approach.. The call to privatise the BBC by 
Labour MP Gerald Kaufman, the current chair of the Select Committee on Media, 
Culture and Sport, is an example of hostility to the BBC from the right of the party. 
There has also been a long tradition of criticism by left-wingers of the Corporation's 
paternalistic, establishment-minded and anti-labour outlook, exemplified by the 
arguments in TPATM. These critics have issued a series of proposals, discussed in 
this thesis, to either abolish or to radically restructure the BBC and to replace the 
licence fee with a more egalitarian revenue source. Yet we have also seen that some 
of the most staunch defenders of the BBC and the licence fee against these proposals 
have been Labour leaders, including Attlee, Callaghan and Kinnock. When Tony 
Benn pressed for advertising to be introduced on the BBC in the mid-1960s to 
compensate for the declining amount of licence fee revenue, even Harold Wilson, 
despite his personal battles with senior BBC figures, was not able to bring himself to 
agree with the plan. 
The Labour leadership's relationship to commercial television has been rather less 
ambiguous. Time and again, conference delegates, trade unionists and party 
committees have demanded that ITV's profits be curbed while the Labour 
frontbench, mindful of the popularity of commercial television with its supporters, 
has refused to accede to these requests. As we have seen, at the height of the 
controversy over excess profits in 1960, Labour's sub-committee on television 
suggested a far less drastic tax on profits than the one eventually introduced by a 
Conservative PMG. It was a Labour government that raised the levy later in the 
decade but then, concerned about the impact of the rise in the run-up to the 1970 
election, lowered it again. The leadership has always had a far more comfortable 
relationship with ITV than with the BBC, from Wilson's warm friendship with the 
ITA's Charles Hill in the 1960s to the Labour frontbench's close ties with the ITV 
companies during the 1990 Broadcasting Act. While the NEC and the Labour left 
have, at different times, called for alternatives to advertising on ITV or at least for 
the centralised collection of advertising revenue, Labour leaders have consistently 
rejected these arguments. Ironically, given Labour's status for many years as a party 
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committed to social ownership, it has been the Conservatives that have introduced 
the measures that have been least popular with the ITV companies: the introduction 
of the levy in 1964 and the auction of ITV franchises in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. 
The struggle for television reform cannot, h6wever, simply be reduced to a clash 
between Labour's grass-roots and the leadership or between left and right. I have 
tried to show how each of the various groups that make up the Labour Party - 
unions, ordinary members, academics, wealthy backers - may be the dominant 
influence at any one time. But I have also attempted to demonstrate that whatever 
view is dominant, whether that of the revisionists in the 1950s or the 'Bennite' left at 
the start of the 1970s, the parliamentary leadership always has the controlling power. 
There appears to be, therefore, an impasse between the demands of left-wing 
reformers, determined to open up television to new voices and to restrict the 
activities of both state and the market, and those who are keen to maintain the 
existing framework and priorities of broadcasting. As long as Labour remains above 
all a parliamentary machine, with an eye on opinion polls and a nervous approach to 
left-wing innovations in policy, this impasse will always be resolved in favour of the 
status quo. 
This perhaps explains the consensus between Labour and Conservative leaderships 
over television policy. Once again this is partly due to the fact that television policy 
has generally been of secondary importance to both parties and is unlikely to be the 
site of inter-party struggle. But it is also the case that, while in office, Labour has 
never attempted to change the framework of broadcasting that it inherited from the 
Conservatives. In opposition, Labour committees have challenged Tory priorities for 
television and suggested a wide range of alternative structures, but in government 
Labour has endorsed the all the broadcasting developments initiated by the 
Conservatives. Labour governments have made no attempt to restructure the ITV 
network nor the BBC, while New Labour has accepted the framework for Channels 
Four and Five and has clung to the vision of digital television first developed by the 
Conservatives. The one major Labour innovation, the Open University, has in 
practice had far more of an impact on educational structures than it has had on 
broadcasting. Furthermore, where Labour has departed from the consensus, for 
example with New Labour's vigorous attempt to loosen cross-media ownership 
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restrictions ahead of the Tories, this has been done on the basis of market, rather than 
traditional socialist, principles. 
I have attempted to demonstrate that Labour 
I 
's inconsistent approach to 
democratising television in the UK is not a question of individual betrayals, 
indifference to the area, nor of ignorance of the issues themselves. A whole host of 
imaginative and creative policies have been proposed at virtually all levels of the 
party, many of which were innovative responses to problems posed at the time about 
the lack of accountability or lack of diversity of British broadcasting. There has been 
no shortage of enthusiasm in party sub-committees and conference discussions and 
amongst intellectuals and Labour-supporting publications for proposals to open up 
television in ways that would reflect the principles of Labourism. 
The problem is a structural one. Socialists who oppose the commercialisation of 
broadcasting find themselves in a party with people who have gained from 
commercialisation; reformers who wish to see an independent and critical television 
system are confronted by parliamentary leaders who have no such desire; activists 
who want to curb the power of millionaire television executives are rebuffed by 
senior Labour figures who want to court the influence of media entrepreneurs. Left- 
wing demands for more accountability and diversity have been articulated 
throughout the last fifty years inside the party and then cast aside by a leadership 
with little inclination to act on these demands. By repeatedly emphasising electoral 
respectability and sound economic government, the party has in practice consistently 
shied away from challenging the status quo and alienating those in positions of 
power in the media. 
The many demands for television reform expressed inside the Labour Party have 
fallen victim to the contradictions of a party that seeks to contain and minimise 
movements for radical change. The party's poor record in democratising British 
television reflects its position as a political organisation that is more accountable and 
responsive to the system it aims to manage than to those constituents on whose 
behalf it claims to govern. Under 'old' Labour there were many conference 
resolutions protesting against media monopolies, many sub-committees considering 
how to make television more representative of the majority of the population and 
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many party statements promising to increase diversity and plurality. However, as 
long as the party remained firmly committed to the political establishment, there 
could be no challenges to the institutions and individuals that dominated the 
television industry. Under New Labour, there are now policy commissions, think- 
tanks and civil service departments determined to increase the liberalisation and 
corporate control of British television. The gap between those Labour supporters 
who wish to see broadcasting serving the needs of the public and Labour leaders who 
see communications as, above all, serving the needs of industry and government is 
growing ever wider. 
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